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Background and objective: No autochthonous human cases of Japanese encephalitis (JE) have been reported to date in the European Union (EU). In this study, we assess the likelihood of Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV) introduction and transmission within the EU and propose outbreak response measures. Risk assessment: Given the global geographical distribution of JEV, the probability of virus introduction into the EU is currently very low, with viremic bird migration being the most plausible pathway of introduction. However, this likelihood would significantly increase if the virus were to become established in the Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia or Africa. Considering the environmental conditions that are expected to be conducive for virus circulation, there is a high likelihood of virus transmission within the EU after its introduction in environmentally suitable areas. The spread of the virus within the EU would likely occur through the movement of wild birds, pigs and mosquitoes. Mitigation: To mitigate or potentially contain the emergence of JE in the EU, early detection of both human and animal cases will be crucial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This report provides an update of the epidemiology of African swine fever (ASF) in the European Union during the period November 2018 to October 2019. In this period, ASF has been confirmed in Slovakia, whereas Czechia became officially ASF‐free in March 2019, bringing the number of affected countries in the EU to nine. The report provides a narrative update of the situation in the different countries and an analysis of the temporal and spatial patterns of the disease. There has been no increase in the proportion of seropositive hunted wild boar in the affected areas. In hunted animals, the proportions of wild boar testing polymerase chain reaction‐positive and enzyme‐linked immunosorbent assay‐positive has remained low (

This technical report is aimed at guiding the reporting of data on analytical test results, and related metadata, to EFSA in the context of the activities for the surveillance and monitoring of African Swine Fever. The objective is to explain in detail the individual data elements that are included in the EFSA Standard Sample Description version 2 (SSD2) data model. The guidance is intended to support the reporting countries in data transmission using eXtensible Markup Language (XML) data file transfer through the Data Collection Framework (DCF) according to the protocol described in the EFSA Guidance on Data Exchange version 2 (GDE2). The data elements are explained, including information about data type, list of allowed terms and associated business rules. Instructions about how to report common sampling schemes are also provided to ensure harmonised reporting among the countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This guidance is providing instructions for the reporting of information on livestock populations to EFSA. It covers the technical aspects for the reporting of data on the domestic animal population data model developed in the context of the SIGMA project1. The guidance explains the individual data elements of the SIGMA animal population data model and is intended to support the reporting countries in data transmission using eXtensible Markup Language (XML) data file transfer through the Data Collection Framework (DCF) according to the protocol described in the EFSA Guidance on Data Exchange version 2 (GDE2). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2014, EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission (EC) to assess the risk and consequences of introduction of new vector‐borne diseases (VBDs), and to determine if further measures were needed. To support the work, a comprehensive and systematic extraction of data from the literature was conducted, covering 36 VBDs in 18 host mammalian species. Regular updates of this corpus of scientific evidence are needed to support risk assessments. The foundation set by the previous rounds of literature review for VBDs can be reused to provide efficient and reliable collection of scientific evidence to support EFSA needs in various areas of knowledge. EFSA has been requested to provide support to the EC via scientific opinions that would form the basis for the production of amending and implementing acts supporting Regulation 2016/429 (of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and repealing certain acts in the area of animal health – the "Animal Health Law"), which lays down rules for the prevention and control of animal diseases which are transmissible to animals or to humans. To support EFSA in keeping the available VBD knowledge as an up‐to‐date source of information for risk assessors, and in providing scientific opinions in matters related to Regulation 2016/429, the methodology for literature review has been further consolidated in seven specific areas of knowledge: experimental infections, pathogen survival, diagnostic tests performance, vaccines, preventive and curative treatments, vector treatments and geographical distribution. This document details the review protocol to update the available knowledge about the 36 VBDs within those seven areas since the last systematic literature reviews were carried out in 2017; as well as extend them to the terrestrial animals category A diseases in the "Animal Health Law". