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Tensions in the Brazilian countryside characterized the period before the military coup of 1964, with the intense participation of organized groups demanding land reform projects and access to rights. This research proposes an analysis of different forms of struggle put into practice in the states of Rio Grande do Sul and Pernambuco between the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the first state, there were mobilizations legitimized by Leonel Brizola government initiatives (1959-1963). The Peasant Leagues emerged in the state of Pernambuco; this movement embodied the struggle for agrarian reform in the country at the time, settling space for the advancement of rural workers unionization, during Miguel Arraes government (1963-1964). Therefore, the thesis seeks to identify how these alternatives contributed to the consolidation of instruments that have remained source of strength even after the advance of repression imposed by the Brazilian military regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the paradox of unpopular corruption and popular corrupt politicians. It explores why corrupt politicians are reelected, paying particular attention to incumbent provision of public goods and voter information on incumbent misconduct. Using a new data set on mayoral elections (2000 and 2004) in the Brazilian state of Pernambuco, we specify econometric models to test the hypothesis that incumbents' performance in delivering public goods might mitigate reputational losses. Our main empirical analysis suggests that (1) corruption decreases the probability of incumbent reelection, (2) public expenditure increases the probability of reelection, and (3) the negative marginal effect of corruption on reelection disappears as public expenditure increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]