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Universal Serial Bus (USB) is widely used, for example to facilitate hot-swapping and plug-and-play. However, USB ports can be exploited by an adversary to extract private or personal data from the connected devices. Hence, a number of organizations and workplaces have prohibited their employees from using USB devices, and there have been efforts to design secure USB storage device schemes to more effectively resist different known security attacks. However, designing such schemes is challenging. For example, in this article we revisit the Wei et al.’s scheme, and demonstrate that it is vulnerable to attacks such as password guessing and user impersonation. We also explain that the scheme does not verify the correctness of user’s input in the login phase, which is another design flaw. Then, we present an improved scheme and prove it secure in the random oracle model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital signature schemes have been extensively studied in the literature, where a large number of such schemes with different properties have been designed for different applications. For example, identity-based signature (IBS) schemes can efficiently map a user’s digital public key to his/her real-world identity (e.g., e-mail address). However, existing implementations of IBS schemes are not generally designed for white-box security (WBS), particularly concerning the protection of the private key when special attackers have full access to the execution environment. Therefore, in this paper, we propose the first white-box implementation for the classical Shamir’s IBS scheme. The basic idea is to utilize a mathematical transformation for embedding private key into some special tables, such that the original private key could be “invisible” during the execution process. We then analyze the security requirements achieved in our implementation, including the conventional black-box security under the random oracle model and WBS (e.g., key recovery attack resilience). This is the first IBS scheme implementation that satisfies WBS. It is also shown from the simulation that the implementation incurs a constant computational cost, which is realistic in deployments where a high security level is required. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The automatic-dependent surveillance-broad-cast (ADS-B) is generally regarded as the most important module in air traffic surveillance technology. To obtain better airline security, ADS-B system will be deployed in most airspace by 2020, where aircraft will be equipped with an ADS-B device that periodically broadcasts messages to other aircraft and ground station controllers. Due to the open communication environment, the ADS-B system is subject to a broad range of attacks. To simultaneously implement both integrity and authenticity of messages transmitted in the ADS-B system, Yang et al. proposed a new authentication frame based on the three-level hierarchical identity-based signature (TLHIBS) scheme with batch verification, as well as constructing two schemes for the ADS-B system. However, neither TLHIBS schemes are sufficiently lightweight for practical deployment due to the need for complex hash-to-point operation or expensive certification management. In this paper, we construct an efficient TLHIBS scheme with batch verification for the ADS-B system. Our scheme does not require hash-to-point operation or (expensive) certification management. We then prove the TLHIBS scheme secure in the random oracle model. We also demonstrate the practicality of the scheme using experiments, whose findings indicate that the TLHIBS scheme supports attributes required by the ADS-B system without the computation cost in Chow et al.’s scheme and Yang et al.’s TLHIBS schemes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]