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Copyright of Philologist / Filolog: Journal of Language, Literary & Cultural Studies is the property of University of Banja Luka, Faculty of Philology / Univerzitet u Banjoj Luci, Filoloski Fakultet and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The aim of this paper is to elucidate the vital meaning and strategic role that nutrition holds in Claude Bernard's "biological philosophy", in the sense Auguste Comte gave to this expression, i.e. the theoretical part of biology. I propose that Bernard's nutritive perspective on life should be thought of as an "interfield" object, following Holmes' category. Not only does nutrition bridge disciplines like physiology and organic chemistry, as well as levels of inquiry ranging from special physiology to the organism's total level, including the cell and protoplasm, but it also forms the genetic and structural foundation for Bernard's two fundamental axioms in general physiology: the necessary complementarity of destruction and creation (1) and the uniformity of this physiological law across all life forms, be it plants or animals (2). Because Bernard's nutritive theory is a major pivot for the re-ordering of life and its characterization, I argue that it must be located and understood in the scientific and metaphysical context of his time, of which he claims to be the heir and challenger—what I propose to characterize as the "epistemic space" of nutrition, on the background of which Bernard builds his own "logic". I then set out this logic of nutrition, focusing on three interrelated bernardian theses: the establishment of the theory of indirect nutrition as the basis for the notion of "milieu intérieur"; the enduring conception of nutrition as a continuous generation; the emphasis on nutrition as a way of reshaping the form/matter relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Auguste Comte's classical status in sociology and social theory is routinely taken to mean outdated. Coupled with this perception, there has been a pervasive tendency within contemporary discourse to presume a positivism that is largely rationalistic or scientistic and therefore critically and analytically useless. This paper explores how some of Comte's lesser acknowledged perspectives on science, history, 'progress' and what it is to be human may yet compel us to reexamine our ideas about the kind of positivism we think we have inherited and therefore need to renounce. I focus my reading of Comte through the lens of genealogies of thought not normally associated with his work, for instance, science and technology studies (STS) and posthumanist social theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Palermo Business Review is the property of Universidad de Palermo and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Despite the importance of the "historiographical revolution" in Kuhn's work, he did not carry out a specific study about it. Without a systematic investigation into it, he even affirms that the "old" historiography of science (OHS) is unhistorical, suggesting its summary disqualification in the face of his "new historiography" of science (NHS). My wider project, of which this paper is a part, is to better discuss the issue of the justification of the NHS. In this paper, I discuss the justification (and the genesis) of the OHS, focusing on Condorcet and Comte and resorting especially to Koyré. This will allow us to understand that the relation between the OHS and the NHS is a new instance of inter-theoretical incommensurability. And, indeed, that the NHS is not stricto senso a new historiography. It is the same historiography used for other disciplines (art, philosophy), which in the twentieth century begins to be applied to science as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes the scientific practices of the anatomists from the Société Anatomique de Paris (1803–1873) who were collecting anatomical and pathological specimens in Nineteenth-Century Paris and which led to the building of the anatomy and pathology Musée Dupuytren (1835–2016). The framework introduced by Robert Kohler to describe collecting sciences (2007) is useful as a tool to identify the set of diverse practices within pathological anatomy in nineteenth-century Paris. However, I will argue that anatomy and pathology collecting had specific features compared to most collecting sciences. Two main collecting practices could be distinguished: first, "finding" anatomical specimens and second, keeping these specimens. The first kind of practices were at least rhetorically and explicitly motivated by Auguste Comte's positive philosophy. But "finding" an anatomy or pathology specimen could not be completely compared to finding an object or making a simple observation, as dissecting as well as some experimental practices were also involved. Heterogeneous practices thus coexisted within collecting in anatomy and pathology. Epistemological as well as pragmatic tensions arose. On top of Kohler's framework, I introduce Sabina Leonelli's concept of "data journey" to offer a narrative of the diversity of collecting practices involved in the Société Anatomique de Paris and the Musée Dupuytren. I use the concept to analyse how this diversity of practices impacted knowledge production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows that Mill's assessment of Comte's work casts light on his own attitude towards the historicity of social phenomena and on the way he connects the notions of utility and liberty. It underlines the relative stability of Mill's views. While the tone of his remarks about Comte varied through time, their content remained basically unchanged. The paper untangles the complex web of the two thinkers’ intellectual relationship by gathering information scattered across many texts, assesses the effects of the Comtian