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To evaluate and compare the risk of emerging vector-borne diseases (VBDs), a Model for INTegrated RISK assessment, MINTRISK, was developed to assess the introduction risk of VBDs for new regions in an objective, transparent and repeatable manner. MINTRISK is a web-based calculation tool, that provides semi-quantitative risk scores that can be used for prioritization purposes. Input into MINTRISK is entered by answering questions regarding entry, transmission, establishment, spread, persistence and impact of a selected VBD. Answers can be chosen from qualitative answer categories with accompanying quantitative explanation to ensure consistent answering. The quantitative information is subsequently used as input for the model calculations to estimate the risk for each individual step in the model and for the summarizing output values (rate of introduction; epidemic size; overall risk). The risk assessor can indicate his uncertainty on each answer, and this is accounted for by Monte Carlo simulation. MINTRISK was used to assess the risk of four VBDs (African horse sickness, epizootic haemorrhagic disease, Rift Valley fever, and West Nile fever) for the Netherlands with the aim to prioritise these diseases for preparedness. Results indicated that the overall risk estimate was very high for all evaluated diseases but epizootic haemorrhagic disease. Uncertainty intervals were, however, wide limiting the options for ranking of the diseases. Risk profiles of the VBDs differed. Whereas all diseases were estimated to have a very high economic impact once introduced, the estimated introduction rates differed from low for Rift Valley fever and epizootic haemorrhagic disease to moderate for African horse sickness and very high for West Nile fever. Entry of infected mosquitoes on board of aircraft was deemed the most likely route of introduction for West Nile fever into the Netherlands, followed by entry of infected migratory birds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is the third in a planned series of data papers presenting modelled vector distributions produced during the ECDC and EFSA funded VectorNet project. The data package presented here includes those Culicoides vectors species first modelled in 2015 as part of the VectorNet gap analysis work namely C. imicola, C. obsoletus, C. scoticus, C. dewulfi, C. chiopterus, C. pulicaris, C. lupicaris, C. punctatus, and C. newsteadi. The known distributions of these species within the Project area (Europe, the Mediterranean Basin, North Africa, and Eurasia) are currently incomplete to a greater or lesser degree. The models are designed to fill the gaps with predicted distributions, to provide a) first indication of vector species distributions across the project geographical extent, and b) assistance in targeting surveys to collect distribution data for those areas with no field validated information. The models are based on input data from light trap surveillance of adult Culicoides across continental Europe and surrounding regions (71.8°N -33.5°S, - 11.2°W - 62°E), concentrated in Western countries, supplemented by transect samples in eastern and northern Europe. Data from central EU are relatively sparse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EFSA assisted four countries in the analysis of epidemiological data on African swine fever (ASF), collected until September 2017. The temporal analysis demonstrated that the average proportions of PCR and antibody-ELISA positive samples from the hunted wild boar remained below 3.9 and 6.6, respectively. A peak in the ASF incidence was observed 6 months after the first observed case, followed by a significant reduction of the number of cases and low levels of African swine fever virus (ASFV) circulation at the end of 38 months follow-up period at different spatial resolutions. The spatial analysis concluded that human-mediated spread of ASFV continues to play a critical role in the ASF epidemiology, despite all measures currently taken. 'Wild boar density', 'total road length' (as proxy for human activity) and 'average suitable wild boar habitat availability' were identified as predictors for the occurrence of ASF in Estonia by a Bayesian hierarchical model, whereas 'wild boar density' and 'density of pig farms' were predictors according to a generalised additive model. To evaluate the preventive strategies proposed in EFSA's Scientific Opinion (2015) to stop the spread of ASFV in the wild boar population, a simulation model, building on expert knowledge and literature was used. It was concluded that reduction of wild boar population and carcass removal to stop the spread of ASFV in the wild boar population are more effective when applied preventively in the infected area. Drastic depopulation, targeted hunting of female wild boar and carcass removal solely implemented as measures to control ASF in the wild boar population need to be implemented in a highly effective manner (at or beyond the limit of reported effectivity in wild boar management) to sustainably halt the spread of ASF. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most significant knowledge gaps in the prevention and control of African swine fever (ASF) were identified by the EU Veterinary services and other stakeholders involved in pig production and wild boar management through an online survey. The respondents were asked to identify the major research needs in order to improve short‐term ASF risk management. Four major gaps were identified: 'wild boar', 'African swine fever virus (ASFV) survival and transmission', 'biosecurity' and 'surveillance'. In particular, the respondents stressed the need for better knowledge on wild boar management and surveillance, and improved knowledge on the possible mechanism for spread and persistence of ASF in wild boar populations. They indicated the need for research on ASFV survival and transmission from the environment, different products such as feed and feed materials, and potential arthropod vector transmission. In addition, several research topics on biosecurity were identified as significant knowledge gaps and the need to identify risk factors for ASFV entry into domestic pig holdings, to develop protocols to implement specific and appropriate biosecurity measures, and to improve the knowledge about the domestic pig–wild boar interface. Potential sources of ASFV introduction into unaffected countries need to be better understood by an in‐depth analysis of the possible pathways of introduction of ASFV with the focus on food, feed, transport of live wild boars and human movements. Finally, research on communication methods to increase awareness among all players involved in the epidemiology of ASF (including truck drivers, hunters and tourists) and to increase compliance with existing control measures was also a topic mentioned by all stakeholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focusses on biological hazards at the global level and considers the challenges to risk assessment (RA) from a One Health perspective. Two topics – vector‐borne diseases (VBD) and antimicrobial resistance (AMR) – are used to illustrate the challenges ahead and to explore the opportunities that new methodologies such as next‐generation sequencing can offer. Globalisation brings complexity and introduces drivers for infectious diseases. Cooperation and the application of an integrated RA approach – one that takes into consideration food farming and production systems including social and environmental factors – are recommended. Also needed are methodologies to identify emerging risks at a global level and propose prevention strategies. AMR is one of the biggest threats to human health in the infectious disease environment. Whereas new genomic typing techniques such as whole genome sequencing (WGS) provide further insights into the mechanisms of spread of resistance, the role of the environment is not fully elucidated, nor is the role of plants as potential vehicles for spread of resistance. Historical trends and recent experience indicate that (re)‐emergence and/or further spread of VBD within the EU is a matter of when rather than if. Standardised and validated vector monitoring programs are required to be implemented at an international level for continuous surveillance and assessment of potential threats. There are benefits to using WGS – such as a quicker and better response to outbreaks and additional evidence for source attribution. However, significant challenges need to be addressed, including method standardisation and validation to fully realise these benefits; barriers to data sharing; and establishing epidemiological capacity for cluster triage and response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This update on the African swine fever (ASF) outbreaks in the EU demonstrated that out of all tested wild boar found dead, the proportion of positive samples peaked in winter and summer. For domestic pigs only, a summer peak was evident. Despite the existence of several plausible factors that could result in the observed seasonality, there is no evidence to prove causality. Wild boar density was the most influential risk factor for the occurrence of ASF in wild boar. In the vast majority of introductions in domestic pig holdings, direct contact with infected domestic pigs or wild boar was excluded as the route of introduction. The implementation of emergency measures in the wild boar management zones following a focal ASF introduction was evaluated. As a sole control strategy, intensive hunting around the buffer area might not always be sufficient to eradicate ASF. However, the probability of eradication success is increased after adding quick and safe carcass removal. A wider buffer area leads to a higher success probability; however it implies a larger intensive hunting area and the need for more animals to be hunted. If carcass removal and intensive hunting are effectively implemented, fencing is more useful for delineating zones, rather than adding substantially to control efficacy. However, segments of fencing will be particularly useful in those areas where carcass removal or intensive hunting is difficult to implement. It was not possible to demonstrate an effect of natural barriers on ASF spread. Human‐mediated translocation may override any effect of natural barriers. Recommendations for ASF control in four different epidemiological scenarios are presented. This publication is linked to the following EFSA Supporting Publications article: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/sp.efsa.2018.EN-1521/full [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vector or reservoir species of three diseases of crustaceans listed in the Animal Health Law were identified based on evidence generated through an extensive literature review, to support a possible updating of Regulation (EU) 2018/1882. Crustacean species on or in which Taura syndrome virus (TSV), Yellow head virus (YHV) or White spot syndrome virus (WSSV) were identified, in the field or during experiments, were classified as reservoir species with different levels of certainty depending