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This paper complicates the classic security dilemma by considering the notions of ontological security and relational deterrence. It studies how the ontological security dilemma has emerged between the US, China, and Taiwan from the relational perspective and how these spiral chains will further develop in the future. The paper incurs the literature on relational analysis to expound on how different ontological security concerns allude to relational deterrence between the three actors. Taiwan's separatism is more of a threat to China's relational self than to physical security because the separatist does not belong to any already agreed relationship. A geometric model and a few simulations yield three unconventional findings. 1) The less advantaged the US military is over China, the less likely armed unification will occur. 2) The US anti-Chinese tendency is irrelevant in determining the probability of armed unification. 3) What may escalate the spiral are China's anti-Taiwan independence and Taiwan's anti-unification. Case sensitivity indicates the ontological sensibilities of a security dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the increasingly volatile global political order, national economic structures and international relations, integrated as they are, are showing concerning signs of strain. Taiwan, whose world-leading semiconductor industry is indispensable in Global Supply Chains and whose economic prosperity and security are critical to a stable global economic system, has received much research interest since the late 1980s. Against the background of a slowing Taiwanese economy, starting in the 2000s, this paper seeks to investigate the causes of Taiwan's challenges and the linkages to the global economy vis-à-vis China. Based on previous research from different social science disciplines, this paper shows that Taiwan's economic performance has been undermined by the declining effectiveness of its industrial policy and the general state intervention in the country, which is in turn caused by deep socio-political divisions on issues of national identity and Taiwan-China relations. The paper reveals the dilemma, which results from this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Though there are still political turbulences, the economic cooperation between mainland China and Taiwan is inseparable. Cooperation between enterprises on both sides has become more frequent. Studying the similarities and differences between employees in Cross-Strait enterprises can contribute to human resource management. This paper aims to study the cultural difference between employees of mainland China and in Taiwan when facing psychological contract violations. Design/methodology/approach: A total of 811 valid sample questionnaires were taken from Cross-Strait private enterprise employees. This research adopted partial least squares-structural equation model statistical analysis as an empirical research evaluation. Findings: This study finds that psychological contract violation has a significant positive impact on turnover intention and a significant negative impact on organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) in the Chinese context. There exist cultural differences between the employees of mainland China and Taiwan. When facing psychological contract violation, it is found that employees from Taiwan are more likely to have a strong turnover intention but still keep higher job performance. Employees from mainland China are found to be more likely to have higher OCB. Originality/value: The originality of this research lies in establishing a stronger theoretical model to understand employee behavior. This paper verifies the validity of this model under the Chinese context. Moreover, this paper verifies the cultural difference between Cross-Strait employees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While most ethnic Chinese in northern Thailand are Thai citizens now, their everyday lives are a site where we can witness the political power entanglement of China, Taiwan and Thailand. With this in mind, this paper aims to look into the relationship between global China and overseas Chinese from the perspective of the ethnic Chinese in the northern borderlands of Thailand. The purpose is not just to disclose the multiplicity of global China in people's everyday lives, but also to complicate the picture of overseas Chinese as portrayed in top-down grand narratives about global China. I argue that the ongoing re-Sinicization in South-East Asia and the territorial geopolitics among China, Taiwan and Thailand have opened a conceptual space for the ethnic Chinese in northern Thailand to flexibly articulate themselves within the changing geopolitical economy. I use tea production and related Chinese-language education programmes, two separate but intertwined cases, to address these issues. By looking beyond the competition, conflict and dilemmas between China and Taiwan, I argue that Taiwan's previous engagement with agricultural transfer to Thailand and the rooting of pro-Taiwan identity and discourse in language education have paradoxically paved a way for China to stretch its influence into the everyday lives of the Chinese communities in the northern Thai borderlands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) (Taiwan) have taken divergent paths in the area of human rights. Since the two leaders Xi Jinping and Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the differences in the area of human rights have further increased. The paper analyses and compares their external human rights strategies based on realist assumptions and the soft and hard power resources of the PRC and the ROC. The PRC's objectives are to deflect international criticism of its human rights situation and to weaken the global human rights system and its underlying human rights norms. Taiwan's objective is to use its record as a human rights leader in Asia to expand its limited international space and to strengthen its ties with other consolidated democracies and the global civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines US public opinion after the drastic changes in US–China relations during the Trump presidency. I argue that the perceived China threat influences Americans' evaluation of the China–Taiwan tension. Based on the US dataset of the 2018 Survey on Global Attitudes and Trends by