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A common pattern of control in firms is for management to retain a broad set of rights, whereas the remaining stakeholders’ contracts provide them with targeted veto rights over specific classes of decisions. We explain this pattern of control sharing as an efficient organizational response that balances the need to encourage management to account for stakeholders’ interests against the need to prevent self-interested stakeholders from blocking valuable proposals. Enforceable obligations of good faith and fair dealing play an essential role in facilitating undivided management control of many decisions. With these legal protections (but not without them), shared control is more likely when the parties are more symmetrically informed and hence, better able to bargain to efficient decisions. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. Funding: Financial support for the research of P. Milgrom was provided by the National Science Foundation [Grants ITR-0427770 and SES-1947514].

Envy is an unpleasant emotion. If individuals anticipate that comparing their payoff with the (potentially higher) payoff of others will make them envious, they may want to actively avoid information about other people’s payoffs. Given the opportunity to reduce another person’s payoff, an individual’s envy may trigger behavior that is detrimental to welfare. In this case, if individuals anticipate that they will react in a welfare-reducing way, they may also avoid information about other people’s payoffs from the outset. We investigated these two hypotheses using three experiments. We found that 13% of our potentially envious subjects avoided information when they did not have the opportunity to reduce another participant’s payoff. Psychological scales do not explain this behavior. We also found that voluntarily uninformed subjects did neither deduct less of the payoff nor less frequently than subjects who could not avoid the information., CEPA Discussion Papers, 17

What determines whether or not multinational firms transplant their mode of organisation to other countries? We embed the theory of knowledge hierarchies in an industry equilibrium model of monopolistic competition to examine how the economic environment may affect the decision of a multinational firm about transplanting its business organisation to other countries. We test the theory with original and matched parent and affiliate data on the internal organisation of 660 Austrian and German multinational firms and 2200 of their affiliate firms in Eastern Europe. We find that three factors stand out in promoting the multinational firm’s decision to transplant the business model to the affiliate firm in the host country: a competitive host market, the corporate culture of the multinational firm, and when an innovative technology is transferred to the host country. These factors increase the respective probabilities of organisational transfer by 18.5 percentage points, 37, and 31 percentage points.

The organizational behavior literature refers to persistent interaction patterns among members of an organization with distributed knowledge as organizational routines. To formalize this concept, as well as intuitions about organizational routines, we investigate dynamic coordination within a problem-solving team where team members cannot communicate. Each team member has a finite number of actions. There is a single action profile with a positive payoff. The task is to identify that profile through repeated trials. For each of their actions, team members have private information regarding their confidence in that action being required for a solution. In this environment, we refer to deterministic sequences of action profiles, where actions are labeled according to their confidence ranking, as organizational routines. We show that there are equilibria that give rise to organizational routines. These organizational routine equilibria partially solve the team’s coordination problem by synchronizing the team’s search efforts. These organizational routine equilibria are resilient to changes in the environment by being ex post equilibria, to agents having only a coarse understanding of other agents’ strategies by being fully cursed, and to natural forms of agents’ overconfidence. If the distribution over team members’ confidences is sufficiently dispersed, this resilience of organizational routine equilibria comes at the price of suboptimality. In contrast, generically, when this distribution is sufficiently concentrated, optimal equilibria induce organizational routines.

This paper examines the optimal structure of hierarchies when workers differ in the range of tasks they can perform. A hierarchical system may reduce costs by allowing most tasks to be handled by unskilled workers. This may however increase delay for those tasks which must pass through several layers before reaching the appropriate level. The paper characterises an optimal hierarchy when such a trade-off exists. Organizations typically have a hierarchical structure. In recent years, economists have investigated a number of explanations for this, for example the need to monitor workers,' the desire to exploit parallel processing by having agents work simultaneously on a project,2 the need to coordinate decisions,3 and so on. This paper explores another explanation for the prevalence of hierarchies: the desire to economize on skilled workers. A firm typically has many problems flowing in that require decisions, many of which do not need the attention of senior management. By employing relatively unskilled workers to deal with tasks initially, one may therefore be able to employ relatively few senior managers. For example, in a shop most customer queries can be dealt with by low-paid assistants, with only the more important problems passed on to supervisors. The drawback of such a hierarchy is that it may delay some decisions by making them pass through more than one layer of control rather than being dealt with immediately. The paper aims to explore the implications of this trade-off between cost and delay for the structure of hierarchies. There are of course many aspects of hierarchies. This paper focuses on a particular one which has been previously neglected. In the model considered, workers differ in their ability to make decisions. Abler workers are capable of making (good) decisions in a wider range of tasks than less able ones. There is no horizontal specialization into different jobs and so the only motivation for employing less able workers is that they command lower wages. Tasks pass through the levels of the hierarchy until they can be dealt with. Software support fits this framework well. Typically, when one contacts a company because of a problem with a package, the enquiry is initially dealt with by low-level staff. If they cannot solve the problem, they hand it on to the next level, who in turn hand it on to the next level if they cannot solve it and so on until it is dealt with. A large number of levels may create considerable delay. Similarly in hospitals in the U.K., routine deliveries of babies are usually dealt with by mid-wives. A junior doctor will be brought in if there is a problem and he in turn will call

