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The main purpose of this paper is to provide a biographical sketch of the late Hans L. Zetterberg and a historical background to a translation of an essay based on a lecture given by Zetterberg in Stockholm in 1995. In it, he recounts his time at the Department of Sociology at Columbia University in the years 1953–1964. This essay is full of insights into an inspiring and formative period for Zetterberg in the United States, particularly in the stimulating milieu that was Columbia, at this time the center of American sociology led by Robert K. Merton and Paul Lazarsfeld. In the introduction to this translated essay, I give a brief overview of the establishment of sociology as a discipline in Sweden, and the transfer of knowledge between the United States and Sweden (and Europe, more broadly), embodied in Hans Zetterberg. In the post-WWII years, American sociology, which had a strong positivistic imprint, played an important role in shaping the beginnings of Swedish sociology. However, the transfer of knowledge went both ways, with Zetterberg, a semi-central and often neglected figure, being both a significant contributor to sociology at Columbia in its period of greatest prominence, and in his native Sweden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tracks Mead's induction into the sociological canon, focusing in particular on American sociologists who made a concerted effort to reconstruct Mead as a systematic social theorist and apply his ideas to empirical research. It distinguishes two interpretive strategies of framing the classic and constructing the canon -- the politics of orthodoxy and politics of the open canon. The politics of orthodoxy aims to ascertain the original meaning and close the textual canon, creating a template relative to which alternative interpretations are judged incomplete, unorthodox, or wrongheaded. The politics of the open canon proceeds on the assumption that the classic text lends itself to conflicting interpretations, that room for the honest difference of opinion must be safeguarded, and that the capacity to further productive inquiry rather than the adherence to an orthodox view recommends a particular construal as viable and canon-worhty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pragmatism, especially the works of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead, is in the midst of a revival in American sociology. American sociologists have drawn on these authors in their addressment of contemporary debates in the wider disciplinary field. Placing these contemporary applications of pragmatist thought alongside the broader intellectual tradition of pragmatic philosophy, however, demonstrates tensions associated with this revival. This paper draws on the work of John Dewey as a particularly stark case of the conflict between the philosophy of social science espoused by the original pragmatist philosophers and the use of their ideas in American sociology today. This treatment affords the opportunity to recover a vision for social science which has been overlooked in the contemporary pragmatist revival with deep implications for the practice of social science today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Classical Theory courses in the U.S. present a history of our discipline grounded in the works of Durkheim, Marx, and Weber, defining "classic" by space and time, giving pre-World War II Europe credit for creating the foundation of contemporary sociology. While past critiques of this canon have argued for expanding the geographic bounds outside of Europe, these efforts still ground the origins of social theory in a time period of racial exclusion and segregation. We argue for a reckoning with the racial origins of the discipline in the United States in anti-Blackness and the legacies of racial exclusions. We must grapple with the histories of exclusion and segregation that continue to impact the discipline's present and futures. In this paper, we argue that the teaching of sociology's history should be through the "Foundations of Social Theory," a broad approach to teaching that rejects the ideas of both "classics" and a "canon." This approach roots theory in our history through core issues of study (e.g., the origins and consequences of capitalism) and directly addresses past racial and gendered exclusions by centering BIPOC intellectual contributions across time. By lifting the time and space restrictions, we open the doors to including voices omitted and repressed due to the exclusion of BIPOC people, especially Black women, from higher education in the U.S. This approach acknowledges the diverse histories and voices in our classrooms and profession, and highlights the relevance of social theory for our future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Charles Tilly's relationship to the schools of thought known as historicism and critical realism. Tilly was committed to a social epistemology that was inherently historicist, and he increasingly called himself a 'historicist.' The 'search for grand laws in human affairs comparable to the laws of Newtonian mechanics,' he argued, was a 'waste of time' and had 'utterly failed.' Tilly's approach was strongly reminiscent of the arguments developed in the first half of the 20th century by Rickert, Weber, Troeltsch, and Meinecke for a synthesis of particularization and generalization and for a focus on 'historical individuals' rather than abstract universals. Nonetheless, Tilly never openly engaged with this earlier wave of historicist sociology, despite its fruitfulness for and similarity to his own project. The paper explores some of the possible reasons for this missed encounter. The paper argues further