influence on Mill's epistemology and shows how Mill's liberalism was partly built on his opposition to Comte's ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is organized in three stages. In the first part, I outline the evolution of the notion of altruism with its critical dimension of political economy by following the intellectual sequence from Auguste Comte to Pierre Bourdieu, through Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss. In the second, I consider the forms of transaction to which these sociologists report altruism and its derivatives. In the last section, I examine recent developments on altruism as a result of developments on performativity on the one hand and market design on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article improves upon our current understanding of the Sociological Society's contributions to the development of sociology in Britain. It challenges the assessment of the Society's legacy made by Philip Abrams in 1968 and the more recent conclusions reached by scholars who contributed to a debate published in The Sociological Review in 2007. The article is built on original findings garnered from empirical research undertaken at The Sociological Review 's archives in Keele. It shows that, despite achieving some results in its attempts to introduce a particular type of sociology into Britain, the influence of the Society in establishing, both institutionally and intellectually, a sociological tradition was largely unsuccessful. A limited legacy, however, does not mean that the history of the Society is of little importance in the history of sociology in this country; on the contrary, as this article attempts to highlight, the Society deserves a critical examination precisely because of its limited legacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper proposes and shows that standard rational choice theory has experienced a certain degree of breakdown or crisis in much of contemporary economic science, especially social, institutional, and related economics. It identifies and considers several instances of standard rational choice theory's breakdown in modern economics. They are, first, the end or discredit of homo economicus, second, the rejection of the premise of exclusive economic motivation, including egoism, third, the refutation of the assumption of fixed 'natural' tastes and preferences, and fourth, the replacement of the conception of perfect rationality. Consequently, the paper suggests that much of contemporary economics tends to move toward a more complex and realistic post-rational and in part irrational choice theory. The paper also discusses the possible implications of this trend in contemporary economics for rational choice sociology. It concludes that the continuing expansion of rational choice theory to sociology and related social sciences may not be sustainable indefinitely if the trend continues toward its breakdown in parts of contemporary economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: In a recent contribution to this journal, McGrath (2017) provided an overview of the reduction process of cognitive dissonance theory. To discuss the reduction strategy, she reviewed relevant studies and highlighted the means to reduce dissonance as well as factors that promote their use. In the present paper, we would like to raise some points which have not been considered by McGrath. First, we stress the historical development of the theory that orientated the study of attitude change as the major means of reduction. Second, we raise the issue of the term “dissonance” and the different conceptions about its reduction. Last, on the strength of published data, we insist on resistance to change as a central and essential factor to predict the reduction strategy. We consider that these elements, in addition to McGrath's valuable contribution, provide a comprehensive understanding of the current view of the dissonance reduction process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper begins by outlining the approaches to the development of a philosophy of social science in the work of Bourdieu, Passeron, and Habermas. The discussion of the positions of Comte and Mill which follows is an historical case-study of the tensions between competing stances adopted in the 1960s — between the tendency to formulate a logic of the social sciences and the tendency to ground a philosophy of social science in ontology or in the socio-political conditions of its production. The method adopted to compare the contributions to the philosophy of social science made by Comte and Mill displays sympathy with Bourdieu’s inclination to analyse the social conditions for the genesis of theory. The paper first considers comparatively the contexts in France and England for the emergence of social science and philosophy about social science. It then examines separately the developments of the projects of Comte and Mill before turning to an articulation of the contrasts between their positions, focusing on aspects of their correspondence as subsequently published and introduced by Lévy-Bruhl. The purpose of the paper is to raise the general question whether international intellectual exchange in relation to the analysis of society can occur within a universal discourse possessing a priori validity or through socio-cultural exchanges which assist the construction of universality through the mutual recognition of difference. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper analyzes the impact that Lamarckian evolutionary theory had in the scientific community during the period between the advent of Zoological Philosophy and the publication Origin of Species. During these 50 years Lamarck's model was a well known theory and it was discussed by the scientific community as a hypothesis to explain the changing nature of the fossil record throughout the history of Earth. Lamarck's transmutation theory established the foundation of an evolutionary model introducing a new way to research in nature. Darwin's selectionist theory was proposed in 1859 to explain the origin of species within this epistemological process. In this context, Charles Lyell's Principles of Geology and Auguste Comte's Cours de Philosophie Positive appear as two major works for the dissemination of Lamarck's evolutionary ideology after the death of the French naturalist in 1829. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the first decade of the twenty-first century, neopositivist claims made about the nature and validity of knowledge in the debates about scientifically based research were countered by educators who, decades earlier, had made various turns away from positivism and were surprised by its resurgence. In those debates, positivists often used postmodernism as a code word for any social science approach that was not positivist and so, they claimed, could not be scientific. To remind us of the nature of positivism and the limits of the knowledge it enables, this paper reviews its assumptions and then returns to Lyotard’s 1979 cogent critique, paralogy that describes postmodern knowledge that moves toward the unknown by engaging undecidables, paradox, incomplete information and catastrophes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

No one doubts the radically transformative power of contemporary technologies and technoscientific practices over the material dimensions of our experience. Yet with the coming of all the exciting changes and the promise of ever better material conditions, what kinds of lives are we implicitly being encouraged to live? One would think that current philosophical studies of technology would make this a central question, and indeed, a few have done so. But many do not. Following the lead of thinkers who have made the so-called 'empirical turn,' many demur, usually with some remarks about the question being too abstract and general-too likely to suck us into utopian or dystopian speculations-when what is called for are truly informative and 'concrete' studies of what it is like to be with actual technologies. My paper considers the good life question-and the philosophical price one pays for not asking it-in light of Auguste Comte's theory of the three stages of intellectual development. Comte's depiction of the third, positive scientific stage is much less dated than one might assume. In fact, it is useful to think of our own era as arriving with a Comtean story attached, that is, a story of life in the 'developed' world becoming ever better thanks to modern science and technology. Because this story now seems less deserving of the unqualified optimism Comte had about it, I argue that thinking of our own experience as permeated by Comte's conception of third-stage life gives us a fresh way to consider our misgivings about this default position without either lapsing into utopian or dystopian speculation, or confining one's focus to purely postphenomenological or pragmatic studies of technoscientific life as it now 'appears.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following paper presents two different models of a just world order that take the French Revolution as their starting point: Condorcet's optimistic account of the bright but unilateral future course of history and the social model of Auguste Comte intended to unite the world's varying value systems. These two opposed approaches will be considered from the point of view of the actual debate on whether Western values should be predominant in the age of globalization. This debate is therefore linked to the questions whether different value systems should be treated equally or whether a particular one can be seen as superior to others, and thus no longer to be termed as a value system, but as a universal norm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to compare the theories of religion held by Comte and Durkheim. My thesis is that, despite a number of differences on specific points, both theories share some significant perspectives with respect to the rle of religious beliefs and institutions in the evolution of humanity, and that these perspectives are founded upon similar assumptions concerning human nature and the characteristic features of primitive social behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a research paper which was read at the Twenty-Second Annual Convention of the American Catholic Sociological Society, Fordham University, New York City on August 31 to September 2, 1960. A sampling of the sociological studies being completed at the present time indicates a trend toward making explicit one's stand with either social system theory in the Parsonian tradition or conflict theory in the Marxist tradition. Some, like Dahrendorf, see in this trend a revival of the perennial problem of social thought which comes down through the ages, represented by Plato and Aristotle, Rousseau and Hobbes, Kant and Hegel, and they imply that it would be temerity on our part to try to resolve these contradictions. Such an attitude, however, would leave us with the necessity of tolerating the status quo in sociology today which, I think most of us would agree, is not intellectually satisfying. Besides this fact, the evaluation equates sociology with social philosophy and ignores the possibility of examining the issue in its empirical forms in a society bursting with stimuli to social change which are being both resisted and accepted in a variety of forms of cooperation and conflict, thus constituting ready data for empirical investigation, the only legitimate source of sociological theory building. Both Karl Marx and Auguste Comte addressed themselves directly to this empirical phenomenon. It was Marx that stirred formal sociology into existence.