on the diagnostic tests used. Where experimental evidence indicated transmission of the pathogen from a studied species to another known susceptible species, the studied species was classified as vector species. Although the quantification of the risk of spread of the pathogens by the vectors or reservoir species was not part of the terms of reference, such risks do exist for the vector species, since transmission from infected vector species to susceptible species was proven. Where evidence for transmission from infected crustaceans was not found, these were defined as reservoirs. Nonetheless, the risk of the spread of the pathogens from infected reservoir species cannot be excluded. Evidence identifying conditions that may prevent transmission by vectors during transport was collected from scientific literature. It was concluded that it is very likely to almost certain (90-100%) that WSSV, TSV and YHV will remain infective at any possible transport condition. Therefore, vector or reservoir species that may have been exposed to these pathogens in an affected area in the wild or aquaculture establishments or by water supply can possibly transmit WSSV, TSV and YHV., (© 2023 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by Wiley‐VCH GmbH on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Vector or reservoir species of five mollusc diseases listed in the Animal Health Law were identified, based on evidence generated through an extensive literature review, to support a possible updating of Regulation (EU) 2018/1882. Mollusc species on or in which Mikrocytos mackini , Perkinsus marinus , Bonamia exitiosa , Bonamia ostreae and Marteilia refringens were detected, in the field or during experiments, were classified as reservoir species with different levels of certainty depending on the diagnostic tests used. Where experimental evidence indicated transmission of the pathogen from a studied species to another known susceptible species, this studied species was classified as a vector species. Although the quantification of the risk of spread of the pathogens by the vectors or reservoir species was not part of the terms of reference, such risks do exist for the vector species, since transmission from infected vector species to susceptible species was proven. Where evidence for transmission from infected molluscs was not found, these were defined as reservoir. Nonetheless, the risk of the spread of the pathogens from infected reservoir species cannot be excluded. Evidence identifying conditions that may prevent transmission by vectors or reservoir mollusc species during transport was collected from scientific literature. It was concluded that it is very likely to almost certain (90-100%) that M. mackini, P. marinus, B. exitiosa B. ostreae and M. refringens will remain infective at any possible transport condition. Therefore, vector or reservoir species that may have been exposed to these pathogens in an affected area in the wild or at aquaculture establishments or through contaminated water supply can possibly transmit these pathogens. For transmission of M. refringens, the presence of an intermediate host, a copepod, is necessary., (© 2023 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by Wiley‐VCH GmbH on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Vector or reservoir species of five fish diseases listed in the Animal Health Law were identified, based on evidence generated through an extensive literature review (ELR), to support a possible updating of Regulation (EU) 2018/1882. Fish species on or in which highly polymorphic region-deleted infectious salmon anaemia virus (HPR∆ ISAV), Koi herpes virus (KHV), epizootic haematopoietic necrosis virus (EHNV), infectious haematopoietic necrosis virus (IHNV) or viral haemorrhagic septicaemia virus (VHSV) were detected, in the field or during experiments, were classified as reservoir species with different levels of certainty depending on the diagnostic tests used. Where experimental evidence indicated transmission of the pathogen from a studied species to another known susceptible species, the studied species was classified as a vector species. Although the quantification of the risk of spread of the pathogens by the vectors or reservoir species was not part of the terms or reference, such risks do exist for the vector species, since transmission from infected vector species to susceptible species was proven. Where evidence for transmission from infected fish was not found, these were defined as reservoirs. Nonetheless, the risk of the spread of the pathogens from infected reservoir species cannot be excluded. Evidence identifying conditions that may prevent transmission by vectors or reservoir fish species during transport was collected from scientific literature. For VHSV, IHNV or HPR∆ ISAV, it was concluded that under transport conditions at temperatures below 25°C, it is likely (66-90%) they will remain infective. Therefore, vector or reservoir species that may have been exposed to these pathogens in an affected area in the wild, aquaculture establishments or through water supply can possibly transmit VHSV, IHNV or HPR∆ ISAV into a non-affected area when transported at a temperature below 25°C. The conclusion was the same for EHN and KHV; however, they are likely to remain infective under all transport temperatures., (© 2023 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by Wiley‐VCH GmbH on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