We incorporate trade in tasks a la Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) into a small open economy version of the theory of firm organization of Marin and Verdier (2012) to examine how offshoring affects the way firms organize. We show that the offshoring of production tasks leads firms to reorganize with a more decentralized management, improving the competitiveness of the offshoring firms. We show further that the offshoring of managerial tasks relaxes the constraint on managers but toughens competition, and thus has an ambiguous impact on the level of decentralized management and CEO wages of the offshoring firms. In sufficiently open economies, however, managerial offshoring unambiguously leads to more decentralized management and to larger CEO wages. We test the predictions of the model based on original firm level data we designed and collected of 660 Austrian and German multinational firms with 2200 subsidiaries in Eastern Europe. We find that offshoring firms are 33.4% more decentralized than non-offshoring firms. We find further that the average fraction of managers offshored reduces the level of decentralized management by 3.1%, but increases the level of decentralized management by 4% in industries with a level of openness above the 25th percentile of the openness distribution. Lastly, we find that one additional offshored manager lowers CEO wages relative to workers by 4.9%.

We model the State as a self-enforcing agreement over the use of force. Powerful individuals punish violations of contracts and property rights, and, if they shirk or abuse their power, society reverts to a low-production “anarchy” stage. Our model has two implications. First, improvements in coercion move the optimal enforcement system from private ordering, where coercive punishments are not used, to centralized State, where punihments sanction violations by citizens but not by the ruler, to decentralized State, where punishments sanction all violations. Second, institutions that reinforce the allegiance of State militias to the law simultaneously insure that contract violations are punished and that the ruler does not expropriate citizens; thus, they are more productive than judicial institutions, which solely facilitate contract enforcement. The model is consistent with the historical correlation between technological advances in coercion and the transition from private to State enforcement, and with the fact that institutional constraints on the Executive affected the long-run economic development of nations more than improvements in judicial institutions (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005). We also provide a framework for the optimal sequencing of institutional reforms: they should focus first on the binding self-enforcement constraint (punishment or expropriation), and switch to other constraints when the initially binding constraint becomes slack.

We show that economic conditions when managers enter the labor market have long-run effects on their career paths and managerial styles. Managers who began their careers during recessions become CEOs more quickly, but at smaller firms. They also have more conservative styles, such as lower investment in capital expenditures and research and development, more cost cutting, and lower leverage and working capital needs. These recession effects appear to be largely driven by the characteristics of the CEO’s first job (recession CEOs tend to start in smaller or private firms), which suggests that the early work environment is important to the formation and selection of managers.

This paper analyses the potentials of jobs to be offshored or outsourced. We use four waves of the BIBB/BAuA Survey on Qualification and Working Conditions in Germany and employ a large set of potential determinants of offshoring and outsourcing derived from the literature. Applying the datadriven method of principal component analysis, we provide two indicators that measure both the offshoring potentials (cross-country geographical relocation) and the outsourcing potentials (organisational relocation) at the level of jobs, occupations, tasks, or industries. Our results show significant variation in the determinants of both dimensions. In addition to the direct contribution, our paper provides two indicators that can be used to further investigate the economic effects of job offshorability.

We study how firms differ from their competitors using new time-varying measures of product differentiation based on text-based analysis of product descriptions from 50,673 firm 10-K statements filed yearly with the Securities and Exchange Commission. This year-by-year set of product differentiation measures allows us to generate a new set of industries and corresponding new measures of industry competition where firms can have their own distinct set of competitors. Our new sets of industry competitors better explain specific discussion of high competition by management, rivals identified by managers as peer firms and firm characteristics such as profitability and leverage than do existing classifications. We also find evidence that firm R&D and advertising are associated with subsequent differentiation from competitors, consistent with theories of endogenous product differentiation.

Many studies have looked at how individual player traits influence individual choice in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, but few studies have looked at how the average traits of pairs of players influence the average choices of pairs. We consider cognitive ability, patience, risk tolerance, and the Big Five personality measures as predictors of individual and average group choices in a ten-round repeated prisoner’s dilemma. We find that a pair’s average cognitive ability measured by the Raven’s IQ test predicts average cooperation rates robustly and average earnings more modestly. Higher individual cognitive ability also predicts a greater probability of sustaining cooperation in the second round, suggesting that positive reciprocity is more likely among players with higher Raven’s scores. Openness is the only control variable that predicts first-round cooperative behavior.

