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Ritual protocols aimed at rainmaking have been a recurrent sociocultural phenomenon across societies and throughout history. Given the fact that such protocols were likely entirely ineffective, why did they repeatedly emerge and persist, sometimes over millennia, even in populations with writing and recordkeeping? To address this puzzle, many scholars have argued that these protocols were not instrumental at all and that their practitioners were not really endeavoring to employ them to bring about rain. Here, taking advantage of the wealth of historical records available in China, we argue to the contrary: that rainmaking is best viewed as an instrumental, means-end activity and that people have always placed strong emphasis on the outcomes of such activities. To account for the persistence of rainmaking, we then present a set of cultural evolutionary explanations rooted in human psychology that can explain why people's adaptive learning processes did not result in the elimination of ineffective rainmaking methods. We suggest that a commitment to a supernatural worldview provides theoretical support for the plausibility of various rainmaking methods and that people often overestimate the efficacy of rainmaking technologies because of statistical artifacts (some methods appear effective simply by chance) and underreporting of disconfirmatory evidence (failures of rainmaking not reported or transmitted). The inclination to "do something" when a drought hits versus "do nothing" likely also plays a role and persists in the world today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a concise statement of ten different problems for which a behavioural science should (and may soon be able to) provide coherent, empirically grounded explanations. These problems were chosen for their social importance as well as their theoretical interest, as demonstrations of the need to integrate psychological, economic and evolutionary factors in explanatory models. For each question, I mention pointers to incipent or possible research programmes. The questions are the following: What are the natural limits to family arrangements? Do we have an intuitive understanding of large societies? Why are despised social categories essentialised? Why gender differences in politics? What logic drives ethnic violence? How are moral concepts acquired? What drives people's economic intuitions? Are there cultural differences in low-level cognition? What explains individual religious attitudes? Why religious fundamentalism and extremism? The general aim is to propose a new approach to issues of human culture, not through an abstract discussion of paradigms and traditions, but through specific examples of possible empirical research.

Children's learning--in the domains of science and religion specifically, but in many other cultural domains as well--relies extensively on testimony and other forms of culturally transmitted information. The cognitive processes that enable such learning must also administrate the evaluation, qualification, and storage of that information, while guarding against the dangers of false or misleading input. Currently, the development of these appraisal processes is not clearly understood. Recent work, reviewed here, has begun to address three important dimensions of the problem: how children and adults evaluate "truth" in communication, how they gauge the "inferential potential" of information, and how they encode and evaluate its "source."

Persistence of nondegeneracy is a phenomenon that appears in the theory of |$\overline{\mathbb{Q}}_l$| -representations of the linear group: every irreducible submodule of the restriction to the mirabolic sub-representation of a nondegenerate irreducible representation is nondegenerate. This is not true anymore in general, if we look at the modulo |$l$| reduction of some stable lattice. As in the Clozel–Harris–Taylor generalization of global Ihara's lemma, we show that this property, called nondegeneracy persistence and related to the notion of essentially absolutely irreducible and generic representations in the work of Emerton and Helm, remains true for lattices given by the cohomology of Lubin–Tate spaces. As a global application, we give a new construction of automorphic congruences in the Ribet spirit. Résumé. La persistence de la non dégénérescence est un phénomène qui apparait dans la théorie des |$\overline{\mathbb{Q}}_l$| -représentations du groupe linéaire: toute sous-représentation irréductible de la restriction au groupe mirabolique d'une représentation irréductible non dégénérée, est non dégénérée. Ce n'est plus le cas en général pour la réduction modulo |$l$| d'un réseau stable. Comme dans la généralisation par Clozel-Harris-Taylor du lemme d'Ihara, nous montrons que cette propriété de non dégénérescence, qui est reliée à la notion de représentation essentiellement absolument générique de Emerton-Helm, reste valide pour les réseaux donnés par la cohomologie des espaces de Lubin-Tate. Nous donnons une application de nature globale en construisant des congruences automorphes dans l'esprit du travail de Ribet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Commentators discussed the coherence and validity of a minimalist approach to ownership intuitions, in ways that make it possible to clarify the model, re-evaluate its cognitive underpinnings, and sketch some of its implications. This response summarizes the model; addresses issues concerning the need for a special technical lexicon when describing cognitive semantics; the psychology involved in contexts of competitive acquisition and their consequences for possession and use of rival resources; the role of cooperative expectations in creating mutually beneficial allocation of resources; the consequences of ownership psychology for social interaction and the production of social norms of property; and the relations between psychological processes and legal institutions in the domain, before proposing some final thoughts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ownership is universal and ubiquitous in human societies, yet the psychology underpinning ownership intuitions is generally not described in a coherent and computationally tractable manner. Ownership intuitions are commonly assumed to derive from culturally transmitted social norms, or from a mentally represented implicit theory. While the social norms account is entirely ad hoc , the mental theory requires prior assumptions about possession and ownership that must be explained. Here I propose such an explanation, arguing that the intuitions result from the interaction of two cognitive systems. One of these handles competitive interactions for the possession of resources observed in many species including humans. The other handles mutually beneficial cooperation between agents, as observed in communal sharing, collective action and trade. Together, these systems attend to specific cues in the environment, and produce definite intuitions such as "this is hers," "that is not mine." This computational model provides an explanation for ownership intuitions, not just in straightforward cases of property, but also in disputed ownership (squatters, indigenous rights), historical changes (abolition of slavery), as well as apparently marginal cases, such as the questions, whether people own their seats on the bus, or their places in a queue, and how people understand "cultural appropriation" and slavery. In contrast to some previous theories, the model is empirically testable and free of ad hoc stipulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explanations of misfortune are the object of much cultural discourse in most human societies. Recurrent themes include the intervention of superhuman agents (gods, ancestors, etc.), witchcraft, karma, and the violation of specific rules or 'taboos'. In modern large‐scale societies, people often respond by blaming the victims of, for example, accidents and assault. These responses may seem both disparate and puzzling, in the sense that the proposed accounts of untoward events provide no valuable information about their causes or the best way to prevent them. However, these responses make sense if we see them in an evolutionary context, where accidents, assault, and illness were common occurrences, the only palliative being social support to victims. This would create a context in which all members of a group might be (a) required to offer support, (b) willing to offer such support to maintain a reputation as co‐operators, and (c) desirous to limit that support because of its cost. In this context, recurrent explanations of misfortune would constitute strategic attempts to create and broadcast a specific description of the situation that concentrates responsibility and potential costs on a few individuals. This strategic model accounts for otherwise perplexing features of explanations based on mystical harm (ancestors, witchcraft, etc.), as well as the tendency to denigrate victims, and offers new predictions about those cultural phenomena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contains the following commentaries: "Further Distinctions between Magic, Reality, Religion, and Fiction"; "The Role of Creative Control and Culture in Children's Fantasy/Reality Judgments"; "The Last of the Magicians? Children, Scientists, and the Invocation of Hidden Causal Powers"; "Rescuing Magical Thinking from the Jaws of Social Determinism"; "Crazy Children, Fantastical Theories, and the Many Uses of Metaphysics." (KB)

