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Australia's new government is committed to delivering the next defence white paper in 2015. The two previous white papers took a predominantly risk-management approach to Southeast Asia, generally ignored the strategic opportunities in the region, treated it as a stand-alone region largely unrelated to developments in East Asia and failed to link Australia's policies in Southeast Asia with the broader goal of helping to ensure greater strategic stability in Asia by putting constraints on Chinese assertiveness and encouraging its peaceful rise. After offering a summary of recent Australian defence thinking on Southeast Asia, this paper outlines why managing China is the key variable when it comes to strategic stability in the region. It then examines how China's strategy and behaviour can be shaped and influenced by events and relationships in Southeast Asia, and offers some suggestions as to the role Australia can seek to play in Southeast Asia that relates to Canberra's China-focused objectives and strategic stability in Asia more broadly If that can be achieved in the 2015 defence white paper, Australia - which is often criticized for being preoccupied primarily with managing the relationship with its superpower ally the United States - will demonstrate to itself and Asia that its heavy reliance on the ANZUS treaty is no barrier to strategic creativity in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the international financing of higher education, an important yet understudied facet of contemporary policy and practice. The paper takes the globally significant China-Australia relationship as a case study. This paper argues that analysing the international political economy of the China-Australia case better illuminates the dynamics of financials flow through situating them in their socio-political context. Through such analysis, the paper makes empirical contributions of relevance to policy and practice. It also contributes more broadly to reframing the design of work in this field by asserting the methodological need for analysing international finance and the conceptual need to take such matters into account.

The article discusses Australia's approach towards world as revealed in Defence White Paper (DWP) 2013, released by Australia's former Prime Minister Julia Gillard on May 3, 2013. DWP mentions that Australia has approved several proposals for defence procurement including the unveiling of new aircrafts and has also signed strategic partnership agreement with China in an effort to strengthen its military system. Also discussed are Australia's good relationship with India and the U.S.

More than any previous generation, today's students need to develop a global perspective and be knowledgeable about other nations in order to play a better role on the global stage. This paper first reviews some earlier and current studies on students' knowledge of the world, mainly conducted in the United States, and then it describes the global education status and similar studies in countries like Canada, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Based on a review of studies in these countries, the paper proposes that contemporary assessments of students' cross-national and global knowledge and attitudes are necessary. The new research must be multinational, assessing what paired nations' school aged populations know about one another's history, geography, politics, economics, and international relations. (Contains 1 footnote.)

Compared with similar research mainly focusing on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Australian mainstream media using discourse analysis, this paper explores the reasons for the narrative shift by conducting semi-structured interviews with leading and well-known Australian narrative producers. This paper takes two conditions as a given. Firstly, the BRI narratives in Australian mainstream media shifted in tone from mostly positive to highly critical. Secondly, the Australian mainstream media's increasingly negative attitudes towards the BRI are essentially not just about the BRI but the Chinese government. Based on my analysis and interviews, this paper makes contributions by filling in the gap of finding out reasons to explain this narrative shift. More concretely, this paper finds out that while mainstream media is influential in many areas of national policy making, mainstream media reporting on foreign affairs is less so. By comparison, the Australian government's BRI or China policy has a significant impact on Australian mainstream media reporting. This narrative shift has been driven by international politics and Australia's China policy, influenced by Australian audiences' preference of local news and their local position, and its democratic responsibilities. Meanwhile, the vagueness and constant changing characteristics of the BRI do not help the understanding of the BRI in Australian media. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sino-Australia relations have experienced a rapid deterioration in the past half-decade. From genial ties centred around trade and exchange, the relationship has descended into mutual hostility, prompting the editor of China's Global Times to notoriously liken Australia to a blob of gum on the bottom of a shoe. To explain the deteriorating relationship, scholars have proposed numerous ideas, pointing to factors as wide-ranging as 'Chinese influence', poor diplomacy efforts, and ontological (in)security touched off by neoliberal governmentality. The current paper examines these ideas in a literature review, then synthesises such ideas to provide its own explanation of why things 'went wrong'. It also addresses corollary questions such as why Australia adopted a uniquely assertive China policy, and why this occurred specifically around 2017. We argue that the breakdown in relations can be attributed to the rise of nationalist, sovereignty-oriented movements in the West, and the spillover effect this had on Australian leadership; the profound uncertainty attending the election of Trump and his isolationist tendencies; and the shift to a more rigid, authoritarian approach to foreign affairs under Xi. This perspective adds to the literature by identifying failings on both sides while underscoring significant yet underappreciated global trends, such as nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the changing geo-political situation in the Asia-Pacific Region from an Australian defense policy perspective. The article focuses on China, the US, and Indonesia and examines Australia's strategic defense needs for the coming decade. The paper concludes by laying out four strategic defense options for Australia, 1. maintaining the US alliance, 2. going back to "fortress Australia," 3. towards Asian integrations, and 4. the "New Zealand" option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Like many other regional powers in the Asia‐Pacific, Australia is a middle‐sized state wedged between two great powers, the United States (US) and the People's Republic of China. While Australia continues to rely upon the US alliance for security, China remains its biggest trading partner. Over the past two decades, Australia's public foreign policy discussions have centred upon Australia's "China Choice" in the context of growing strategic rivalry between these dominant powers. This debate has sought to grapple with the options available to Australia in managing its relations with an increasingly assertive China and an unpredictable US. This article examines the public debate on China policy since the election of the conservative Liberal‐National Coalition government in 2013. It argues the appropriateness of a pragmatic foreign policy in relation to the engagement of great powers has been the central question in Australia's China debate. Yet what constitutes pragmatic action in relation to Australia's China policy is varied and based on differing understandings of how middle‐sized states can and do seek to cope with structural shifts. The paper also argues, however, that an emergent anti‐pragmatist tradition has recently emerged that reflects the unprecedented challenges facing Australian foreign policy and presents "pragmatism" as a threat to Australian sovereignty, principles, and values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Asia's middle powers face a trilateral dilemma stemming from their relationships with the U.S. and China. This paper uses the Australian example to examine the dilemma. It shows that Australia has bound itself to the U.S. because of domestic political factors, cost considerations, a belief that it can keep its interests separate, and its perception of regional threats. The paper then argues that others are likely to resolve their trilateral dilemmas in ways that make the regional strategic dynamic more competitive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of the rise of China, Southeast Asian countries and Australia have begun shifting towards an accommodation policy. Robert Ross examines the accommodation policy in South Korea, Mochizuki discusses Japanese accommodationists, and Manicom and O'Neil show some evidence of Australian accommodation of Chinese strategic preferences. The scholarship has, however, narrowly focused on and overestimated the role of security. Through a study of the origin, process, structural conditions and impacts of accommodation policy, this paper broadens the concept of accommodation to capture its multiple meanings and practices. It finds that a selective accommodation policy and strategy toward the rise of China developed in Australia is a sign of the changing power relations under which the mainstream paradigms of containment and engagement, hard balancing or bandwagoning, have proved inadequate to the task of dealing with China, and that economic interdependence has driven the politics of accommodation in Australia and several Asian countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the context of the ongoing international debate concerning the efficacy or otherwise of the NPT and IAEA in preventing or managing nuclear proliferation, Australia's undertaking to enter a nuclear cooperation agreement with the People's Republic of China (PRC), once identified as a “strategic competitor” of Australia's major alliance partner the United States (US), suggests that Australia's approach to proliferation issues is being re-evaluated. This paper argues, utilising an analysis of the relationship between the evolving US approach to nuclear issues and Australian policy, that the Howard government's evolving approach to nuclear issues can be characterised as an attempt to balance the competing imperatives of maintaining Australia's reputation as a nuclear non-proliferation standard bearer, regional strategic and economic considerations and the weight of the Australia-US alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a critical overview of Australian, Chinese, and American perspectives on trilateralism, with a detailed discussion of Australian debates on the matter. Its aim is to trace the evolution of the changing discourse on the rise of China, examine major debates in Australia, and provide both an intellectual background and an overview for this special issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reflects on the mediated cultural politics of the Beijing Olympics through analysis of selected Australian print, online and television coverage. It demonstrates that media coverage of major sports events such as the Olympics is linked to the particular concerns of each country, while also displaying elements of internationalism and globalism. The 2008 games provided an opportunity to 'interrogate' the current condition and trajectory of China, creating a very mixed picture of a nation wishing to use the games to symbolize its increasingly prominent place in world economics, politics and sport, but inducing considerable resistance to its projected image among the Australian press, as well as some robust defences of its achievements. Ultimately, the Beijing Olympics revealed (despite the familiar catchcry that sport and politics should be separated) a battle of narratives that saw, for example, Chinese nationalism and global engagement pitted against international defensive positioning and global scepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the impact of recent upgrades in security ties between Australia and Japan and their implications for the bilateral relationship. In particular, the development and future of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) is assessed. It is argued that former Prime Ministers Abe and Howard encouraged the enhancement of security ties to unprecedented new highs, but that the rise of China and leadership change in Japan and Australia in 2007 will make the prospects of a full security treaty unlikely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the changing nature of Australian-American relations in the aftermath of the Iraq imbroglio and China's rise. While many observers see differences in Australian and U.S. approaches toward China as a reflection of different interests, it is the contention of this paper that these different Australian-U.S. perspectives on China are, in fact, premised more upon some highly skewed and fallacious assumptions and beliefs, misconceptions, and myths that have lately come to underlie Australia's China policy, than upon divergent Australian-U.S. interests. This article looks into the proposition that China's rise has the potential to divide Australia and America, but concludes that Beijing is unlikely to succeed in driving a wedge between Washington and Canberra (or "doing a South Korea on Australia"). While in peacetime, Canberra may be unwilling to displease Beijing, Australia will ultimately side with the United States in any conflict because sitting on the fence in regional affairs has never been an option for Australia. The shared values and shared strategic interests ensure broad support for the Australia-U.S. alliance in Australia, which has now expanded into a global partnership encompassing the transnational security issues as well as the traditional geopolitical issues of managing the rise of new powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Australia's China Odyssey: From Euphoria to Fear" by James Curran provides a historical overview of Australian attitudes towards China from the end of World War II to the present. The book draws on various sources, including memoirs, declassified government documents, and Wikileaks revelations, to shed light on Australian thinking about China. The author focuses on uncovering the thinking behind historical events and policy behavior rather than mounting an argument or critique. While the book devotes more space to the US factor in Australia's China thinking, it does not explore China's motivations in conducting its international relations. [Extracted from the article]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various topics within the issue, including the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on social workers in Australia, posttraumatic growth (PTG), and the preparedness of social workers in Israeli hospitals for the next pandemic.

Australia–China relations are at a turning point 50 years after diplomatic recognition. While the past five decades have witnessed extensive growth in economic exchanges, in recent years, bilateral ties have experienced serious deterioration. Australia's alliance with the United States, domestic politics—in particular the two major parties' approaches to foreign policy—and economic interdependence are important variables in Canberra's approach to China. There will be no exception for the incoming Australian Labor Party government to deal with these. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of Australia's main policy interventions in the South Pacific since the end of the Cold War was sanctions on Fiji in response to the latter's December 2006 coup. Dubbed 'Smart' sanctions, this policy was not only designed to pressure Fiji to return to democracy, but also to sustain Australia's longstanding regional leadership aspirations, aspirations which went hand in hand with its 'strategic denial' of unwelcome geopolitical challengers (Hawksley Global Change, Peace & Security, 21(1) 115-130, 2009). There has been little analysis of the unintended consequences of sanctions, namely, whether 'Smart' sanctions ironically contributed to greater strategic competition in the South Pacific, weakened regional security and prompted expressions of Pacific regionalism that excluded Australia. In the years after the coup, Canberra achieved its primary aim of being, and being seen to be, the dominant power in the South Pacific. However, during this time, Fiji "Looked North" and Pacific Island Countries (PICs) developed greater confidence in the 'New Pacific Diplomacy', thus