Relational contracts – informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships – are integral parts of global production processes. This paper develops a repeated-game model of global sourcing in which final good producers decide whether to engage with their suppliers in relational contracting and whether to integrate a supplier into a firm's boundaries or deal with the latter at arm's-length. The model predicts that the relative prevalence of vertical integration increases in the long-term orientation of the headquarters' and suppliers' managers. It further suggests that the share of a foreign subsidiary owned by a final good producer increases in the headquarters' long-term orientation. Combining industry-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Related Party Trade database with measures for long-term orientation from Hofstede et al. (2010) and the World Management Survey, I find empirical evidence supportive of the positive link between the long-term orientation of cooperation parties and the relative prevalence of vertical integration. Using information on managerial composition of firms and ownership stakes from the Bureau van Dijk's Orbis database, I find that firms led by long-term oriented managers own higher shares of their foreign subsidiaries.

There is mounting evidence of the influence of personal characteristics of CEOs on corporate outcomes. In this paper we analyze the relation between military service of CEOs and managerial decisions, financial policies, and corporate outcomes. Exploiting exogenous variation in the propensity to serve in the military, we show that military service is associated with conservative corporate policies and ethical behavior. Military CEOs pursue lower corporate investment, are less likely to be involved in corporate fraudulent activity, and perform better during industry downturns. Taken together, our results show that military service has significant explanatory power for managerial decisions and firm outcomes.

The purpose of this study is to examine which personality traits explain the amount of variance in organizational dissent and whether organizational climate has a moderating role on the relationship between personality traits and organizational dissent. A convenience sampling was used and 527 Turkish participants completed the survey questionnaire. The results show that conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience personality traits explain the variance in upward dissent. In addition, extraversion and emotional stability contribute to displaced dissent whereas emotional stability predicts the variance in latent dissent. Moreover, humanistic climates have a moderating role on the relationship between conscientiousness and upward dissent. On the other hand, formalization climates have a moderating effect between extraversion and displaced dissent. Overall, the results support the association between personality and employee dissent and the partial moderating role of organizational climate on this relationship. Organizations may utilize the results in their efforts to create an organizational climate that supports the expression of different ideas and thoughts. Organizational leaders may apply the study outcomes about role of employee personality and organizational climate to motivate employees’ upward dissent.

This paper introduces an empirical investigation of on-the-job relationships by studying two facets of relationships, namely time spent in relationships with colleagues and clients and quality of relationships cultivated on the job. The analysis is carried out on a sample of organisations in the welfare sector. This sector is characterised by the relevance of relationships due to the multitasking activity performed; specifically, the quality of services produced is frequently to result from attention paid to clients and relational aspects. The paper focuses on both the determinants of time spent in relationships and employees satisfaction with relationships in order to understand the main factors determining the development of relationships, as well as the impact of relationships with colleagues and superiors on employees’ wellbeing and performance. The natural traits of employees and their motivations towards relationships, affective and informational support by colleagues and superiors and the working environment are individuated as determinants of good-quality relationships. Furthermore, the results show that having good on-thejob relationships enhances job satisfaction, but also workforce productivity, with positive consequences for organisations as well.

In this paper we analyze a principal's optimal monitoring strategies in a team environment. In doing so we study the interaction between formal monitoring and informal (peer) monitoring. We show that if the technology satisfies complementarity, peer monitoring substitutes for the principal's monitoring. However, if the technology satisfies substitution, the principal's optimal monitoring is independent of the peer monitoring. We also show that if the technology satisfies complementarity, then the principal in the optimal contracts will monitor more closely than in the case of substitution. (JEL D23, D82, M54)

Organizations are all around us. Culture is trickier—to analyze and even to see. We consider both the effect of management on culture and the effect of culture on performance. We begin by describing an intervention that dramatically improved outcomes and conspicuously included a culture-change component. We then use details from this intervention to describe potential empirical analyses of the association between organizational culture and performance in this and similar settings. Finally, we describe opportunities for theoretical models to explore how and why organizational culture might influence organizational performance.

The aim of this study is conducting bibliometric content analysis on academic articles related leader-member exchange theory which published in Turkish literature. Thus, the contribution of Turkish literature to leader-member exchange theory will revealed. Moreover, this research will serve as an important assessment to who done research and will do research about this phenomenon. The scope of research, 20 published & accessible empiric article which in domestic literature until 2014 was reviewed. When phenomenon of leader-member exchange was dependent variable, independent variable and mediating variable, the other dependent and independent variables have been introduced. According to result, in order that organizational, personal and leadership factors develop into useful behaviors and attitudes, leader-member exchange has been shown to be a significant mediating role. Creating a culture of collaboration and group climate, transformational leadership, extroverts and self-sufficiency personality increase leader-member interaction, this interaction will increase the effectiveness of the organization, positive work attitudes, psychological empowerment and job performance, and decrease intention of leaving the organization, in fact leads to extra effort by employees for organizations.