Humans is always a problem discussed and analyzed in many philosophical schools from ancient times up to now. Each philosopher, depending on his social condition and cognitive point of view, has his interpretations of the human problem. Inheriting the previous philosophers. L.Feuerbach looks at a new way of adapting to the society of his time. The philosophy of love, happiness, and freedom is associated with L.Feuerbach's conception of the spiritual goal of humanity - the religion of love, similar to the "humanitarianism" of Auguste Comte. It is necessary to consider that philosophy must start from humans and for humans. The human theory is the center that shows not an only the center of philosophical research, but also, for All schools, is the center of the world [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the writing of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865) is neglected within sociology. Yet building on the work of Auguste Comte, Proudhon was an influential, if controversial, social theorist throughout the 19th century. Proudhon, "the father of anarchism," held an understanding of progress antagonistic toward that of Marx, his contemporary within the emerging socialist movement. While Comte and Marx focused on knowledge or class struggle respectively as the source of progress within society, Proudhon argued that only justice generates social progress. Several notable French sociologists have written on the importance of Proudhon's work, but contemporary sociology continues to neglect his ideas. In what follows, I first outline Proudhon's place in sociology. Then, I describe his law of progress and the "three revolutions in justice." Next, I derive several theoretical propositions from Proudhon's idea of justice. Lastly, I examine what a serious study of Proudhonian justice can contribute to the discipline of sociology as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociology is par excellence the science of the other since relationality is the object of its approach. It is precisely from the relationship that is established with the other that various dynamics develop, which can be pro-social or counter-social, generating forms of altruism and selfishness, generosity and appropriation, acceptance and rejection, collaboration and competition. Altruism, in particular, has been the object of attention by Comte and Spencer in a universalistic perspective very different from the contemporary forms assumed by the phenomenon of globalization. Perhaps, it is only through the analysis of the modalities of altruism that we can understand well enough the reasons that produce attitudes and behaviours that are more or less favourable towards others. If we then combine altruism with the peculiar processes of the exercise of empathy, the sociological problem in its complexity becomes even more intriguing. It is not by chance that Daniel Batson has started a rather articulate discussion that tends to show how altruism is motivated by empathy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conception of the founder of the Austrian School in his book on the philosophy of social sciences has been described by the supporters of this school as a total methodological individualism, upholding the absolute specificity of these sciences to those of nature, and as rejecting the use of mathematics in economics. On the contrary, we shall see that for Carl Menger the human individual was only the fundamental element of socio-economic structures, not reducible to it. Economic theory was to be inspired by the 'atomism' of natural sciences and determine the causes, effects, and laws of the studied phenomena, with the aim of predicting and controlling them. Empirical study had to unite with conceptual abstraction and mathematics in the degree determined by the simplicity or complexity of the field of research. These characteristics of C. Manger's conception, like others, make us assume an important (but unconfessed) influence of A. Comte's positivism. However, in order to prove it, we will try to restore his true philosophy of science, warped by the neo-positivism of the energeticist scientists and of the Vienna Circle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The word ‘environment’ has a history. Before the mid-nineteenth century, the idea of a singular, abstract entity—the organism—interacting with another singular, abstract entity—the environment—was virtually unknown. In this paper I trace how the idea of a plurality of external conditions or circumstances was replaced by the idea of a singular environment. The central figure behind this shift, at least in Anglo-American intellectual life, was the philosopher Herbert Spencer. I examine Spencer’s work from 1840 to 1855, demonstrating that he was exposed to a variety of discussions of the ‘force of circumstances’ in this period, and was decisively influenced by the ideas of Auguste Comte in the years preceding the publication of Principles of psychology (1855). It is this latter work that popularized the word ‘environment’ and the corresponding idea of organism–environment interaction—an idea with important metaphysical and methodological implications. Spencer introduced into the English-speaking world one of our most enduring dichotomies: organism and environment. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Copyright of Política & Sociedade: Revista de Sociologia Política is the property of Revista Politica & Sociedade and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper we list the various criticisms that have been formulated against introspection, fro,n Auguste Comte denying that consciousness can observe itself to recent criticisms of the reliability of first person descriptions. We show that these criticisms rely on the one hand on poor knowledge of the introspective process, and on the other hand on a naïve conception of scientific objectivity Two kinds of answers are offered. the first one is grounded on a refined description of the process of becoming aware of one's experience and describing it, the second one relies on a comparison with the methods of the experimental sciences. We conclude the article by providing a renewed definition of 'the truth' of a first person description. