Search

This paper explores for the first time the consequences of centrally imposed local tax limitations on the modelling and estimation of spatial auto-correlation in local fiscal policies, and compares three spatial interaction estimators: a) the conventional maximum likelihood estimator that ignores censoring; b) a spatial Tobit estimator; c) a discrete hazard estimator. Implementation of the above empirical approaches on the case of local vehicle taxation in Italy provides a reasonably coherent picture in terms of the direction and size of the spatial interaction process, and offers a plausible spatial interpretation of the race to the top in provincial Vehicle taxes.

This paper explores for the first time the consequences of centrally imposed local tax limitations on the modelling and estimation of spatial auto-correlation in local fiscal policies, and compares three spatial interaction estimators: a) the conventional maximum likelihood estimator that ignores censoring; b) a spatial Tobit estimator; c) a discrete hazard estimator. Implementation of the above empirical approaches on the case of local vehicle taxation in Italy provides a reasonably coherent picture in terms of the direction and size of the spatial interaction process, and offers a plausible spatial interpretation of the race to the top in provincial vehicle taxes.

Informal employment is a pervasive and persistent feature of most developing and developed economies. Labour taxation and labour market regulations are deemed two major causes for operating in the informal sector. Using data from France, Italy, and Spain, we analyse gross job flows and gross worker flows in the formal and informal sectors in the presence of lenient employment protection legislation, and investigate the way traditional policy interventions may favour transitions from one sector to the other. We show that optimal outcomes in terms of reduction and formalisation of informal jobs across the three countries examined are achieved with the combination of lower payroll taxes for permanent contracts and higher inspection rate for firms operating in the informal sector. Coupling lower firing costs with more frequent labour inspections also reduces informality, but this comes at the cost of an increased ratio of temporary to total employment.

The present study shows that AGE, DELAY, and PTA_PRE may be considered factors influencing therapeutic success in intra-tympanic steroid therapy.The aim of the study is to evaluate the relationship between the therapeutic success of intra-tympanic prednisolone therapy and age, in patients affected by idiopathic sudden sensorineural hearing loss (ISSNHL), considering the influence of factors such as delay, gender, and pure tone average (PTA) pre-therapy.This retrospective study involved 402 consecutive patients, affected by unilateral ISSNHL between January 2009 and January 2014. Patients were divided into two groups based on age: group one with 94 patients aged over 65 years and group two with all 402 patients enrolled in the study, including those over 65.PTA recorded before the beginning of the therapy (PTA_PRE) in group one was worse than for group two. In both groups the therapy was significantly effective in improving hearing thresholds, even if PTA_PRE was significant and negatively correlated with success rate. This effect disappeared within the population over 65. On average, each day of DELAY from the onset of hearing loss to the beginning of therapy cuts almost 2% of the possibility to recover. AGE was negative and significant when specified continuously for group two.

Agglomeration and workplace training: knowledge spillovers versus poaching. Regional Studies. The paper aims at ascertaining whether and how a local agglomeration of highly educated employers affects firms’ propensity to invest in training. On a theoretical ground such agglomeration may favour two different scenarios: a knowledge spillover effect may foster larger investments, or a poaching effect may prevail inducing more competition and less training. Econometric estimates find that in the Italian environment, where small businesses are prominent, the second effect is stronger. Endogeneity issues are addressed by adopting an instrumental variables (IV) approach. Moreover, estimates show that an employer’s higher educational level is associated with a greater propensity to sponsor training.

This article analyzes employer labor tax evasion and the impact on this evasion of tax inspections by a labor inspectorate. The analysis is based on a unique data set built by linking two sources of information: a data set of individual artisan firms and an individual audit data set. Our data describe the universe of artisan firms in Piedmont (Italy) in 2000 to 2005. Using information on firm characteristics and tax evasion observed directly from the audit exercise, we estimate undeclared work in the artisan sector, and we then evaluate the impact of tax inspections on employer labor tax declarations. We find that inspections could actually be counterproductive, decreasing both tax compliance and tax revenues.

Deterrence of illegal activities is frequently carried out by many atomistic auditors (tax auditors, law enforcement agents, etc.). Not much is known either normatively about the best way to incentivize atomistic auditors, nor positively about what these incentives actually look like in real world organizations. This paper focuses almost exclusively on the positive question. It proposes a game-theoretic model of decentralized deterrence and an empirical test, based on the equilibrium of the model, to identify the incentives of individual auditors. In the special (but important) case of tax enforcement, the paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a strategic auditing game and provides a method to calibrate its parameters based on audit data. Applying the model and method to Italian auditing data provides “proof of concept:” the methods are practical and tractable. We are able to provide an estimate of tax evasion based on (non-random) audit data alone. Counterfactual simulation of the model quanti…es the costs and bene…ts of alternative auditing policies. We compare decentralized enforcement with a counterfactual “commitment policy,” and compute the loss from the former. Thus we are able to quantify the costs of decentralizing enforcement.

This article contributes to the literature on local tax interactions. Its novelty lies in its focus on the interactions of local governments across national borders. We use panel data for the French and German municipalities in the Rhine Valley for the period 2000–2007. The local governments of each country influence firms’ overall tax burdens, but the tax instruments available at the local level differ. We estimate panel models that distinguish between the effects of competing municipalities belonging to the same country and belonging to the other country. Our empirical model shows that local jurisdictions along borders choose their business tax rates based on those of their domestic neighbors and that foreign fiscal policy does not have an impact on the local domestic tax setting behavior in these contexts.