BackgroundArthropod vectors such as ticks, mosquitoes, sandflies and biting midges are of public and veterinary health significance because of the pathogens they can transmit. Understanding their distributions is a key means of assessing risk. VectorNet maps their distribution in the EU and surrounding areas.AimWe aim to describe the methodology underlying VectorNet maps, encourage standardisation and evaluate output.Methods: Vector distribution and surveillance activity data have been collected since 2010 from a combination of literature searches, field-survey data by entomologist volunteers via a network facilitated for each participating country and expert validation. Data were collated by VectorNet members and extensively validated during data entry and mapping processes.ResultsAs of 2021, the VectorNet archive consisted of ca 475,000 records relating to > 330 species. Maps for 42 species are routinely produced online at subnational administrative unit resolution. On VectorNet maps, there are relatively few areas where surveillance has been recorded but there are no distribution data. Comparison with other continental databases, namely the Global Biodiversity Information Facility and VectorBase show that VectorNet has 5-10 times as many records overall, although three species are better represented in the other databases. In addition, VectorNet maps show where species are absent. VectorNet's impact as assessed by citations (ca 60 per year) and web statistics (58,000 views) is substantial and its maps are widely used as reference material by professionals and the public.ConclusionVectorNet maps are the pre-eminent source of rigorously validated arthropod vector maps for Europe and its surrounding areas.

This report provides a descriptive analysis of the African swine fever (ASF) Genotype II epidemic in the affected Member States in the EU and two neighbouring countries for the period from 1 September 2020 to 31 August 2021. ASF continued to spread in wild boar in the EU, it entered Germany in September 2020, while Belgium became free from ASF in October 2020. No ASF outbreaks in domestic pigs nor cases in wild boar have been reported in Greece since February 2020. In the Baltic States, overall, there has been a declining trend in proportions of polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-positive samples from wild boar carcasses in the last few years. In the other countries, the proportions of PCR-positive wild boar carcasses remained high, indicating continuing spread of the disease. A systematic literature review revealed that the risk factors most frequently significantly associated with ASF in domestic pigs were pig density, low levels of biosecurity and socio-economic factors. For wild boar, most significant risk factors were related to habitat, socio-economic factors and wild boar management. The effectiveness of different control options in the so-named white zones, areas where wild boar densities have been drastically reduced to avoid further spread of ASF after a new introduction, was assessed with a stochastic model. Important findings were that establishing a white zone is much more challenging when the area of ASF incursion is adjacent to an area where limited control measures are in place. Very stringent wild boar population reduction measures in the white zone are key to success. The white zone needs to be far enough away from the affected core area so that the population can be reduced in time before the disease arrives and the timing of this will depend on the wild boar density and the required population reduction target in the white zone. Finally, establishing a proactive white zone along the demarcation line of an affected area requires higher culling efforts, but has a higher chance of success to stop the spread of the disease than establishing reactive white zones after the disease has already entered in the area., (© 2022 Wiley‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KgaA on behalf of the European Food Safety Authority.)

Public and animal health authorities face many challenges in surveillance and control of vector-borne diseases. Those challenges are principally due to the multitude of interactions between vertebrate hosts, pathogens, and vectors in continuously changing environments. VectorNet, a joint project of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) facilitates risk assessments of VBD threats through the collection, mapping and sharing of distribution data for ticks, mosquitoes, sand flies, and biting midges that are vectors of pathogens of importance to animal and/or human health in Europe. We describe the development and maintenance of this One Health network that celebrated its 10th anniversary in 2020 and the value of its most tangible outputs, the vector distribution maps, that are freely available online and its raw data on request. VectorNet encourages usage of these maps by health professionals and participation, sharing and usage of the raw data by the network and other experts in the science community. For the latter, a more complete technical description of the mapping procedure will be submitted elsewhere., Competing Interests: GH and CM are employed by AviaGis and FS by Francis Schaffner Consultancy/Mabritec AG, Riehen. RS is employed by Wageningen Academic Publishers. WW was employed by Environmental Research Group Oxford Ltd. The remaining authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2022 Braks, Schaffner, Medlock, Berriatua, Balenghien, Mihalca, Hendrickx, Marsboom, Van Bortel, Smallegange, Sprong, Gossner, Czwienczek, Dhollander, Briët and Wint.)