the Pew Research Center, Americans tend to perceive the China–Taiwan tension as a serious problem for the USA when Americans identify China as a major threat and its military strength as a concern. As US public opinion shapes the US foreign policy on China, the findings shed light on the public support for the ongoing US–China conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's opposition to PRC demands such as acceptance of the '92 Consensus' and 'One Country, Two Systems' formula since 2016 has invited a series of retaliatory measures from Beijing, designed to coerce Taiwan into compliance. Given the stark asymmetry in economic size, military capability, and diplomatic status, Taiwan provides a case for studying coercive diplomacy that takes the form of threats to punish. Material differences suggest that Taiwan should capitulate, and 'cheap talk' theses expect PRC threats to have no discernible effect, while balance of threat arguments expect resolve. In this article, we use the survey data collected in the 2016, 2019, and 2020 rounds of the Taiwan National Security Study to examine how Taiwanese respond to China's intensifying and expanding threats. Our paper identifies four strategies that the public sees as responses to PRC coercion: isolation, bandwagon with China, balance against China by allying with the USA and Japan, and hedge by deepening economic ties with China while aligning with the USA and Japan against China. We show that the popular support for balancing against China rises as PRC coercion grows and Taiwanese citizens increasingly perceive China to be a threat. Our findings imply that citizens in a liberal democracy can develop the will to pushback against pressure from an authoritarian regime despite sharp asymmetries in capabilities and material limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Up until the end of Cold War mainstream theories in the disciplines of International Relations and Peace Studies have overlooked the transformation in relations between actors but instead concentrated on either the constant state of conflict between units or radical changes from war to peace. Acknowledging major changes in their subject matters due to the changing conditions with the end of Cold War, both disciplines had to rethink their theoretical assumptions and renew their toolboxes. Accordingly, the constructivist turn in International Relations and the introduction of Transformational Approach to conflict in Peace Studies have brought the two disciplines closer. Similar to the Constructivist theory of International Relations that emphasizes changes rather than law-like regularities in international politics, the Conflict Transformation Approach in Peace Studies focuses on perennial transformation processes in conflicts. This paper through bringing together insights from the disciplines of International Relations and Peace Studies, analyses the cross-strait conflict between the People's Republic of China and Republic of China (Taiwan) within a constructivist framework, and from a transformational perspective by applying Hugh Miall's five-point model of conflict transformation (context transformation, structural transformation, actor transformation, issue transformation, and personal/elite transformation). Miall's five-point model is utilized in this paper to show that, despite serious crisis occurred in more than 70 years history of People's Republic of China-Republic of China conflict, the relationship of the parties has undergone a set of transformations on the way to reconciliation. Although the conflict, with serious disagreements on crucial issues, is far from being settled, the ongoing transformation creates room for negotiations and further reconciliation on issues that were previously regarded as non-negotiable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The issue of concurrent jurisdiction over cross-border crimes has become common in a globalizing world, while the rigid compliance with territoriality and active personality jurisdiction has created a legal vacuum for cross-border crimes in many situations. The jurisdiction dispute between mainland China and Taiwan over cross-border telecom fraud crimes is a good example. In recent years, the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China cracked down a series of cross-border telecom fraud crimes against mainland residents and extradited suspects to mainland China. Given a certain proportion of Taiwan residents in criminal gangs, the Taiwan side raised jurisdiction objections, arguing that mainland China had no right to exercise jurisdiction over Taiwanese criminals. The essence of the jurisdiction dispute between two sides is the concurrence of Taiwan's right to exercise active personality jurisdiction and the mainland's right to exercise passive personality jurisdiction. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the connotation of different jurisdiction principles (namely, territorial, active personality, protective and passive personality jurisdiction) and reinterpret their prioritization of applicability from a jurisprudential perspective, and thus, enhance the theoretical basis for resolving the issue of concurrent jurisdiction over cross-border crimes. Design/methodology/approach: By reviewing the historical trajectory of major jurisdiction principles since the 1920s, and studying the specificities of the case in this context, this paper argues that territorial jurisdiction and active personality jurisdiction have presumed priority but not an absolute priority for resolving the issue of concurrent jurisdiction. The applicability of protective and passive personality jurisdiction could precede the former provided the jurisdictions of territoriality or active personality are inadequate, incompetent or lack of motivation to combat crimes, which harm other jurisdictions. Findings: The developmental trajectory and contemporary connotation of major jurisdiction principles suggests that the legitimacy of the mainland's exercise of passive personality jurisdiction over Taiwan criminal suspects lies in the urgent need to recover mainland victims' significant property loss, the incompetence of Taiwan in detecting and prosecuting telecom fraud crimes committed by Taiwanese residents and targeting mainland victims and that the mainland has guaranteed the Taiwan side's right to be timely informed and fully participate in its exercise of criminal jurisdiction