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China's photovoltaic poverty alleviation power stations (PPAPS) properly combine poverty alleviation and renewable power generation while also meeting rural energy demands. The fundamental problem is how to optimize the benefits of PPAPS during its limited lifetime. Using the post-operation of photovoltaic poverty alleviation power plants as a starting point, this paper proposes a model combining real option theory and cooperative game to determine the ideal contract period of service committed by the government to the operation and maintenance (O&M) company, thus providing a reference for both parties. The model's validity and applicability are verified by incorporating a PPAPS from Henan Province in China as an example; ultimately, the factors influencing the O&M contract period are ranked using the Sobol global sensitivity analysis. The results show that when the solar industry's environment is positive, the government is more inclined to sign long-term contracts with O&M companies. In contrast, the more the government invests in the facilities, the more likely both parties will sign short-term contracts. Furthermore, the O&M company's capital investment in the power station has a direct impact on the contract period. Finally, corresponding policy recommendations are proposed for future O&M contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Photovoltaic poverty alleviation power stations (PPAPS) are the foundation of poverty alleviation, whose operation and maintenance (O&M) status is the key to ensuring long-term poverty reduction advantages. As part of PPAPS′ O&M performance, the role of the O&M contracts has yet to be proven. This paper uses a three-stage data envelopment analysis (DEA) model and grey relation analysis (GRA) to analyze the O&M performance efficiency of PPAPS and the influencing factors of contract governance from field data of 110 counties in Henan Province, China. The results show that:1) the O&M efficiency of the PPAPS is relatively high and inconsistent across the region, which has not yet attained optimal productivity; 2) the present efficiency is mainly determined by the initial investment size and installed capacity; 3) the governance factors of O&M contracts affect the performance efficiency of PPAPS, which may lead to overestimation; and 4) longer contract term and higher performance incentive coefficients may result in inefficiencies at the initial stage of PPAPS′ use, while government subsidies allocation and timely O&M cost settlement have little impact on O&M efficiency. This paper proposes corresponding policy recommendations finally. • This paper focuses on the true O&M performance efficiency of PPAPS and influencing factors of contractual. • PPAPS′ O&M performance efficiency is relatively high with regional differences among counties. • The initial investment and capacity installed mostly determined the present efficiency. • Longer O&M contract terms and a higher achievements drive will result in inefficiency at the initial stage of PPAPS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]