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Evaluates the various factors that influence the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan. Details on international factors; Factors originating in mainland China; Factors arising from developments within Taiwan.

Examines issues surrounding the national unity and territorial integrity of Taiwan. Significance of national reunification of China and Taiwan; Discussion on the civil war started by the Kuomintang; Position of the Chinese government regarding the settlement of the Taiwan question.

This paper analyzes the development of Taiwan's security policy by exploring the decision-making of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government under the leadership of President Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2004. The first part of the paper reviews the development of Taiwan-China relations and theoretical developments related to this subject, as well as the major theoretical approaches adopted by scholars and strategic analysts, to explain the influence of Taiwan-China relations on Taiwan's security. Next the paper attempts to define the structure and process of the security policymaking mechanism during Chen's government to identify the major "players" in the decision-making process and their roles. The last part of the paper examines the development of the referendum issue before the 2004 presidential election in order to show how President Chen's decision-making style affected the decision to how the controversial referendum in March 2004, and how such a decision-making mechanism makes a foreign policy crisis inevitable. This paper finds that President Chen and his DPP government have a top-down decision-making style in which the president is supreme in deciding foreign policy objectives. Limited numbers of high-ranking officials are consulted or involved in the formulation of key policy objectives. This decision-making style often leads to poor communication between different decision-making levels and sometimes misunderstandings among government agencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The PRC-Taiwan diplomatic rivalry has not spared the South Pacific islands, a region only rarely mentioned within a Western strategy for Asia. This paper argues that the PRC and Taiwan have, since the 1970s, become players in their own right in Oceania, raising new variables in an uneventful area. Beijing and Taipei have made energetic efforts out of all proportion to draw such tiny islands to either camp. The elusive reasons are dissected herein. Wary of Western hegemony, the region's leaders have turned to Asia for offers of trade and aid, and have played the PRC and Taiwan against each other. This paper seeks to: explain Beijing's and Taipei's goals in lands that yield seemingly negligible gains; show how such activism has impacted Oceania; determine the region's perceptions and reactions; portray the relative position of all players; and point out future problems. The study is divided into contentious points crystallized over time: Cold War decolonization and the Chinese/Taiwanese arrival; aid, trade, and investment; fishing disputes; the role of China's navy; the region's nuclear-free zone; UN and South Pacific Forum dialogues; and the region's social economic, environmental ethnic, and security concerns. The study concludes that the supremacy of Chinese and Taiwanese global commercial considerations aims to demand a specific institutional-geopolitical alignment in Oceania. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Taiwan, the public's attitude on the unification/independence issue is very diversified, ranging between supporting immediate unification and supporting immediate independence. The majority of the Taiwan public stands between these two extremes. On an aggregate level, the distribution of these positions has been quite stable in the past three years. However, there have been variations on the individual level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the individual differences among the Taiwan public regarding this issue. The concept of "political generation" will be applied to distinguish attitudinal discrepancies among different groups. Survey data will be used to analyze the different distributions of unification/independence attitudes among various generations of the three major ethnic groups in Taiwan: the Fulao, Hakka, and mainlanders. Discrepancies have been found among these generation groups; especially noticeable is the fact that the youngest generations of Fulao and Hakka tend to be more supportive of a unified Taiwan and China than their elders. This could be a life-cycle phenomenon and subject to change in the future. These discrepancies also have been found to have an impact on presidential preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes several of the major challenges that the Taiwanese government will confront during President Chen Shui-bian's second term of office. These include serious strains in relations with the US, a continued deterioration in ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and increased political polarization, ethnic division and gridlock at home. The author suggests that, while these problems are certainly formidable, they should not he exaggerated. Nor should they be attributed solely to one politician or political camp. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The behavior of Taiwan leaders and people in 2003–2004 raised the salience of Taiwan's assertive movement toward permanent independence for US policy makers. No longer did US officials responsible for assessing cross-Strait relations and their implications for US policy take it for granted that such assertiveness and moves toward independence would be held in check by the mainstream Opinion in Taiwan, previously but no longer viewed as pragmatic by US decision makers. In response to the new situation, US policy makers intervened in Taiwan politics, trying to channel Taiwan assertiveness along lines less likely to lead to war with China. US interventions were widely seen to have had a moderating effect on the Taiwan elite and public opinion in the lead-up to the December 2004 legislative election that resulted in a significant setback for President Chen Shui-bian's push toward greater independence. Taiwan's political opposition leaders pursued high-level contacts with China. Chinese leaders warmly welcomed the Taiwan opposition leaders who renounced