1. Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm
- Author
-
Jozsef Sakovics, Françoise Forges, CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision (CEREMADE), Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine (LEDa), and Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)-Université Paris Dauphine-PSL
- Subjects
game theory ,Statistics and Probability ,JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games ,Economics and Econometrics ,JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D0 - General/D.D0.D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ,[QFIN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin] ,C.C7.C72 ,JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness ,JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D9 - Intertemporal Choice/D.D9.D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving ,microeconomics ,Nash Equilibrium ,Mathematics (miscellaneous) ,backward induction ,JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games ,games of perfect information ,sequential rationality ,threat ,Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty ,credible threat ,equilibrium refinement ,Social Sciences (miscellaneous) - Abstract
We formally assume that players in a game consider Nash Equilibrium (NE) the behavioral norm. In finite games of perfect information this leads to a refinement of NE: Faithful Nash Equilibrium (FNE). FNE is outcome equivalent to NE of the trimmed game, obtained by restricting the original tree to its NE paths. Thus, it always exists but it need not be unique. Iterating the norm ensures uniqueness of outcome. FNE may violate backward induction when subgame perfection requires play according to the SPE following a deviation from it. We thus provide an alternative view of tenable threats in equilibrium analysis.
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF