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Tins paper is intended as an effort at taking-stock of the reference group concept after nearly three decades of use, the latter two of which have been marked by its more than ample employment. Its popularity indeed has so frequently led to its serving as an all-purpose post hoc explanation of behavior that it has led to the wry definition, "Your reference group is a group that you behave like and you behave like them because they're your reference group" (Cohen, 1962: 104). The inconsistencies, lack of clarity, but also areas of agreement which have marked the varied formulations of the concept, will be apparent from the following review and commentary. The Final discussion indicates some of the matters still to be considered in the use of thin important but perhaps overworked concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ordinarily an anniversary occasions the reification of an artificial period. In this case however, there is a certain juncture in the history of the point of view which makes of the past quarter-century something worthy of consideration for symbolic interactionism as well as for our celebration of the founding of the Midwest Sociological Society. The year 1937 lies virtually in the middle of a four-year period which saw the publication of Mind, Self, and Society, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, and The Philosophy of the Act. It would represent the greatest naiveté to suggest that thus the year 1937 represented the introduction of symbolic interactionism. We are all aware of the long development: from James, Baldwin, and Cooley to Thomas, Faris, Dewey, Blumer, and Young. Even the Tardean imitation and suggestion which underlay Ross's Social Psychology contributed a good deal ordinarily not credited to him in the development of interaction theory. Nor is it the fact that Mead represents the fullest development of the orientation that makes so significant the posthumous publication of his works (for which we may conveniently take 1937 as an anchoring point). Mead's ideas had been known for a very long time. He had taught University of Chicago students from 1893 to 1931. His notions were bruited about in classes and seminars wherever there were professors conducting them who had studied at the University of Chicago—not least in the great heartland included in the Mid-west of our Society. Some of Mead's students had published their versions of his ideas or quotations from some of his philosophical papers—Kimbali Young's Source Book in Social Psychology of a decade earlier contained a paper by Mead, and his Social Psychology bore the strong imprint of Meadian interactionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper suggests possible implications of a study of clothing fashion leadership for current sociological theory in regard to the process of fashion diffusion. Theory of the diffusion of innovations was chosen as the framework for the investigation. Fashion innovativeness and fashion opinion leadership were studied in relation to selected social, psychological, and economic variables. Since the test of collective selection occurs in the local social system it would seem appropriate that theories regarding the operation of the fashion process account more fully for the rate and degree of acceptance and rejection of innovations in the local social system, and for the functions of local participants in the process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interest in the diffusion of innovations has, in the last twenty years, produced a plethora of research findings, which have been summarized by a number of writers (e.g., Lionberger, 1960; Rogers, 1962, 1967 and 1968; Katz et al., 1963; Jones, 1967; Bohlen, 1064). However, these summaries are basically taxonomic and programmatic rather than theoretic in nature. As the paucity of theoretical work in diffusion studies has been well recognized (cf. Bogers, 1962:300; Robinson and Bailey, 1965:332), there exists a real need for us to search for a general theory pertinent to this field. The aim of the present paper is to discuss a recurrent theme running through many diffusion studies, namely the old concept of adopter-innovation compatibility, and to show how this concept looms as highly suggestive of its utility as a theoretical approach to the studies in the diffusion of innovations and social change. The notion of adopter-innovation compatibility has been utilized in recent diffusion research in two general ways: explicitly and implicitly. We shall therefore discuss first these two different modes in which it has been used and then its implications as a general theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is intended as an effort at taking stock of the reference group concept after three decades of use in sociological research. The inconsistencies and some areas of agreement shared by social scientists are presented. Throughout its history, the phenomena of the reference group have been described by the idea of social groups, namely in-groups and out-groups, primary groups and significant others. The crucial problem in the reference group theory is stated as that of "ascertaining how a person defines such a situation, which perspective he uses in arriving in a definition, and who constitutes the audience whose responses provide the necessary confirmation and support for his position." The value of the reference group concept in specifying the types of others "represents a vast simplification and fairly sharp specification of the idea of the other" and the idea that groups other than one's own may serve to shape one's frame of reference is economically articulated by the concept.

The present paper began with an attempt to formalize the Davis-Moore functional theory of social stratification. It was found that the theory could be represented by a static model consisting of two algebraic equations with appropriate constraints on the functions. Then the tools of path analysis were used to evaluate the empirical adequacy of the Davis-Moore and Parsonian functional theories of social stratification as representations of cultural beliefs about stratification. Because of the likely presence of measurement and sampling errors, it was impossible to reject definitely either of the models. However, the estimated path coefficients were more consistent with the Parsonian theory than the Davis-Moore theory. This led to an inquiry into the conditions under which one model would be a better representation than the other. It was argued that the Davis-Moore scheme would provide a more accurate representation of cultural beliefs under conditions of high organizational interdependence whereas the Parsonian framework would give a better representation under conditions of low interdependence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on an article by Hugh Dalziel Duncan, which discussed the uses and misuses of Max Weber's types of legitimationin American sociology. The author of this article said that he delivered a critical paper on the social theory of Talcott Parsons, the substance of which was a rather stern injunction for him to realize that social action was better conceived of as symbolic interaction, and that man's propensity for selection and creativeness made social process out of what he thought was social system. Since the true breadth of Duncan's theoretical perspective may unwittingly have been obscured by a rather heavily developed critique of Parsons, it might be pointed out that at a time when the social organizational and social psychological dimensions of our field are increasingly subject to disparate analysis, Duncan's function has been to mount a campaign for their reintegration through an expanded and improved synmbolic interaction approach.

It has been almost twenty years since Davis and Moore published their famed theory of stratification. During this period, the discussions which it has engendered have been numerous and highly instructive. It is now time to address ourselves to problems which concern the testability of the theory and its experimental validity. This paper reports the results of an empirical study of one of the basic issues raised by Davis and Moore. A major proposition of their theory argues that in the final analysis, social stratification arises in a society because of differential rewards for performance in the social positions therein. These rewards can be of several types. For our purposes, two are of major importance: symbolic and economic rewards, hereafter referred to as "prestige" and "reward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]