over crimes involving Taiwan suspects. Originality/value: Current literature on jurisdiction doctrines mainly uses a historical or descriptive approach to reveal the attitudes of different countries toward jurisdiction principles, which helps little in resolving the issue of concurrent jurisdiction over cross-border crimes in an era of globalization. This paper uses an interpretative approach, reinterprets the contemporary connotation of different jurisdiction principles and redefines the criteria for determining their prioritization in the context of the specificities of a case. It is expected to update the academic literature for resolving concurrent jurisdiction, fill the legal vacuum for combating cross-border crimes created by rigid compliance with territorial jurisdiction, and meanwhile relieve concerns about abuse of extraterritorial jurisdiction as it provides concrete standards for weighting the applicability of jurisdiction principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The Biden administration has in general been operating both “strategic ambiguity” and “strategic clarity,” prompting the question: Is the United States being strategically ambiguous or strategically clear towards Taiwan? This paper believes the discussion should start with the clarification of “U.S. policy regarding Taiwan.” However, U.S. policy towards Taiwan involves the highly sensitive One–China policy. Thus, the United States will evaluate its “core interest” in relation to China when dealing with the One–China policy, as mishandling it may trigger a war between the United States and China or the rest of the world. This is the reason why the United States must devise its Taiwan policy at a macro-level and cautious manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes the growing human rights gap between China on one side and the US and Taiwan on the other side and analyses its impact on cross-strait relations. Since Xi Jinping's ascent to power in the People's Republic of China in 2012/2013 and the elections of Donald Trump in the US and Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan in 2016, the relationship between China and the other two countries has worsened. The US and Taiwan have a similar view on human rights in the PRC. The increasing repression and authoritarianism of the PRC leads to a human rights gap in the Taiwan Strait that increases the divide and the tensions between both sides. The failure of the PRC to address in its proposal for a peaceful unification the concerns of the Taiwanese for their democracy and human rights pushes Taiwan further away. The similar assessment of the PRC's authoritarian threat by the US and Taiwan strengthens the bond between both, based on the shared values of democracy and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the recent features of China's economic coercion against Taiwan by offering an up‐to‐date and in‐depth analysis of China's targeted sanctions on Taishang in Tsai Ing‐wen's first term. The paper elaborates on China's specific reasons and means for imposing informal targeted sanctions, as well as their newly observed features in comparison with the past. Heavy dependence on the Chinese economy by certain enterprises of the island has made them vulnerable to sanction targeting. Compared to the past, nationalist boycotts by Chinese consumers and online activities have had a greater influence as part of China's informal targeted sanctions. Beijing's demands for supporting the "one China" policy and the "1992 Consensus" have also become more obvious. These findings suggest that the impetus for developing the cross‐Strait economic exchanges has become more susceptible to the effects of non‐economic factors. Although Beijing's sanctions on Taishang have not yet changed Taipei's policy, they cannot be said to be ineffective. Through the tactics, Beijing definitely sends clear signals of what it wants as it advances their strategy on cross‐Strait relations to the outside world. The case studies on Taiwan provide important implications for other economies as a barometer of China's increasing economic sanction practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• The literatures on subterranean geopolitics have paid insufficient attention to issues of peace. • The concept of affective atmosphere helps to flesh out the elemental and embodied dimensions of subterranean geopolitics. • The paper uses the case study of the Zhaishan Tunnel to show how it serves as a rapprochement tourism site. • Visitors of Zhaishan Tunnel (re)negotiate peaceful China-Taiwan relations in this subterranean space. Geopolitical studies on the subterranean have tended to portray underground spaces (including tunnels and caves) as closely imbricated with warfare, violence and militarism. This paper departs from existing literatures insofar as it explores how peaceful ideas and relationships can similarly be fostered through the subterranean realm. Using the case of the Zhaishan Tunnel located on the Taiwanese island of Kinmen, we demonstrate how this site has converted from a defensive structure against the military antagonisms from mainland China to one that is largely associated with rapprochement tourism for the cultivation of benign China-Taiwan relations. Specifically, by drawing on the concept of affective atmosphere, we argue that the elemental and material aspects of the tunnel have been strategically deployed to affectively shore up Chinese and Taiwanese visitors' collective memories in order to re-orientate their dispositions towards peaceful cross-strait futures. In so doing, we demonstrate how affective atmosphere can be analytically productive in examining the elemental and embodied dimensions of subterranean geopolitics. It not only enables critical appreciation of the ways in which different elemental materialities impact upon subjective feelings in/of subterranean spaces. More crucially, it also encourages incisive reflections into the agency and politics behind the conjoining of the elemental and bodily for the (re)making of subterranean geopolitics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses the theory of social construction of reality deriving from the writings of Max Weber, Alfred Schutz, Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger to explain the origin of national identity and hence the emergence of a nation. It argues that social construction of national reality originates from everyday