that Tilly's program of 'relational realism' resembled critical realism, but with main two differences: Tilly did not fully embrace critical realism's argument that social mechanisms are always co-constituted by social meaning or its normative program of explanatory critique. In order to continue developing Tilly's ideas it is crucial to connect them to the epistemological ideas that governed the first wave of historicist sociology in Weimar Germany and to a version of philosophical realism that is interpretivist and critical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The scope and structure of social theory are often analyzed as part of or preamble to theorizing proper. This paper takes an indirect approach to the metatheoretical question, "what does social theory look like in terms of scope and structure?" by analyzing a form of social theory that sociologists tend not to think of as social theory: namely, judge-made law produced in Federal appellate courts. We argue that judges engage in social theorizing on a routine basis, and that they arrive at some of their theoretical claims through a process of theorizing that has features in common with sociological theorizing. The social theorizing of judges holds up a mirror to our own. By recognizing and examining judicial social theorizing as a form of structured, social theorizing, we aim to facilitate a clearer understanding of the social conditions enabling (and constraining) the production of social theory within sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1885 and 1930, as sociology was becoming an academic discipline, sociology was also being practiced intelligently, innovatively, and self-consciously outside the academy in the social settlements that grew up in America's major cities. In this paper, we first define and give a brief overview of the settlement movement in America; second, we show how the settlement workers were sociologists in their self-definition and action and in their relations with other sociologists; third, in the body of the paper, we describe the sociology done by the settlements in terms of the empirical research they undertook and the theory they created. Our argument is that settlement sociologists produced empirical studies that were both substantively significant and methodologically pioneering; that they did so in terms of a coherent social theory unique in its focus on "the neighborly relation"; and that both their research and theory were part of a critical, reflexive, and activist sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published in 1899, The Philadelphia Negro provides an important template to examine both the use and promise of heterogeneity as one of the earliest pillars in the establishment of American sociology. In this paper, I locate the notion of heterogeneity within W.E.B. Du Bois's classic The Philadelphia Negro to demonstrate both the historical roots of the concept and also Du Bois's use of the concept as key to his production of new sociological knowledge. As will be shown, Du Bois explicitly and implicitly disrupts existing notions of heterogeneity and of a monolithic Black population by emphasizing the intraracial variation thereof; thus Du Bois's The Philadelphia Negro intervention amplifies the role of heterogeneity as a tool for uncovering variation that produces incisive sociological theorization and analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stephen Turner's rich and informative history navigates the complex and changing landscape of American Sociology. He discusses how political, social, and academic conditions enabled varying forms of sociology and what epistemological and methodological impacts these conditions had on different schools of sociology. Turner's book asks readers to reflect on what sociology is and what place elite and nonelite sociology should have in the discipline. Turner emphasizes the role of feminist sociology and 'activist scholarship,' arguing that current sociology is one where we have in part returned to our early 20th century reformist roots. This paper expands Turner's conversation about the contributions of feminist sociology. I offer this critique to function as an entry point through which to contemplate what elite sociology is, and how it relates to feminist sociology. I argue that Turner under-explores the contributions of feminist sociology by reducing its contributions to advocacy-based scholarship. By placing feminist sociology in opposition to elite sociology, he simplifies the important discussion of elite sociology, and loses sight of feminist sociology's theoretical and methodological strengths. Highlighting aspects of intersectional theory and institutional ethnography, I argue that new elites have emerged in opposition, contrast, and conjunction to the elite that Turner describes, and I hope to further a dialogue on what constitutes 'elite' sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American Dream is among the United States' most recognizable and revered symbols of our national heritage. Celebrated in popular culture, this statement of national purpose has been analyzed by commentators across the broad range of humanistic and scholarly disciplines, including American sociology. While sociology has developed a lengthy history of studies dedicated to 'the American way of life' and - to a lesser degree - the role of the American Dream in society, the work of sociologists from earlier eras arguably over-shadows many of the efforts undertaken since the millennium. The present paper argues that sociology is especially well suited to investigations and analyses of the role and impact of the American Dream and urges a re-dedication of sociological efforts to chart its meaning and influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the concept of the ‘social,’ particularly from an archaeological perspective, and explores how it relates to the ways in which we seek to understand the processes of technological innovation and change. It is demonstrated that the concept ‘social’ is far from well defined and that enquiry is bedevilled by artificial polarization between subject-centred approaches and object-centred particularism. Through the medium of early United States steamboat technology a different approach is forged through the melding of people and things with the idea of viewing artefacts as active social actors along with people. Ultimately, it is argued that maritime archaeologists should be more bullish in their approaches to material things—instead of adopting social theories ‘wholesale,’ we should insist that they include the things we study: boats, material objects, people, artefacts, landscapes and animals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

C. Wright Mills was one of the most important critics of Talcott Parsons who succeeded in establishing the image of Parsons as a conservative "grand theorist" out of touch with the real world and its real problems, as passed on in sociological textbooks. In this essay, it is argued that Mills' "translation of Parsons into English" is a one-sided interpretation based on his own theoretical premises, which he called the sociological imagination. The way Mills conceptualized sociological imagination leans towards an ideological world-view with political ambitions but lacks the necessary theoretical differentiation for an adequate evaluation of Parsons' general theory of action and the conceptualization of the social system in particular. Given Mills' premises, it appeared to him as if Parsons could not deal with social conflict, social change, domination and power relationships, which laid the foundations of a narrative quite distinct from the "real" Parsons. The conceptual deficiencies of Mills' sociological imagination lead into theoretical antinomies and the practical inability to resolve political issues outside of forceful intervention as suggested in the theoretical tradition of Thomas Hobbes. Independent of a political positioning, Parsons' sophistications in his understanding of power as one of several generalized symbolic media of interaction beyond the Hobbesian utilitarian model are necessary to come to terms with the increased complexity of modern society, both in theoretical and in political terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At a time when cognitive and behavioral theories dominated the landscape of learning theories, Lave and Wenger's situated learning theory (SLT) opened new territory by illuminating social and cultural learning processes. Many researchers and educators in the health professions embraced this theory, but few have considered how SLT has been used and what has been learned or improved through its use in health professions education (HPE). In this scoping review, the authors examine these questions and consider opportunities for future work with SLT in HPE. The authors followed Levac's modified scoping review framework. They conducted a search of CINAHL, ERIC, PubMed, Scopus, and Web of Science for articles referencing SLT or related concepts in HPE between 2006 and 2016. Two reviewers screened all titles and abstracts, then screened full text for inclusion based on substantive treatment of SLT. Two authors extracted, analyzed and synthesized data from the final set of 193 articles. The authors identified two patterns of theory use. One sought an understanding of social learning processes in a specific context. The other aimed to design and/or evaluate interventions associated with communities of practice. These patterns are similar to other literatures (e.g., general education, healthcare, and organizational development) and, according to Lave and Wenger, may reflect confusion about the purpose, stance, and terminology of SLT. The authors discuss their findings in relation to primary source literature and consider opportunities for HPE researchers to employ and contribute to SLT going forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Peter Baehr, Katelin Albert, Eleanore Townsley and Neil Gross raise a variety of issues in relation to American Sociology: From Pre-Disciplinary to Post-Normal (). In response, I defend the claim that the revival of sociology enrollments after the 1980s owes something to the concentration on gender issues and the feminization of sociology. I defend the claim that the response to the enrollment crisis was a rational strategy which succeeded. I also consider challenges to my depiction of the caste system in American sociology against the idea that there is a continuous distribution of merit. I argue that the changes in American sociology during this period need to be understood against the larger backdrop of the transformation to post-normal science and the acceptance of openly partisan academic fields. Although I attempted to record rather than evaluate these developments, I respond to Baehr and Townsley's attempt to discern an evaluative stance, and provide a context for this response in relation to the problem of expertise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historical binaries constrain Turner's narrative, American Sociology: From Pre-Disciplinary to Post-Normal. The identification of mid-20th century American sociology as a gold standard for judging predisciplinary and post-normal sociology paints the epistemological challenges of the 1960s and 1970s in an unnecessarily negative light. The conflation of feminization with feminism reduces the contributions of Sociologists for Women in Society and collapses them into a narrative about a generational struggle between men. The focus on the elite-mass dynamics of academic labor markets misses the vibrancy of the broader disciplinary project of contemporary sociology. The prospects for 21st century sociology are more positive than Turner imagines. Rather than a scientific failure with a damaged brand, 21st century sociology offers a more reflexive and culturally nuanced form of sociology appropriate for the deeply unequal, global and mediatized social world we inhabit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

