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This paper examines the impact of implicit guarantees and capital regulations on the behavior of a bank and on the expected losses for its depositors. I show that implicit guarantees increase the incentives of the bank to enhance leverage and/or risk taking and that this leads to higher expected losses for its depositors. To reduce the adverse effects of moral hazard, policy measures have to be taken. However, a simple leverage ratio is likely to increase expected losses further and risk adjusted capital requirements do not necessarily affect highly leveraged banks with very low risk assets. A combination of both requirements can be successful. Positive long-term effects can be achieved by a reduction of moral hazard and informational imperfections. However, it is difficult to achieve these reductions and potentially severe short-term effects have to be taken into account.

I study economies where banks do not fully internalize the social costs of default, which distorts their lending decisions. In all these economies, a common general equilibrium effect leads to aggregate over-investment. As a result, under laissez-faire, crises are too frequent and too costly from a social point of view. In response, the regulator sets a capital requirement to trade off expected output against financial stability. The capital requirement that ensures investment efficiency depends on the state of the economy. Because of the general equilibrium effect, the more aggregate banking capital the tighter the optimal requirement. A regulation that fails to take this effect into account exacerbates economic fluctuations and allows for excessive build-up of risk in the financial sector during booms. Government guarantees amplify this mechanism and, at the peak of a boom, even a small adverse shock can trigger a banking sector collapse, followed by an excessively severe credit crunch. JEL Classification: E44, G01, G21, G28

We measure the impact of bank capital requirements on corporate borrowing and expansion. We use French loan-level data and take advantage of the transition from Basel I to Basel II. While under Basel I the capital charge was the same for all firms, under Basel II, it depends in a predictable way on both the bank's model and the firm's risk. We exploit this two-way variation to empirically estimate the sensitivity of bank lending to capital requirement. This rich identification allows us to control for firm-level credit demand shocks and bank-level credit supply shocks. We find very large effects of capital requirements on bank lending: A 1 percentage point decrease in capital requirement leads to an increase in loan size by about 5%. At the firm level, borrowing also responds strongly although a bit less, consistent with some limited between-bank substitutability. Investment and employment also increase strongly. Overall, because the transition to Basel II led to an average reduction by 2 percentage points of capital requirements, we estimate that the new regulation led, in France, to an increase in average loan size by 10%, an increase in aggregate corporate lending by 1.5%, an increase in aggregate investment by 0.5%, and the creation or preservation of 235,000 jobs.

This paper specifies an empirical framework for estimating both technical and allocative efficiency, which is applied to a large panel of European banks over the years 1996 to 2003. Our methodology allows for self-consistent measurement of technical and allocative inefficiency, in an effort to address the issue known in the literature as the Greene problem. The results suggest that, on average, European banks exhibit constant returns to scale, that technical and allocative efficiency are close to 80% and 75% respectively, and that overall economic efficiency shows a clearly improving trend. We also show through the comparison of various estimators that models incorporating only technical efficiency tend to overestimate it.

This paper provides parametric estimates of technical change, efficiency change, economies of scale, and total factor productivity growth for large banks (those with assets in excess of $1 billion) in the United States, over the period from 2000 to 2005. This is done by estimating an output distance function subject to theoretical regularity within a Bayesian framework. We find that failure to incorporate theoretical regularity conditions results in mismeasured shadow revenue and/or cost shares, which in turn leads to perverse conclusions regarding productivity growth. Our results from the regularity-constrained model show that total factor productivity of the large US banks grew at an average rate of 1.98% over the sample period. However, our estimates also show a clear downward trend in the growth rate of total factor productivity and our decomposition of the primal Divisia total factor productivity growth index into its three components – technical change, efficiency change, and economies of scale – indicates that technical change is the driving force behind this decline.

This study reviews and evaluates a particular aspect of the institution building process in the transition countries of Southeast Europe. The focus is the development of the banking sector. It is argued that banking sector development plays an integral and pivotal role in the successful completion of the transition process. It functions as a very strong integrating force contributing to the broader institution building process and as a pillar of future growth and development in the new market environment of the Balkan economies. This study concentrates on three main issues. First, it undertakes a brief literature review of regional integration approaches in the Balkans. Second, it provides an overview of the most significant changes that have taken place in the banking sector. Third, it reviews some structural characteristics and performance indicators, all of which point to considerable advancements made in this sector in recent years. Empirical evidence is provided showing that a substantial harmonisation of ownership structures and performance indicators has been achieved in the banking sectors of these countries initiating a convergence process toward EU banking structures and functions. In this regard, this study complements the findings of other studies focusing on various sectors of economic activity, which clearly show that a de facto regional and, even more so, continental integration of the Southeast European countries is under way.

