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Much has been written to explain the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Little attention, however, has been paid to understanding why post-1991 Russia has maintained stability despite continued economic and political turmoil throughout the 1990s. This paper attempts to answer this question by applying an integrated model of territorial disintegration to examine the political, economic, demographic, and geopolitical changes in the pre-1991 Soviet Union and post-1991 Russia. The integrated model is constructed by synthesizing Goldstone’s demographic-structural model, Skocpol’s and Collins’ geopolitical model, and a modified version of Collins’ argument of the destabilizing potential brought about by rapid market development as three alternative routes to territorial disintegration. It is found that improvement in Russia’s geopolitical condition after 1991 is largely responsible for the decline in disintegrative potential. Slower population growth also rendered the demographic route less disintegrative during the 1990s. More effective taxation and the availability of foreign loans enabled the Russian state to handle its financial crises, thereby curbing the development of destabilizing forces through the dynamics proposed by Collins. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information about the re-emergence of Russian sociology. The revolutionary tendency within the society contains a strong nihilistic strand. Nihilism as a political position considers necessary the destruction rather than transformation of existing structures. Those who may be classified as bourgeois-liberals are divided on the issue of the system's transformability: some want a peaceful transition to a more efficient economy and democratic polity by continuing the gradual transformation of the system to mould it into a better, more democratic socialist society. Others, with a more capitalist orientation, would prefer a return to the pre-Bolshevik period. There is also a conservative or reactionary tendency. This contains two strands one of which is quite familiar, namely a return to the firm disciplinarian state ruled by the strong leader. The other, but most unlikely possibility, is the restoration of some form of monarchical rule, beginning innocuously by giving cities their pre-revolutionary names. Ironically, this alternative is lent credibility by the growth in nationalism both in the Russian republic and in the other republics of the union.

When war challenges civilian survival, what shapes the balance between normative and instrumental rationalities in survival practices? Increasing desperation and uncertainty can lead civilians to focus on their own material interests and to violate norms in the name of survival or gain-to the detriment of the war effort and of other civilians. Do norms, boundaries against transgressions, and considerations of collective interests and identities persist, and, if so, through what mechanisms? Using diaries and recollections from the 872-day Blockade of Leningrad (1941-1944)-an extreme case of wartime desperation-this article examines how three forms of cultural embeddedness shape variation in the strength of norms against calculative, instrumental rationality. Proximity and empathy with others, the structure of norms and analogies to legitimate instrumental practices, and reflexivity vis-à-vis war and others' response interact dialectically with the war context to shape variation in violating norms and rationalizing transgressions. Theft of food and cannibalism, which involve tactics of survival or gain that also risk the well-being of victims (theft) or violation of a powerful taboo (cannibalism), demonstrate the weakness of norms on the margins but their power when core norms or other real, visible individuals are threatened. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the inter-relationship between integration and exclusion in a country in transition as in the case of Russia and the assesses the impact of social and economic change on Russian youth, which is also in transition. The article critically evaluate the validity of myths and half-truths currently circulating about Russian youth. Young people have had to adapt to rapid economic change and to respond to changes in the market economy as well as to decay in the social sphere. Young people had not been integrated into pre-reform social structures and institutions, and were protected against these changes mostly by their parents and family. For this reason, they are not faced with the need to break old social ties. An analysis of youth and their role and place in society allows outline of obstacles to the realization of their goals and the strengthening of their integration and social position in a society that is highly unstable.