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[Resumen] Modelo y modelización son términos empleados habitualmente con distintas acepciones en la enseñanza de las ciencias. En este artículo se analiza la dimensión instrumental de la modelización, identificándose distintos recursos y actividades de este tipo, como analogías, metáforas, personificaciones, maquetas, experimentos mentales, simulaciones, etc. Además, se revisan algunas aportaciones procedentes de la literatura sobre investigación en este ámbito, proporcionando ejemplos de estudios realizados y del tipo de metodología de investigación usada a lo largo de los mismos. Finalmente se formulan distintas conclusiones obtenidas en el conjunto de publicaciones realizadas y se sugieren algunos interrogantes y líneas de trabajo que quedan por cubrir en este marco. [Abstract] The terms model and modelling are commonly used with different meanings in science education. This paper analyses the instrumental dimension of modelling and identifies different modelling resources and activities, such as analogies, metaphors, embodiments, mock-ups, thought experiments, simulations, etc. The paper also reviews contributions from the literature in this area, including the different kinds of studies conducted, research methodologies used and conclusions obtained. The paper concludes by identifying a series of questions and new lines of research that remain to be explored. Financiado por: FEDER/Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades-Agencia Estatal de Investigación/_Proyecto EDU2017-82518-P

The method of cases, i.e., the informal elicitation of judgements in thought experiments for the purpose of philosophical theorising, has been much criticised in recent years. In this paper we point out that the method of cases is not peculiar to philosophy: it can also be found in physics, where it has made a more limited, but still valuable contribution to the probing and formulation of theories. The method of cases per se should therefore not be treated as intrinsically methodologically flawed. This paper has also a narrower goal: to show that when the analogy underlying the so-called ‘expertise defence’ is drawn between judgements in thought experiments in philosophy and in physics, several objections can be avoided.

The purpose of this study is to test tasks that participants will—in subsequent work—complete both individually and in small groups. For the subsequent work, we will need forced binary choice reasoning tasks and thought experiments that produce a roughly equal proportion of each response. So we developed a battery of forced choice items from the intelligence, philosophy, and psychology literature that have been relatively highly cited and have been replicated. The broad research questions are as follows. Which items produced the most equal response distributions? Does performance vary depending on whether reasoning items are presented before (vs. after) thought experiments? How familiar are participants with modified versions of classic reflection test questions and thought experiments? This preliminary experiment addresses this question by randomizing participants to one of two conditions. The reflection-first condition begins with a randomized battery of reflection test questions and proceeds to a randomized battery of thought experiments. The philosophy-first condition reverses this order. (See attached survey.)

Funder: Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes; doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100004350, Funder: Churchill College, University of Cambridge; doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000742, Good physical experiments conform to the basic methodological standards of experimental design: they are objective, reliable, and valid. But is this also true of thought experiments? Especially problems of personal identity have engendered hypothetical scenarios that are very distant from the actual world. These imagined situations have been conspicuously ineffective at resolving conflicting intuitions and deciding between the different accounts of personal identity. Using prominent examples from the literature, I argue that this is due to many of these thought experiments not adhering to the methodological standards that guide experimental design in nearly all other disciplines. I also show how empirically unwarranted background assumptions about human physiology render some of the hypothetical scenarios that are employed in the debate about personal identity highly misleading.

This chapter augments established epistemologies of representation and epistemologies of emancipation by adding a third orientation, which can be termed epistemology of fiction. An epistemology of fiction deliberately generates scientific statements that deviate from actual empirical reality. The chapter is structured according to three main purposes of fictional inquiry: (1) juxtaposing fictional and counterfactual statements with empirical reality to reveal new insights and enhance our understanding of that reality (e.g., through ideal-type thinking or figurative imagination); (2) juxtaposing fictional/counterfactual statements against other scientific statements to test and refine the latter statements (e.g., via counterfactual reasoning, thought experiments, or simulation); and (3) drawing on fictional realities as objects of inquiry in their own right, typically in order to understand the impact of these fictional realities on current or future (nonfictional) empirical realities. The chapter concludes with some considerations regarding the fit of an epistemology of fiction to management studies as an academic field.