life experience taken for granted during the process of socialization. Individuals make sense out of the external world. Experiences taken for granted become actor's stock of knowledge. A common scheme of knowledge shared by the community serves to differentiate in-group (nationals) and out-group (foreigners). Collective consciousness thus defines national identity and hence a nation. Unless people (both in-group and out-group) interact with and learn from each other, different stocks of knowledge taken for granted will create political tension. This theory will be applied to understand the tensions in Tibet and along the Taiwan Strait. The paper further argues that Taiwan can hardly separate from mainland China in the future, while strong Tibetan consciousness continues to defy against powerful Chineseness, resulting in endless upheavals in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-Strait economic activities are no longer unidirectional. The Taiwanese government opened the doors to Chinese investment in 2009. This paper addresses the following crucial question: What is the impact of Chinese investment on Taiwan's high-technology industrial development? Two further questions immediately follow: Will Chinese investment put Taiwanese industrial development at risk? Will an influx of Chinese investment lead to a turning point for Taiwanese industry? The paper first reviews Chinese investment in Taiwan under the framework of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and then explains why we have chosen to focus here on the high-technology industry in Taiwan. It then outlines the main elements of Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) before seeking to answer the above research questions. Fieldwork for this paper was conducted from December 2014 to March 2016. Interviewees include Chinese investors, along with consultants from a Taiwanese institute created to promote industrial development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The war in Ukraine and reactions to it have affected, and mostly worsened, already-formidable and growing challenges for US policy toward China-Taiwan conflict situations. These challenges include deterring a more powerful and assertive China in a more complex set of scenarios (including gray zone conflicts), assuring China that behavior that conforms to US preferences will mean more cooperative US behavior, and managing the abandonment / entrapment dynamic in US relations with Taiwan. The implication of the Ukraine war for the US and cross-Strait issues is mixed, complicated, and stillevolving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the data from the 1991–2016 agricultural investment of China's Taiwan in China's Mainland and the agricultural GDP of the latter, through models of vector autoregressive (VAR) and vector error correction (VEC), the influences of China's Taiwan agricultural investment on the development of agriculture in the eastern, central, and western regions of China are discussed. The results show a long-term equilibrium relationship between China's Taiwan agricultural investment and agricultural development in China's eastern, central, and western regions. In the long term, China's Taiwan investment in agriculture in the eastern, central, and western regions of China have certain positive promoting effect on their agricultural development. However, there is an obvious regional diversity in investment effect: Impulse response and variance decomposition show that the positive effect from China's Taiwan agricultural investment in China's western region agricultural development is most significant, and it is significantly higher than that in the eastern region; its contribution to the central region's agricultural development is little. VEC model analysis shows that in the short term, China's Taiwan investment in agriculture has a significant positive effect on the agricultural development of China's eastern region, but not on the agricultural development of the central and western regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines two Taiwan projects: the National Palace Museum (1965) in Taipei (NPM) and the NPM Southern Branch (NPMSB) in Chiayi (2003). The NPMSB targeted the liberalisation of the NPM from the stained political connotation of Chinese nationalism and constructs anew Taiwan's autonomous national identity. This paper argues that the construction of NPM/NPMSB in Taiwan is a cultural and colonial traumatism of national identity, and a struggle between official Chinese nationalism and rising prior Taiwanese subjectivity in a postcolonial context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does it mean to say a state is angry? To answer this question, this paper theorizes a diplomacy of anger. Specifically, the diplomacy of anger involves a vehement and overt state-level display of anger in response to a perceived violation. Although the diplomacy of anger threatens precipitous escalation in the face of further violations, it can be ameliorated by conciliatory gestures and will subside over time absent new provocations. What is more, the diplomacy of anger can also exercise a reciprocal influence on the emotional dispositions of those that practice it. The diplomacy of anger thereby contributes to constructing particular issues as sensitive and volatile, and thus outside the realm of standard bargaining interactions. To examine the analytical purchase of this approach vis-à-vis standard accounts of coercive diplomacy, this paper looks in-depth at the 1995–96 Taiwan Straits crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper investigates the diverse approaches of EU members' integration with the EU through modelling, and assesses the applicability of each model to Taiwan-China relations. Building upon two variables: 'the association with national identity and reorientation or not', and 'being the leading or founding member or not' four EU members' integrative models stand out. The German model is proved to be the most integrationist, followed by the Finnish and the French models. The UK model appears to be the least committed. Due to sovereignty controversies, the visionary German and French models are not applicable to Taiwan-China integrations and the prospects are for the pragmatic Finnish model at best, and the UK model at worst. These modelling outcomes can then explain why the growing economic integration between the two sides has