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Aims: To discuss how Husserl's descriptive phenomenology, as a philosophy and approach, has been used and reported in researching the experiences of others, using the topic of foreign‐trained nurses. Design: Discussion paper. Data sources A systematic search of MEDLINE (PubMed), CINAHL, SCOPUS, British Nursing Database and PsycInfo was carried out in December 2021. The inclusion criteria were peer‐reviewed phenomenological research articles, grounded by Husserl's philosophy, conducted among foreign‐trained nurses and published in English from 2000 to 2021. Findings Two main themes were the outcome of critically reviewing relevant selected literature, 'referring to the original philosophy is not enough' and 'phenomenological findings need to be phenomenological'. These findings confirm some arguments about nurse researchers' discrepant use of phenomenology in their studies, including the proper application of phenomenological notions on the ground. Implication for Nursing: Nurse researchers need to clearly distinguish between phenomenology and other qualitative research approaches and consider the uniqueness of philosophical underpinnings that are essential in Husserl's phenomenology, which also need to be clearly applied and reflected in their studies. Conclusion: There are continually existing discrepancies and variations in using phenomenology by nurse researchers. These variations were uniquely evident when nurse researchers could not provide enough philosophical grounds and assumptions to their studies and underestimated the need to keep up with the various applications of Husserl's phenomenological notions, including the proper practice of phenomenological attitude. Therefore, it is recommended that nurse researchers should opt for different, less complex qualitative approaches if they do not adequately prepare and understand what constitutes phenomenology and the particulars of Husserl's philosophy. Impact What problem did the study address? Phenomenology remains popular in nursing. However, it can confuse nurse researchers and may result in an improper understanding of its core concepts. The use of phenomenology in nursing has been criticized over the years with nurse researchers being accused of conducting phenomenological research inconsistent with the original philosophy. What were the main findings? Using phenomenology by nurse researchers is various and includes some discrepancies. This variation is caused by not complying with essential philosophical grounds and underestimating proper applications of Husserl's phenomenological notions. Where and on whom will the research have impact? Outcomes of this paper illustrate examples of proper and improper uses of Husserl's phenomenology in nursing research, including critical considerations, which can guide nurse researchers aiming to conduct descriptive phenomenological research. Additionally, nurse lecturers can utilize this paper to show and emphasize the importance of philosophical grounds in phenomenology. No Patient or Public Contribution: Due to the nature of this discussion paper addressing philosophical and methodological aspects using examples from the literature, no direct patient or public contribution was required. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is proposed a fine-tuning of the definition of intersubjectivity as inferable by Giuseppe Civitarese (2023a) – especially with regard to the expression “with-being” which is included therein – in order to overcome certain ambiguities within a constructive perspective, also paying particular attention to compatibility with Bion’s notion of group (and therefore of “field”). It is urged also to stick to the most consolidated interpretations of the philosophers mentioned, if their ideas are used in non-philosophical disciplines; in this way it is further attested to Husserl’s unlikely compatibility with psychoanalysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author responds to the critical remarks in the comments by Ferro & Riefolo (2023) and by Fornaro (2023). The main points are, in the first comment, the status of reality in psychoanalysis, enactment, the various conceptions of the unconscious, self-disclosure, and the dialogue between philosophy and psychoanalysis. As for the second comment, on the other hand, the issues addressed concern the interpretation of Husserl's contribution to a better definition of the concept of intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis and methodological aspects related to the use of notions derived from speculative thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the necessity of proposing an epistemological approach that focuses on both essential and empirical features of culture. Phenomenology, as we find in Edmund Husserl, is introduced as the main methodology enabling us to establish invariant or essential principles of human culture. We explain how phenomenology analyzes consciousness and its structures, showing a different approach from empirical studies of culture, such as cultural anthropology. Despite these epistemological divergencies, we argue that phenomenology and anthropology should collaborate, and we illustrate this through an analysis of particular Jewish rituals, as an instance of anthropological descriptions and phenomenological analysis. In the first part of the paper, we provide a brief introduction to phenomenology, by outlining the most important concepts to understand this methodology, such as intentionality, constitution, and experiential layers. In