We tested whether responses to trolley problems by nurse specialist students correlated with their responses to hypothetical vaccine problems, as a follow-up to a similar study on ethics committees. No statistically significant correlation was found between the trolley and vaccination scores. These results confirmed and strengthened the finding of a very weak correlation (possibly zero), and the point estimate was even lower than for the ethics committees. Hence, the nurse specialists’ responses to the trolley problems cannot be used to indicate any direction for their responses to the vaccine problems, although there is a common core issue of sacrificing some for many. The respondents reported a relatively high willingness to push one man in front of a trolley to save five. They also reported a high willingness to act in trolley dilemmas compared with vaccination dilemmas, although the dimensions of risk–reward ratios and consent heavily favored the latter.

Pursuing both disciplinary authenticity and personal relevance in the teaching and learning of science in school generates tensions that should be acknowledged and resolved. This paper problematizes and explores the conceptualizations of these tensions by considering personal relevance, disciplinary authenticity, and common school science as three perspectives that entail different educational goals. Based on an analysis of the literature, we identify five facets of the tensions: content fidelity, content coverage, language and discursive norms, epistemic structure and standards, and significance. We then explore the manifestations of these facets in two different examples of the instruction and learning of physics at the advanced high school level in Israel and Italy. Our analysis suggests that (1) the manifestations of these tensions and their resolution are highly contextual. (2) While maintaining personal relevance and disciplinary authenticity requires some negotiation, the main tension that needs to be resolved is between personal relevance and common school science. (3) Disciplinary authenticity, when considered in terms of its full depth and scope, can be equipped to resolve this tension within the discipline. (4) To achieve resolution, teachers’ expertise should include not only pedagogical expertise but also a deep and broad disciplinary understanding.

Funding: Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland. Recent experimental studies indicate that epistemically irrelevant factors can skew our intuitions, and that some degree of scepticism about appealing to intuition in philosophy is warranted. In response, some have claimed that philosophers are experts in such a way as to vindicate their reliance on intuitions—this has become known as the ‘expertise defence’. This paper explores the viability of the expertise defence, and suggests that it can be partially vindicated. Arguing that extant discussion is problematically imprecise, we will finesse the notion of ‘philosophical expertise’ in order to better reflect the complex reality of the different practices involved in philosophical inquiry. On this basis, we offer a new version of the expertise defence that allows for distinct types of philosophical expertise. The upshot of our approach is that wholesale vindications or rejections of the expertise defence are shown to be unwarranted; we must instead turn to local, piecemeal investigations of philosophical expertise. Lastly, in the spirit of taking our own advice, we exemplify how recent developments from experimental philosophy lend themselves to this approach, and can empirically support one instance of a successful expertise defence. Publisher PDF

The conventional interpretation that Pierre Duhem condemned outright any type of thought experiment in Ernst Mach’s sense should be, at least in large part, rejected. Although Duhem placed particul...

Les observations de Galilée quant aux propriétés intensives sont un exemple de la « puissance du rationnel », et un indicateur fondamental de la réalité physique. D’un bout à l’autre de son travail, Galilée trace des chemins de l’intensif vers l’extensif, ce qui incite Leibniz à élaborer une « science des intensités » (mathesis intensorum), créant ainsi de nouveaux concepts liés aux sensations (sensate esperienze) comme fondements de l’expérimentation. L’idée de virtualité, que Descartes voulait bannir de sa philosophie naturelle, est ainsi justifiée, le principe des vitesses virtuelles ayant été anticipé par Galilée. Le fameux texte de L’Essayeur sur les qualités sensibles est un bon exemple d’une « expérience de pensée » qui implique le rejet des formes substantielles. La principale portée d’une telle expérience « mentale » (mente concipio, dit Galilée) n’était pas de réduire les sensations concrètes (intensives) à certaines idéalités abstraites, mais d’anticiper des définitions génétiques des objets physiques, selon le modèle constitutif des mathématiques. La puissance du rationnel est une invitation à relire dans une nouvelle perspective la prose de Galilée. Galileo’s observations of intensive properties are an instance of “powers of the rational”, and a chief indicator of physical reality. Throughout his work, Galileo goes tracing ways from intensive to extensive, which causes Leibniz to elaborate a “science of intensities” (mathesis intensorum), creating new concepts connected with sensations (sensate esperienze) as grounds of experiment. The idea of virtuality, which Descartes wanted to banish from his natural philosophy is thus vindicated, the principle of virtual velocities being anticipated by Galileo. The Assayer’s famous text about sensitive qualities, is a good example of a “thought experiment”, involving the rejection of scholastic substantial forms. The main scope of such a ‘mental’ experiment (mente concipio, says Galileo) was not to reduce the concrete sensations (intensive) to some abstract idealities, but to anticipate genetic definitions for physical objects, according to the constitutive model of mathematics. Powers of the rational (Indiana University Press, 1994, for the translation) is an invitation to read Galileo’s prose in a new way.

