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A key component of California's cap-and-trade program is the use of carbon offsets as compliance instruments for reducing statewide GHG emissions. Under this program, offsets are tradable credits representing real, verifiable, quantifiable, enforceable, permanent, and additional reductions or removals of GHG emissions. This paper focuses on the permanence and additionality standards for offset credits as defined and operationalized in California's Compliance Offset Protocol for U.S. Forest Projects. Drawing on a review of the protocol, interviews, current offset projects, and existing literature, we discuss how additionality and permanence standards relate to project participation and overall program effectiveness. Specifically, we provide an overview of offset credits as compliance instruments in California's cap-and-trade program, the timeline for a forest offset project, and the factors shaping participation in offset projects. We then discuss the implications of permanence and additionality at both the project and program levels. Largely consistent with previous work, we find that stringent standards for permanent and additional project activities can present barriers to participation, but also, that there may be a trade-off between project quality and quantity (i.e. levels of participation) when considering overall program effectiveness. We summarize what this implies for California's forest offset program and provide suggestions for improvements in light of potential program diffusion and policy learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Although there is broad agreement that negative carbon emissions may be required in order to meet the global climate change targets specified in the Paris Agreement and that carbon sequestration in the terrestrial biosphere can be an important contributor, there are important accounting issues that often discourage forest carbon sequestration projects. The legislation establishing the California forest offset program, for example, requires that offsets be "real, additional, quantifiable, permanent, verifiable, and enforceable". While these are all clearly desirable attributes, their implementation has been a great challenge in balancing complexity, expense, and risk. Most forest offset protocols carry similar accounting objectives, but often with different details, (e.g. Richards and Huebner in Carbon Manag 3(4):393–410, 2012 and Galik et al. in Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Change 14:677–690, 2009). The result is that the complexity, expense, and risk of participation discourage participation and make it more difficult to achieve climate mitigation goals. We focus on the requirements for accounting and permanence to illustrate that current requirements disproportionately disadvantage small landowners. Results: The simplified 1040EZ filing system for U.S. income taxes may provide insight for a protocol model that balances reward, effort, and risk, while still achieving the overall objectives of standardized offset protocols. In this paper, we present initial ideas and lay the groundwork behind a "2050EZ" protocol for forest carbon sequestration as a complement to existing protocols. Conclusion: The Paris Agreement states that "Parties should take action to conserve and enhance, as appropriate, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases." The Paris Agreement also refers to issues such as equity, sustainable development, and other non-carbon benefits. The challenge is to provide incentives for maintaining and increasing the amount of carbon sequestered in the biosphere. Monitoring and verification of carbon storage need to be sufficient to demonstrate sequestration from the atmosphere while providing clear incentives and simple accounting approaches that encourage participation by diverse participants, including small land holders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]