In reply to commentary on our target article, we supply further evidence and hypotheses in the description of ritualized behaviors in humans. Reactions to indirect fitness threats probably activate specialized precaution systems rather than a unified form of danger-avoidance or causal reasoning. Impairment of precaution systems may be present in pathologies other than obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), autism in particular. Ritualized behavior is attention-grabbing enough to be culturally transmitted whether or not it is associated with group identity, cohesion, or with any other social aspect of collective ceremonies.

Ritualized behavior, intuitively recognizable by its stereotypy, rigidity, repetition, and apparent lack of rational motivation, is found in a variety of life conditions, customs, and everyday practices: in cultural rituals, whether religious or non-religious; in many children's complicated routines; in the pathology of obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD); in normal adults around certain stages of the life-cycle, birthing in particular. Combining evidence from evolutionary anthropology, neuropsychology and neuroimaging, we propose an explanation of ritualized behavior in terms of an evolved Precaution System geared to the detection of and reaction to inferred threats to fitness. This system, distinct from fear-systems geared to respond to manifest danger, includes a repertoire of clues for potential danger as well as a repertoire of species-typical precautions. In OCD pathology, this system does not supply a negative feedback to the appraisal of potential threats, resulting in doubts about the proper performance of precautions, and repetition of action. Also, anxiety levels focus the attention on low-level gestural units of behavior rather than on the goal-related higher-level units normally used in parsing the action-flow. Normally automatized actions are submitted to cognitive control. This 'swamps' working memory, an effect of which is a temporary relief from intrusions but also their long-term strengthening. Normal activation of this Precaution System explains intrusions and ritual behaviors in normal adults. Gradual calibration of the system occurs through childhood rituals. Cultural mimicry of this system's normal input makes cultural rituals attention-grabbing and compelling. A number of empirical predictions follow from this synthetic model. Keywords: childhood ritual; compulsion; event boundaries; evolutionary psychology; obsessive-colnpulsive disorder; ritual; thought intrusion

Ritualized behavior is a specific way of organizing the flow of action, characterized by stereotypy, rigidity in performance, a feeling of compulsion, and specific themes, in particular the potential danger from contamination, predation, and social hazard. We proposed elsewhere a neurocognitive model of ritualized behavior in human development and pathology, as based on the activation of a specific hazard-precaution system specialized in the detection of and response to potential threats. We show how certain features of collective rituals--by conveying information about potential danger and presenting appropriate reaction as a sequence of rigidly described precautionary measures--probably activate this neurocognitive system. This makes some collective ritual sequences highly attention-demanding and intuitively compelling and contributes to their transmission from place to place or generation to generation. The recurrence of ritualized behavior as a central feature of collective ceremonies may be explained as a consequence of this bias in selective transmission. [Keywords: ritual, cognition, evolution, epidemiology, cultural transmission]

This article discusses the development of evolutionary psychology as a discipline. Topics include the subject's roots in Darwinism and the idea that environment and ecology help shape psychological evolution.

This article is an evaluation of how evolutionary psychology can contribute to the description and explanation of cultural material as a continuation of other research frameworks that connected genetic inheritance and cultural evolution. Evolutionary psychology provides a proximate explanation of cultural transmission in that it is based on a description of the cognitive mechanisms involved in acquisition of cultural representations. To illustrate this point, the author uses the example of religious concepts. A better understanding of cultural acquisition processes will probably require new descriptive models for anthropological data.

Pascal Boyer provides a persuasive argument for what makes anthropomorphism natural: the very fact that it is counter-intuitive (J. Roy. anthrop. Inst. (N.S.) 2, 83-97). Drawing on recent research in [...]