Thought Experiments of Economic Surplus: Science and Economy in Ernst Mach's Epistemology. Thought experiments are an important element in Ernst Mach's epistemology: They facilitate amplifying our knowledge by experimenting with thoughts; they thus exceed the empirical experience and suspend the quest for immediate utility. In an economical perspective, Mach suggested that thought experiments depended on the production of an economic surplus based on the division of labor relieving the struggle for survival of the individual. Thus, as frequently emphasized, in Mach's epistemology, not only the 'economy of thought' is an important feature; instead, also the socioeconomic conditions of science play a decisive role. The paper discusses the mental and social economic aspects of experimental thinking in Mach's epistemology and examines those within the contemporary evolutionary, physiological, and economic contexts., + ID der Publikation: unilu_57237 + Sprache: Deutsch + Bemerkungen: "This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Wulz, M. (2015), Gedankenexperimente im ökonomischen Überschuss. Wissenschaft und Ökonomie bei Ernst Mach. Ber. Wissenschaftsgesch., 38: 59-76., which has been published in final form at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/bewi.201501703 . This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation. Copyright notices must not be removed, obscured or modified. The article must be linked to Wiley's version of record on Wiley Online Library and any embedding, framing or otherwise making available the article or pages thereof by third parties from platforms, services and websites other than Wiley Online Library must be prohibited." + Letzte Aktualisierung: 2022-09-07 15:50:19

In the first half of the fourteenth century, a great polemic surrounding atomistic conceptions arose at the University of Oxford and the University of Paris. This paper will focus on the use of two tools of investigation on atomism, to wit, "thought experiments" and the "theory of supposition", which reveal the prominence of the a priori in late medieval debates on atomism. The paper intends to show the heuristic role of those two tools in the investigation of unobservable phenomena. The imaginative scenarios express the relation between natural philosophy, mathematics and logic, illustrating the medieval conception of science. En la primera mitad del siglo xiv, se ha levantado en la Universidad de Oxford y en la Universidad de París una gran polémica en torno a las concepciones atomistas. Este trabajo se centrará en el uso de dos herramientas de investigación en el atomismo, a saber, los "experimentos de pensamiento" y la "teoría de la suposición", que revelan la prominencia de lo a priori en los debates medievales tardíos sobre el atomismo. El artículo pretende mostrar el papel heurístico de estas dos herramientas en la investigación de fenómenos no observables. Los escenarios imaginativos expresan la relación entre la filosofía natural, la matemática y la lógica, ilustrando la concepción medieval de la ciencia.

Thought experiments are widely used in natural science research. Nonetheless, their reliability to produce cognitive results has been a disputable matter. This study is conducted to present some rules of confirmation for evaluating the cognitive outcome of thought experiments. I begin given an example of a “paradigmatic” thought experiment from Galileo Galilei: the falling bodies. Afterwards, I briefly surveying two different accounts of thought experiments: James R. Brown’s rationalism and John D. Norton’s empiricism. Then, I discuss their positions and I show that none of them may tip the balance towards the rationalism or empiricism they try to defend. Finally, I put forward that the notion of confirmation, connected to the notion of increasing plausibility, can be used to develop some confirmation rules to compare the explanatory power of thought experiments in competition, regardless of their rational or empirical nature in which the discussion of this type of experiment has been engaged in recent years.