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociology was proposed by its founder Auguste Comte to be a science, following in the line and logic of the other sciences in the nineteenth century. Based on his dictates, the early sociologists like Herbert Spencer and Emile Durkheim sought to perfect a methodology suitable for a science of society. But over the years, and particularly as sociology crossed the ocean and began its career in the USA, much of the objectives of being a science was lost. And today it is difficult to claim sociology as a science. This paper looks at the demarcation criteria used over the years to designate the sciences and concludes that sociology is no longer a science according to these demarcation criteria. But by posing as a science, which it is not, sociology has relegated itself to the realm of the pseudoscience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Hospital a Domicilio is the property of Centro Internacional Virtual de Investigacion en Nutricion and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Recent research has brought to light numerous facts that go against received views of the development of philosophy of science. One encounters several concepts, claims, or projects much earlier than is generally acknowledged. Auguste Comte was careful to distinguish each major science with respect to method and object, speaking of mathematical philosophy, biological philosophy, sociological philosophy, and so forth. He thereby in a sense anticipated the regionalist turn: philosophical analysis should be carried out with respect to a specific body of knowledge. He also adopted a general perspective, a scientific philosophy. In the light of new discoveries, later thinkers such as Pierre Duhem, Gaston Milhaud, and Abel Rey endeavored to reformulate Comte's doctrine as a neopositivism, a logical positivism, or an absolute positivism. The aim of this article is to examine the constitutive concepts mentioned and the controversies that hinge on them, in an effort to reach a precise understanding of the aim, scope, and import of philosophy of science in the context of nineteenth-century France. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comte argued against the Cartesian conception of the mind that the thinker cannot simultaneously think or perceive and observe itself so doing. Based on insights from cognitive neuroscience, Dehaene has recently given a contemporary answer to Comte's challenge. He has extended some ideas of Helmholtz on unconscious inferences and argued that we can resolve Comte's problem by reformulating it in terms of the brain. Since the brain consists of different parts having different functions, it is possible that some parts are involved in observing (they unconsciously process information) while other parts integrate the received information resulting in conscious experiences to which we have access. Dehaene's answer is criticized and the alternative neo-Aristotelian resolution of Comte's challenge is discussed. Explanations of blindsight are used to illustrate the differences between the two responses to Comte's challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on Auguste Comte's understanding of the organism–environment relationship. It makes three key claims therein: (a) Comte's metaphysical position privileged materiality and relativized the intellect along two dimensions: one related to the biological organism, one related to the social environment; (b) this twofold materiality confounds attempts to reduce cognition to either nature or nurture, so Comte's position has interesting parallels to the field of 'epigenetics', which sees the social environment as a causative factor in biology; and (c) although Comte ultimately diverged from the 'postgenomic' view in crucial ways, he remains a forerunner of the trend towards viewing the social and biological as entangled. Tending to these dimensions challenges the view that Comte is notable from a classical standpoint but ignorable from a contemporary one. It consequently invites renewed attention to his theoretical system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Hans Jonas wrote his Das Prinzip Verantwortung (1979), no theoretical tradition seemed to be available to face the risks humanity was experiencing in light of its own technological progress. However, Auguste Comte – considered the founding father of scientific positivism – paved the way for a new form of knowledge, sociology, conceived to provide a unitary theoretical framework accounting for the relationship between human being and the surrounding world. He reoriented all the scientific specializations within the limits imposed by such a foundational relationship. In the first part of the article, I try to isolate, among the reasons leading Comte to found sociology, the most interesting ones for the “imperative of responsibility” as professed by Jonas. In the second part, instead, I try to identify the cultural obstacles that prevented Jonas from finding in Comte, and in the sociological tradition tout court, any useful ideas in order to conceive “an ethics for technological civilization”. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reports on the Business Meeting of the American Sociological Society that took place on December 29, 1937 in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The second business meeting of the Society was called to order by the president of the society in the Main Lounge of the Claridge Hotel. Minutes of the Executive Committee were read. A preliminary report of chairman of the Planning Committee for the Utilization of the Services of Professional Sociologists in Public and Private Agencies was read by the secretary. The Society formally approved this report and also the motion that this committee should be continued. Member E.A. Ross moved that the incoming officers take into consideration in planning program for the next annual meetings a survey of the first hundred years of sociology since sociologist Auguste Comte's use of the term. Ross also moved that a time limit of one-half hour be set for papers in general sessions in order to permit discussion. Both motions were passed, and upon the further approval of the Society, the chairman referred both matters to the Committee on Resolutions.