not produced spillover effects into the political arena. This paper therefore argues that it would be in China's interest to make Taiwan an equal leading player in Taiwan-China integrations, and to transform its 'one-China policy' from the current political and sovereignty contents to a cultural and value-laden concept. Among the theories being examined, (neo)realist-constructivism demonstrates more applicability than two mainstream integration theories - neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1990s, Taiwan and China conducted over twenty rounds of negotiations through the semi-official Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) concerning the following issues: notarized papers, registered mail, illegal immigration, fishing disputes, airplane hijacking, and post-1997 shipping links between Taiwan and Hong Kong. Regrouping these issues into rights, law-and-order, and shipping, this study analyzes the differences in the negotiation processes and outcomes through variations of value-interest alignments and their perceived impact on future policy objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Taiwan Strait has often been referred to as one of the world's most dangerous hotspots and many dire predictions have been made about a military conflict between mainland China and Taiwan, likely involving the United States. Yet, despite several crises in the Taiwan Strait and numerous war speculations, there has been no major armed conflict between Beijing and Taipei since the 1950s. How do we explain the puzzle that an expected war across the Taiwan Strait did not happen after all? This paper first examines the explanations based on military balance of power. Having found the realist/rationalist explanations less convincing, however, this study explores the explanatory power of the 'ethnicity' factor. It suggests that when the Chinese society is no longer divided by ideological differences, the 'ethnicity' may provide a more convincing explanation of why a military conflict has not happened in the Taiwan Strait in the past four decades. This paper also considers several counterarguments, including the neo-liberal argument of economic integration as a driving force for peace in the age of globalization. The paper concludes with a discussion of some policy implications resulting from the 'ethnic peace' thesis and proposes that when actively promoted by the both sides, the Chinese ethnic identity is likely to be the most important strategic guarantee of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for many years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan is a vexed issue, and having no definite sovereignty status at the inter-state level, it carries the potential for conflagration. There is palpably a contradiction between its de jure and de facto status. Contradiction is also discernible in realizing the right brand of nationalism and the question of justice in adopting the appropriate hierarchical mode of governance. As such, there is a need to rethink its status and also the surrounding security architecture. The actors concerned may have to confront high stakes if its status quo is changed. The “one China” policy is accepted by all—but its varying interpretations and ambiguities in different official documents and pronouncements, made mostly keeping in view the geopolitical and nationalist compulsions, give rise to concern. It has turned out to be a flashpoint whose political status will, hopefully, be finally decided peacefully in a mutually accepted agreement through dialogue and confidence-building measures. This paper examines the present status of Taiwan and the suggested ways forward for its final settlement, keeping in focus the security, political and economic realities—both in the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, as well as the surrounding region. There is a suggestion for a people-centric, like people being masters of their own destiny (people-first) solution—maybe in order to preclude the geopolitical complexities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tests the hypothesis that the links and dependency relationships between China and her special regions have changed over the past 20 years with the industrialisation of China, and the emergence of Taiwan as a source of investment and sophisticated manufactures, and Hong Kong as financial centre and supplier of services. Has this changed the size and direction of spillovers in the region, and has it curtailed or eliminated American economic leadership? We use time-varying spectral methods to decompose the links between six advanced Asian economies and the US. We find: (a) the links with the US have been weakening, while those within a bloc based on China have strengthened; (b) that this is not new – it has been happening since the 1980s, but has now been reversed by the surge in trade; (c) that Taiwan is more integrated with, and dependent on, the Chinese economy, while Hong Kong continues her separate development based on specialisation and comparative advantage; (d) that the links with the US are rather complex, with the US able to shape the cycles elsewhere through her control of monetary conditions, but the China zone able to control the size of their cycles; and (e) there appears to be no real evidence that pegged exchange rates encourage convergence; in fact the reverse may be true. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Europeans regard monetary arrangements as a key element of the overwhelming effort to never again allow hostilities to flare up on their continent. For Taiwan and China, a monetary coordination mechanism may also be appealing in order to eliminate hostilities caused by the Chinese civil war since 1949. Due to certain historical and geopolitical reasons, the impact of a China-Taiwan Economic Union on the world can not be measured by its economic scale only. On the basis of Robert Mundell's earlier proposal and the current development of the European Monetary Union, this paper provides a framework to analyze whether the establishment of a Chinese monetary union (CMU) could be sustained after suffering various economic shocks. We assume that a Chinese central bank coordinates the single monetary policy of the Chinese Economic Area and that China and Taiwan maintain their fiscal independence. An international policy coordination approach is used to simulate possible outcomes if the CMU were to be