Despite its enormous empirical success, the formalism of quantum theory still raises fundamental questions: why is nature described in terms of complex Hilbert spaces, and what modifications of it could we reasonably expect to find in some regimes of physics? Here we address these questions by studying how compatibility with thermodynamics constrains the structure of quantum theory. We employ two postulates that any probabilistic theory with reasonable thermodynamic behavior should arguably satisfy. In the framework of generalized probabilistic theories, we show that these postulates already imply important aspects of quantum theory, like self-duality and analogues of projective measurements, subspaces and eigenvalues. However, they may still admit a class of theories beyond quantum mechanics. Using a thought experiment by von Neumann, we show that these theories admit a consistent thermodynamic notion of entropy, and prove that the second law holds for projective measurements and mixing procedures. Furthermore, we study additional entropy-like quantities based on measurement probabilities and convex decomposition probabilities, and uncover a relation between one of these quantities and Sorkin's notion of higher-order interference., Comment: 19+8 pages, 5 figures. See also the related work by Chiribella and Scandolo in arXiv:1608.04459 and arXiv:1608.04460. v2: close to published version

Straipsnyje siekiama parodyti, kad psichologinio tęstinumo teorijos pačios save sugriauna iš vidaus dėl nepakankamų ir nepatikimų metodologinių prielaidų, todėl asmens tapatumas lieka be asmens ir be tapatumo. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad mintiniai eksperimentai, laikomi būtina metodologine priemone asmens egzistavimo ontologijai, yra ir nepakankami, ir nepatikimi. Pateikiami du argumentai: pirma, mintiniai eksperimentai numato konceptualinę asmens ir biologinio organizmo skirtingumo ir atskiriamumo galimybę, tačiau tiesioginis tokios galimybės pritaikymas tikrovėje nėra patikimas dėl subjektyvaus mintinio eksperimento aprašymo ir nepriklausomų argumentų trūkumo, antra, iš to paties mintinio eksperimento dviejų skirtingų interpretacijų gaunamos konceptualiai galimos, tačiau priešingos, vadinasi, ir ontologiškai nesuderinamos išvados (padalintų smegenų persodinimo atvejis).

This paper reflects on the relationship between theory and practice in bioethics, by using various concepts drawn from debates on innovation in healthcare research--in particular debates around how best to connect up blue skies 'basic' research with practical innovations that can improve human lives. It argues that it is a mistake to assume that the most difficult and important questions in bioethics are the most abstract ones, and also a mistake to assume that getting clear about abstract cases will automatically be of much help in getting clear about more complex cases. It replaces this implicitly linear model with a more complex one that draws on the idea of translational research in healthcare. On the translational model, there is a continuum of cases from the most simple and abstract (thought experiments) to the most concrete and complex (real world cases). Insights need to travel in both directions along this continuum--from the more abstract to the more concrete and from the more concrete to the more abstract. The paper maps out some difficulties in moving from simpler to more complex cases, and in doing so makes recommendations about the future of bioethics.

Bu çalışmada, muhtemelen Tractatus’u çağdaş analitik zihin felsefesiyle ilişkilendirebilecek ve birbirleriyle yakından ilişkili üç meseleyi tartışacağım. İlki Dünya, Gerçeklik ve Olgu Durumları Bağlamları arasındaki ilişkidir. Diğeri, Mantıksal Uzam kavramıdır. Sonuncusuysa, mantıksal olasılığın Tractatus türü kavramlaştırmasının tutarlı olup olmadığıdır. Bu üç sorunun tek bir makalede ele alınmasını gerektirecek kadar iç içe geçip geçmediği sorulabilir. Burada ben Mantıksal Uzam metaforunun mantıksal olasılıklar kavramına sıkıca bağlı olmasından ötürü cevabın olumlu olduğunu savunuyorum. Dolayısıyla, ikincisindeki tutarsızlık ve anlaşılmazlıklar, ilkini çok problemli hale getirecektir. Bu son dediğim doğruysa bu durum, çağdaş analitik zihin felsefesindeki tahayyül edilebilirlik temelli tezler için etkileri büyük olumsuz sonuçlar doğurabilecektir. Tractatus’taki mantıksal uzam kavramı modal metafiziğin erken dönemli bir çeşidi olarak kendi başına da oldukça ilginçtir. Fakat daha önemli olan, onun analitik zihin felsefesinde sıklıkla kullanılan yakın dönemli metafizik argümanlar için barındırdığı sonuçlardır

