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The article takes a look at the American attitudes toward Japan and China in 1937-38. The Chinese Cultural Society of New York published in October 1937 a reprint of 39 editorials from American papers on the Far Eastern crisis. The editor, M. Hsitien Lin wrote in the foreword "Of some 5,000 editorials which have been examined, there is none that justifies Japanese aggression or condemns Chinese resistance. In the American press Japan is almost universally treated as the aggressor and China as the victim in the undeclared war. As to American policy, the press generally favors neither extreme isolationism nor political entanglements or alliances, but a golden mean, whereby world peace, it is hoped, may be maintained." The present study is designed to test the validity of this impression as well as to test the utility of a method of attitude measurement by press sampling. It is impossible here to enter into a discussion of the relationship between beliefs as to facts and emotional attitudes such as are measured by the indices used, except to suggest that attitudes, which are at first accompanied by emotions, may in time become beliefs regarding "facts" which are taken for granted.

The article reports developments pertaining to the nuclear weapons in China. The two atomic tests of October 16, 1964 and May 14, 1965 had marked the entry of the People's Republic of China into the nuclear club, an entry which was planned and methodically executed by the Peking regime over the years. The evolution of the Chinese atomic bomb can conveniently be divided into two phases. The first phase is in 1950 through 1958 which is characterized by heavy Chinese reliance upon and cooperation with the Soviet Union for financial, material, and technical support. On the other hand, the second phase is in 1959 to 1965 in which the country became almost entirely self-sufficient in all phases of nuclear weapons research, development, engineering, testing and production.

The article examines the contribution of nuclear weapons in the conflict between China and the Soviet Union. The conflict started when the Chinese government decided to acquire nuclear weapons. The Soviet government issued a statement that depicts China as a country that favors war as indicated by its acquisition of nuclear weapons. China reiterated by emphasizing that its position follows with the basic premises of Marxism-Leninism and of principled opposition to imperialism. Both countries' relation further deteriorated when Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev charged that the Chinese government firmly believe in the possibility of a new world war.

The article discusses the significance of the U.S. China policy and disarmament issues, which focuses on getting rid of communist control of mainland China. According to the author, it follows that the present China policy not only can not achieve its main purpose but can not be maintained without change, under any circumstances. Attempts to maintain it may jeopardize a détente with the USSR and block achievement of a meaningful disarmament agreement. Moreover, many high officials in each of the three postwar administrations, have recognized the absurdity of the China policy, but have felt helpless to do anything about it.

The article presents a discussion of the second world disarmament conference proposal through the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). There had been only one "world disarmament conference" that occurred in the 20th century, which dissolved as Hitler's Germany walked out of the Conference and started openly to rearm. The effort for a world disarmament conference languished when the heads of state met in Cairo in 1964. The 27th U.N. General Assembly could not authorize a Preparatory Committee due to the rising U.S. opposition to a world disarmament conference and continued Chinese opposition.

The article focuses on the situation of commerce, finance and British diplomatic support in China from 1885-1886. China, in the mid-nineteenth century, was a classic illustration; while attempting to preserve their territorial integrity and to control a serious traffic in drugs, the Chinese appeared to close the door in the face of British trade, and thereby to deny the mainstay of Britain's imperial and world position. There were already some indications prior to 1886 that the government was concerned for the future of commercial and financial interests. Despite the early awareness of the difficulties faced by British commerce or financial interests in West Africa, Persia, and Turkey, there were as yet no signs of any relaxation from the rigid principle of non-intervention in the case of China. The most influential source of commercial opinion, however, proved to be the London Chamber of Commerce. Events in Europe necessitated even more fundamental steps for the support of British interests. The political importance which became attached to loans and financial concessions in China after 1895 is, of course, well known, and Foreign Office policy of giving full diplomatic support to the strongest British syndicates in their applications for the most strategically important concessions indicates how closely politics and finance were interwoven in the late 1890's.

The article presents a study on the international political system of Sino-Soviet relation. The six variables within the international political system are the change of status quo, general effect, hostility, friendship, satisfaction and frustration. Q-Sort method of scaling was used to classify the foreign policy statements in terms of the degree of manifestation of each of the above variables. To determine the degree to which curves representing two variables were similar, it must consider the directional movement of the curves from one period to the next and the disparity between the curves on the overall vertical plane of the scale.

The article shares the author's insights on the containment effort of the U.S. to retain its position as a major power in Asia which results to a struggle with China. The author points out that the U.S. containment of China depends on the chain of military bases in China's periphery. Vietnam on the other hand, represents the chain's anchor in Southeast Asia with its vast ports and airfields and its commitment to the American troops. The author cites that the U.S. military bases in Japan are responsible for the country's defense, yet the U.S. failed to link Japan to the containment policy. He suggested that the U.S. should refrain from military maneuvering in order to force Japan into a deeper commitment with its interests and to encourage increasing contacts between Japan and China.