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Transcription factors control cell-specific gene expression programs by binding regulatory elements and recruiting cofactors and the transcription apparatus to the initiation sites of active genes. One of these cofactors is cohesin, a structural maintenance of chromosomes (SMC) complex that is necessary for proper gene expression. We report that a second SMC complex, condensin II, is also present at transcriptional regulatory elements of active genes during interphase and is necessary for normal gene activity. Both cohesin and condensin II are associated with genes in euchromatin and not heterochromatin. The two SMC complexes and the SMC loading factor NIPBL are particularly enriched at super-enhancers, and the genes associated with these regulatory elements are especially sensitive to reduced levels of these complexes. Thus, in addition to their well-established functions in chromosome maintenance during mitosis, both cohesin and condensin II make important contributions to the functions of the key transcriptional regulatory elements during interphase., Canadian Institutes of Health Research (Fellowship), National Institutes of Health (U.S.) (grant GM42694), National Institutes of Health (U.S.) (grant HG002668), National Cancer Institute (U.S.) (NIH, Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Award (CA168263-01A1))

A number of collusive agreements involve the exchange of self-reported sales data between firms, which use them to monitor compliance with a target market share allocation. This paper shows that such communication between competitors may facilitate collusion even if all private information becomes public after a delay. The exchange of sales information may allow firms to implement incentive-compatible market share reallocation mechanisms after unexpected swings, limiting the recourse to price wars as a tool for mutual disciplining. In some cases, efficient collusion cannot occur unless firms are able to engage in such communication.

Result of bias-correction for a simulation of biases in multi-viewpoint 4C experiment (with 100 viewpoints). Figure S2. Overview of PE-4Cseq methodology. Figure S3. Positions of DIRs for all viewpoints 1, 2, 11 and 12 are compared against structural protein binding sites. First track is for Df and + 129 comparisons and second track is for + D Bl6 and + Bl6 comparison. Figure S4. Calculated ν per viewpoint for + D Bl6 vs + Bl6 . + D Bl6 (red squares). Figure S5. Distance distributions between query probes for (A) BACset1, (B) BACset2, (C) BACset3, (D) BACset4, FISH experiments. (DOCX 1390 kb)

Result of bias-correction for a simulation of biases in multi-viewpoint 4C experiment (with 100 viewpoints). Figure S2. Overview of PE-4Cseq methodology. Figure S3. Positions of DIRs for all viewpoints 1, 2, 11 and 12 are compared against structural protein binding sites. First track is for Df and + 129 comparisons and second track is for + D Bl6 and + Bl6 comparison. Figure S4. Calculated ν per viewpoint for + D Bl6 vs + Bl6 . + D Bl6 (red squares). Figure S5. Distance distributions between query probes for (A) BACset1, (B) BACset2, (C) BACset3, (D) BACset4, FISH experiments. (DOCX 1390 kb)

This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of changes in the intensity of product market competition. The focus is on the interaction between imperfect competition in product markets and bargaining in the labor market. The main result is that, while a uniform intensification of product market competition increases employment, it may cause real wages to fall, in the short run as well as in the long run. This is especially likely if labor market regulations are favorable to workers. Therefore, product market and labor market regulations tend to reinforce each other politically, and compensatory fiscal transfers may be needed in order to enact employment-enhancing deregulation policies.