The European Commission asked EFSA to provide study designs for the investigation of four research domains (RDs) according to major gaps in knowledge identified by EFSA in a report published in 2019: (RD 1) African swine fever (ASF) epidemiology in wild boar; (RD 2) ASF transmission by vectors; (RD 3) African swine fever virus (ASFV) survival in the environment, and (RD 4) the patterns of seasonality of ASF in wild boar and domestic pigs in the EU. In this Scientific Opinion, the second RD on ASF epidemiology in wild boar is addressed. Twenty-nine research objectives were proposed by the working group and broader ASF expert networks and 23 of these research objectives met a prespecified inclusion criterion. Fourteen of these 23 research objectives met the predefined threshold for selection and so were prioritised based on the following set of criteria: (1) the impact on ASF management; (2) the feasibility or practicality to carry out the study; (3) the potential implementation of study results in practice; (4) a possible short time-frame study (< 1 year); (5) the novelty of the study; and (6) if it was a priority for risk managers. Finally, after further elimination of three of the proposed research objectives due to overlapping scope of studies published during the development of this opinion, 11 research priorities were elaborated into short research proposals, considering the potential impact on ASF management and the period of one year for the research activities., (© 2021 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

The European Commission requested that EFSA provide study designs for the investigation of four research domains according to major gaps in knowledge identified by EFSA in a report published in 2019: (i) the patterns of seasonality of African Swine Fever (ASF) in wild boar and domestic pigs in the EU; (ii) the epidemiology of ASF in wild boar; (iii) survival of ASF virus (ASFV) in the environment and (iv) transmission of ASFV by vectors. In this Scientific Opinion, the fourth research domain on ASFV transmission by vectors is addressed. Eleven research objectives were proposed by the EFSA working group and broader ASF expert networks, such as ASF stop, ENETWILD, VectorNet, AHAW network and the AHAW Panel Experts. Of the 11 research objectives, six were prioritised based on the following set of criteria: (1) the impact on ASF management; (2) the feasibility or practicality to carry out the study; (3) the potential implementation of study results in practice; (4) a possible short time-frame study (< 1 year); (5) the novelty of the study and (6) if it was a priority for risk managers. The prioritised research objectives were: (I) Studies on the potential vector fauna at the pig-wild boar interface and the feeding preference of blood-feeding potential vectors in ASF-affected areas; (II) Assessment of the efficacy of insect screens on indoor/outdoor pig holdings to prevent the entry of blood-sucking vectors (i.e. Stomoxys) in ASF endemic areas; (III) Assess the role of mechanical vectors in the virus transmission in ASF-affected areas; (IV) Distribution of the potential mechanical transmission vectors in ASF-affected areas of the EU; (V) ASFV transmission by synanthropic birds; and (VI) Assessment on the presence/absence of the soft tick Ornithodoros erraticus in ASF-affected areas in Europe. For each of the selected research objectives, a research protocol has been proposed considering the potential impact on ASF management and the period of 1 year for the research activities., (© 2021 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

The European Commission requested that EFSA provide study designs for the investigation of four research domains according to major gaps in knowledge identified by EFSA in a report published in 2019: i) the patterns of seasonality of African Swine Fever (ASF) in wild boar and domestic pigs in the EU; ii) the epidemiology of ASF in wild boar; iii) survival of ASF virus (ASFV) in the environment and iv) transmission of ASFV by vectors. In this Scientific Opinion, the third research domain on ASFV survival is addressed. Nine research objectives were proposed by the working group and broader ASF expert networks, such as ASF stop, ENETWILD, VectorNet, AHAW network and the AHAW Panel Experts. Of the nine research objectives, only one was prioritised and elaborated into a general protocol/study design research proposal, pertaining ASFV survival in feed and bedding. To investigate the survival of ASFV in feed, bedding and roughage, laboratory survival studies are proposed. To investigate possible risk mitigation measures, proof-of-concept approaches should be investigated., (© 2021 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

