1. T‐Philosophy.
- Subjects
ANALOGY ,PROBLEM solving ,SCIENTISM - Abstract
This paper evaluates the case Paul Horwich makes in his book Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy against so‐called T‐philosophy—the traditional conception of philosophy as a theoretical enterprise that seeks to analyse concepts, solve problems, and explain phenomena in a unified and systematic way. Different forms of T‐philosophy are identified in the paper, but it is argued that Horwich's multi‐pronged critique has no force against any of them. The paper also assesses, as a case study, Horwich's contention that the problem of our knowledge of mathematical objects can be dissolved on the grounds that the problem is based on a misguided analogy with our knowledge of physical objects. The paper shows that Horwich's contention is mistaken and that the problem can be established without drawing any analogy with our knowledge of physical objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
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