We examine the relationship between the organization of a multi-divisional firm and its ability to adapt production decisions to changes in the environment. We show that even if lower-level managers have superior information about local conditions, and incentive conflicts are negligible, a centralized organization can be better at adapting to local information than a decentralized one. As a result, and in contrast to what is commonly argued, an increase in product market competition that makes adaptation more important can favor centralization rather than decentralization. (JEL D21, D23, F23, L22)

Purpose - The paper examines the relationships between CEOs' personal traits, emotions, attitudes and tolerance of ambiguity; and subsequently, the influence of CEOs' ambiguity tolerance in firms' performance. Design/methodology/approach - Survey data were collected from 256 ICT firms established in Greece. Their CEOs completed questionnaires examining TOA, personal traits, emotions and attitudes in the workplace. Principal components analysis and ordinary least-squares regressions were used to explore the hypotheses of the paper. Findings - Three factors characterize CEOs' emotions, namely pleasure, dominance and arousal; two factors their involvement, namely importance and interest; and, respectively, one their emotional intelligence namely, empathy/handling relationships. Further, locus of control; importance; arousal; empathy/handling relationships and interest affect decisively CEOs' tolerance of ambiguity, which in turn, seems to influence positively firms' performance. Research limitations/implications - Further research is required in Greek ICT industry regarding the influence of CEOs'emotional and cognitive attributes in organizations' financial performance. Likewise, this research should be expanded to other industries. Originality/value - The originality of this study lies in the finding that emotional and cognitive characteristics affect CEOs' TOA, which, in turn, influences significantly firms' performance. Another significant contributing factor is that the study is carried out in Greece, where few studies have been conducted in this area.

Can formal contracts help resolving the holdup problem? We address this important question by studying the holdup problem in repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer in which the seller can make relation-specific investments in each period. In contrast to previous findings, we demonstrate that writing a simple fixed-price contract based on product delivery is of value even when relation-specific investment is purely cooperative. In particular, there is a range of parameter values in which a higher investment can be implemented only if a formal fixed-price contract is written and combined with an informal agreement on additional payments or termination of future trade, contingent upon investments. Furthermore, we show that under an additional natural assumption, focusing our attention on fixed-price contracts as a form of formal contracts is without loss of generality. The key driving force of our result is a possibility that the threat-point effect is negative, i.e., the relation-specific investment decreases the surplus under no trade. This possibility, although very plausible, has been largely ignored in previous theoretical/empirical analyses of the holdup problem.

In this paper, I seek to understand the behavioral basis of higher organizational learning and adaption as a teleological dynamic equilibrium process to decipher the underlying psycho-physiological aspects of individual cognitive learning related to organizational adaption. Dynamics of cognitive learning has some differential paths within the neural circuitry which follows certain patterns that leads to individual as well as organized evolution in course of a learning process. I undertake a comparative analysis of human cognitive and behavioral changes and the active mechanisms underlying animal behavior and learning processes to understand the differential patterns of these adaptive changes in these two species. Cognitive behavioral learning processes have certain economic perspectives which help an individual to attain efficiency in workplace adaptation and in learning which however, the individual when being part of an alliance, ember positive influence on the society or organization as a whole. Comparatively, in primates, I review some empirical evidences drawn from chronological studies about cognitive behavioral learning process and adaptation as well as the presence of the capacity of making attributions about mental states, which exists in rudimentary form in chimpanzees and apes. Following this, I apply the outcomes of the findings on different aspects of human cognitive and adaptive behavioral learning-induced evolutionary changes and how human beings are able to exploit the presence of these additive advantages under cluster settings. 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In the paper the trade-offs among endogenous transaction costs caused by two-sided moral hazard, exogenous monitoring cost, and economies of specialization are specified in a Grossman, Hart and Moore (GHM) model to absorb Maskin and Tirole's recent critique and Holmstrom and Milgrom's criticism of the model of incomplete contract. The extended GHM model allowing incomplete contingent labor contract as well as complete contingent trade contract of goods is used to explore the implications of structure of ownership and residual rights for the equilibrium network size of division of labor and productivity.

Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government or the NGO own the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public good most should be the owner. We demonstrate the robustness of their insight when the split-the-difference rule is replaced by the deal-me-out solution. Our finding is in contrast to the private good results of Chiu (1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998), who show that the optimal ownership structure crucially depends on whether the split-the-difference rule or the deal-me-out solution is used.

This paper examines markets, firms, and the law as alternative institutional arrangements for organizing transactions that involve transaction-specific investments and uncertain performance. The analysis is the logical extension of Coase's seminal analysis of the market-firm boundary on one hand, and the market-law boundary on the other. It thus combines insights from the literature on industrial organization and law and economics. The result is a unified framework that reveals the relative advantages and disadvantages, within a fairly simple economic setting, of market exchange, court ordering (contracts), and internal governance (agency).

