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The author surveys the review of Japan's defense programs and several other key defense-related documents the Liberal Democratic government initiated in 2013. She focuses on the pivotal points of Japan's Defense White Paper and on the current state and prospects of military cooperation between the U.S. and Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The build-up of Japan's military apparatus in the 1990s and 2000s has been often regarded by security analysts as indicative of a departure from the country's Cold War strategic posture. Japan appears to be engaged in a process of militarisation that is eroding the foundations of its 'exclusively defence-oriented' policy. In the case of the archipelago's naval strategy, such assessments overlook the longstanding significance of a core feature of its defence policy, namely the surveillance of maritime crossroads delivering the wealth of the country. The paper reassesses the evolution of the Japanese strategy since the Cold War by examining the development of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force's submarine force, one of the key components of the defensive shield for these crossroads. The paper argues that with the changes in the security environment of the 1990s, Japan already fielded a mature force with state-of-the-art submarines, and that the rise of a new naval competitor aiming at controlling key strategic points along Japan's sea lanes reconfirmed the critical importance of submarine operations to Japanese national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that a significant change in Japanese post-Cold War security policy has occurred, as compared to its Cold War security policy. Instead of relying solely on power-based realist variables, this paper argues that a significant change is taking place because of the shift in Japan's security identity from a 'peace state' to an 'international state'. What this refers to is that Japan sees itself as playing a more active role in military-strategic affairs in the post-Cold War period due to the normative structure shift within Japan in relation to the practices and role(s) in the regional and international security environment. To show change in Japan's security identity and its resultant security behaviour, norms in three areas that define and shape its security policy are contrasted - Japan's definition of national security; its contribution, in military terms, to regional and international security affairs; and the level of agency (control) Japan has in its security policy. The international-state security identity is increasingly recognised by the members of Japan's security policy-making elite and is used to formulate Japan's security policy in the post-Cold War period. It is also gradually being accepted by the larger Japanese society and has become a permanent feature of Japan's security discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent domestic constructivist studies characterize Japanese security policy as a serious anomaly to realism and a crucial case vindicating their approach to the larger study of world politics. The present paper challenges this view. It advances a postclassical realist interpretation of Japan's core security policy in the past quarter century. Japan's military doctrine expressed in the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) is consistent with postclassical realism's predictions, as opposed to neorealism's predictions, which focus on the dynamics of the regional security dilemma and the question of financial burden resulting from military build-up. In addition, postclassical realism offers a more compelling theoretical guide for understanding Japan's core security policy than defensive realism or mercantile realism. This paper backs up its argument with the empirical evidence that Takuya Kubo, the author of the NDPO, himself intentionally based the NDPO on a postclassical realist line of thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sheds light on a relatively underexplored aspect of Japan’s recent security changes by examining the subnational level where the impact has been far-reaching. It focuses on Japan’s maritime frontier zone: the Yaeyama Islands located at the southwestern end of the Japanese archipelago and administered as part of Okinawa Prefecture. It argues that while Yaeyama militarization has been primarily a national response to China’s portrayed assertiveness in the East China Sea, it has also been facilitated by the strategic actions of local political elites, in cooperation with sympathetic extra-local forces. Political elites from two islands, Yonaguni and Ishigaki, have been motivated primarily by diverging material and ideational factors. Yonaguni elites have viewed militarization largely through the prism of “compensation politics.” Their counterparts in Ishigaki have been driven by more ideological objectives, seeking militarization for deterrence purposes and otherwise transforming the island into a rightist breeding ground in defence of Japanese territory. Yaeyama militarization has not only diminished enthusiasm for seeking autonomy and enhancing economic security through microregional cooperation, but has also enhanced local-level insecurities while creating and exacerbating divisions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper deals with the new (2013) Japan's National Security Strategy and its relationship with the actual changes in the regional and global strategic landscape. The connections between the new Japanese perspectives on the subject and the recent U.S decision to focus its military Power in the Asia Pacific region will be specially stressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the end of the Cold War, Japan became very active in its security policy. How can we explain this phenomenon? This essay argues that (neo-) realist settings (the end of the Cold War, the Taepodong missile launch) have triggered changes in Japanese domestic security culture, which subsequently affected Japanese security policy. In spite of rationalist theorists' criticism of the constructivist approach for not being able to clarify independent and dependent variables, this essay attempts to elucidate the relationship between security culture and policies thereof. By utilizing "cultural process-tracing," this paper investigates how cultural elements become linked and internalized into policymaker-level and illustrates the causal relationship between these two. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper draws an analogy between post Cold War American policy in Iraq and prewar Japanese policy for the region of Manchuria (northeastern China), arguing that both the United States and Japan became obsessed with "solving" a perceived foreign policy "problem" that had plagued them for decades. In both cases, the "problem" grew in proportion to the fear that domestic radicals and ideologues were successful in instilling in their fellow citizens. However, the perception of threat often existed in an inverse relationship to any actual threat presented to national interests. The rising level of fear-as well as the posting of ideologues to serve in key policy positions-resulted in efforts by both prewar Japan and post Cold War America to "solve" its perceived problem through the use of military force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early 1990s Japan's defense policy has been under incremental significant change, revealed mainly in the legislative field. This paper explores the extent to which Japan's defense policy is changing in military terms. Analysis of Japan's latest security posture in Iraq (2003-2006) brings to light changes in Japan's overall defense policy in terms of defense priorities and implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that closer defense cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) of Japan and United States forces under the 1997 Guidelines for United States-Japan Defense Cooperation has brought about an issue of exercise of the right to collective self-defense, which might infringe on Article 9 of Japan's Constitution. The article explores Japan's options in cases of emergencies such as those in Japan, the Taiwan Strait, and the Korean peninsula and concludes that Japan has no choice but to follow U.S. policy as long as it maintains a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan. The United States fully understands the importance of Japan's strategic location to its security, particularly Okinawa's. From Okinawa, U.S. forces could easily cover the Korean peninsula, China, and Taiwan. Therefore, the United States will not give up its bases in Japan, and so the argument of a "fear of abandonment" on the side of Japan is a myth. The article further examines the importance of the 2001 dispatch of the Maritime SDF to the Indian Ocean and the 2004 dispatch of the Ground SDF to Iraq from the viewpoint of the right to collective self-defense and Article 9. It also analyzes Japan's recent defense efforts. utilizing the concepts of alliance dilemma and complex security dilemma. Finally, the article concludes that a new Japan with the right to collective self-defense would become more assertive in conducting its foreign policy using the SDF overseas. Such a Japan would have an impact on security in East Asia, causing a problem for China and both Koreas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using hitherto underutilized Japanese material, this paper systematically analyzes two competing theories of military doctrine formation that account for the construction of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), postwar Japan’s first military doctrine. It demonstrates that, on balance, available evidence on the policy preference of two key civilian policymakers, Michio Sakata and Takuya Kubo, is more consistent with the interpretation drawn from Posen’s balance‐of‐power theory than with that from Kier’s domestic culturalist theory. While by no means ignored by these policymakers, domestic political concerns neither dominantly shaped, nor gave a specific direction to their policy action. Rather, the policymakers were motivated to formulate the best response possible to Japan’s new international strategic conditions. This finding relates the hitherto neglected significance of the NDPO case to the larger, ongoing realist–constructivist debate on the formation of military doctrine. It also leads us to a more sophisticated understanding of NDPO formation, which focuses on the process of how a combination of political leadership and ideas triggered the breakthrough in Japanese security policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]