During the housing bust of 2008–2009, housing prices and transaction volumes fell across the United Kingdom. Although the drop in prices was similar across housing types, transaction volumes fell more for units at the lower end of the market. I document this fact and provide panel and instrumental variable estimates showing its link with tightening credit conditions in England and Wales during 2008. I then use an overlapping-generation framework to relate the change in the composition of sales with the reduction in loan-to-value ratios by British banks and to derive additional predictions. As down-payment requirements increase, young households with scarce financial resources are priced out by older owners who retain their previous houses as rental properties when trading up. Recent changes in aggregate housing tenure, disaggregated changes in renting, and sales in areas with different age compositions, are consistent with these predictions. The results presented here show how the composition of sales changes over the housing cycle and may inform ongoing policy discussions about reduced access to home-ownership by the young.

In this paper, we argue for a regulatory framework under which a bank’s required level of equity capital depends on the equity capital of its peers. Such bankingon- the-average rules are transparent and could also be combined with the current regulatory framework. In addition, we argue that banking-on-the-average rules ensure the build-up of bank equity capitals in booms and thus avoid excessive leverage. Prudent banks can impose prudency on other banks. In a simple model of a banking system, we show that a banking-on-the-average framework can deliver the socially optimal solution because it induces banks to abstain from gambling. Moreover, it alleviates socially harmful consequences of conventional equity-capital rules, which may induce banks to excessively cut back on lending or liquidate desirable long-term investment projects in downturns.

European comparisons for the 2000s show that Italy was among the EU countries where women were least represented in bank boardrooms. Using a unique dataset on Italian banks over the period 1995-2010, this paper investigates the effects of gender diversity in boards on bank riskiness and economic performance. Taking account of omitted variables and reverse causality problems, as a source of endogeneity, our main econometric findings suggest that gender diversity may have a positive impact on the quality of credit and, to a lesser extent, on profitability. Both results may be driven by women’s higher risk aversion and their attitude to monitoring activities. Our study therefore suggests that women are ‘gold dust’ for Italian banks and that increasing their presence may be beneficial to economic performance.

What is the relationship between entrepreneurial saving practices and reinvestment? We develop a model of entrepreneurial finance and show that entrepreneurial reinvestment decisions depend on the efficiency of saving practices. Utilizing a novel micro & small enterprise survey from Tanzania we test the empirical implications of this theory. We find (1) saving for business purposes and earnings reinvestment are positively related; (2) the practice of saving in a deposit account of a formal financial institution is more likely to facilitate a reinvestment compared to the practice of keeping savings within the household. We also show that the negative impact of saving within-the-household on investment is more pronounced for family members with inherently low intra-household bargaining power - such as females and non-head household members. Our work contributes to the recent debate on the implications of saving instruments in developing countries, and suggests informal saving practices as potential barriers to microenterprise performance.

In this paper, we analyse a novel panel data set to compare the relevance of alternative measures of capitalisation for bank failure during the 2007-10 crisis, and to search for evidence of manipulated Basel risk-weights. Compared with the unweighted leverage ratio, we find the risk-weighted asset ratio to be a superior predictor of bank failure when banks operate under the Basel II regime, provided that the risk of a crisis is low. When the risk of a crisis is high, the unweighted leverage ratio is the more reliable predictor. However, when banks do not operate under Basel II rules, both ratios perform comparably, independent of the risk of a crisis. Furthermore, we find a strong decline in the risk-weighted asset ratio leading up to the crisis. Several empirical findings indicate that this decline is driven by the strategic use of internal risk models under the Basel II advanced approaches. Evidence of manipulation is stronger in less competitive banking systems, in banks with low initial levels of Tier 1 capital and in banks that adopted Basel II rules early. We find tangible common equity and Tier 1 ratios to be better predictors of bank distress than broader measures of capital, and identify market-based measures of capitalisation as poor indicators. We find no relationship between the probability of a bank being selected into a public recapitalisation plan and regulatory measures of capital.

Banks create excessive systemic risk through leverage and maturity mismatch, as financial constraints introduce welfare-reducing pecuniary externalities. Macroprudential regulators can achieve efficiency with simple linear constraints on banks' balance sheets, which require less information than Pigouvian taxes. These can be implemented using the Liquidity Coverage and Net Stable Funding ratios of Basel III. When bank failures are socially costly, microprudential regulation of leverage is also required. Optimally, macroprudential policy reacts to changes in systematic risk and credit conditions over the business cycle, while microprudential policy reacts to both systematic and idiosyncratic risk.