providing the opportunity for China and other powers to expand their influence in the region (Fry and Tarte, 2015). To the backdrop of growing concern about Chinese influence, the failure of 'Smart' sanctions against Fiji shows the constraints of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. The fact that sanctions are no longer a palatable policy option has not been adequately canvassed in the literature. In this context, in order to counter Chinese influence, Australia requires greater soft power resources and a sustained effort to listen to the concerns of PICs in order to achieve Australia's interests (Newton, 2020b). In the 'New Pacific Diplomacy', threatening sanctions is likely to be counterproductive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ongoing reassessments in U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific have coincided with a major growth in Sino-Australian economic relations. The Australian-American alliance could be increasingly tested if U.S. policy planners are unsuccessful in generating more sensitive and proactive alliance security postures to ensure Australian support for key U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the global network society, the power of a nation-state is built not only on its hard-power, but also on its soft-power. International communication, understanding and tolerance are essential for national development as well as for the world's peace and prosperity. This research studied the attitudes of Australians towards China, via documentary study and secondary-data research. The paper discussed perceptions and opinions of Australian government and citizenry in three aspects: multilateral international relations, economic and trade and the rise of China; analyzed the characteristics of international communication in the information network era and explored the international communication challenges facing China. It showed that China's dramatic economic development and the benefits of Australia-China relationship had gained general recognition among the Australians. However, there was considerable distrust of China among the Australians. Some of them even wished to team up with the United States in order to constrain China. It recommended helping the international society know, understand and trust China be a focus of China's international communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an assumption in international relations literature that junior allies must choose between supporting a dominant global alliance partner and engaging with a rising power. Yet, Australian policy-makers have paradoxically managed to deepen Sino-Australian relations despite their bilateral alliance with the United States. They have developed a discrete China policy on the assumption that they could persuade Washington to accept it over time. They reasoned that this outcome was more likely if Australia used diplomacy to facilitate Sino-American cooperation and to develop an Australian China policy non-prejudicial to ANZUS. This article explores how this ‘diplomatic formula’ supported expansion of Sino-Australian relations under the Whitlam, Hawke, and Howard Governments. It explains Australia's intra-alliance influence and paradoxical foreign policy behavior and contributes to understanding the dynamics of asymmetric alliances during power transition. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents an overview and analysis of the foreign policy stance taken by China since the mid-1990s. Various outside perceptions of China's power and influence are reviewed. The nation's deliberate adherence to a "middle power" strategy of fostering a global image of caution and pragmatism in security issues is introduced and explained. Further analysis is offered relating this doctrine to those of Australia and South Korea, showing where their respective approaches to the region's geopolitics are in agreement and in conflict.

The shift in international migration research away from a focus on permanent displacement and settlement to transnationalism has not been accompanied by a similar shift in international migration systems which are still based on the old paradigm. This study utilizes Australia-based secondary and primary data to show the actual nature of population movement between two of Australia's major countries of origin of migrants: China and India. It focuses particularly on one group of migrants — university-based researchers and teachers. The paper demonstrates that the mobility relationship between Australia on the one hand, and India and China on the other, is most accurately depicted as a complex system involving substantial and diverse flows in both directions. Survey data are used to explore the linkages maintained by Indian and Chinese academics in Australia with their homelands. The findings suggest that there is considerable scope from the perspectives of China and India to engage their diaspora in activities which will be beneficial to development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the diplomatic relations between Taipei, Taiwan and Australia from 1966-1972. In 1966, the decision of Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt to open a diplomatic mission in the capital has been viewed as one of the more unique episodes in the history of Australian diplomacy in Asia during the Cold War. Though formal, it is noted in the article that the diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan has not been a priority by the Australian government. Australia has maintained a nominal alliance with the nationalists in China, but does little to develop or strengthen their relationship.