In this article Scott Soames talks about his book "The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy: A New Vision." According to Soames, his book creates a better version of tractarian propositions which is consistent with numerous tractarian doctrines. The scientific positivism of Auguste Comte and Ernst Mach is also examined by Soames.

Historians of science and religion usually trace the origins of the "conflict thesis," the notion that science and religion have been in perennial "conflict" or "warfare," to the late nineteenth century, particularly to the narratives of New York chemist John William Draper and historian Andrew Dickson White. In this essay, I argue against that convention. Their narratives should not be read as stories to debunk, but rather as primary sources reflecting themes and changes in religious thought during the late nineteenth century. I contend that Draper and White were part of a long liberal Protestant heritage that emphasized history, reason, and religious emancipation against ecclesiastical authority. As an alternative source of origins, however, I suggest that the real "conflict thesis" is to be found in the fledgling discipline of the history of science as it emerged during the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. The real origin of the "conflict thesis" is found in the very discipline that now seeks to condemn it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The historiographic tradition of the history of science that originated with Auguste Comte bears all the marks of narratives with roots in the Enlightenment, such as a view of religion as an underdeveloped stage in the ascending road in humanity's quest for a more mature understanding. This article explores the development of the peripheral branch of a tradition that developed in Argentina by the mid‐twentieth century with authors such as the Italians Aldo Mieli, José Babini, and the Hungarian Desiderius Papp. It is argued that, contrary to the historiographic program of the conflict thesis developed in English‐speaking countries, those scholars who cultivated the kind of "positivist" history of science that thrived in continental Europe were inclined to see science as a social and epistemological replacement of a fossilized religious outlook. In the final section, I suggest a way to relate the more or less strong versions of the conflict thesis to different patterns of secularization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article shows that there is a strong connection between the religious component of French sociology and the critique of political economy. In the first section, I consider how selfish behaviour, or egoism, became treated as a major threat endangering the creation of industrial society by those concerned about the diffusion of political economy. I then summarise the methodological critique set forth in theCours, before connecting this critique to the economic content of theSystèmeand the concept of altruism. In the following section, Spencer's view of altruism is contrasted to that held by Comte, and then I consider the reaction of French political economists, defending the moral value bought about by their science. In the final section, I explain how the Comtean approach was re-enacted by Durkheim and then by Mauss, at the head of the “sociology of religion” section ofL'Année sociologique, the Durkheimian journal, to give birth to the theory of gift-giving behaviour that Mauss used to critique political economy in the 1920s. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

According to a long-standing narrative of Western modernity science is one of the main drivers of secularization. Science is said to have generated challenges to core religious beliefs and to have provided an alternative, rational way of looking at the world. This narrative typically relies on progressive and teleological understandings of history, and commitment to some version of an ongoing struggle between science and religion. By way of contrast, recent theories of secularization, such as that of Charles Taylor, have suggested that the role of science in secularization has been greatly exaggerated. This article also offers a critique of the standard “science causes secularization” story. But in contrast to other critiques of this kind, it suggests that science nonetheless has a significant role in secularization – one that can be maintained without a commitment to a crude progressivist history or a narrative of science-religion conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the article, the author discusses issues in social normality with respect to the common or normal behavior of humans. She cites the Oscar Wilde play "The Importance of Being Earnest" to examine the issues. Also tackled are such topics as descriptive sociology, the works of sociologists Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim on the common or normal behavior within a specific society, and the Gaussian normality distribution.