The interwar years saw the rise of New York to challenge London as the world’s leading provider of financial services. This paper will show that the current explanations fail to identify a key factor in New York’s rise. The City was prevented from operating a full capacity by a capital issues embargo, imposed by the Bank of England to support the pound. As a result, New York was able to enter the sector with little competition from London, and expand rapidly to issue over half of the global capital exported abroad in the 1920s. Without the embargo, this would not have been possible, as the London merchant banks were the most productive producers in the industry, a position built up over the previous half century. This result challenges the consensus that the return to gold was good for the City. The merchant banks suffered and lost business, suggesting that this policy was even more disastrous than is currently thought.

In many countries, house prices are subject to boom/bust cycles and in some these are linked to severe economic and financial instability. Overheating can have both a price and a quantity dimension, but it is likely that they are linked by common drivers. However, much depends on the land-use planning regime which profoundly affects the supply response. It is helpful to make the distinction between overshooting of house prices due to extrapolative expectations and 'frenzy', given fundamentals, and shifts in possibly fragile fundamentals. The contribution of careful econometric modelling to estimating the effects of the former is demonstrated: central banks or other policy makers should institute quarterly surveys of house price expectations of potential housing market participants to help assess the first type of overshooting. Assessing the fragility or otherwise of the economic fundamentals is more complex. Credit supply conditions in the mortgage market are the 'elephant in the room'. Without taking a credit conditions measure into account, one simply cannot understand the behaviour of house prices, housing debt and consumption in countries such as Australia, the UK, the US, South Africa or France or understand vulnerability of some economies to high levels of household debt. Other financial and economic indicators of vulnerability are discussed, including high bank leverage ratios, high ratios of loans to deposits, debt, deficit and current account of ratios. Models of early warning of financial and economic crises estimated on large country panels need to be quite complex, for example, including some important interaction effects since shock transmission is very institution dependent.

We analyze the individual and macroeconomic impacts of heterogeneous expectations and action rules within an agent-based model populated by heterogeneous, interacting firms. Agents have to cope with a complex evolving economy characterized by deep uncertainty resulting from technical change, imperfect information and coordination hurdles. In these circumstances, we find that neither individual nor macroeconomic dynamics improve when agents replace myopic expectations with less naïve learning rules. In fact, more sophisticated, e.g. recursive least squares (RLS) expectations produce less accurate individual forecasts and also considerably worsen the performance of the economy. Finally, we experiment with agents that adjust simply to technological shocks, and we show that individual and aggregate performances dramatically degrade. Our results suggest that fast and frugal robust heuristics are not a second-best option: rather they are “rational” in macroeconomic environments with heterogeneous, interacting agents and changing “fundamentals”.

The development of shadow banking system in China catalyzes the expansion of banks’ off-balance-sheet activities, resulting in a distortion of China’s traditional credit expansion and underestimation of its commercial banks’ overall risk. This paper is the first to incorporate banks’ overall risk, endogenously into bank’s production process as undesirable by-product for the estimation of banks’ total factor efficiency (TFE) as well as TFE of each production factor. A unique data sample of 171 Chinese commercial banks, which is the largest data sample concerning with Chinese banking efficiency issues until now as far as we know, making our results more convincing and meaningful. Our results show that, compared with a model incorporated with banks’ overall risk, a model considering on-balance-sheet lending activities only may over-estimate the overall average TFE and under-estimate TFE volatility as a whole. Higher overall risk taking of banks tends to decrease bank TFE through ‘diverting effect’. However, significant heterogeneities of bank integrated TFE (TFIE) and TFE of each production factor exist among banks of different types or located in different regions, as a result of still prominent unbalanced development of Chinese commercial banks today. Based on newly estimated TFIE, the paper also investigates the determinants of bank efficiency, and finds that a model with risk-weighted assets as undesirable outputs can better capture the impact of shadow banking involvement.

We use randomized interest rates, offered across eighty geographically distinct regions for twenty-nine months by Mexico’s largest microlender, to sketch the adjustment from a price change to a new equilibrium. Demand is elastic, and more so over the longer run; e.g. the dollars-borrowed elasticity increases from $-$1.1 in Year one to $-$2.9 in Year three. Credit bureau data do not show evidence of crowd-out, although this and other null results are imprecisely estimated. The lender’s profits increase, albeit noisily, starting in Year two. But competitors do not respond by reducing rates. These findings, together with other results, suggest that informational frictions are important, and that cutting rates furthered Compartamos Banco’s “double bottom line” of improving social welfare subject to a profitability constraint.

