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SANDLER and SHELTON [6] recently made a significant contribution to the theory of benefit spillovers in a setting of local governments. Unlike previous authors [1, 2, 3, 7], they have integrated this theory with the possibility of tax exportation. Their analysis allows them to derive certain predictions about the effect of tax exporting on the levels of public good production in both the tax exporting and the tax importing jurisdictions.
This paper does not question the fruitfulness of their approach. It does, however, argue that if different and, perhaps, more realistic assumptions are made about the connection between tax spillouts and the level of public goods actually chosen, then their predictions about the effects on public good output levels may not be valid. Section 1 reiterates the relevant portion of the SANDLER-SHELTON argument. Section 2 presents an alternate formulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My purpose is to explain the findings that even when "good" measures of schooling and experience have been employed in empirical studies, age and the square of age have in several cases proved significant in their own right, but the empirical results imply that the effect of age is apparently not entirely due to physiological phenomena. The explanation offered here is connected with what might be termed "goofing off" by employees and employers' attempts to control this phenomena. Section I briefly reviews the effects of age on earnings that have been discovered and considers their relationship to possible physio-psychological deterioration. Section II reviews the theory of goofing off by employees. It also discusses the use of wage premiums to discourage goofing off. Such premiums are implied by a recent contribution of Becket and Stigler [2] to the literature on law enforcement. I also relate this theory to the empirical connection between age and earnings and offer an explanation of why aging has a negative effect on earnings at an earlier date than would otherwise be expected. Section III provides a few brief concluding comments.
In conclusion, it would seem that the goof-off premium analysis is capable of lending two insights about the nature of earnings functions. In the first place, it implies one reason why it is not surprising that earnings functions cannot explain all earnings variation. Some of this variation may be explained by the nature of the job and the monitoring problems connected with it. Queues will form awaiting entry to the high goof-off premium jobs. The applicants will be sorted by some institutional mechanism which need not depend on the individual's own characteristics. In this respect the implications are similar to Thurow's [13] job competition model. Secondly, the goof-off premium concept can help explain why age may have an effect on earnings that peaks earlier than would otherwise have been expected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]