This article examines the changing nature of Australian-American relations in the aftermath of the Iraq imbroglio and China's rise. While many observers see differences in Australian and US approaches toward China as a reflection of different interests, it is the contention of this paper that these different Australian-US perspectives on China are, in fact, premised more on some highly skewed assumptions and fallacious beliefs, misconceptions and myths that have lately come to underlie Australia's China policy than on divergent Australian-US interests. This article looks at the proposition that China's rise has the potential to divide Australia and America but concludes that Beijing is unlikely to succeed in driving a wedge between Washington and Canberra. The shared values and shared strategic interests ensure broad support for the Australia-US alliance in Australia which has now expanded into a global partnership encompassing the transnational security issues as well as the traditional geopolitical issues of managing the rise of new powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid deterioration of the Australia‐China bilateral relationship from a warm and positive partnership to cold hostility has been overwhelmingly interpreted as the result of the actions of one or the other of the parties. This article seeks to analyse the recent negative dynamic in Sino‐Australian bilateral ties in a broader context, considering the full history of Sino‐Australian relations, and by drawing into the analysis both countries' crucial relationships with the United States. It argues that a deep and comprehensive understanding of Sino‐Australian relations is not possible without appreciating the triangular dynamics that operate among Australia, China, and the United States. It seeks to conceptually elaborate on the notion of triangulation as a foreign policy strategy as a prelude to examining the changing dynamics of Australia‐China relations between 1949 and the present day. It then traces the evolution of the triangulation dynamic through several phases, most recently attempts by Australia to "de‐triangulate" the relationship before succumbing to Washington's and Beijing's efforts at re‐triangulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite systemic internal and external differences, Australia and China have shown striking similarities in their pursuit of disputed maritime resource and jurisdictional claims. This high-stakes area of international politics is governed by a codified, globally accepted international legal regime (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), making it an important case for examining the relationship between states' foreign policies and the 'rules-based international order'. In the South China Sea, Beijing is haunted by the legacy of its strong geopolitically driven support for an expansive law of the sea regime in the 1970s. Strategic considerations also drove Australia's belated embrace of international legal processes in the Timor Sea in 2016. Before that, successive Australian governments had been as keen to pursue national maritime interests through bilateral negotiations as their Chinese counterparts. Australia's shift was enabled by pro-Timor domestic public opinion and a confluence of geographic and commercial circumstances not present in the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research collaboration is promoted by governments and research funders, but if the relative prevalence and merits of collaboration vary internationally then different national and disciplinary strategies may be needed to promote it. This study compares the team size and field normalized citation impact of research across all 27 Scopus broad fields in the 10 countries with the most journal articles indexed in Scopus 2008–2012. The results show that team size varies substantially by discipline and country, with Japan (4.2) having two‐thirds more authors per article than the United Kingdom (2.5). Solo authorship is rare in China (4%) but common in the United Kingdom (27%). While increasing team size associates with higher citation impact in almost all countries and fields, this association is much weaker in China than elsewhere. There are also field differences in the association between citation impact and collaboration. For example, larger team sizes in the Business, Management & Accounting category do not seem to associate with greater research impact, and for China and India, solo authorship associates with higher citation impact in this field. Overall, there are substantial international and field differences in the extent to which researchers collaborate and the extent to which collaboration associates with higher citation impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In responding to China's rise, the best strategy for Australia involves a combination of accommodation and "soft balancing.'' The viability of this strategy is related to the extent to which U.S.-China relations are cooperative or conflictual. Recent Australian governments have been successful in implementing this preferred strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia faces a complex set of dilemmas in foreign, defence, and economic policy. Australian governments have traditionally relied on the United States to underwrite the country's defence policies, and have regularly demonstrated loyalty to the bilateral strategic alliance. Yet, Australia's economic security has become more dependent on China, a country with which the US has a competitive relationship. This article first reviews theories of competition among great powers. It then analyses key factors that are shaping the region and the Australian policy environment. It is argued that Australia may have much to gain from acting collaboratively with other middle powers within multilateral institutions. In this context, Australia may also benefit from a more robust recognition of its own distinctive national interest. 