We study a gift exchange game with 12 employees and one employer. When the employer can offer individually differentiated wages in a setting without collective action, we observe high levels of wages, effort choices, and total earnings. When the employer is restricted to offering a uniform wage, trust and reciprocity drop dramatically due to widespread shirking. The stepwise introduction of two collective action mechanisms, strike and coordination, increases the employees׳ share of the total earnings, but does not mitigate the free-riding problem. Adding employment risk to the collective action setup drives up wages, reduces free-riding, and leads to higher total earnings. However, this increase in productivity is not sufficient to achieve the high levels of wages, efforts and earnings that we observe with individually differentiated wages.

We develop indicators for signs of liquidity shortages and potential financial problems of banks by studying transaction data of the Dutch part of the European real time gross settlement system and collateral management data. The indicators give information on 1) overall liquidity position, 2) the interbank money market, 3) the timing of payment flows, 4) the collateral's amount and use and 5) bank run signs. This information can be used both for monitoring the TARGET2 payment system and for individual banks' supervision. By studying these data before, during and after stressful events in the crisis, banks' reaction patterns are identified. These patterns are translated into a set of behavioural rules, which can be used in payment systems' stress scenario analyses, such as e.g. simulations and network topology. In the literature behaviour and reaction patterns in simulations are either ignored or very static. To perform realistic payment system simulations it is crucial to understand how banks react to shocks.

Consider a seller who can make an observable but non-contractible investment to improve an intermediate good that is specialized to a particular buyerʼs needs. The buyer then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. The seller has private information about the fraction of the ex post surplus that he can realize on his own. Compared to a situation with complete information, additional investment incentives are generated by the sellerʼs desire to pretend a strong outside option. On the other hand, ex post efficiency is not attained since asymmetric information at the bargaining stage sometimes leads to inefficient separations.

We extend the propertyrights framework to allow for a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto and for sequential investment. Parties investing first do so before contracting is feasible. It is possible, however, that parties investing second can share (at least some of) their investment costs. Along with this costsharing effect, the incentive to invest is affected by a strategic effect generated by sequential investment. Together these effects can overturn some of the predictions of the propertyrights literature. For example, the most inclusive ownership structure might not be optimal, even if all investments are complementary.

Bu calismanin amaci, psikolojik sozlesmelerin iki turu olan iliskisel ve islemsel sozlesmelerde algilanan ihlalin, isten ayrilma niyeti ve algilanan orgutsel destek uzerindeki etkisini belirleyebilmektir. Bu amac kapsaminda, Turkiye’de yer alan devlet ve vakif universitelerinde gorev yapan 570 akademik personelden anket yontemi kullanilarak veriler elde edilmistir. Hipotezleri test etmek amaciyla hiyerarsik regresyon analizinden yararlanilmistir. Calismanin sonucunda, iliskisel psikolojik sozlesmede algilanan ihlalin, isten ayrilma niyetini artirici ve algilanan orgutsel destegi azaltici bir etkisinin bulundugu belirlenmistir. Islemsel psikolojik sozlesme algilanan ihlalin ise isten ayrilma niyeti uzerinde anlamli bir etkisinin bulunmadigi, fakat yalnizca islemsel sozlesmenin faydalar boyutunda algilanan ihlalin, algilanan orgutsel destegi azaltici bir etkisinin bulundugu tespit edilmistir.

With increasing competition among hotels, managing employees seems to be important issue in delivering services to customers effectively. This issue also affects the firms’ outcomes and incomes. Thus, hotels as a service providing firms must be able to man age the emotions of employees in order to increase the quality of services and to create value for customers. Controlling emotions of employees also contribute to gain competitive advantage across rivals. The objective of this paper is to reveal the effect s of emotional labor on job attitudes of hotel employees by considering the mediating and moderating roles of social support and job autonomy. To this end, a questionnaire was employed to employees of hotels operating in Antalya Province. Results of the analyses support that emotional labor has a negative effect on emotional exhaustion. Emotional labor also has a positive effect on job satisfaction. In addition there are mediating and moderating roles of job autonomy and social support between emotional exhaustion and emotional labor, and emotional labor and job satisfaction.

