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The "Beijing Consensus" (BC) as a concept has been utilised to distinguish China's economic development experience from the "Washington Consensus" (WC), the policy toolkit offered to developing countries by Washington-based international organisations. This paper posits that recent Chinese initiatives in the international political economy constitute the building blocks of an emerging BC with potential to significantly influence developing countries' economic development trajectories. In order to have a better understanding of the emerging BC and its relation with China's economic development experience, the main elements of the Chinese economic development experience are compared to the WC and Post- WC (PWC), and an early critical analysis of the BC is provided. This analysis illustrates that China does not try to export its economic development model to other countries; the BC has similar and distinguishing features compared to the WC and PWC; and while the BC offers some opportunities to developing countries, it also involves some contradictions and challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Foro Internacional is the property of El Colegio de Mexico AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista CS is the property of Rafael Silva Vega and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Geosul is the property of Geosul and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since the turn of the 21st century, China has leveraged the international environment in its favour to achieve a spectacularly rapid rise, a success that Chinese strategic policymakers attribute in part to 'seizing the strategic window of opportunity'. How has China perceived the international environment and shaped the narrative of its macro-strategy? What impact has it had on China and the world? The article explores the evolution of the strategic narrative of the 'window of opportunity' in three stages since the 21st century and explores its impact in terms of quantity and keyword mapping by analysing the narrative texts of China's 'discourse coalition' (government, official media and intellectual elites). The study found that China's macro-strategic narrative is primarily driven by the official political and semi-official intellectual elites and places a premium on domestic political persuasion rather than external displays of strategic intent. It combines classical and modern philosophical thinking and methodology with the two core objectives of 'maintaining peace' and an 'economic priority'. Over 20 years, the trend of narrative production of the 'strategic opportunity period' has shown a concentrated emergence and fluctuating decline, and its narrative elements have been enriched, interlinked and aligned with the narrative of the CPC's core policies. The narrative of the 'strategic opportunity period' has been a powerful force in building domestic legitimacy, guaranteeing partial fulfilment of strategic objectives and offering lessons for other countries to learn from. Inevitably, the narrative faces a number of dilemmas and challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2001, China finally joined the WTO. The accession of China was looked forward to by many WTO members and China itself. However, observers had some fears that the Chinese accession would prove to be a Trojan horse, disrupting the working of the WTO. This paper looks into the Chinese accession and its involvement in the WTO Dispute Settlement and argues that these fears seem so far to be unfounded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Foro Internacional is the property of El Colegio de Mexico AC and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The initiation in Warsaw of the CEE-China cooperation (so called 16+1 format) in 2012 has aroused many hopes in participating countries, since many of them were cash-strapped after the global financial crisis and China offered credit lines as well as know-how in infrastructure building. At the beginning, Poland viewed 16+1 as a useful platform to prove its growing diplomatic clout in CEE because China claimed that Poland is a natural and real leader of the 16+1. As the 16+1 cooperation matured this format quickly showed a major drawback - China uses the diversity among the 16 CEE countries (e.g. EU and non-EU status) to promote its own interests (divide et impera). The Chinese strategy turned out to be particularly at odds with Polish foreign policy goals, since from Warsaw's point of view the unity of the EU at all fronts in the face of Russian aggression on Ukraine is of the utmost necessity. Moreover Polish diplomacy is becoming more and more sceptical of 16+1 because of the EU's pressure to toe the line of EU framework of cooperation with China. The absence of Polish PM Ewa Kopacz at the 16+1 Belgrade Summit in December 2014 may result in a change of Chinese attitude towards 16+1. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American geopolitical analysts perceive the steady rise of China as a strategic competitor and challenger to the United States' sole superpower stature in the twenty-first century. The vibrance of the United States (US) economy is on the wane as the Belt and Road Initiative of China is heralded as a vision of shared prosperity. Therefore, Trump administration adopted a hostile-cum-containment foreign policy posture towards China. The main fear of the administration was that China could transform the prevalent global geopolitical order to its advantage. Therefore, the administration constructed and publicised the anti-China narrative internally and externally which seems detrimental to Pakistan's geoeconomic pursuits through CPEC. Besides, Washington's reservation over the CPEC undermines Pakistan-US strategic cooperation. The study systematically analyses how the US ruling elite, academia and media constructs, shapes, and rebuilds anti-China and CPEC narratives to pursue their geopolitical objectives during the Trump administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The tendency for Chinese foreign policy elites to securitize culture in international relations by portraying it as a zone of intense contestation with other states suggests that China's rise will be rocky. Some seek to defend China's cultural autonomy from American hegemony, others, to establish Chinese domination over weaker states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]