We study a controlled experiment in which a bank's loan officers were incentivized based on originated loan volume to encourage prospecting for new business. While treated loan officers did attract new applications, both extensive and intensive margins of loan origination expanded (+ 31% new loans; loan size + 15%). We find that loan officers gave greater weight to hard information in approval decisions. Despite no change in the observable characteristics of approved loans, their default rate increased (+ 24%). Finally, the bank's imputed credit default model lost its predictive power. Overall, loan prospecting incentives led to unfavorable soft information being overlooked in the origination process.

When borrowers are delinquent, senior debtholders prefer liquidation, whereas junior debtholders prefer to maintain their option value by delaying resolution or modifying the loan. In the mortgage market, a conflict of interest (“holdup”) arises when servicers of securitized senior liens are also the owners of the junior liens on the same property. We show that holdup servicers are able to delay action on the first-lien mortgage. When they do act, servicers are more likely to choose resolutions that maintain their option value, favoring modification and soft foreclosures over outright foreclosures. Holdup behavior is more likely to result in borrower self-curing.

This paper investigates the importance of bank loans for the financing of startups and how location matters for expansion plans and financing. We will show that there has not been sufficient attention paid to legal form when distinguishing between the external and internal financing of startups. The focus will be on the corporate form of business and the implications of this legal form for what can be considered external financing. In the analysis of how location matters, we will draw upon the literature about agglomeration and knowledge spillovers. The two main questions posed are: How does the corporate form matter for what can be considered the external financing of startups, and how does location matter for expansion plans and financing? To provide empirical answers to these questions, both survey data and registry data have been used. The survey data are from a questionnaire sent out to startups listed in the files of the Swedish Jobs and Society Foundation. We looked at corporations founded during the period 2009-2013 that family firms in terms of ownership structure. The survey indicated that bank loans are rare and had to be backed up with personal assets used as collateral and personal guarantees of repayment for the majority of the firms who had used bank loans. Essentially, the entrepreneur personally takes most of the business risk. Bank loans have, to a large extent, the character of internal financing. Combining registry data with the qualitative data from the survey, we used regression analysis to further study differences due to location. The regression analysis showed that the degree of urbanization matters for plans for expansion. In the three most urbanized areas, the startup firms had plans to expand their business both at home and abroad. In the other urbanized areas, the focus was on expansion at home.

Using harmonized wealth data and a novel decomposition approach, we show that cohort effects exist in the income profiles of asset and debt portfolios for a sample of European countries, the U.S. and Canada. We find that younger households' participation decisions in assets are more responsive to income than older households. Family structure plays a significant role in explaining cross-country differences for both cohorts. Examining institutional differences, we find that in more financially developed and economically open countries, households are less likely to own housing but more likely to be in debt. Typical mortgage characteristics and mathematical literacy are also correlated with debt participation across countries. These findings have important implications for policy setting during times of financial unease for the young, as well as for the future in helping secure adequate income for the elderly. Our results show that there is scope for policies which promote asset participation for young households and debt participation, where there is a need for consumpation smoothing, for older households.

This paper shows that the sovereign debt crisis and the resulting credit crunch in the periphery of the Eurozone lead to negative real effects for borrowing firms. Using a hand matched sample of loan information from Dealscan and accounting information from Amadeus, we show that firms with a higher exposure to banks affected by the sovereign debt crisis become financially constrained during the crisis. As a result, these firms have significantly lower employment growth, capital expenditures, and sales growth rates. We show that our results are not driven by country or industry-specific macroeconomic shocks or a change in the demand for credit of borrowing firms. Thus, the high interdependence of bank and sovereign health and the resulting credit crunch is one important contributor to the severe economic downturn in the southern European countries during the sovereign debt crisis.

We show that supply-side financial shocks have a large impact on firms' investment. We develop a new methodology to separate firm-borrowing shocks from bank-supply shocks using a vast sample of matched bank-firm lending data. We decompose aggregate loan movements in Japan for the period 1990 to 2010 into bank, firm, industry, and common shocks. The high degree of financial institution concentration means that individual banks are large relative to the size of the economy, which creates a role for granular shocks as in Gabaix (2011). We show that idiosyncratic granular bank-supply shocks explain 30-40 percent of aggregate loan and investment fluctuations.