Taiwan independence. However, Taiwan politics remained sharply divided over cross-Strait issues, with President Chen unwilling to renounce Taiwan independence or accept a version of the so-called one China principle seen by China as a prerequisite for improved relations with the Taiwan government. President Bush and other US officials encouraged both governments to show greater flexibility in order to promote dialogue that would reduce misunderstanding and ease tensions. The uncertain outlook for cross-Strait relations included the possibility of talks, improved relations, and agreements on managing cross-Strait tensions between the Taiwan and Chinese governments. On the other hand, the impasse between China and Taiwan could deepen. The Bush administration appeared to have settled on a policy that endeavored to deter China from using force against Taiwan and deter Taiwan from taking provocative steps toward independence. The main alternatives to this approach seemed less acceptable to US policy makers under prevailing conditions, suggesting that US policy is likely to persist with a dual deterrence policy for the rest of President Bush's term in office. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of Taiwan and relations across the Taiwan Strait is not only of fundamental interest to China, but also crucial to peace and stability in the Asian Pacific, thereby also making it of key concern to major players such as the United States and Japan. Beijing has faced enormous challenges over how to solve its dilemma. I would like to achieve reunification with Taiwan through a peaceful path, but perceive that it must be prepared for a war scenario if Taiwan insists on breaking from the mainland for its independence. The dilemma facing Beijing in terms of war or peace with Taiwan has become more acute since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) moved to power in 2000. This article analyses Beijing's dilemma over the above policy choices by examining five stages of Beijing's assessment toward regime change in Taiwan from late 1999 to early 2005. It also illuminates the potential impact on major power relations in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan is a mildly divided society--divided essentially along the lines of national identity. Indeed, there is no doubt that national identity is the dominant factor affecting Taiwan's mainland China policy. Other factors such as business interests and security concerns may enter the picture from time to time, but they often get bogged down in the national identity controversies. As a matter of fact, there is high correlation between people's attitudes toward business and security concerns and their positions on the national identity issue. The key to understanding Taiwan's mainland China policy is thus the distribution of voters on the national identity issue and how it is translated into the political fortunes of various political parties in the electoral game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Taiwan, as well as the US, have failed to adapt new practices in response to the paradigmatic changes in the sources and nature of the China­Taiwan conflict. Reflecting the tremendous political and social changes in Taiwan, China, and the world that have occurred during the past 10–15 years, the most prominent source of the China­Taiwan conflict has shifted from power to identity. This article discusses the change of social identity in Taiwan and the re-emergence of nativistic nationalism in the PRC identity. The authors suggest that policymakers on all three sides could begin to re-think the Taiwan issue by taking advantage of the ideas and methods pioneered by experts in the rapidly growing field of conflict analysis and resolution. In this article, the authors apply concepts related to identity used by practitioners in the field of conflict resolution to look at the deeper cultural issues of identity and suggest some more appropriate methods for intervention and resolution of this deeply rooted conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's China policy and the impact this has on the cross-strait relationship. Chen is unlikely to deviate from the pro-independence stand of the Democratic and Progressive Party (DPP). For the short-term, Beijing has good reason not to use force, but resorts to both well-calculated pressure (on the DPP) and concessions (to the opposition), in the hope that this may eventually weaken the DPP This "neiwai jiaokun" (internal trouble and external pressure) may emasculate Chen's will and ability to push for independence. Even a declaration of independence by Taiwan, if without U.S. support, will be manageable to Beijing, which has been psychologically, politically, and militarily prepared for such a contingency. The declaration can only pose a threat if it is used by a major foreign power for other objectives. Therefore, the Chinese reading of U.S. strategic intentions is crucial in deciding what action China will take on Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Looks at the impact which domestic political factors had on Taiwan's bargaining position, at the April 1993 talks between political representatives from China and Taiwan in Singapore. Changes which occurred in Taiwan's political system; Examination of how this domestic political change impacted on Taiwan's policy towards China; Reciprocal influence which the results of that policy had on Taiwan's political transition.

In June 1995 a private visit to the United States by Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui generated a wave of acrimonious rhetoric and bellicose activity by China. Tensions in the Taiwan Strait, which by the early 1990s appeared to be at a four-decade low, suddenly escalated In mid 1995 and. early 1996 China conducted missile tests in the waters around Taiwan and conducted large scale military exercises off the Chinese coast in the vicinity of the island But just as suddenly as tensions had heightened, they dissipated following the conclusion of Taiwan's first-ever direct presidential election in March 1996 China acknowledged the result, the re-election of President Lee, and urged Taipei to resume a dialogue with Beijing. The recent confrontation between China and Taiwan is one that is not easily explained or predicted. This article contends that the recent China-Taiwan tensions can best be explained by factoring in ethnicity and irredentism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]