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This paper applies insights from global value chains (GVC)/global production networks (GPN) frameworks to explore the economic geographies brought into being by digital labour platforms. In particular, these perspectives facilitate analyses of power imbalances and value extraction across territories—an under‐theorized aspect within platform studies. We theorize this dynamic by introducing the descriptor 'digital value network' (DVN): a digitally mediated nexus of platform operations that produce and distribute value between territories, on the basis of labour transactions. Empirically, we draw on a multi‐year action research project, assessing the operations of platforms and the experiences of platform workers in 54 countries. Our analysis highlights that platforms as lead firms extend GVC/GPN logics of coordination and drivenness in DVN to (i) optimize production capabilities while externalizing ownership and costs, (ii) accumulate both monetary and non‐monetary forms of value, and (iii) concentrate power at the global scale in both existing and new sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of institutions in regional industrial dynamics has been a long‐lasting issue in economic geography and regional studies. This paper seeks to examine this issue in the context of transitional economies, where the market economy is embryonic, by using China as an example. Specifically, we examine how regional industrial dynamics have been shaped by China's peculiar institutional context in general and by its new round of economic reform in particular. One key part of the new reform is the establishment of administrative approval centers (AACs) to streamline official procedures that regulate business start‐ups and existing business. Empirical results show that the establishment of AACs has boosted new industry creations. However, in the first 3 years after the establishment of AACs, the effect of AACs on new industry creation is not evident and becomes significant afterwards. Furthermore, the effect varies across regions and industries. It is especially evident in less marketized cities. Labor‐intensive industries benefit more from the establishment of AACs than do capital‐intensive industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]