implemented. The simulation indicates that the U.S. and Japan may suffer welfare losses if China and Taiwan insist on their monetary unification. However, if both the U.S. and Japan accept the CMU, further international policy coordination may help them decrease such kind of losses. The analysis is preliminary but may be helpful in considering the East Asian economic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years the concept of 'soft power', popularized by the work of Joseph Nye, has gained currency in both China and Taiwan. This paper explores how the Chinese and Taiwanese understand soft power and its sources, and how their understanding differs from Nye's formulation. It discusses why this foreign concept has become so salient in the Chinese and the Taiwanese discourse. It also examines the impact of this concept on the external policies of China and Taiwan. The paper concludes by pointing out the limitations of the concept of soft power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of public support for war among non-Western and non-major powers (NWNM) states are distinctive from United States foreign military operations. First, these wars often intrude on subjects' direct livelihood. Second, great powers' intervention can drastically alter the outcome of these wars. These factors have not been examined extensively in the war support literature. We fill this gap by spearheading several hypotheses of war support unique to NWNM countries. Through an original and representative survey experiment on a hypothetical military conflict between China and Taiwan, our analysis yields that the information about the United States coming to Taiwan's defense in an armed conflict with China drives up war support by around 7% among the citizenry, although such information does not make the Taiwanese population more tolerant of combat casualties. In addition, perception of military training increases public support for war significantly. The findings suggest that the study of NWNM states could contribute to the war support literature from different perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates whether and w hy the Taiwanese investors in mainland China are pursuing a different location selection strategy from other foreign direct investors. I find that, compared to the general foreign direct investors, Taiwanese direct investors seem to be more dependent on the autonomy of local governments, especially as investment in a locality increases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do people risk their lives fighting in wars? This article looks beyond group grievance and material benefits to add another psychological mechanism explaining why people choose to fight or not to fight – perceived collective action. An individual is much more likely to fight when they perceive that others will also fight. Contrary to the expectations of social identity theory and social pressure theory, the effect of perceived collective action is stronger among those who have a weaker national identity because they are more likely to rationally calculate the chance of winning by accounting for others' decisions. To mitigate the endogeneity in post-conflict cross-sectional surveys, we conduct a survey experiment (n = 1,001) in Taiwan manipulating perceptions of others' willingness to fight in a potential China–Taiwan military conflict. Experimental evidence supports the hypotheses that perceived collective action works only on weak Taiwanese identifiers. The result holds in robustness checks and in another nationally representative survey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Because of the complex and special political relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan. Cross-Strait trade is influenced by many variables, there has been a view that trade relations between Mainland China and Taiwan are more influenced by political factors. However, between the Cross-Strait, the trade volume has generally shown an upward development trend, especially since 2001. Therefore, the political factors can hardly explain the facts, and economic factors, especially industrial structure factors in Mainland China play an important role in Cross-Strait trade. Based on the small sample data since 2001, this study employed Grey Relational Analysis （GRA） method to verify the evolution of Mainland China's industrial structure and Cross-Strait trade. Based on the results show that the evolution of Mainland China's industrial structure strongly impacts the development of Cross-Strait trade. The tertiary industry has the strongest correlation with Cross-Strait trade, followed by the secondary and primary industries. Furthermore, the evolution of the mainland's industrial structure will expand as well as accelerate the imbalance of Cross-Strait trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the essence of China's Taiwan policy has not changed from the era of Jiang Zemin to the present, the era of Hu Jintao, Jiang's and Hu's attitudes are different. Jiang was impatient with the delay in the unification of China and Taiwan, talking about timetables for unification; however, Hu has so far been patient, saying that he is not afraid of delaying unification. The purpose of this paper is to explain why their attitudes are different. I argue that two factors combine to result in Jiang's impatience and Hu's patience: conflicting ‘perceptions of Taiwan's domestic politics and Taiwan's China policy’ and differing ‘perceptions of the US behavior and attitude regarding Taiwan’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In June 2010, the People's Republic of China and Taiwan signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a preferential trade agreement, which is arguably the most important agreement between China and Taiwan. In this paper, we analyze ECFA and investigate its implications for South Korea since China is South Korea's largest trade partner and Taiwan is its sixth largest. We find that ECFA will have significant political and economic implications for South Korea due to China's role in East Asia and South Korea's competition with Taiwan in the China market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, many people have called for a more active role for the EU in cross-Taiwan Strait relations. While acknowledging its immense power and influence, this paper argues that the EU's role will remain limited for three structural reasons. Despite