Angesichts der teilweise prekären Finanzlage deutscher Kommunen gelten freiwillige Kooperationen im Kommunalbereich als mögliche Alternative, z. B. zu politisch heiklen Gebietsreformen, um Kostenersparnisse zu realisieren. Die Ergebnisse einer Effizienzstudie des IWH (in Kooperation mit der Universität Kassel) zeigen am Beispiel der hessischen kommunalen Abwasserentsorgung allerdings, dass sich nicht jede Form der kommunalen Zusammenarbeit bzw. Arbeitsteilung günstig auf die Effizienz der Leistungserstellung auswirken muss. Insbesondere die verbreitete Teilzweckverbandslösung schneidet hier eher ungünstig ab. Weitere Ergebnisse zeigen neben einem erheblichen Effizienzsteigerungspotenzial auch eine weitgehende Ausschöpfung von Größenvorteilen. Daneben bestätigt sich außerdem der erhebliche Einfluss demographischer und siedlungsstruktureller Faktoren für die effiziente Abwassersammlung und -behandlung.

In this study, the effects of service employees’ job performance and intentions to quit on their displays of emotional labor are examined. Also, the mediating role of interpersonal deviance on these effects are also observed. For this purpose, data are obtained and analyzed from 403 private service employees’ working in Ankara. The relations and effects between variables are presented by correlation and regression analyses. The validity of scales are measured with structural equation model. According to the findings, it is seen that employees’ emotional labors have significant effects on their job performance and intention to quit the job. Particularly, it is found that while job performances of employees who act surfacely are low, but their intentions to quit are high. It is observed that interpersonal deviance has negative contribution to the employees’ job performance, but positive contribution to the intention to quit. And also, coming through that interpersonal deviance has partial mediating role between emotional labor and job performance and intention to quit. Due to the findings of this study, recommendations are given for the managers of service sector to recruit and maintain productive and effective service emplooyees.

This article is based on literature studies, comparative analysis of two different models to stimulate innovative solutions and protect industrial property rights – particularly rights to inventions. For this purpose, the most important assumptions and the essence of traditional patent system based on institutional protection as well as concepts of free revealing (free access) and open innovation (open invention) were characterized. The paper also presents potential strengths and weaknesses of presented approaches – closed (traditional) and open inventiveness. The article gives value to the argument that, given real shortcomings, the most effective way to create and commercialize inventions would be one of a complementary nature, taking into account solutions offered by each of the presented approaches, changing current innovation policy. On the one hand, modern companies should not give up institutional protection of their developed technology solutions and carrying out R&D, on the other, they will be increasingly forced to resort to modern tools of stimulating innovations based on openness, direct market communication and flexible approach to innovation processes of products and services.

The aim of the paper is to reconstruct the category of “information quality” and to attempt answering the question: how are employee’s attitudes towards organisational change related to the quality of information concerning that process in the context of enterprises’ competitiveness? The secondary data analysis method – covering theoretical literature and numerous empirical studies results – is applied to attain the above-mentioned research aims. The results of conducted analysis are presented in the following order. Firstly, the category of ‘information quality’ is conceptualised, the factors which influence the information quality are identified and the authors’ scheme for analysing the information quality is proposed. Secondly, the view on employees’ attitudes towards organisational change is presented. Thirdly, the conditions of the information transmission in the organisational change process are analysed. Further, conceptual remarks on the influence of information quality on attitudes towards organisational change are presented on the background of previous research results. Since the idea of incorporating the concept of information quality in the theoretical considerations and empirical models in the area of research on attitudes towards organisational change seems to be promising, the authors propose the directions of further research in the final part of the paper.

Human behaviors are governed by two main systems: one system of reward and punishment. Our behaviors followed by positive results tend to develop. Conversely, behaviors followed by negative results tend to diminish. What is usually overlooked is that the rewards of working extremely intense emotions, such as pleasure (reward) and fear, aggression, conflict states (penalty) and determine motivation. Labor ?n there is a large increase in the unpleasant consequences of what we generally call it frustration. Frustrations are increasingly less compensated by rewards and which are permanent sources of organizational conflicts.

El objetivo de este artículo es demostrar el vínculo causal que existe entre la divisióncognitiva del trabajo que determina ciertas estructuras organizacionales y el proceso de innovación mediante el caso de una importante empresa biotecnológica mexicana. La pregunta de investigación es: ¿en qué medida la estructura organizacional derivada de la división cognitiva del trabajo determina el éxito para innovar de la empresa estudiada? La proposición principal que se esgrime es que en algunas empresas de alta tecnología, como la que se presenta en este trabajo, cobra especial relevancia la estructura cognitiva interna, hasta el punto de convertirse en el principal determinante de sus actividades innovadoras. En la parte teórica se explica la relación entre división cognitiva del trabajo, estructura organizacional e innovación empresarial, y en la empírica se estudia el desempeño innovador de la empresa analizada. La metodología que se emplea es un estudio de caso basado en entrevistas exhaustivas y corroboración activa.

This paper investigates a range of approaches toward developing a Knowledge Management (KM) strategy according to the organizational vision of Romanian companies. Focused on issues which Romanian organizations face with respect to KM, this article centers on how the implementation of KM can be improved, considering both managerial and cultural issues. The data on which this qualitative research is based was obtained from local managers who reflected on aspects related to knowledge and its management within their organizations by fill in a reflection guide which consisted of open questions only. The analysis performed revealed several valuable insights provided through managers’ attitudes and behaviors related to knowledge and KM.

