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The founding of the Society for the Anthropology of Consciousness (SAC) can only be understood within the cultural context of its heritage. This paper is an historical narrative tracing the intellectual lineage of the SAC. The immediate causes were a series of symposia in 1974, including several on the challenge to anthropology represented by Carlos Castaneda, who attacked the way a critical part of anthropology was conducted. The argument in his own narrative was that one could not understand the shamanic world view without becoming a shaman. No informant could ever convey this, because so much of it was experiential. It could not be properly known unless one entered with sincerity into the experience, as a participant not just an observer. Two insights central to this thesis are particularly relevant to SAC: an aspect of human consciousness exists independent of time and space susceptible to volitional control; and, there is an interconnection between all life forms, which must be understood if the universal impulse humans feel toward the spiritual component of their lives is to properly mature. The SAC can be seen in pure Kuhnian terms as one response to the reassessment that Castaneda forced on anthropology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed self and subjective experience, as well as on the tendency of post‐Meadian sociologists to push Mead's position in ever more radical directions. Drawing inspiration from a multifaceted understanding of selfhood that can be found in Husserlian phenomenology, we then propose that the most basic level of selfhood is anchored in irreducible subjective experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article highlights the role played by the body in the work of George Herbert Mead. For Mead, the social emergence of mind depends on human physiology. This is revealed through a detailed exploration of three thematic domains in his work: the organism–environment dyad, perception, and the manipulatory stage of the act. From this, I argue that Mead saw the body as constitutive of cognition and central to the development of mind and self. Present‐day research supports this view and demonstrates Mead's relevance for understanding embodied cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To understand themselves as playing a social role, individuals must understand themselves to be contributing to a cooperative endeavor. Psychologically, the form of cooperation required is a specific type that only humans may possess, namely, one in which individuals form a joint or collective agency to pursue a common end. This begins ontogenetically not with the societal level but rather with more local collaboration between individuals. Participating in collaborative endeavors of this type leads young children, cognitively, to think in terms of different perspectives on a joint focus of attention ‐ including ultimately an objective perspective ‐ and to organize their experience in terms of a relational‐thematic‐narrative dimension. Socially, such participation leads young children to an understanding of self‐other equivalence with mutual respect among collaborative partners and, ultimately, to a normative (i.e. moral) stance toward "we" in the community within which one is forming a moral role or identity. The dual‐level structure of shared endeavors/realities with individual roles/perspectives is responsible for many aspects of the human species' most distinctive psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent research in cognitive science has provided broad empirical support for the model of cognition and self-development formulated by G.H. Mead. This is demonstrated specifically through three distinct cognitive mechanisms: basic-level categories, mirror neurons, and joint-attention schemes. These mechanisms illustrate a form of embodied sociality that underscores the intersubjective foundation of mind and self articulated by Mead. Research on basic-level categories, mirror neurons, and joint-attention schemes further extends Mead's relevance outside standard sociological and social psychological circles to the field of cognitive science and its emerging focus on sociality and social interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reported research uses an extension of Bartlett's method of repeated reproduction to provide data on the sociocultural processes underlying reconstructive remembering. Twenty participants worked in pairs to remember the War of the Ghosts story 15 min and 1 week after presentation. The observed transformations were comparable to previous research with individuals. Going beyond previous research, we analyse participants' discourse to provide a window on the processes underlying these transformations. Textual excerpts demonstrate how imagery, narrative coherence, deduction, repetition, gesture, questioning and deferring contribute to the transformation and conventionalization of the material. These diverse sociocultural mediators are integrated into a partially coherent recollection by participants self-reflecting, or as Bartlett termed it, turning around upon their schemas. We demonstrate that this self-reflection is both a social and a psychological process, occurring because participants are responding to their own utterances in the same way that they respond to the utterances of other people. These empirical findings are used to make a case for using discursive data to look not only at discursive processes but also at socially situated and scaffolded psychological processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]