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Seeking to assess the current state of international broadcasters (IBs) within the framework of public diplomacy, this paper assesses the relevance of state-sponsored IBs within the contemporary public diplomacy. This paper focuses on the IBs of two neighboring countries, Indonesia and Australia, and political authorities' dynamic support for their services. Data were obtained through desk reviews of IB policies, in-depth interviews, and online observation of the websites of Siaran Luar Negeri (SLN, Indonesia's IB) and ABC Radio Australia (RA, Australia's IB). This paper finds that both countries have continued to use IBs for their public diplomacy, yet 'political parallelism' determines the position and sustainability of each. SLN has had limited political support and faced a series of managerial crises, while RA has enjoyed the fruitful support of the Australian authorities and has been heavily involved in public diplomacy in the Asia–Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research shows there is variability in factors that cause a person to radicalize to violent extremism. The use of the push/pull distinction has been one way in which scholars have aimed to provide clarity to the process of radicalization and extremist disengagement. However, it remains a conceptually underdeveloped distinction. In this paper, we draw on aspects of criminological theory to better understand the push and pull distinction. The paper draws on research comprising interviews with three Indonesians and two Australian individuals who have radicalized to violent extremism that is aligned with jihadist ideologies. Based on this primary data, case descriptions and narratives are provided on each individual examining pathways into and away from violent extremism. We draw on aspects of strain theory, social control, differential association, and desistance theory to understand common patterns across each case and to highlight the relative influence of various push and pull factors. Implications for theory and policy are highlighted. We also acknowledge limitations in our approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2008, the number of asylum seekers and refugees trying to reach Australia from Indonesia by boat has increased. With many of them hailing from conflict-ridden countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Sri Lanka, most entered Indonesia with short-term tourist visas or fraudulent papers or no documents at all. It is widely known that a significant number of these 'irregular' migrants pay various types of brokers (often labelled, accurately or otherwise, 'human smugglers') at least at one stage - either to enter the country or to escape it. As a non-signatory to the UN Refugee Convention, Indonesia does not permit local integration. While a substantial part of these migrants are detained in the 13 immigration detention centres scattered around the archipelago, many roam freely, looking for opportunities for onward migration. Due to the restrictive border protection arrangements between Australia and Indonesia and a number of bilateral intelligence measures for deterring 'unwanted' migrants, human smugglers have been gradually forced to adapt strategies, routes and prices. According to much of the available data, most human smugglers are not Indonesians but foreigners who have been lingering in Indonesia for many years. This article demonstrates, moreover, that these foreigners depend upon local contacts to successfully carry out their risky business. Most often, the Indonesian counterparts are solely facilitators or handymen, but in a number of cases Indonesian authorities have also been involved in this highly lucrative business. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]