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This article addresses the codification of formal rules and procedures of governance through Administrative Procedure Acts (APAs). The recent enactment of APAs in two new democracies, South Korea and Taiwan, highlights an apparent paradox. Because administrative reform limits the executive's power, it is clear why legislatures in separation-of-power systems would favour APAs. But it is less clear why presidents would support them. Why would a president accept a law designed to restrict her ability to act freely? The answer is that presidents have agency problems too. The more intra-branch conflict they face during their administrations, the more likely they will support administrative reform. Thus, instead of tying the hands of future administrations, presidents also use APAs to overcome current control problems. Three recently democratized East Asian countries, two with APAs (South Korea and Taiwan) and one without (Philippines), support this 'reining in' theory. Conflict within the executive branch may be an important ingredient in democratic consolidation. APAs result from political struggle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In nations where the executive has budgetary control, how are spending decisions and allocations affected? Is intraparty conflict relevant? This article sets out to show that institutional rules and leadership roles affect budgetary outcomes. It makes the following argument: if intraparty conflict exists in a oneparty dominant or majority-party system, the executive reduces spending to punish the party in the legislature; if no intraparty conflict exists, then the executive increases spending to reward or cultivate loyalty to himself as the party leader. If intraparty conflict exists in a minority government or majority-coalition within a competitive multiparty system, the executive increases spending to reward or cultivate loyalty to himself as the party or coalition leader. Evidence from South Korea and Taiwan between the 1970s and 2000 supports the theory. This study advances scholarship in three ways. First, it shows that institutional rules that provide the executive with agenda control also lead to the strategic use of the budgetary process and outcomes to generate loyalty to the executive as leader. Second, it reveals that this strategy affects spending outcomes in election years; this is an important caveat to electoral spending manipulations. Third, the strategic use of the budget to control intraparty conflict occurred prior to and following democratization; this reveals that institutional changes need to include modifications in rules for policy transformations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on labor and neo-liberal globalization in South Korea and Taiwan. Evaluation of distinctive political, economic and ideological characteristics that distinguish the recent market-oriented labor reforms; Citation of the political influence of organized labor unions; Emergence of doubts about the coherence of democratic market economy.