Search

Following economic reforms, China has become one of the premiere destinations for foreign capital; however, the benefits of this spectacular growth are not evenly distributed. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the Chinese government has designed and implemented policies to encourage foreign investment in central and western provinces to help decrease the significant distributional differences in regional industrial value-added, with limited success. In contrast to previous literature, this paper uses Panel Least Squares method to analyze empirically the impact of industrial sector FDI on Chinese regional inequality in industrial value-added 2003–2013, using three Chinese regions. The lack of prerequisite institutional structure to aid in FDI absorption affects location choices. Despite government policies to support inland regional economic development, foreign firms still prefer to invest in coastal provinces, further illustrating the effects of regional clusters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Journal of Labour Research is the property of International Labour Organization and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of International Journal of Labour Research is the property of International Labour Organization and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Value chains are characterized by power asymmetries, with lead firms in the dominating position and dominated firms mainly in developing countries which compete worldwide to take over certain tasks in the production process of goods. The competitive pressure to produce at low cost in low value adding segments of global value chains (GVCs) increases the pressure for low wages and poor working conditions. Industrialization in the low-value segment can increase productivity and living standards to a certain extent in economically underdeveloped countries, but in the end the allocation of production in GVCs prevents any true catching up, leaving developing countries stuck in the so-called middle-income trap. Vertical GVCs based on subcontracting typically lead to very low value added, low technological spillover and the worst working conditions. Vertical GVCs based on FDI are on average more advantageous, but without government rules and interventions they are not a ladder to eventually joining the group of developed countries. There is no doubt that decent working conditions have to be established at all levels of value chains. In addition, unions should support and join efforts to create more democracy in multinational companies and push for an economically and socially fairer investment and subcontracting policy which strengthens training and technological transfer. Unions can play a significant role in industrial and other policies which are important for catching up, as well as supporting initiatives to devise global regulations and sanctions for multinational companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Weak economic performance of most oil rich countries states that natural resources are more curse than blessing for these countries. Resource curse theory examines the negative effects of rich natural resources on economic growth from an economic and political perspective. Since 1960s appreciation of real domestic exchange rate (Dutch Disease) was explained as the main reason for poor economic performance of oil rich countries. But since 1990s, other causes such as long lasting ineffective institutions, corruption and rent seeking are considered to be other major political reasons behind backwardness of most resource rich countries. These political features are the corner stone of Resource Curse theory. In this paper we examine the viability of Resource Curse theory for Iran, Russia and Norway using fact finding method through interdisciplinary approach to see whether natural resources are curse or blessing for these countries. For doing so, we compare main macroeconomic and good governance indicators from 2000 to 2010 of Iran with Turkey and Russia with China to illustrate the negative effects of oil revenue on quality of institutions and economic performance. The result of this research shows that institutional quality has vital role in sustainable economic development. Weak institutions in Iran and Russia have significant effects on their economic performance. But Norway as a successful oil rich country shows that efficient institutions can turn natural resource into blessing; while Iran's and Russia's experiences are a clear example of resource curse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]