This paper addresses to accounting researchers and proposes the use of abductive research strategy to improve the quality of accounting research outcomes. We argue that abductive reasoning has developed as a typical research method in all fields of interpretive studies but is still unrecognized by accounting researchers and practitioners. Therefore, this study aims to raise awareness on the benefits obtained through the implementation of abduction as a research strategy. Starting from Peirce (1903) and Blaikie (1993), we explore two types of abduction designs and discuss the advantages of building accounting research on grounded concepts. While this is a conceptual paper that only describes the bridge abduction reasoning can build between studying the reality and new theory emergence, we do not tackle any ethnographical case studies, social survey, or other exploratory field analyses.

The interesting volume by Cracogna, Fici and Henry offers much more than the reader can normally expect from a Handbook.In addition to the very useful presentation of thirty-one national legislations on cooperatives (based on a predetermined model that facilitates the comparison), the Handbook offers an exhaustive comparative essay about the different "Cooperative law" systems and a deep analysis of the supranational legislation that Europe, South America and Africa follow in order to provide, through different technical solutions, uniform regulatory models to national legislators.As the right frame of a valuable painting highlights and does not overshadow the work of art, in the same way the first two hundred pages of the International Handbook accurately introduce the analysis of the national legislations while also creating a solid foundation for the following normative data collection without reducing its importance. The following six hundred pages dedicated to the analysis of thirty-one national cooperative laws offer a large number of ideas and solutions useful for every future study of the topic.The overview offered to the reader, whether he is an economic operator or a scholar in law, is not as heterogeneous as one would expect coming from such different experiences in the cultural and normative traditions. This is a tangible proof of the positive effects of the normative harmonization led by the supranational organizations and also of the existence of cooperative "natural" rules which are identically adopted everywhere.Therefore, the differences and peculiarities of the normative solutions adopted mainly catch the attention of those who are used to managing the typical problems of the cooperative companies.

The material approaches the complex relation between cost, value and price in case of real estate properties, analyzed in the context of evaluation mission exercised by a specialist in the field. Therewith, this material illustrates the influence of particularities of the real estate market on the establishment of the market value of residential properties and also the specific elements which the evaluation shall consider within the professional approach in order to formulate an opinion. This shall consider, in addition to the previsions of evaluation standards, the selfregulating mechanism of the market by means of the report between demand and offer, and the inter-relation, in this context, between the three concepts mentioned.

Arastirmanin temel amaci, Kars ilindeki hastanelerde calisan hemsirelerin orgutsel adalet algilari, is tatminleri ve orgutsel vatandaslik davranislarinin duzeyini ve birbirleri ile olan iliskilerini inceleyerek is tatmininin bu iliskideki araci rolunu analiz etmektir. Ayrica hemsirelerin cinsiyet, yas, egitim, nobet tutma ve kidem durumlarina gore bu degiskenlerin farklilik gosterip gostermedigi de incelenmistir. Arastirma aciklayici nitelikte tasarlanmistir ve veri toplama yontemi ankettir. Kolayda ornekleme yoluyla 147 ornege ulasilmistir. Arastirmanin bulgularina gore, surec adaletinin orgutle ilgili orgutsel vatandaslik davranisi uzerindeki etkisinde is tatminin tam araci rolu varken, etkilesim adaletinin kisiyle ilgili orgutsel vatandaslik davranisi ve orgutle ilgili orgutsel vatandaslik davranisi uzerindeki etkisinde is tatmininin tam araci rolu vardir. Ayrica cinsiyet, yas, egitim ve nobet tutma duruma gore degiskenler anlamli farklilik gostermemisken sadece kideme gore dagitim, surec ve etkilesim adaleti ile is tatmini duzeyi farklilik gostermistir. 1 yildan daha az kidemli olanlar digerlerine gore daha yuksek duzeyde adalet algisi ve is tatmini hissettiklerini belirtmislerdir.

We used metaphors to explain several processes in organizations over the years. The metaphorical analysis allows us to transfer concepts from one domain of knowledge to another, improving our understanding of organizations. As a psychological process, we analyzed creativity through the lenses of particular abilities of certain people. But, is it possible to personify organizations and consider them as creative entities? How powerful had been the use of metaphors to explain creativity as organizational process in the past? The purpose of this conceptual work, based on discourse or textual analysis, is to explain how two recent developed metaphors could be used as to increase our understanding of the creative process exhibited in organizations: from conceptual ideas of the symbolic interactionism, the creativity as a role; from theory of constructivism, the creativity as a zone of potential development.