the second part, we will use the previous essential analysis of culture as guidelines to analyze a concrete culture, like Judaism, with a focus on specific rituals. While analyzing Judaism unavoidably requires empirical observations in their various forms, phenomenology provides us with a method through which enucleating universal principles underlying contextual and historical elements, which need to be considered as invariant in each human group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the phenomenological method's reliance on imaginative procedures in view of ethnomethodological research. While ethnomethodology has often been seen in continuity with Alfred Schütz' phenomenological sociology, it mainly parts ways with phenomenology by stressing that the decisive details structuring mutual understanding (gestures, bodily expressions, or the myriad trifles that regulate casual conversation) are „not imaginable, but can only be found out". This paper reflects from a phenomenological perspective on what such a claim entails by first delineating this line of criticism from other objections raised against the use of imaginative procedures in phenomenology and by showing how this line of questioning departs from the core philosophical debates concerning imaginabilitiy and unimaginability in the Kantian tradition. Further on, the paper offers an in-depth interpretation of the aforementioned ethnomethodological claim in order not only to outline its methodological implications for phenomenology, but also to show that it involves possible key insights for understanding interaction, which phenomenology needs to take into account despite its eidetic scope. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I offer an intellectual-historical reading of Foucault's unpublished master's thesis. In contrast with other recent scholarship on the pre-1961 period of Foucault's career, the purpose of this paper is to grapple with the philosophical content of this thesis on its own terms, distinguishing it as far as possible from his mature work. This allows forgotten concepts to re-emerge in the course of reading the text and for a novel engagement with such neglected facets of Foucault's oeuvre. Indeed, the key concept which I argue emerges from Foucault's early thesis is that of language as the être-la of thought. By closely following Foucault's Husserlian reading of Hegel, and his response to Eugen Fink's paradoxes of phenomenology, it is possible to see how Foucault briefly lands upon a novel kind of scepticism about the reality of history and minds. In the same way, I will also show why Foucault was unable to fully develop or commit to these sceptical positions during this part of his career. The article concludes by briefly suggesting contrasts between my reading of this early text and the way Foucault's oeuvre is more generally understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reconstructs Merleau-Ponty's philosophical project in terms of a phenomenology of sensible transcendence. According to this framework, (i) any given data are correlative to a subjective apprehension, (ii) but they cannot be fully captured by this same experience. Therefore, subjective apprehension must remain open to a type of absence or radical indeterminacy. This notion of transcendence must be grounded in bodily experience, and the challenge is to develop a notion of logos that can account for its sensible donation. We describe that the critical apparatus mobilized to achieve this goal, primarily through the notions of "field of presence" and "presentation", restores a logic of consciousness in these analyses that focus on the body. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relational turn in psychoanalysis can be identified by the replacement of Freudian drives for intersubjectivity as main regulative principle. "Intersubjective systems theory" is the name of one strand within the relational turn that explicitly locates its philosophical foundations in a number of phenomenological insights. In this paper, I investigate some of the essential phenomenological assumptions underlying intersubjective systems theory. I identify 2 main problems: 1. intersubjective systems theory relies on the premise that meaning is intersubjectively constituted, yet fails to offer an account of this constitution; 2. intersubjective systems theory is based on an ambiguous conception of the unconscious. The aim of this paper is to show how Husserlian phenomenology offers a valuable theoretical foundation for intersubjective systems theory in the sense that it presents a convincing account of the intersubjective constitution of meaning that in its very constitution allows for a dynamic and situational relation between consciousness and unconsciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes two episodes of Foucault's reading(s) of Hume's philosophy. In both cases Hume is important to Foucault's overall argument and aims. In particular, in both Foucault takes a fairly conventional philosophical description of Hume--as a 'skeptic' and 'empiricist'--for granted and shows that these disguise a worldhistorical significance. In section 1, the paper explores Hume's role in Foucault's (1966) The Order of Things. The paper argues Hume stands in for the hidden role of similarity in the human sciences of the so-called 'classical period.' The paper examines Hume's account of relations which do not fully support Foucault's claims about Hume. It is proposed that Foucault's reading is motivated by the role Hume plays in Husserl's philosophy. In section 2, Foucault's treatment of Hume on March 28, 1979, during the eleventh lecture of the series known as Birth of Biopolitics, is analyzed. There Foucault ascribes to Hume's account of the subject the key building blocks that allowed for the development of Benthamite radicalism and homo economicus. The paper situates Foucault's later analysis of Hume in Foucault's larger account of the development of the so-called radical (Benthamite) strain of liberalism that, on Foucault's telling, runs through Chicago economics. While Foucault's account of Hume is anachronistic, this anachronism illuminates the building blocks of modern liberalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Husserl envisages transcendental phenomenology as a radically founding science that lays bare the higher-order experiences whereby logic and a theory of science become constituted. On the other hand, according to a usual presentation of Hegel's philosophy, phenomenology is "logic's precondition," and science presents itself as its "result." This alleged precedence of Hegel's phenomenology (with its experiential and historical horizons) regarding logic may be a motif behind the current affinities recently traced between Hegelian and Husserlian notions of phenomenology that highlight their views on experience, history, and the lifeworld. This paper offers instead a reconsideration of aspects of their philosophies mostly challenged or dismissed since the rise of positivism: a reappraisal of their views on the relationship between phenomenology, logic, and philosophy as an "absolute" system of sciences. The argument is made that the irreconcilable difference between their projects ultimately stands on the radical contrast between Hegel's speculative-conceptual method and system of sciences and Husserl's foundational science and method as experiential-phenomenological all the way through. Despite this methodological abyss, this paper vindicates their affinities in their refusal to segregate science from life, and their attempts to overcome modernity's inherited fragmentation of culture by providing an all-unifying approach to philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human consciousness is characterized by constant transitions in time. On the other hand, what is consciously experienced always possesses the temporal feature of "now." In consciousness, "now" constantly holds different contents, yet it remains "now" no matter how far it goes. This duality is thematized in Husserlian phenomenology as "the standing-streaming now." Although this phrase appears contradictory in everyday language, it has a structure that can be clearly understood and formalized. In this paper, we show that this structure can be described as a monoid in category theory. Furthermore, monoids can be transformed into the coslice category, which corresponds to the way of perceiving present moments as juxtaposed in succession. The seemingly contradictory nature of the "now" as both flowing and standing can be precisely structured and comprehended through the monoid, while the perspective of the "now" as discrete points on a timeline can be effectively formalized using the coslice category. This framework helps us more precisely understand the differences between ordinary consciousness and meditative consciousness, specifically the experience of the "eternal now." We illustrate how the meditative states of consciousness presented in the early Buddhist scriptures (Pali Canon) and Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō remarkably reflect a monoid structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a new philosophical account of vocations as deeply personal but at the same time also communal and generational forms of multimodal intending. It provides a reconstruction and a systematic development of Edmund Husserl's scattered discussions on vocations. On these grounds, the paper argues that vocational life is a general human possibility and not determined by any set of material values, religious, epistemic or moral. Rather, vocations are distinguished from other complexes of intentional acts and attitudes by certain structural features of their core valuations and volitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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If a new generation of phenomenologists (Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Henry, Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Jean-François Courtine) in France sought to overcome the "methodic atheism" imposed on the phenomenological method by the fathers of phenomenology, it was at the price of going beyond experience immanent to existence which targeted the invisible, and therefore of lacking a discourse on the critical restriction of the phenomenological method and on the points of contact between phenomenology and theology. The task of this paper is to show how this lack is overcome by Marc Richir's "quasi theology" viewed from his articulation of the relationship between the phenomenological and the symbolical. This paper argues that whereas for the new French phenomenologists it is usually a question of a subreptitious crossing from one discipline to another, in Richir, what we have is an enigmatic relationship of the overlap between phenomenology and the symbolical. While Richir was only interested in the articulation of the relationship between the phenomenological, the symbolical and the absolute transcendence, his thoughts motivate us to explore, following Emmanuel Falque's approach, the reciprocal transformation between phenomenology and theology. The paper concludes, on the one hand, that experience remains the immanent ground for phenomenology and theological science and, on the other, that Richir's approach could be understood as a "metaphysical phenomenology". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Husserl, Hume's empirical method was deeply flawed—like all empiricists, Hume did not, and could not adequately justify his method, much less his findings (PRP 113–114, LI 115–117, 406). Instead, Hume gives us a "circular" and "irrational" "psychological explanation" of "mediate judgments of fact," i.e. of inductive inferences (LI, 117). Yet Husserl was certain that he could justify both his own method and his own findings with an appeal to the phenomenological, pre-theoretical, pre-naturalistic "epoché" (I1 §§59–60). However, whether or not Husserl's notion of an epoché is justified, or even viable, is not our focus here. Rather, our issue is with Hume, particularly: How could Hume have responded? In this paper, I show that in Book I of the Treatise, Hume did—however implicitly—appeal to a "pre-theoretical" notion of belief, which meets Husserl's demands for a pre-theoretical grounding, i.e. a justificatory grounding. And so, his method is, at least in this respect, justified. But this belief is by no means "prenaturalistic." Rather, it is a function of empirical data. In particular, it is a product of the "constant and coherent" impressions that seem to naturally obtain of experience. As a result, Hume's method, which, in agreement with Husserl, we may characterize as psychology, does admit of a certain degree of regularity, but an empirical regularity. And according to Hume, contra Husserl's complaints, this is the best that we can hope for; regularity will have to suffice, not certainty. However, it must be noted up front that this justification is implicit—Hume is not nearly as forthright as he could have been. Thus, making his position more explicit is the task of this paper. I am not presenting my own position, where I offer my own arguments. Instead, I present textual evidence, contextualized with ample explication. It is my hope that by doing so, Hume may more effectively make his case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, phenomenology and hermeneutical phenomenology have taken the lead in addressing the question of personal identity through the inquiry of "who are you?". However, this lead has questionable aspects in capturing the relationality between self, others, and the surrounding world, characterized by its ever-changing state. To understand personal identity in its ever-changing state of becoming, the primary focus of this paper is twofold: firstly, exploring how to reconcile these complex relations into a unified conception of personal identity by following Husserl's notion of "indeterminate determinacy" and his theory of variation, and secondly, considering the limitations of defining this unity as an "autobiography or biography" in accordance with Arendt's notion of a "life-story". In the final analyses the notion of life-story will be revised together with Waldenfels's analyses on "radical alien" and Sözer's "in-between". This will prompt a reconsideration of personal identity as a process, leading to a genetic phenomenological perspective that recognizes the "indeterminacy of the self". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Husserl and the phenomenology of religion have a delicate relationship that combines direct references to religious themes with broader analyses subsumable under the more general phenomenology of consciousness. This paper shows the themes and problems of a Husserlian phenomenological analysis of religious consciousness through an encounter with its elements. Word, Prayer, relationship with the Sacred and Faith are some of the indelible traces of a phenomenology of religious consciousness. The belief, however, is that phenomenology can be spoken of if and only if the themes are addressed through the analysis of consciousness as the method teaches. Thus, an analysis of religious livedexperiences and transcendence (subjective and absolute) is joined by such phenomenologically diriment questions as a possible dichotomy between transcendence of immanence or immanence of transcendence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are many ways to describe gender, making this notion both productive and challenging for phenomenological analysis. This paper will begin with an eidetic/static analysis in order to determine the multiple aspects of gender--from individual experience to intersubjective concept. We will then shift to a genetic analysis, looking also to how gender appears at distinct phenomenological levels of experience. In doing so, we hope to gain not only a better understanding of gender through a phenomenological lens, but also new insights into phenomenology itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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As is well known, Husserl develops his early phenomenological concept of "species" by elaboratinga novel form of abstraction, whichhe calls "ideating" abstraction. This paper traces systematic parallels between the works of Lotze, Bolzano and Husserl in order to gain a better understanding of Husserl's theory of abstraction and his early conception of species. Two lines of interpretation are central to this paper. The first concerns a critique of the Kantian understanding of "concept" (and thus also of the Kantian understanding of analyticity). The second line of interpretation relates to abstraction