The emergence of social theory is closely linked to the transformations inaugurated by the rise of a distinctly capitalist modernity from the second half of the eighteenth century onwards. In this article, I reconstruct the outlines of two strands of social theorising that emerged in response to the radical challenges posed by ‘the great transformation’ on the one hand, and the French Revolution on the other. I juxtapose two responses to the transnational constellations these events signify, one heralded by Auguste Comte, and the other, inter alia, by Karl Marx. While the Comtean frame obliterates meaningful registers of thinking about political transformation, I argue that conflict-theoretic tradition indebted to G. W. F. Hegel and Marx is much more amenable to analytical and practical concerns with responding politically to the challenges posed by ‘the rise of the social’. In the final part, this is discussed with reference to the ‘social turn’ in IR theory. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Jane Addams played an integral role in the development of a pragmatic ethic. Influenced by Darwinian naturalism, Addams found her religious calling as the founder of an American settlement house, Hull House. On a postgraduation European tour Addams visited Toynbee Hall and met followers of Auguste Comte's Religion of Humanity and adherents of Edward Caird's Oxford Hegelian idealism. Comtes account of the social organism provides Addams with an alternative to Spencer's social Darwinism, one more compatible with Addams's social gospel ethics. Caird's Hegelian interpretation of the evolution of Christianity shaped the settlement movement. Addam's saw her American settlement house as the perfect environment for developing American democratic and humanistic faith. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the nineteenth-century intellectual history of Mexico, focusing particularly on the period from 1876 to 1911 when President Porfirio Díaz was in power. The influence of positivism, as espoused by French philosopher August Comte as well as other philosophers including John Stuart Mill, Alexander Bain, and Herbert Spencer, on Mexican social and education policies is explored. Topics considered include physician Gabino Barreda, Mexican President Benito Juárez, secularism, and intellectual José María Luis Mora.