An update on the African swine fever (ASF) situation in the 10 affected Member States (MS) in the EU and in two neighbouring countries from the 1 September 2019 until the 31 August 2020 is provided. The dynamics of the proportions of PCR- and ELISA-positive samples since the first ASF detection in the country were provided and seasonal patterns were investigated. The impact of the ASF epidemic on the annual numbers of hunted wild boar in each affected MS was investigated. To evaluate differences in the extent of spread of ASF in the wild boar populations, the number of notifications that could be classified as secondary cases to a single source was calculated for each affected MS and compared for the earliest and latest year of the epidemic in the country. To evaluate possible risk factors for the occurrence of ASFV in wild boar or domestic pigs, a literature review was performed. Risk factors for the occurrence of ASF in wild boar in Romanian hunting grounds in 2019 were identified with a generalised linear model. The probability to find at least one PCR-confirmed ASF case in wild boar in a hunting ground in Romania was driven by environmental factors, wild boar abundance and the density of backyard pigs in the hunting ground area, while hunting-related variables were not retained in the final model. Finally, measures implemented in white zones (ASF-free zones that are geographically adjacent to an area where ASF is present in wild boar) to prevent further spread of ASF were analysed with a spatially, explicit stochastic individual-based model. To be effective, the wild boar population in the white zone would need to be drastically reduced before ASF arrives at the zone and it must be wide enough. To achieve the necessary pre-emptive culling targets of wild boar in the white zone, at the start of the establishment, the white zone should be placed sufficiently far from the affected area, considering the speed of the natural spread of the disease. This spread is faster in denser wild boar populations. After a focal ASF introduction, the white zone is always close to the infection hence pre-emptive culling measures in the white zone must be completed in short term, i.e. in a few months., (© 2021 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

The European Commission requested EFSA to provide study designs for the investigation of four research domains according to major gaps in knowledge identified by EFSA in a report published in 2019: i) the patterns of seasonality of ASF in wild boar and domestic pigs in the EU; ii) the ASF epidemiology in wild boar; iii) ASF virus (ASFV) survival in the environment and iv) ASF transmission by vectors. In this Scientific Opinion, the first research domain on ASF seasonality is addressed. Therefore, five research objectives were proposed by the working group and broader ASF expert networks, such as ASF stop, ENETWILD, VectorNet, AHAW network and the AHAW Panel Experts. Of the five research objectives, only two were prioritised and elaborated into a general protocol/study design research proposal, namely: 1) to monitor the herd incidence of ASF outbreaks in EU Member States (MS) and 2) to investigate potential (seasonal) risk factors for ASF incursion in domestic pig herds of different herd types and/or size. To monitor the incidence in different pig herd types, it is advised to collect, besides ASF surveillance data, pig population data describing at least the following parameters per farm from the first moment of incursion in an affected MS: the numbers of pigs (e.g. number of breeding pigs sows and boars, weaners and fatteners) and the location and the type of farm (including details on the level of biosecurity implemented on the farm and the outdoor/indoor production). We suggest collecting data from all ASF-affected MS through the SIGMA data model, which was developed for this purpose. To investigate potential risk factors for ASF incursion in domestic pig herds, we suggest a matched case-control design. Such a study design can be run either retrospectively or prospectively. The collected data on the pig herds and the ASF surveillance data in the SIGMA data model can be used to identify case and control farms., (© 2021 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

EFSA assessed the role of seropositive wild boar in African swine fever (ASF) persistence. Surveillance data from Estonia and Latvia investigated with a generalised equation method demonstrated a significantly slower decline in seroprevalence in adult animals compared with subadults. The seroprevalence in adults, taking more than 24 months to approach zero after the last detection of ASFV circulation, would be a poor indicator to demonstrate the absence of virus circulation. A narrative literature review updated the knowledge on the mortality rate, the duration of protective immunity and maternal antibodies and transmission parameters. In addition, parameters potentially leading to prolonged virus circulation (persistence) in wild boar populations were reviewed. A stochastic explicit model was used to evaluate the dynamics of virus prevalence, seroprevalence and the number of carcasses attributed to ASF. Secondly, the impact of four scenarios on the duration of ASF virus (ASFV) persistence was evaluated with the