itself. In contrast to the British empiricists, all three thinkers understand abstraction as a positive, logical and non-psychological process of bringing about an abstract attribute. Furthermore, we will recognize the importance of Bolzano's syntactic structure of representations (Vorstellungen) for Husserl's understanding of abstraction in the 2nd Logical Investigation. We will see that Husserl's "ideating abstraction" depends on syncategorematic forms and cannot be understood detached from a correctly formulated proposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that the dynamics of personal and collective individuation could be interrelated and bear ethical significance thanks to an analysis of the Lifeworld and intersubjectivity that link together the genetic and the generative perspectives of phenomenology. The first section of the paper recalls the epistemological and ontological implications of Husserl's and Stein's analysis of personal individuation in relation to what Husserl would call, later, the "Lifeworld" and the intersubjective constitution of communities. The second section of the paper turns to a phenomenology of the Lifeworld through an analysis of refugees' care and the intersubjective dynamics involved in the clinic of exile. Such an example will bring to light the importance of embodiment and intercorporeity to grasp the process through which the genetic constitution of the Lifeworld constitutes itself as a collective process of individuation trying to heal the scars of historicity. Consequently, individuation will appear as a personal and collective task, rather than a static and ego-centered achievement that would be forgetful of our fundamental interdependency. Finally, the last section argues that "healing the Lifeworld" does not amount to conceive of its "horizon" as being itself a predetermined "telos" of transcendental subjectivity, as if this open structure could be itself constituted. Rather, the varieties of the Lifeworld and its paradoxical movement of appropriation and differentiation point to a relational ontology that considers the becoming of a common and meaningful world as a limit-problem of phenomenology and, perhaps, its ethical and critical promise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's insights on professor P. Hadreas' paper titled "Husserlian self-awareness and SSRIs." The author mentions that professor Hadreas should be praised by using Husserl's notion of pre-reflective consciousness in approaching phenomenologically the patients' testimony concerning on how selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) medication changed their self-awareness. He also comments that Hadreas' aims in writing the paper is unclear basing on his conclusions.

In this paper we propose to carry out a comparative study of Edmund Husserl's image theory and the theory of the pictorial work of art by the Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden. This study will be carried out from the idealism-realism polemic between both authors. Our purpose is to demonstrate the existence of a clear parallelism between the aesthetic theory of each of the authors and the general idealism-realism dispute between them, as well as to point out that the same controversy can be understood from Ingarden's theory of the purely intentional object. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eschatology is central to Christian theology: the significance of the death and resurrection of Christ is the promise of the "kingdom of God". This paper takes up this idea in discussion with contemporary Christian theologians and discusses it phenomenologically by recourse to Husserl's account of "horizon". The horizon is both finite and infinite: always limited in its actualization but with an infinity of potential actualizations. This is explored with respect to time and its relation to the eternal, as well as the dispositions of hope and fear with respect to the eschaton. The final section draws these insights together in a discussion of the eschaton to understand the eschatological destiny of nature in a "new heaven and a new earth" (Revelations, 21: 1) and conceiving of eschatological justice as a harmony of horizonal perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Husserl's writings on sociality have received increasing attention in recent years. Despite this growing interest, Husserl's reflections on the specific role of communication remain underexplored. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by reconstructing the various ways in which Husserl draws systematic connections between communication and communalization. As will become clear, Husserl's analysis converges with much more recent ideas defended by Margaret Gilbert and Naomi Eilan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Laura Gow, Uriah Kriegel, Hamid Taieb, and David Woodruff Smith raised help – and insightful points of criticism about my book Brentano's Mind. In this paper, I will defend and expand on the main claims of the book. My responses are organized around four topics: Psychology without a Soul, Plural Intentionality (and Conceptual Parts), Intentionality and Intentionality Primitivism, Mark of Mental. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fundamental goal of this paper is to clarify the importance of Husserl's reflections on destiny (Schicksal) in the context of his post-WWI ethics. In the first section, I sketch Husserl's reflections on war in his private correspondence. In the second section, I show that, in his post-WWI research manuscripts on ethics, Husserl conceptualized various forms of meaningless suffering under the heading of destiny. One of the main questions of Husserl's post-WWI ethics can be formulated as follows: in the dark horizon of senselessness, how is an ethical life possible? In the remaining sections, I show that Husserl's reflections on this question led him to deformalize his earlier ethics and motivated him to ground his ethics of reason in an ethics of love. In the third and fourth sections, I sketch Husserl's two fundamental answers to this question, the first of which concerns his phenomenology of love, while the second one – his phenomenological metaphysics in general, and his phenomenological teleology, in particular. While for Husserl, these answers are complementary, after clarifying Husserl's view on the conflicts of values, I conclude with some reflections on the importance of not overlooking that these answers are analytically distinct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The peculiar legacy of Husserl's mereology, chiefly studied by analytic philosophers interested in ontology, has led to a partial understanding of the III. LU, which is too often reduced to a chapter of "formal ontology". Yet, the power of this Investigation goes far beyond: it enabled Husserl to deal, in the framework of a unified theory, with a vast range of particular problems. The paper focuses on one of these issues, namely abstraction, so as to expose how Husserl instrumentalizes his formal tools in order to tackle material issues. The existence of an up and down pattern is uncovered: Husserl first reinterprets the psychological problem of abstraction in ontological terms ("bottom-up"), before coming back to the original problem with new insights ("top-down"). The second, correlative aim of the paper is to emphasize the key role played by Friedrich Schumann, a forgotten yet crucial character for Husserl's conception of abstraction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that Husserl offers an important, although almost completely neglected so far, contribution to the reductionist/antireductionist debate about testimony. Through a phenomenological analysis, Husserl shows that testimony works through the constitution of an intentional intersubjective bond between the speaker and the hearer. In this paper I focus on the Logical Investigations, a 1914 manuscript now published as text 2 in Husserliana 20.2, and a 1931 manuscript now published as Appendix 12 in Husserliana 15. I argue that, in those texts, Husserl highlights three essential phenomenological features of testimony: a) testimony is personal, meaning that it only takes place among persons, b) testimony is social, meaning that it requires the joint effort of multiple cognitive agents, c) testimony is community-building, meaning that it generates a long-lasting social bond among the parts involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following paper discusses and contrasts two important works about the development of the concept of truth in Husserl's oeuvre: Alphonse de Wahlens' book Phénoménologie et vérité and Ernst Tugendhat's better known work Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger. The goal of the paper is to show the way in which Husserl's position with regard to truth reaches certain impasses in his Logical Investigations and how these impasses were reframed in a positive manner so as to form a basis for a radically new philosophical undertaking: his transcendental phenomenology. The paper focuses on the immanent destruction of the classical concept of truth, unwillingly engendered by the conceptual framework of the Logical Investigations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to clarify Husserl's critical remarks about Kant's view of logic by comparing their respective views of logic. In his Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929, §100) Husserl criticizes Kant for not asking transcendental questions about formal logic, but rather ascribing an 'extraordinary apriority' to it. He thinks the reason for Kant's uncritical attitude to logic lies in Kant's view of logic as directed toward the subjective, instead of being concerned with a '"world" of ideal Objects'. Whereas for Kant, general logic is about laws of reasoning. Husserl thinks that formal logic should describe formal structures. Husserl claims that if Kant had had a more comprehensive concept of logic, he would have thought of raising critical questions about how logic is possible. This kind of criticism cannot itself use forms of judgments or syllogisms of logic, nor even the 'inferential' [schliessende] method more generally, but should be descriptive in nature. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is the method for such criticism. The paper argues that this results in reflection, and possibly revision, of the logical principles with respect to the normative goals governing the investigation in question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the puzzling question of what motivates the radical epistemological shift necessary for engaging in transcendental phenomenology. Husserl touches on the problem of motivation on many occasions, but it becomes an explicit issue in Fink's bold reimagining of the transcendental theory of method, as presented in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation. In the first section, I briefly introduce the problem as it appears in Husserl. The second section of the paper discusses Fink's Hegelian dissolution of it. Finally, I point to several historical, practical, and ethical aspects of