This article explores the process of the creation of photographs on kibbutz through a case study of one nuclear family living on kibbutz in Israel. It examines the process of construction of photographs in the private family album of the nuclear family in relation to the public forms of documentation on kibbutz. The article explores to what extent the photographs enabled the family to express their individuality in kibbutz society, which was self-governed by a socialist, egalitarian ideology. It examines the influences of the childhood photographs of the mother, who joined the kibbutz as an adult, on the construction of images of motherhood in her private kibbutz photo album. It investigates the way in which the construction of private photographs in one family album contested dominant mythologies on kibbutz at that time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 14th century, Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) propounded sociological ideas similar to those of classical sociologists such as Auguste Comte (1798–1857), Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), Ferdinand Tonnies (1855–1936) and Karl Marx (1818–1883). He attempted to study and understand human society by using scientific methods of enquiry. However, Ibn Khaldun's name and contributions to modern sociology are apparently missing from most Western sociological textbooks in most universities across the globe. This article examines the sociological ideas of Ibn Khaldun and their relevance to contemporary sociology. The article considers factors responsible for why Ibn Khaldun has ceased to command a wide audience in contemporary mainstream sociology and suggests the need for modern sociologists and social scientists generally to begin to become acquainted and engage rigorously with his ideas and arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article looks at a specific case of intellectual exchange by approaching Luís Pereira Barreto (1840–1923), a Brazilian medic who, having studied in Brussels in the 1850s, came into contact with Comte's positivism and with the ideas of his disciples. While in Europe, Barreto established a long-lasting friendship with Pierre Lafitte, and became a convert to Comte's Religion of Humanity. Upon his return to Brazil in 1864, Barreto sought to apply Comte's principles to Brazilian society and politics. Although Barreto's use of positivism extends beyond the issue of slavery and slave work, I will focus on this priest of humanity's considerations about positivism, social evolutionism, and Brazilian slavery. This will allow me to extrapolate some qualified conclusions about the nature of the intellectual exchange that occurred between Barreto and the French positivists, and the development of Brazilian positivism as a political philosophy and social theory which had to address the problem of slavery in the 1870s and 1880s. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author responds to Piotr Sztompka's reviews of the book "Facing an Unequal World: Challenges for a Global Sociology" Volume One: Introduction, Latin America and Africa, Volume Two: Asia, and Volume Three: Europe and Concluding Reflections." He discusses how Sztompka revived the 19th-century vision of science of positivism founder Auguste Comte. He also comments on the conception of science at the inception of sociology.

The article discusses the use of series by social scientist as well as within socialist doctrine in France, focusing particularly on the period of the 19th century during the Restoration and July Monarchy. Some of the subjects considered include the use of series in the book "Introduction à la science de l’histoire" by J. P. B. Buchez, social reform movements of the period, the idea of progress in sciences such as physiology, zoology and geology, and the introduction of the terms “sociology” by Auguste Comte and “socialism” by Pierre Leroux.

The article discusses the unknown political and social influence of the military forces in Turkey. It states that Turkey's military has denounced the Ottoman principle of autonomous cultures and ethnicities. It clarifies that Turkey did not evolve from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire but has succeeded from the military-led seizure of power by the secret society of French-speaking military medical students known as the Ottoman Union in Instanbul. It cites the resignation of education director Ahmed Riza following the discovery of his link to the Ottoman Union and the influences of Auguste Comte and Gustave Le Bon.

Auguste Comte's doctrine of the three phases through which sciences pass (the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive) allows us to explain what John Stuart Mill was attempting in his magnum opus, the System of Logic: namely, to move the science of logic to its terminal and 'positive' stage. Both Mill's startling account of deduction and his unremarked solution to the Humean problem of induction eliminate the notions of necessity or force—in this case, the 'logical must'—characteristic of a science's metaphysical stage. Mill's treatment had a further surprising payoff: his solution to the Problem of Necessity (what today we call the problem of determinism and freedom of the will). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay I examine the new sciences of religion, spanning the traditional fields such as the psychology, sociology, and anthropology of religion to new fields such as the economics, neurosciences, epidemiology, and evolutionary psychology of religion. The purpose is to welcome these approaches but also delineate some of their philosophical and theological limitations. I argue for pluralistic methodologies in the scientific study of religious and spiritual phenomena. I argue that religious persons and institutions should welcome these investigations, because science affects only interpretative strategies and does not present a fundamental challenge to core religious commitments. Indeed, the new sciences of religion can help religions in becoming more effective and wholesome. I am critical of confusing the scientific study of religion with scientism and trace this ideological project back to August Comte. In the end I deconstruct the metaphoric boundary that places religion on the inside as the object and science as the subject on the outside looking in. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Suicide as self-sacrifice was described by early nineteenth century authors before the delineation of altruism by the French Philosopher and Mathematician Auguste Comte. The concept evolved, leading to the categorization of altruistic suicide by Savage in England in 1892 and the elaboration of the term by Durkheim in France in 1897. Pre-Durkheim suicidologists were aware of the subtleties of sacrifice as opposed to revenge in this type of suicide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]