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This article aims at challenging certain conceptions related to the activities of non-State armed groups (NSAGs) in armed conflict. Contrary to the conventional thinking that all NSAGs are violent and disrespectful of international law, not only are some of them are aware of the applicable rules, they have even adopted measures to respect, implement and enforce the obligations contained therein, thus willingly restricting their own behaviours and prerogatives. In the context of these practices—and despite the lack of a clear legal framework addressing their international responsibility as collective entities, NSAGs have also dealt with violations of international law by their own members in various ways: some groups have publicly committed to provide compensation, while others have issued public apologies and modified their internal codes of conduct to prohibit the commission of certain acts by their members. NSAGs have also signed Geneva Call's Deeds of Commitment , through which they pledge to prevent the violation of specific norms. Based on these responses, this article's goal is to explore certain correlations that may exist between NSAGs' degree of compliance with international humanitarian law and the manner in which they have reacted to possible breaches of this normative framework. In doing so, it examines the reasons why NSAGs may have a different attitude when responding to international law violations and concludes by proposing some causal factors that may serve to explain the adoption of restorative measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last few decades, the role of non-state armed groups has become an essential topic of analysis and discussion to better understand international humanitarian law dynamics. While their increasing importance is uncontroversial, their place and regulation in specific areas of international law still remains unclear or insufficiently explored. Chief among these is the possible non-state armed groups' international responsibility. Although it is undisputed that some of these entities breach their international law obligations, others seemingly engage with certain rules on the topic. This article addresses some legal consequences of such scenarios. Taking into account the principle of equality of belligerents in noninternational armed conflicts, two issues are dealt with: i) the existence of "nonstate" organs that could trigger the attribution of violations of international rules to non-state armed groups; ii) possible reparations owed by these non-state entities for their breaches during armed conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions encourages the parties to a non-international armed conflict to bring into force international humanitarian law provisions through the conclusion of special agreements. Since armed groups are ever more frequent participants in contemporary armed conflicts, the relevance of those agreements as means to enhance compliance with IHL has grown as well. The decision-making process of special agreements recognizes that all the parties to the conflict participate in the clarification and expansion of the applicable rights and obligations in a way that is consistent with the principle of equality of belligerents. This provides incentives for armed groups to respect the IHL rules they have themselves negotiated. However, even upon the conclusion of such agreements, it remains unclear which legal regime governs them. This paper will argue that special agreements are governed by international law instead of domestic law or a sui generis legal regime. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]