Keith DeRose has argued that context shifting experiments should be designed in a specific way in order to accommodate what he calls a ‘truth/falsity asymmetry’. I explain and critique DeRose’s reasons for proposing this modification to contextualist methodology, drawing on recent experimental studies of DeRose’s bank cases as well as experimental findings about the verification of affirmative and negative statements. While DeRose’s arguments for his particular modification to contextualist methodology fail, the lesson of his proposal is that there is good reason to pay close attention to several subtle aspects of the design of context shifting experiments. Article first published online: 10 APR 2012

Consider groups of partying college students failing to helpfully assist someone in life-threatening distress from alcoholic poisoning. Anecdotal evidence (Davis and DeBarros, 2006) supports the social-norming theory subfield of unresponsive bystander research by Latane and Darley (1970) and others (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). This article is a call for structurally transforming the dynamics of the unfolding dramas in natural groups where alcoholic poisoning leading to death occurs. The present article includes the proposal for a quasi-experiment of natural groups (members of fraternities and sororities) in naturally occurring contexts (party situations) using placebo, a standardized training for intervention programs for servers (TIPS) designed for peer intervention, and two versions of advanced TIPS designed to structurally introduce a designated interventionist (DI). The DI and DI training designs are crafted to overcome the unresponsive bystander effect. The proposal includes thought experiments to explain both short- and long-term dependent measures of program impact in such quasi-experiments that include immediate measures of alcohol drinking and intervention knowledge, the medium-term creation and assignment of a group DI position, and the long-term interventionist behavior of groups appointing persons holding DI appointments versus groups not making such appointments.

WOS: 000467140300001, Emerging Sources Citation Index, In this work, the concept of mass-energy equivalence in left-handed metamaterials is discussed by following Einstein's box thought experiment. Left-handed metamaterials are artificial composite structures that exhibit unusual properties, especially negative refractive index, in which phase and group velocities are directed oppositely. Equation E=mc(2) assumes that, in vacuum, the propagation of an electromagnetic radiation from emitter to receiver is accompanied by the transfer of mass. It was hypothesized previously that if the space between emitter and receiver is medium with a negative refractive index, then radiation transfers the mass not from the emitter to receiver as expected, but rather from the receiver to the emitter due to the opposite directions of phase and group velocities. In this paper, it is shown that even though one radiating atom is taken, the negative mass transferring must be in force. In particular, it means that, if the atom radiates a photon in a medium with negative refractive index, photon transfers the mass not from the atom, but to the atom., Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK); Scientific Project Unit of Cukurova University [FDK-2017-8948], The authors would like to express their gratitude to Prof. V.G. Veselago for useful discussions and advice. The authors would also like to acknowledge the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) and the Scientific Project Unit of Cukurova University (FDK-2017-8948) for full financial support.