McCormack and Anderson () present a case for using homohysteria as a lens through which to examine the effects of declining homophobia. This commentary addresses limitations of the concept of homohysteria, and offers suggestions on ways to improve the concept as a theoretical lens. We identify two central concerns in this presentation of homohysteria; a definitional problem in operationalizing the construct of homohysteria, and a logical weakness in the construction of the definition of a homohysteric society. We offer suggestions based in psychological and historical data aimed to improve homohysteria as a lens through which to view shifts in attitudes toward sexual orientation minorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Doctrinally, a precedent is a case of the same or higher court that furnishes an authoritative rule for the determination of the case at hand, either because the facts are alike, or, if the facts are different, because the principle that governed the first case is applicable to the different facts. In this article I try to free precedent form the dominant doctrinal view by offering a more intuitive conception: that to be precedent means to be treated as precedent. Put differently, I attempt to see precedent not as descriptive of a previous decision or rule but as the aggregate effect of responses to one or a series of court decisions in the legal community. I illustrate this viewpoint by developing a version of a response-dependent concept that incorporates our intuitive grasp of how precedent works. In the pursuit of this task I rely on the basic philosophical premises of response-dependence theory and on one paradigmatic response-dependent concept-the quality of being 'funny.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Charles Tilly's work on repertoires of contention and social mechanisms was pathbreaking. In this article, I argue that his understanding of both concepts overlaps with social-theoretical work informed by the philosophical tradition of classical American pragmatism. There is no evidence that Tilly was influenced by pragmatism, but I argue that the overlap is substantial enough that large portions of his oeuvre can serve as illustrations of the explanatory power of pragmatist social science-and that Tilly's theorization of mechanisms in particular would have been even stronger had he engaged pragmatism directly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's opinion on the relationship of Alvin Gouldner with the Marxist tradition as a radical social theorist in America. To the extent that he employed Marxism as his own method, Gouldner resisted draping himself in the mantle of science; although, as we will note shortly, he was not entirely hostile to the scientific strain in Marxism, he saw himself as a reflexive Marxist not a scientific one. But the most fundamental and typically American absence at the heart of Gouldner's Marxism was his lack of faith in a concrete class, movement or party capable of revolutionizing society. In his controversial 1971 essay on The Politics of the Mind, published in expanded form in For Sociology, he distinguished between partisanship defined as attachment to a party or part of the larger interest and commitment, which meant an attachment to the larger interest itself. Although Gouldner always warned against any form of anti-intellectualism, there was a streak of characteristic American populist wariness about intellectual pretension in his work. Instead, Gouldner played Marxism off against the more academic tradition of sociology that dominated American mainstream social theory.

This article focuses on the social arrangements that foster claims of victimization. The announcement of new forms of victimization has become common place as of 1997. Some of these claims gained wide acceptance, whereas others met with considerable skepticism. Debating the merits of claims ignores underlying patterns in the way contemporary Americans interpret victimization. During the 1960s, Americans became sensitized to victims and victimization; by the 1970s, there was a widespread ideology of victimization. As this ideology gained acceptance in key institutions, it created a victim industry, a set of social arrangements that now supports the identification of large numbers of victims. Whether human actions and experiences are best understood as products of individuals' choices or as shaped by social arrangements is a central issue in social theory.

The idea of standardizing concepts in sociology is not new, but we have made little progress, despite the early hopes of such theorists as Durkheim and Weber. This article refutes the arguments of some who contend that we do not need standard concepts, we cannot make standard concepts, social phenomena are too complex and changeful sociologists are too individualistic and sociological concepts are too context-dependent. The author proposes that the American Sociological Association appoint a Committee on Basic Sociological Concepts to investigate and recommend the official adoption of a basic conceptual language in American sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]