In this paper, we assess empirically whether financial inclusion contributes to reducing income inequality when controlling for other key factors, such as economic development and fiscal policy. We conclude that financial inclusion contributes to reducing income inequality to a significant degree, while the size of the financial sector does not. Although our results are still preliminary and constrained by data limitations, they still bear significant policy implications. More specifically, fostering financial inclusion has one more important by-product, which had hardly been analyzed yet, namely reducing income inequality. More specifically, given the broad definition of financial inclusion used in our analysis, promoting financial inclusion implies facilitating the use of credit to low-income households, as well as granting credit to small and medium-sized enterprises.

We present a novel empirical benchmark for analyzing credit risk using “pseudo firms” that purchase traded assets financed with equity and zero-coupon bonds. By no-arbitrage, pseudo bonds are equivalent to Treasuries minus put options on pseudo firm assets. Empirically, like corporate spreads, pseudo bond spreads are large, countercyclical, and predict lower economic growth. Using this framework, we find that bond market illiquidity, investors' overestimation of default risks, and corporate frictions do not seem to explain excessive observed credit spreads but, instead, a risk premium for tail and idiosyncratic asset risks is the primary determinant of corporate spreads. (JEL E23, E32, E44, G13, G24, G32)

This study examines the exposure of microfinance institutions to liquidity-, interest rate and foreign exchange (FX) risk. Using manually collected data from microfinance institutions’ financial reporting, I find that the microfinance sector faces minimal liquidity risk, high interest rate risk and a lower than commonly assumed exposure to FX risk. Linking risk exposure to institutional characteristics, the data shows that legal status and regional affiliation are correlated with risk exposure while regulatory quality is not. Results suggest that the development community may not expect large benefits from expanding the plethora of current measures taken to mitigate liquidity or FX risk.

We study how debt market frictions that constrain the ability of firms to buffer a tightening in bank credit supply affect corporate yield spreads. We focus on the frictions driven by the regional availability of debt financing. We provide evidence of a strong regional segmentation in the debt market, and build a measure of debt inflexibility that captures the inability to replace bank loans with corporate bonds. We document that more inflexible firms suffer a bigger increase in yield spreads as bank credit tightens. The impact is stronger among smaller firms, lower rated firms, and firms relying more on bank debt. Further, more inflexible firms display a stronger link between yield spreads and cash flow volatility, a stronger link between yield spreads and stock volatility (Campbell and Taksler, 2003) as well as a closer connection between changes in yield spreads and stock returns.

Why does the market discipline that financial intermediaries face seem too weak during booms and too strong during crises? This paper shows in a general equilibrium setting that rollover risk as a disciplining device is effective only if all intermediaries face purely idiosyncratic risk. However, if assets are correlated, a two-sided inefficiency arises: Good aggregate states have intermediaries taking excessive risks, while bad aggregate states suffer from costly fire sales. The driving force behind this inefficiency is an amplifying feedback loop between asset values and market discipline. In equilibrium, financial intermediaries inefficiently amplify both positive and negative aggregate shocks.

Surprisingly little is known about the importance of mortgage payment size for default, as efforts to measure the treatment effect of rate increases or loan modifications are confounded by borrower selection. We study a sample of hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages that have experienced large rate reductions over the past years and are largely immune to these selection concerns. We show that interest rate reductions dramatically affect repayment behavior, even for borrowers who are significantly underwater on their mortgages. Our estimates imply that cutting a borrower's payment in half reduces his hazard of becoming delinquent by about 55 percent, an effect approximately equivalent to lowering the borrower's combined loan-to-value ratio from 145 to 95 (holding the payment fixed). These findings shed light on the driving forces behind default behavior and have important implications for public policy.

In the years preceding the 2007-2009 financial crisis, forward-looking indicators of bank risk concentrated and suggested unusually low expectations of bank default. We assess whether the ex-ante (i.e. prior to the crisis) cross-sectional variability in bank characteristics is related to the ex-post (i.e. during the crisis) materialization of bank risk. Our tailor-made dataset crucially accounts for the different dimensions of realized bank risk including access to central bank liquidity during the crisis. We consistently find that less reliance on deposit funding, more aggressive credit growth, larger size and leverage were associated with larger levels of realized risk. The impact of these characteristics is particularly relevant for capturing the systemic dimensions of bank risk and tends to become stronger for the tail of the riskier banks. The majority of these characteristics also predicted bank risk as materialized before the financial crisis.