transcendental phenomenology, and argue that a good account of motivation for phenomenology ought to find a way to address these without hastily bracketing them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an eminent tradition of thought that sees in the phenomenon of time something contradictory. This tradition has been recently revived by some contemporary proponents of dialethism – the view that there are true contradictions. In this paper, I will contribute to this line of thinking by tracing the first steps of a dialethic account of time-consciousness. In particular, I will argue that the experiential flow of time can be accounted for in the framework of an intentionalist approach to temporal perception if we conceive of time-consciousness as a quasi-multiplicity, i.e., a multiplicity of non-self-identical parts, hence the embrace of dialethism. Section 1 introduces dialethism, discusses Priest's dialethic theory of motion and time, and motivates the project of a dialethic account of time-consciousness. Section 2 introduces the intentionalist approach to time-consciousness and distinguishes pure intentionalism from sense-data intentionalism; both subscribes to a certain Principle of Simultaneous Awareness but interprets it differently. In Sect. 3, I offer an in-depth analysis of this principle and identify its core as the requirement of self-unification, i.e., the requirement that time-consciousness unifies itself in flowing without any higher-order act of unification. Section 4 then argues that pure intentionalism can satisfy this requirement by embracing dialethism. I conclude by noting how the dialethic account of time-consciousness incorporates a central extensionalist insight within an intentionalist outlook. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to develop a phenomenological account of community which would not be pervaded by Eurocentric assumptions. Such Eurocentrism is what Husserl's phenomenological framework has been accused of. I first reconstruct Husserl's phenomenology of community in his late transcendental phenomenology by examining the Vienna Lecture. I show that Husserl's Eurocentrism is encapsulated in his account of corporeity, which simultaneously recognizes the importance of corporeity and its necessary overcoming in theoria , which originates in the European philosopher. I then argue that Merleau-Ponty, through his rigorously embodied phenomenology, can offer a non-Eurocentric phenomenology of community. Elaborating on the Husserlian insight of corporeity, notably the perceptual experience and the écart at stake in the encounter with other bodies, allows Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the flesh to recast community from and with the body as an open, situated, and non-archeo-teleological structure, allowing phenomenology to reimagine inter-cultural encounters away from tropes of European exemplarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the overlooked contributions of Husserl's Phenomenology of intersubjectivity in understanding anorexia nervosa. It highlights the intricate relationship between the self and others, emphasizing their mutual constitution while acknowledging inherent differences. The distorted body image approach often overlooks this perspective, leading to psychopathological issues in individuals with anorexia nervosa. By integrating subjective experience and external observation, a more balanced and equal intersubjective relationship can be established. Utilizing this philosophical framework allows for a deeper understanding of the disorder's dynamics and sheds new light on the subjective experiences of individuals with anorexia nervosa in relation to others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of «reassessing the relationship between explanation and phenomenology», the paper discusses the question in what ways Husserlian phenomenology as a descriptive science of consciousness has an explanatory potential in consciousness studies. It takes a very limited approach to the wide-ranging themes that may come to mind on this topic. At the center is an exploration of consciousness as an explanandum in its own right, building on Husserl's reflective-eidetic analyses of conscious experiences. It will concentrate on explicating acts of intuitive representification (anschauliche Vergegenwärtigungen) as intentional modifications of perception, making up higher, radical novel levels of intentionality. Acts of remembering, imagining, depicting something, as well as iterations and combinations of such acts, will serve as examples. A formal notation will be used with the intention to make the reflection-based theoretical language of phenomenology more precise and easier to survey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reads Blumenberg's posthumously published study Die nackte Wahrheit as a book left unfinished becauseamajor, if not central, chapter was still pending: a chapter on Husserl's metaphor of a dress of ideas ("Ideenkleid") that veils the lifeworld. Arguing that Blumenberg aimed ata phenomenological foundation for his metaphorology basedonhis critique and inversion of the Husserlian concept of lifeworld, the article reveals resulting tensions between Blumenberg's late and early theoretical approaches to a theory of metaphor that sought, but did not find, a solution in his own theory of lifeworld, which remained unfinished as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tábano is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica Argentina and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)