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Uganda is highly vulnerable to public health emergencies (PHEs) due to its geographic location next to the Congo Basin epidemic hot spot, placement within multiple epidemic belts, high population growth rates, and refugee influx. In view of this, Uganda's Ministry of Health established the Public Health Emergency Operations Center (PHEOC) in September 2013, as a central coordination unit for all PHEs in the country. Uganda followed the World Health Organization's framework to establish the PHEOC, including establishing a steering committee, acquiring legal authority, developing emergency response plans, and developing a concept of operations. The same framework governs the PHEOC's daily activities. Between January 2014 and December 2021, Uganda's PHEOC coordinated response to 271 PHEs, hosted 207 emergency coordination meetings, trained all core staff in public health emergency management principles, participated in 21 simulation exercises, coordinated Uganda's Global Health Security Agenda activities, established 6 subnational PHEOCs, and strengthened the capacity of 7 countries in public health emergency management. In this article, we discuss the following lessons learned: PHEOCs are key in PHE coordination and thus mitigate the associated adverse impacts; although the functions of a PHEOC may be legalized by the existence of a National Institute of Public Health, their establishment may precede formally securing the legal framework; staff may learn public health emergency management principles on the job; involvement of leaders and health partners is crucial to the success of a public health emergency management program; subnational PHEOCs are resourceful in mounting regional responses to PHEs; and service on the PHE Strategic Committee may be voluntary.

Uganda has implemented several interventions that have contributed to prevention, early detection, and effective response to Public Health Emergencies (PHEs). However, there are gaps in collecting and documenting data on the overall response to these PHEs. We set out to establish a comprehensive electronic database of PHEs that occurred in Uganda since 2000. We constituted a core development team, developed a data dictionary, and worked with Health Information Systems Program (HISP)-Uganda to develop and customize a compendium of PHEs using the electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (eIDSR) module on the District Health Information Software version 2 (DHIS2) platform. We reviewed literature for retrospective data on PHEs for the compendium. Working with the Uganda Public Health Emergency Operations Center (PHEOC), we prospectively updated the compendium with real-time data on reported PHEs. We developed a user’s guide to support future data entry teams. An operational compendium was developed within the eIDSR module of the DHIS2 platform. The variables for PHEs data collection include those that identify the type, location, nature and time to response of each PHE. The compendium has been updated with retrospective PHE data and real-time prospective data collection is ongoing. Data within this compendium is being used to generate information that can guide future outbreak response and management. The compendium development highlights the importance of documenting outbreak detection and response data in a central location for future reference. This data provides an opportunity to evaluate and inform improvements in PHEs response.

Background Since the declaration of the 10th Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in DRC on 1st Aug 2018, several neighboring countries have been developing and implementing preparedness efforts to prevent EVD cross-border transmission to enable timely detection, investigation, and response in the event of a confirmed EVD outbreak in the country. We describe Uganda’s experience in EVD preparedness. Results On 4 August 2018, the Uganda Ministry of Health (MoH) activated the Public Health Emergency Operations Centre (PHEOC) and the National Task Force (NTF) for public health emergencies to plan, guide, and coordinate EVD preparedness in the country. The NTF selected an Incident Management Team (IMT), constituting a National Rapid Response Team (NRRT) that supported activation of the District Task Forces (DTFs) and District Rapid Response Teams (DRRTs) that jointly assessed levels of preparedness in 30 designated high-risk districts representing category 1 (20 districts) and category 2 (10 districts). The MoH, with technical guidance from the World Health Organisation (WHO), led EVD preparedness activities and worked together with other ministries and partner organisations to enhance community-based surveillance systems, develop and disseminate risk communication messages, engage communities, reinforce EVD screening and infection prevention measures at Points of Entry (PoEs) and in high-risk health facilities, construct and equip EVD isolation and treatment units, and establish coordination and procurement mechanisms. Conclusion As of 31 May 2019, there was no confirmed case of EVD as Uganda has continued to make significant and verifiable progress in EVD preparedness. There is a need to sustain these efforts, not only in EVD preparedness but also across the entire spectrum of a multi-hazard framework. These efforts strengthen country capacity and compel the country to avail resources for preparedness and management of incidents at the source while effectively cutting costs of using a “fire-fighting” approach during public health emergencies.

Background: Uganda is an ecological hot-spot with infectious disease transmission belts which exacerbates its vulnerability to epidemics. Its proximity to the Congo Basin, climate change pressure on eco-systems, increased international travel and globalization, and influx of refugees due to porous borders, has compounded the problem. Public Health Events are a major challenge in the region with significant impact on Global Health Security. Objective: The country developed a multi-hazard plan with the purpose of harmonizing processes and guiding stakeholders on strengthening emergency preparedness and response. Method: Comprehensive risk profiling, identification of preparedness gaps and capacities were developed using a preparedness logic model, which is a step by step process. A multidisciplinary team was constituted; the Strategic Tool for Analysis of Risks was used for risk profiling and identification of hazards; a desk review of relevant documents informed the process and finally, approval was sought from the National Task Force for public health emergencies. Results: Target users and key public health preparedness and response functions of the multi-hazard plan were identified. The key capabilities identified were: coordination; epidemiology and surveillance; laboratory; risk communication and social mobilization. In each of these capabilities, key players were identified. Risk profiling classified road traffic accident, cholera, malaria and typhoid as very high risk. Meningitis, VHF, drought, industrial accidents, terrorism, floods and landslides were high risk. Hepatitis E, avian influenza and measles were low risk and the only plague fell into the category of very low risk. Risk profiling using STAR yielded good results. All risk categories required additional preparedness activities, and very high and high-risk categories required improved operational response capacity and risk mitigation measures. Conclusion: Uganda successfully developed a national multi-hazard emergency preparedness and response plan using the preparedness logic model. The plan is now ready for implementation by the Uganda MoH and partners.

Uganda is currently implementing the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), aiming at accelerating compliance to the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005). To assess progress toward compliance, a Joint External Evaluation (JEE) was conducted by the World Health Organization (WHO). Based on this evaluation, we present the process and lessons learned. Uganda's methodological approach to the JEE followed the WHO recommendations, including conducting a whole-of-government in-country self-assessment prior to the final assessment, using the same tool at both assessments, and generating consensus scores during the final assessment. The in-country self-assessment process began on March 24, 2017, with a multisectoral representation of 203 subject matter experts from 81 institutions. The final assessment was conducted between June 26 and 30, 2017, by 15 external evaluators. Discrepancies between the in-country and final scores occurred in 27 of 50 indicators. Prioritized gaps from the JEE formed the basis of the National Action Plan for Health Security. We learned 4 major lessons from this process: subject matter experts should be adequately oriented on the scoring requirements of the JEE tool; whole-of-government representation should be ensured during the entire JEE process; equitable multisectoral implementation of IHR activities must be ensured; and over-reliance on external support is a threat to sustainability of GHSA gains.