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-12T17:52:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2010-03-01 Made available in DSpace on 2013-09-30T18:04:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2010-03-01 Submitted by Vitor Silverio Rodrigues (vitorsrodrigues@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2014-05-20T13:26:53Z No. of bitstreams: 0 Made available in DSpace on 2014-05-20T13:26:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2010-03-01 A review of some articles on thought experiments shows that the use of these tools as resources seems to be very useful in understanding some phenomena that are very difficult to be observed in a real laboratory. In this paper we present an analysis and discussion about the very characteristics of though experiments as a potential instrument for physics teaching. Univ Estadual Paulista, Doutoranda Programa Pos Grad Educ Ciencia, Bauru, SP, Brazil Univ Estadual Paulista, Dept Quim, Bauru, SP, Brazil Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM), Dept Quim, Maringa, Parana, Brazil Univ Estadual Paulista, Programa Pos Grad Educ Ciencia, Fac Ciencias, Bauru, SP, Brazil Universidade Estadual de Maringá (UEM), Programa Pos Grad Educ Ciência & Matemat, Maringa, Parana, Brazil Univ Estadual Paulista, Doutoranda Programa Pos Grad Educ Ciencia, Bauru, SP, Brazil Univ Estadual Paulista, Dept Quim, Bauru, SP, Brazil Univ Estadual Paulista, Programa Pos Grad Educ Ciencia, Fac Ciencias, Bauru, SP, Brazil

Some areas of biological research use artificial means to explore the natural world. But how the natural and artificial are related across wide-ranging research areas is not always clear. Relations differ further for bioengineering fields. We propose a taxonomy which would serve to elucidate distinct relations; there are three ways in which the natural is linked to the artificial, corresponding with distinct methods of investigation: i) a comparative approach (natural vs artificial) in which artificial systems are treated in the same way as natural systems, ii) a modeling approach (natural via artificial) in which we use artificial systems to learn about features of natural ones, and iii) an engineering approach (natural pro artificial) in which natural systems are used to draw inspiration for artefacts. Ambiguities about and between these approaches limit the development of fields and impact negatively on interdisciplinary communication.

The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of thought experiments on students? conceptual understanding of Newton?s Laws of Motion and Logical Thinking Ability. The sample of this study consisted of 20 students from eleventh grade in High School. Students did six taught experiments during instruction in cooperative learning environment which included strong man, flies in the jar, dynamics, solar chimney, tunnel through the earth and magnet car. One group pre-post tests quasi experimental design was used. In order to test treatment effects, Newton?s laws of Motion Test (NLMT) and Logical Thinking Ability Test (LTAT) were administered as pre- and post test to the students. The results of Independent t-Test showed that students? conceptual understanding of Newton?s Laws of Motion and Logical Thinking Ability increased from pre-NLMT and pre-LTAT to post-NLMT and post-LTAT. In order to improve the students? conceptual understanding of Newton?s Laws of Motion and Logical Thinking Ability, some suggestions are given under the light of the findings of this study and under the guidance of the previous research in the literature in this field., Bu çalıGmanın amacı, düGünce deneylerinin fizik eğitiminde uygulanabilirliğini, öğrencilerin mantıksal düGünme becerileri ve kavramsal anlama düzeylerine etkisini araGtırmaktır. Tek gruplu öntest-sontest modelinde olan örneklem, Lisede öğrenim gören 20, 11.sınıf öğrencisi üzerinde yapıldı. GGbirlikli öğrenme grupları haline getirilen öğrenciler, kendilerine verilen altı tane; güçlü adam, kavanozdaki sinek, dinamik, güneG bacası, dünyadan ortasından geçen tünel ve manyetik araba düGünce deneylerini ve Newton Hareket Kanunları ile Glgili Kavramsal Anlama Testini yapmıGlardır. Bu testler, ön-test ve son-test olarak gruba uygulanmıGtır. Veri toplama aracı olarak Mantıksal DüGünme Yeteneği Testi (MDYT) ve Newton Hareket Kanunları ile Glgili Kavramsal Anlama Testi (NHKKAT) uygulanmıGtır. Yapılan bağımsız t-testi sonucunda, öğrencilerin mantıksal düGünme becerileri ve temel fizik konularındaki kavramsal anlama düzeylerinde artıG gözlenmiGtir. Öğrencilerin Mantıksal DüGünme Yeteneğini ve Newton?un Hareket Kanunları ile Glgili Kavramsal Anlamalarını daha da geliGtirmek için, bu çalıGmanın sonuçları ıGığında ve bu alanda daha önce yapılmıG çalıGmalara göre bazı tavsiyelerde bulunulmuGtur.