澳大利亚面临外交、防务、经济政策上一系列的复杂难题。澳政府以往一直是依赖美国为澳国的防务政策签字画押，而且一直对双边战略联盟忠诚不二。但澳大利亚的经济安全却更依赖同美国有着竞争关系的中国。本文梳理了有关大国竞争关系的各种理论，分析了构成地区以及澳大利亚政策环境的诸多因素。作者认为，与中等强国进行多边体制内的合作，会让澳大利益受益非强。坚定不移的强调自己的国家利益，对澳大利亚也是有益的。 [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article considers the regional order-building challenges that Australia presently confronts in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). The author argues that while regional stability within the IOR constitutes an increasingly important Australian security interest, policy makers will struggle to translate the order-building strategies they have previously pursued in East Asia into an Indian Ocean context. In East Asia, Australia has historically pursued a ‘dual track’ order-building strategy centred on its participation in a US-dominated ‘hub and spokes’ alliance system alongside multilateral regional engagement. The absence of an equivalent alliance system or an established tradition of multilateral security diplomacy conversely precludes an extension of this strategy into the IOR. Growing tensions between the USA and China and between China and India, meanwhile, further complicate IOR security dynamics, while underscoring the urgent need for a more coherent approach to regional order-building. With these challenges in mind, the author concludes by proposing a range of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral initiatives that Australia should pursue to stimulate the emergence of a more cooperative IOR security environment. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Australia and China have evolved a synergistic relationship driven largely by the rapidly expanding Chinese demand for Australian resources. China's growing political and economic influence, regionally and globally, has prompted for different reasons the leadership of both countries to develop new channels and forms of communication. It has left Australian society with the unfamiliar task of engaging with a major center of power whose cultural and political traditions are radically different from its own. This article explores the scope and limitations of Australia's emerging dialogue with China. It makes the case for a sustained and multidimensional dialogue that harnesses more effectively the energies of civil society as well as business and government, thereby facilitating the task of redefining the relationship in a period of far-reaching transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1990s, Australia has become increasingly concerned about a perceived incongruence between its booming economic relationship with China and its security alliance with the US. There have been dire warnings that the future will be marked by an inevitable increase in tensions between China and the US as the former threatens to overtake and surpass the latter in aggregate GDP and in military force projection capability. This combination of bilateral tensions and concomitant pressures from each side for Australia’s support could force Canberra into a difficult choice: renounce its economic relationship with China to side with an economically moribund West, or betray old alliance commitments in pursuit of a lucrative relationship with a rising but ideologically alien new hegemon. What should Australia do? That is not a question that can be answered scientifically, but the framework provided here can perhaps elucidate the stakes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The relations between China and Australia are akin to close interdependence; however, they are not symmetrical and are sometimes even contradictory. Although China is the number-one trade partner of Australia, it is the most uncertain factor in security concerns for Australia. The Sino-Australian relationship is essentially a process of constant inter-adjustment by China, as an Oriental great power with a socialistic political system, and Australia, which is a leading middle power in the Asia-Pacific region and tends to keep its policies at a status quo. The phenomenon of both cooperation and competition in Sino-Australian relations reflects a universal law in the international political power transfer process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assessments of how international actors are responding to China's rise typically focus on rival great powers or on China's Asian neighbors. In these cases, relative power, geographic proximity, and regional institutions have conditioned relationships with China. The relationship of China with the developing world has mainly been defined by power asymmetry and the appeal of the Chinese governance model to authoritarian regimes. Largely absent from this discussion is an understanding of how Western middle power democracies are responding to China's rise. This article compares how Canada and Australia – two Western democratic states with prominent middle power foreign policy traditions – are responding to the rise of China. The two case studies are similar in many respects: both are resource-based economies with a track record of bilateral and institutional engagement in the Asia-Pacific, and both are key US allies. These similarities allow differences in the Canadian and Australian responses to China's rise to be isolated in the political, economic, and strategic realms. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The material transformation of the Chinese economy is forcing a concomitant process of political adjustment-and not just in China. Other states are being forced to accommodate the 'rise of China'. In this context, this article first presents a comparative analysis of China's impact on two countries, Australia and South Africa, which have little in common other than a wealth of natural resources and a possible status as middle powers; this is a particularly useful exercise because these states are geographically distant and have very different political structures and general developmental histories. Second, the authors consider how China's bilateral ties look from a Chinese perspective in these two very different relationships. Such an analysis serves as a reminder that resource dependency is a two-way street. The article argues that underlying material realities are constraining and to some extent determining the domestic and foreign policies of three very different states that otherwise have little in common. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australian foreign and strategic policy has not yet begun to address the implications for Australia's international situation of China's growing power. China today already challenges the American leadership that has kept Asia peaceful and Australia secure for many decades. There are real and growing risks that Washington and Beijing will not find a way to work together peacefully as relative power shifts from one to the other. Unless they do, Asia's future is bleak, and so is Australia's. Australia therefore needs to work to promote a new order in Asia which accommodates China's power without conceding more than is necessary to keep the peace. This will mean encouraging America to forgo primacy in Asia in favour of working with China and others in a shared regional leadership. Australia also needs to start preparing for the possibility that Asia will nonetheless become a more contested and dangerous place over coming decades, and consider what its options would be. None of them appear attractive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What will be the nature of the relationships of the major Asia-Pacific Rim powers, including Japan, the United States and Australia with China following Beijing 2008? To what extent was China successful by means of Beijing 2008 in actually selling 'brand China' to the rest of the world, and particularly to its neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region? Were they able to achieve the soft power objective of changing the perception of how other nations perceive them? The overarching ambition of China was that by hosting a 'successful' Olympics they would further add to their credibility as a global power. To achieve this China had to overcome a series of major obstacles, including issues of human rights, governance and its reputation of being the world's biggest polluter. As the Beijing Olympics began on 8 August 2008 the global financial crisis was beginning to bite, and in this contribution it will be asked, to what extent did this negate any potential positive global or regional geopolitical or diplomatic outcomes that China may have otherwise elicited from their hosting of the Games? The centre of gravity of global geopolitical power is shifting to Asia with China being positioned as a future leader in the region. Did this process accelerate as a consequence of the Beijing Olympics, and to what extent can it said that the geopolitical balance in the Asia-Pacific region will in any way be altered as an outcome of the Games or will the effects of the global economic crisis neutralize the energy China was to draw from hosting the 2008 Olympics to power its advance to global leadership? These questions will be considered through the analysis of policies and actions of the Australian Labor Party government, led by Kevin Rudd, the Mandarin-speaking ex-diplomat, who gained power in late 2007. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay tracks selected Australian print, online and television coverage of the 2008 Olympic torch relay at various stages and places between Greece and the Chinese mainland. Initial reference is made to the Olympic Charter, and to the political and philosophical issues that it (directly and indirectly) invokes. Host cities and nations are then appraised in relation to matters of concern both domestically and in the international sphere. It is noted that previous Olympics have seen sustained media coverage of such controversial areas as, in the case of the Sydney 2000 games, reconciliation with Australia's indigenous people. There follows a series of analytical observations of the relay, including that the Sichuan earthquake had the impact of producing more sympathetic coverage of China than was evident beforehand, given the previously dominant international press emphasis on political protest, especially on the subject of Tibet. Thus media coverage is revealed to be both routine and unpredictable in nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on the undertakings of the Commonwealth of Australia from July to December 2009. Topics covered include the Henry Tax Review, the Council of Australian Government's increased focus on health issues, water conservation and the management of the Murray-Darling Basin, foreign relations with China and efforts by Liberal parliamentarians to undermine the leadership of politician Malcolm Turnbull. The article also includes examinations of the political undertakings of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory.