From the point of view of Durkheim, institutions are ways of acting, feeling and thinking, expressing any social act. Institutions have stringent action on the individual, have its own existence, independent of individual manifestations, which are distinctive for a given group, being accepted by all members. Types of social institutions are economic institutions, educational, political, cultural and family. Within institutions, communication is an inherent phenomenon.For Katz and Kahn "communication is a social process of great relevance to the functioning of each group, organization or society," the very essence of the social system or organization. The organizational structure provides stability for human communication and facilitates administrative tasks. (Rogers Everett M. and Agarwala-Rogers Rekha, 1976, p. 6). Therefore, an effective institutional communication adds value to any institution.

The aim of the paper is to reconstruct the category of “information quality” and to attempt answering the question: how are employee’s attitudes towards organi-sational change related to the quality of information concerning that process in the context of enterprises’ competitiveness? The secondary data analysis method – covering theoretical literature and numerous empirical studies results – is ap-plied to attain the above-mentioned research aims. The results of conducted anal-ysis are presented in the following order. Firstly, the category of ‘information quality’ is conceptualised, the factors which influence the information quality are identified and the authors’ scheme for analysing the information quality is pro-posed. Secondly, the view on employees’ attitudes towards organisational change is presented. Thirdly, the conditions of the information transmission in the organ-isational change process are analysed. Further, conceptual remarks on the influ-ence of information quality on attitudes towards organisational change are pre-sented on the background of previous research results. Since the idea of incorpo-rating the concept of information quality in the theoretical considerations and empirical models in the area of research on attitudes towards organisational change seems to be promising, the authors propose the directions of further re-search in the final part of the paper.

This research is trying an approach on the risk concepts that appear when using inconsequently accounting policies and management techniques for controlling them. The increase of companies’ vulnerability, their size, the huge impact of technology, the global interdependence and competition, the environment awareness, too, are only a few of the factors which are drawing my attention on the issue of these risks and their management. Romania’s emerging economy is creating a favourable environment for building a business. The reaching of the established objectives is encumbered by this uncertainty that can be either a barrier or an opportunity for the profitability of the entity. It is envisaged the getting/obtaining of information regarding the state of the phenomenon under study, as anchored in the national economic reality, the exploitation of the information available in the field of interest that is being studied, as well as the exchange of information and good practices.

Standard economic theory predicts that if property rights to pollute are clearly established, equilibrium outcomes in an efficient emissions permit market will be independent of how the emissions permits are initially distributed. This so-called independence property has important implications for policy design and implementation. Past studies document a strong positive correlation between the initial permit allocation and firm-level emissions, raising concerns that the independence property is failing to hold in real-world settings. We exploit the random assignment of firms to different permit allocation cycles in Southern California's RECLAIM program in order to test the independence of permit allocation and emissions. Our results lend empirical support to the independence hypothesis. © 2013 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

When there are three parties, instability problems brought about by the emptiness of the core of the corresponding cooperative game may cause the Coase Theorem to fail, even when other more direct impediments to bargaining are low. We show that the standard Coasean bargaining game involving three parties is strategically equivalent to an asymmetric three-player majority game. Hence, when there are three parties, instability problems will cause the Coase Theorem to fail if and only if the core of the corresponding three-player majority game is empty. We use this equivalence result to derive all instances in which the Coase Theorem will and will not hold with three parties, and show that a priori, such instability problems are likely to be rare - the Coase Theorem will actually hold most (over 80%) of the time. We also demonstrate that it is always possible to find a set of transaction costs which, when introduced into a frictionless bargaining situation, will cause an empty core to become non-empty. In other words, transaction costs can mitigate instability problems: situations exist in which the presence of transaction costs will cause the Coase Theorem to hold when, in the absence of those direct transaction costs, it would fail to hold. When there are three parties, rather than hindering agreements, the existence of direct transaction costs can sometimes - but not always - reduce instability and encourage Coasean bargaining.

We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on decentralization within firms. We first discuss how the concept of incomplete contracts shapes our views about the organization of decision-making. We then overview the empirical evidence on the determinants of decentralization and on the effects of decentralization on firm performance. A number of factors highlighted in the theory are shown to be important in accounting for delegation, such as heterogeneity and congruence of preferences as proxied by trust. Empirically, competition, human capital, and IT also appear to foster decentralization. There are substantial gaps between theoretical and empirical work and we suggest avenues for future research in bridging this gap (JEL O31, O32, O33, F23).

Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life, but empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of authority is limited. We study the motivation and incentive effects of authority experimentally in an authority-delegation game. Individuals often retain authority even when its delegation is in their material interest—suggesting that authority has nonpecuniary consequences for utility. Authority also leads to overprovision of effort by the controlling parties, while a large percentage of subordinates underprovide effort despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. Authority thus has important motivational consequences that exacerbate the inefficiencies arising from suboptimal delegation choices. (JEL C92, D23, D82)