© 2017 Elsevier B.V. We study the effect of mortgage prepayment penalties on borrowers’ prepayments and delinquencies by exploiting a 2007 reform in Italy that reduced penalties on outstanding mortgages and banned penalties on newly-issued mortgages. Using a unique dataset of mortgages issued by a large Italian lender, we provide evidence that: 1) before the reform, mortgages issued to riskier borrowers included larger penalties; 2) higher prepayment penalties decreased borrowers’ prepayments; and 3) higher prepayment penalties did not affect borrowers’ delinquencies. Moreover, we find suggestive evidence that prepayment penalties affected mortgage pricing, as well as prepayments and delinquencies through borrowers’ mortgage selection at origination, most notably for riskier borrowers.

Using vector autoregressive models with either constant or time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility for the United States, we find that a contractionary monetary policy shock has a persistent negative impact on the asset growth of commercial banks, but increases the asset growth of shadow banks and securitisation activity. To explain this ‘waterbed’ effect, we propose a standard New Keynesian model featuring both commercial and shadow banking, and we show that the model comes close to explaining the empirical results. Our findings cast doubt on the idea that monetary policy can usefully ‘get in all the cracks’ of the financial sector in a uniform way.

We study the effect of the increase in Italian sovereign debt risk on credit supply on a sample of 670,000 bank-firm relationships between December 2010 and December 2011, drawn from the Italian Central Credit Register. To identify a causal link, we exploit the lower impact of sovereign risk on foreign banks operating in Italy than on domestic banks. We study firms borrowing from at least two banks and include firm x period fixed effects in all regressions to controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity. We find that Italian banks tightened credit supply: the lending of Italian banks grew by about 3 percentage points less than that of foreign banks, and their interest rates were 15-20 basis points higher, after the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis. We test robustness by splitting foreign banks into branches and subsidiaries, and then examine whether selected bank characteristics may have amplified or mitigated the impact. We also study the extensive margin of credit, analyzing banks' propensity to terminate existing relationships and to grant new loan applications. Finally, we test whether firms were able to compensate for the reduction of credit from Italian banks by borrowing more from foreign banks. We find that this was not the case, so that the sovereign crisis had an aggregate impact on credit supply.

We assess the effects of reforms in product and labor markets in a model economy featuring credit restrictions and pre-existing long-term debt. Both elements, which are core features of the current scenario faced by some euro area countries, combine to produce a slow and protracted deleveraging of the private sector and a persistent recession following a negative financial shock. In this environment, we show that product and labor market reforms may stimulate output and employment even in the short run, despite their defl ationary effects. Furthermore, by favoring a faster recovery of investment and collateral values, product market reforms bring forward the end of deleveraging and the exit from recession.

An increase in the household debt to GDP ratio in the medium run predicts lower subsequent GDP growth, higher unemployment, and negative growth forecasting errors in a panel of 30 countries from 1960 to 2012. Consistent with the “credit supply hypothesis,” we show that low mortgage spreads predict an increase in the household debt to GDP ratio and a decline in subsequent GDP growth when used as an instrument. The negative relation between the change in household debt to GDP and subsequent output growth is stronger for countries that face stricter monetary policy constraints as measured by a less flexible exchange rate regime, proximity to the zero lower bound, or more external borrowing. A rise in the household debt to GDP ratio is contemporaneously associated with a consumption boom followed by a reversal in the trade deficit as imports collapse. We also uncover a global household debt cycle that partly predicts the severity of the global growth slowdown after 2007. Countries with a household debt cycle more correlated with the global household debt cycle experience a sharper decline in growth after an increase in domestic household debt.

Microfinance groups often engage in a variety of collective activities not directly related to credit. We design a three-stage repayment game to examine how the existence of these ancillary activities affect repayment behavior and group attrition. In the first stage, the group borrows under joint liability, each member undertakes a risky project and decides whether or not to contribute to loan repayment. In the second stage, contributing members can vote to expel others from the group. Those remaining engage in a public goods game in the last stage. The public good game represents the non-credit collective activity that members can be involved in. We identify repayment equilibria with and without exclusion and show that exclusionary equilibria are most likely when loans are large and there is significant within-group heterogeneity in the gains from the public good. Results from a laboratory experiment that embodies the main features of the repayment game are consistent with the theoretical predictions. Individual decisions to contribute to loan repayment depend on gains from the public good and groups with the largest debt burdens have the highest rates of default and attrition.

Banks are optimally opaque institutions. They produce debt for use as a transaction medium (bank money), which requires that information about the backing assets – loans – not be revealed, so that bank money does not fluctuate in value, reducing the efficiency of trade. This need for opacity conflicts with the production of information about investment projects, needed for allocative efficiency. Intermediaries exist to hide such information, so banks select portfolios of information-insensitive assets. For the economy as a whole, firms endogenously separate into bank finance and capital market/stock market finance depending on the cost of producing information about their projects.