Recent changes of government in Australia and Japan, and a pending one in the United States, signifies a historical crossroads in these three allies' security politics in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, all three countries have tended to rationalize their strategic collaboration on the need to build innovative and competitive-oriented "strategic geometries" as a means to counter China's growing power and to meet new types of threats in the region. Yet the Australian Government under John Howard simultaneously pursued a hedging strategy, exploiting its growing economic relationship with China while strengthening its diplomatic and strategic profile with the United States. Despite Tokyo's own substantial economic relationship with Beijing, recent Japanese leaders were unable to pursue the same type of "dual track" strategy to the same extent as Howard. With Kevin Rudd's election as the new Australian Prime Minister and Yasuo Fukuda's ascent to power in Japan, prospects for Australia and Japan to cultivate more independent politico-security ties with Beijing have strengthened. If so, the evolving regional security postures of both these US allies may compel the United States to reassess its own traditional skepticism towards multilateral security groupings in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

General equilibrium modelling has been used to analyse many policy proposals. This article aims to help non-modellers assess general equilibrium analyses, particularly of a potential Australia-China free trade agreement (FTA). General equilibrium modelling is effective in studies of unilateral tariff reductions. However, most general equilibrium modelling assumes given technologies and information. For issues where the essence is technology transfer and new information, general equilibrium models can only produce results after most of the analysis has been done outside the model. In an Australia-China FTA, tariff cuts may be only a small part of the package. The main part may be goodwill, technology transfer and increased mutual awareness. Thus, for analysing FTAs, general equilibrium modelling is of limited value. The only conclusion for Australia that general equilibrium modelling of an Australia-China FTA can deliver with any certainty is that such an agreement will cause significant contraction in the Australian clothing industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Compared to its relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), Australia's relations with Taiwan are often underrated. As a substantial trading partner and as a polity that has transformed into a robust 'Asian democracy', Taiwan constitutes a significant if highly complex dimension of evolving Australian foreign policy. A workshop was convened at the Australian National University in early May 2007 to consider the evolving geopolitical, economic and socio-cultural dimensions of bilateral relations between these two regional actors. Among the basic themes emerging from workshop deliberations were how the growth of Chinese power would effect stability in the Taiwan Straits and throughout maritime Asia; how Chinese power would shape future order-building in the region and any role that Australia and/or Taiwan might play in that process; how Taiwanese democracy would factor into any future regional order and what Australia's future Taiwan posture should be given that that country is committed to a 'one China policy' acknowledging the PRC as China. Among the conclusions reached were that Australia must intensify its diplomatic efforts toward both Beijing and Washington to ensure that potential Sino-American differences over Taiwan do not escalate into military conflict and that time and generational change may work to facilitate a peaceful solution to this protracted security dilemma*. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vanuatu became a major issue in Australia-China-Taiwan relations during Serge Vohor's turbulent prime ministership in 2004. Already engaged in a struggle with Australia over 'good governance', Vohor signed an agreement diplomatically recognising Taiwan. Chinese and Australian pressure led to Vohor's ouster, and a diplomatic setback for Taiwan. Although Australia and Taiwan viewed each other as side issues in this episode, with Australia focused on Vohor and Taiwan on China, their interests were directly opposed during the episode. As became evident in the aftermath of the post-election riot in Solomon Islands in April 2006, these divergent positions have had a lasting negative impact on each country's perception of the other. The key events of 2004 are examined here to demonstrate how this episode has affected the wider landscape of Australia-China-Taiwan relations.1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year 2005 was notable for the Howard government's embrace of China. Spectacular resource deals were accompanied by the government's optimistic public declarations that China's rise could be accommodated in the current Asia–Pacific power structure. Alliance relations, which were the cornerstone of the Howard government's foreign policy, were boosted further by the decision to strengthen the Australian Defence Force's capacity to contribute to future US operations. The central challenge for this government arising from its decision-making in 2005 was to manage both major power relations in tandem. This was a year where the connection between international policy and domestic issues stood in stark relief. Terrorism concerns provided the context for the government's foreign policy but it also drove stringent domestic legislation. Australia's relationship with Indonesia improved but the commitment to Iraq remained problematic. Not the least of these difficulties stemmed from the exposure of the Australian Wheat Board's corporate dealings in Iraq which had operated counter to the government's international policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]