the Lisbon Treaty, the EU's sui generis system will continue to constrain its policy towards cross-strait relations. With 27 countries of varying interests, power and perspectives, it is difficult to expect the EU to change its current policies, which consist of the 'one-China' notion and the principle of a peaceful solution. Second, the regional structure along the strait is so complex that the EU can hardly come up with new initiatives. Given the fact that China is more important than Taiwan, the EU can hardly make its policy more favourable to Taiwan. However, supporting Chinese unification, especially in a non-peaceful way, will run counter to the EU's interests and principles. Even if it is willing to play a more active role, the EU lacks power to do so. Finally, the global structure will limit the EU's freedom of action. The EU does not live in a care-free environment, and nearby stability tops its security agenda. In its dealing with global issues, the EU may benefit from Chinese cooperation. Although the EU has close relations with the US, the American factor can hardly be expected to cause major changes in the EU's policy towards cross-strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how and why China has been perceived as an economic threat in Taiwan through an examination of Taipei's post-Cold War economic policy with respect to the mainland. While Taipei's restriction on trade and investment across the Taiwan Strait until mid-2008 was widely considered a failure by both opponents and supporters of closer cross-Strait economic ties, this analysis points to an overlooked function of Taiwan's economic policy that was not just about tackling the problems of the security externalities or promoting the island's economic development. What appeared to be an ineffective policy can be understood as a successful boundary-drawing practice that discursively constituted a vulnerable Taiwan under Chinese economic threat, hence conducive to the (re)production of Taiwanese national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U. S. role in cross-strait relations before and after the political power transition in Taiwan during 2008. It explores the question of whether a new dynamic is shaping the Beijing-Taipei-Washington trilateral relations with the significant relaxation of cross-strait relations, and how that affects Washington's ability to influence the direction of cross-strait relations in the future. More specifically the paper analyzes the role the United States played in shaping the new reality in the Taiwan Straits, and the evolving thinking on Taiwan in American strategic and political circles. It will also discuss how Washington has managed the cross-strait relations so far as well as how Beijing and Taipei have handled the American factor on some sensitive issues. Finally it will look at the potential benefits and limitations that the United States could contribute to achieving a higher level of reconciliation and integration between the two sides across the Taiwan Straits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Taiwan and China have a long history of sharing marine resources in the China Seas. However, due to political issues, the two sides have yet to formalize collaboration and interaction despite such a close geographical relationship. The lack of formal collaboration means they cannot manage fisheries or conserve resources as a team. The lack of collaboration in the regional fisheries management organizations also means a mutually beneficial situation for the two sides is yet to be achieved. Recognizing this, the two sides began negotiations in 2008 and have since signed agreements on fisheries co-operation projects. This paper discusses the unique fisheries relationship between Taiwan and China, and the characteristics of their fishing industries. The paper also presents the latest update on the collaboration between the two sides. Finally, this paper proposes practical solutions for resolving outstanding issues between the two sides’ fishing industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Facing the ever-growing interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, Mainland China's strategy towards Taiwan is undergoing a profound change, that is, transcending the staunch realpolitik mentality and turning to an institutional arrangement in policy making. Especially since President Hu Jintao took up his position, the Mainland has endeavored to improve cross-Strait relations through the institutionalization of a series of sensitive issues, such as the proposals and signatures of some long-term accords aiming to advocate economic cooperation, promote social exchanges, weaken political opposition and foster mutual trust. By taking the Mainland's national development strategy shift, Taiwan's domestic reality and 'institution deficit' in cross-Strait relations into consideration, this paper analyzes the reasons, efforts and features of the Mainland's recent institutional-orientated policy transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For a broad understanding of tourism across the Taiwan Strait, this paper previously draws on an overview of tourism and the evolutionary process of “Mini Three Links” policy between Kinmen (of Taiwan) and Xiamen (of China). Further, using empirical testing, the paper assesses the perceptions of Kinmen tourists towards China. The results reveal the fact that low-politics activity or people-to-people contacts can be an effective force to reduce tension. The finding of the paper also indicates that as long as tourism across the Taiwan Strait continues to grow, the relationship between Kinmen and Xiamen can therefore be normalized and promoted. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper investigates the Japanese occupation of Taiwan from 1895 to 1945. It also explores the development of the Sino- Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the process of colonization. It explains the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese military and civilian governments. It demonstrates that although the Japanese occupation brought economic welfare, it also brought discrimination towards Taiwanese people. The paper looks at the movement organized by Taiwanese intellectuals and students who wanted to gain political participation. Final remarks are given about the fifty years that Taiwan was occupied by the Japanese. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Washington's Taiwan policy has been a controversial issue for U.S. policymakers and politicians for decades. At the core of the Taiwan issue is the question of establishing sovereignty. However, there is no "silver bullet" for resolving cross-Strait issues, especially the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty. This paper first presents a chronological review of the components of the U.S. government's "one-China policy" and then examines a definitional problem found in the debate on sovereignty and its implications for Taiwan's sovereignty. A preliminary assessment will be made of the US. perception of Taiwan's sovereignty by analyzing key documents and interviews which have been conducted in Washington. This paper will then conclude with a discussion of some of the implications for the future of cross-Strait relations. Iris argued that for the United States, Taiwan's sovereignty is defined as "one policy, three sovereignties, and five perceptions." The United States is reluctant to define Taiwan's sovereignty, and as interviews conducted in Washington indicate, Taiwan's status is clearly unsettled. The United States challenges neither the Republic of China's (ROC) governance of Taiwan, nor Beijing's position on Taiwan's sovereignty. In brief the United States does not take sides on this issue, but is still bound to a certain degree by its domestic law, the Taiwan Relations Act. The United States' foremost concern is to strike a delicate balance between helping Taiwan to practice its consent, while at same time not violating its own national interests (which implies avoiding a military confrontation with China). This clearly takes precedence over getting involved in defining Taiwan's sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the impact of ongoing cross-strait economic integration on the development of China and Taiwan. The overall impact has been positive for both economies. Taiwan's industrial employment remains robust even as it transforms into a knowledge-based economy. Taiwanese investment has spurred China's technological development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In its relations with Taiwan and China, Washington has begun to implement separate dual strategies in order to simultaneously deter unilateral action while balancing out the rival political and military forces of each side. A simple standard strategy just is not sufficient to maintain the status quo. The way to maintain peace is for Washington to keep its role as a moderator between the two sides while preventing both from taking unilateral steps toward goals that would naturally provoke the other. US policy has to mirror the duality of the cross-strait arena by implementing dual balancing and deterrent strategies. It is also imperative that policymakers realize the complexity of the situation so as not to unwittingly provoke either side. This paper is an analysis of the emerging US strategy of deterring both sides of the Taiwan Strait from taking unilateral action while maintaining a balance of military and political forces, and gives some suggestions as to the further development of this strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

China is accused of conducting disinformation campaigns on Taiwan's social media. Existing studies on foreign interventions in democratic societies predict that such disinformation campaigns should lead to increasing partisan polarization within Taiwan. We argue that a backlash effect, making Taiwan's citizens more united against China, is equally plausible. We conduct a survey experiment exposing participants to a real-life rumour and rebuttal to test these competing hypotheses. We find, at best, mixed evidence for polarization. Although neither rumour nor rebuttal mention China, there is consistent evidence of backlash against China. Most notably, participants across the political spectrum are more inclined to support Taiwanese independence after viewing the rumour rebuttal. These findings indicate that citizens may put aside partisanship when confronted with false news that is plausibly linked to an external actor. We conclude by discussing the broader applicability of our theory and implications for cross-Strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U.S. military's engagement with maintaining security in Taiwan and its evaluation of a possible Taiwan Strait crisis. Topics include how the U.S. became committed to resisting changes to Taiwan through the "Taiwan Relations Act" of 1979 and how U.S. military assessments consider the potential use of force by the People's Republic of China (PRC) against Taiwan. Additional information is presented on how the PRC will likely not attack if it believes it cannot deter the U.S. from defending Taiwan.

The article examines mutual non-denial within the context of cross-strait relations between mainland China and Taiwan. Information on the evolution of cross-strait relations from 1949 to present is provided. The views of Chinese President Ma Ying-joeu on the effectiveness of the concept of mutual non-denial approach in handling complex and sensitive cross-strait relations are explained. The relevance of the state of relations between the two countries to international law is also analyzed.

Taiwan poses a unique challenge to China's domestic stability, the political survival of its leaders and its relations with other countries. Unlike most external problems, this challenge calls for fundamental and systemic reforms to accommodate Taiwanese appeals. Yet, even if China makes these painful changes, there is no guarantee that the island polity will embrace Beijing's ultimate strategic goal of national reunification. When Taiwan's independence forces induce a crisis, China's leaders are forced to act harshly; on the other hand, when no crisis is imminent, Beijing can afford concessions. When Hu Jintao officially became the leader of the People's Republic of China (PRC), his first political initiative was to institute the controversial Anti-Secession Law, the so-called "legal weapon" to fight Taiwan's secessionism. A longitudinal comparison between Hu and his predecessors' policies reveals that the Anti-Secession Law was more conciliatory than is perceived by the West. This paper examines why the leadership in China felt the need to enact the "anti-secession" law instead of more radical "unification" legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]