This paper documents the cyclical properties of financial intermediation costs and uses their dynamics to explain excess consumption volatility differences across countries in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework. I find that financial development levels have no role in explaining excess consumption volatilities. Instead, the volatility of the financial sector plays the determinative role. The model matches the data, finding excess consumption volatility to be four times higher in an average emerging country compared to the US. This paper also shows that if the US had the same intermediation cost structure as the average emerging country, deteriorations in the production, consumption, labor market, business investment, and real estate market following a financial shock would increase sixfold, on average.

This paper develops a model of a competitive search credit market under hidden information and limited commitment. Using the model, it provides a theoretical account that links time delays and costs in financial intermediation as well as lack of collateral to the distribution of credit supply and interest rate spreads. The link sheds light on and explains the possibility of pure credit rationing due to the credit frictions. This paper also demonstrates the possibility of contract dispersion among homogeneous borrowers.

We examine the delinquency rate for mortgages originated before and after the 2008 financial crisis, using a novel and large representative panel obtained by merging data from tax records and credit registers. First, we estimate the selection into the mortgage market using an exogenous index of local credit supply as exclusion restriction. Second, controlling for selection we estimate the impact of income shocks on the probability of recording a delinquency. We find that since 2008 the selection process operated by banks has led to the halving of the delinquency rate. Conditional on mortgage origination, a job loss nearly doubles the delinquency risk. Estimates uncorrected for selection are subject to severe downward biased.

Since the 2007-08 crisis, banks in many countries have been facing what seems to be a serious “trust crisis”. This sharp decline in trust in banks and banking, the likely outcome of the near-collapse of banking systems during the crisis, is partly captured by a growing empirical literature. However, this literature presents serious shortcomings, which reflect a more general lack of theorization of trust in banks. This lack of theorization certainly has much to do with the distance between the economic literature on banks and banking and the sociological and economic literature on trust. This paper aims at bridging this gap by proposing a new conceptual framework. In particular, the paper identifies three related dimensions of trust that seem to have relevance for the banking industry: “relational”, “systemic” and “vertical” trust. While mainstream financial intermediation theory and agency theory provide a good understanding of relational trust, they are less well equipped to deal with the other dimensions of trust. The paper, therefore, builds on heterodox theories of money and debt to build a more comprehensive understanding of trust in banks. This tentative conceptual framework, in turn, has implications for current theories of banking and of trust.

It is a popular perception that administrative receivers and their appointors hold «too much» power in relation to troubled companies. Many who hold this view have called for the reform of insolvency law in order to redress the balance of power. This issue is timely, because insolvency law is currently under review. This article argues that although the law's formal structure is imbalanced, it can nevertheless generate savings for parties, by allowing a concentrated creditor who has invested in information-gathering about the debtor to conduct a private insolvency procedure. It is suggested that this procedure is likely to be more efficient than one conducted by a state official, and that it is likely to reduce the costs of debt finance, a matter of particular importance for small and medium-sized businesses. Empirical data are presented from 26 interviews with practitioners, which shed further light on the operation of receivership. Finally, the current law is compared with possible alternatives. It is argued that the case for wide-ranging reform is not made out.

Recent theoretical literature has debated the desirability of permitting debtors to contract with lenders over control rights in bankruptcy. Proponents point to the monitoring benefits brought from concentrating control rights in the hands of a single lender. Detractors point to the costs imposed on other creditors by a senior claimant's inadequate incentives to maximise net recoveries. The UK provides the setting for a natural experiment regarding these theories. Until recently, UK bankruptcy law permitted firms to give complete ex post control to secured creditors, through a procedure known as Receivership. Receivership was replaced in 2003 by a new procedure, Administration, which was intended to introduce greater accountability to unsecured creditors to the governance of bankrupt firms, through a combination of voting rights and fiduciary duties. We present empirical findings from a hand-coded sample of 348 bankruptcies from both before and after the change in the law, supplemented with qualitative interview data. We find robust evidence that whilst gross realisations have increased following the change in the law, these have tended to be eaten up by concomitantly increased bankruptcy costs. The net result has been that creditor recoveries have remained unchanged. This implies that dispersed and concentrated creditor governance in bankruptcy may be functionally equivalent.

The world’s poor are seeing a rapid expansion in access to formal savings accounts. What is the source of savings when households are connected to a formal account? We combine a high-frequency panel survey spanning two and a half years with an experiment in which a Sri Lankan bank used mobile Point-of-Service (POS) terminals to collect deposits directly from households each week. We find that the headwaters of formal savings lie in sacrificed leisure time: households work more, and improved savings options generate an increase in labour effort in both self-employment and in the wage market. The results suggest that the labour allocation channel is an important mechanism linking savings opportunities to income.

This paper explores whether the extent of informality in a sector affects a firm's investment decision directly or indirectly through a credit availability channel. The dataset used in the estimation of the econometric models consists of an unbalanced panel of Uruguayan firms for the period 1997-2008. The results suggest that financial restrictions affect investment decisions in Uruguay, as an increase in credit to the private sector translates into higher investment rates. A one percentage point increase in overall credit growth translates into a one half percent increase in investment rates. It is also found that, although there is no direct effect of informality on the firm investment decision, there is an indirect effect through the borrowing channel. More specifically, financial restrictions reduce the amount of investment undertaken by Uruguayan firms, the effect being smaller if the firm operates in a sector with lower informality.

We assess the impact on the credit supply to non-financial corporations of the two very long term refinancing operations (VLTROs) conducted by the Eurosystem in December 2011 and February 2012 for the case of Spain. To do so we use bank–firm level information from a sample of more than one million lending relationships during two years. Our methodology tackles three main identification challenges: (i) how to disentangle credit supply from demand; (ii) the non-random assignment of firms to banks; (iii) the endogeneity of the VLTRO bids, as banks with more deteriorated funding conditions were more likely both to ask for a large amount of funds and to restrain credit supply. Our findings suggest that the VLTROs had a positive moderate-sized effect on the supply of bank credit to firms. We also find that the effect was greater for illiquid banks and that it was driven by credit to SMEs, as there was no impact on loans to large firms. By contrast, strong firm–bank relationships were less sensitive to the positive liquidity shock caused by the VLTROs, which is consistent with the studies that find that relationship lending is a more stable source of credit than transaction lending. Finally, the VLTROs had no impact on either the degree of loan collateralisation or the probability of making loans to new borrowers, while they decreased the probability of renewing old ones, which suggests that those funds were not used for loan “evergreening”.

Using account-level credit card data from six major commercial banks from January 2009 to December 2013, we apply machine-learning techniques to combined consumer tradeline, credit bureau, and macroeconomic variables to predict delinquency. In addition to providing accurate measures of loss probabilities and credit risk, our models can also be used to analyze and compare risk management practices and the drivers of delinquency across banks. We find substantial heterogeneity in risk factors, sensitivities, and predictability of delinquency across banks, implying that no single model applies to all six institutions. We measure the efficacy of a bank's risk management process by the percentage of delinquent accounts that a bank manages effectively, and find that efficacy also varies widely across institutions. These results suggest the need for a more customized approached to the supervision and regulation of financial institutions, in which capital ratios, loss reserves, and other parameters are specified individually for each institution according to its credit risk model exposures and forecasts.

We examine how the impact on women’s empowerment varies with respect to the location and type of group linkage of the respondent. Using household survey data from five states in India, we correct for selection bias to estimate a structural equation model. Our results reveal that in the southern states of India empowerment of women takes place through economic factors. For the other states, we find a significant correlation between women’s empowerment and autonomy in women’s decision-making and network, communication and political participation respectively. We do not, however, find any differential causal impact of different delivery methods (linkage models).

The CLASS model is a top-down capital stress testing framework that uses public data, simple econometric models and auxiliary assumptions to project the effect of macroeconomic scenarios on U.S. banking firms. Through the lens of the model, we find that the total banking system capital shortfall under stressful macroeconomic conditions began to rise 4 years before the financial crisis, peaking in the fourth quarter of 2008. The capital gap has since fallen sharply, and is now significantly below pre-crisis levels. In the cross-section, banking firms estimated to be most sensitive to macroeconomic conditions also have higher capital ratios, consistent with a “precautionary” view of bank capital, though this behavior is evident only since the crisis. We interpret our results as evidence that the resiliency of the U.S. banking system has improved since the financial crisis, and also as an illustration of the value of stress testing as a macroprudential policy tool.

The announcement of Timothy Geithner as nominee for Treasury Secretary in November 2008 produced a cumulative abnormal return for financial firms with which he had a prior connection. This return was about 6% after the first full day of trading and about 12% after ten trading days. There were subsequently abnormal negative returns for connected firms when news broke that Geithner’s confirmation might be derailed by tax issues. Personal connections to top executive branch officials can matter greatly even in a country with strong overall institutions, at least during a time of acute financial crisis and heightened policy discretion.