model, namely a: (1) prolonged, lifelong infectious period, (2) reduction in the case-fatality rate and prolonged transient infectiousness; (3) change in duration of protective immunity and (4) change in the duration of protection from maternal antibodies. Only the lifelong infectious period scenario had an important prolonging effect on the persistence of ASF. Finally, the model tested the performance of different proposed surveillance strategies to provide evidence of the absence of virus circulation (Exit Strategy). A two-phase approach (Screening Phase, Confirmation Phase) was suggested for the Exit Strategy. The accuracy of the Exit Strategy increases with increasing numbers of carcasses collected and tested. The inclusion of active surveillance based on hunting has limited impact on the performance of the Exit Strategy compared with lengthening of the monitoring period. This performance improvement should be reasonably balanced against an unnecessary prolonged 'time free' with only a marginal gain in performance. Recommendations are provided for minimum monitoring periods leading to minimal failure rates of the Exit Strategy. The proposed Exit Strategy would fail with the presence of lifelong infectious wild boar. That said, it should be emphasised that the existence of such animals is speculative, based on current knowledge., (© 2021 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Effectiveness of surveillance and control measures against Rift Valley Fever (RVF) in Mayotte (overseas France) and in continental EU were assessed using mathematical models. Surveillance for early detection of RVF virus circulation implies very low design prevalence values and thus sampling a high number of animals, so feasibility issues may rise. Passive surveillance based on notified abortions in ruminants is key for early warning and at present the only feasible surveillance option. The assessment of vaccination and culling against RVF in Mayotte suggests that vaccination is more effective when quickly implemented throughout the population, e.g. at a rate of 200 or 2,000 animals vaccinated per day. Test and cull is not an option for RVF control in Mayotte given the high number of animals that would need to be tested. If the risk of RVFV introduction into the continental EU increases, ruminant establishments close to possible points of disease incursion should be included in the surveillance. An enhanced surveillance on reproductive disorders should be applied during summer in risk areas. Serosurveillance targets of 0.3% animals should be at least considered. RVF control measures possibly applied in the continental EU have been assessed in the Netherlands, as an example. Culling animals on farms within a 20 km radius of detected farms appears as the most effective measure to control RVF spread, although too many animals should be culled. Alternative measures are vaccination in a 50 km radius around detection, ring vaccination between 20 and 50 km and culling of detected farms. The assessment of zoning showed that, following RVFV introduction and considering an R 0 = 2, a mean vector dispersal of 10 km and 10 farms initially detected, RVFV would spread beyond a radius of up to 100 km or 50 km from the infected area with 10% or 55% probability, respectively., (© 2020 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Rift Valley fever (RVF) is a vector-borne disease transmitted by different mosquito species, especially Aedes and Culex genus, to animals and humans. In November 2018, RVF re-emerged in Mayotte (France) after 11 years. Up to the end of October 2019, 126 outbreaks in animals and 143 human cases were reported. RVF mortality was 0.01%, and the number of abortions reported in polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-positive ruminants was fivefold greater than the previous 7 years. Milk loss production in 2019 compared to 2015-2018 was estimated to be 18%, corresponding to an economic loss of around €191,000 in all of Mayotte. The tropical climate in Mayotte provides conditions for the presence of mosquitoes during the whole year, and illegal introductions of animals represent a continuous risk of (re)introduction of RVF. The probability of RVF virus (RVFV) persisting in Mayotte for 5 or more years was estimated to be < 10% but could be much lower if vertical transmission in vectors does not occur. Persistence of RVF by vertical transmission in Mayotte and Réunion appears to be of minor relevance compared to other pathways of re-introduction (i.e. animal movement). However, there is a high uncertainty since there is limited information about the vertical transmission of some of the major species of vectors of RVFV in Mayotte and Réunion. The only identified pathways for the risk of spread of RVF from Mayotte to other countries were by infected vectors transported in airplanes or by wind currents. For the former, the risk of introduction of RVF to continental France was estimated to 4 × 10 -6 epidemic per year (median value; 95% CI: 2 × 10 -8 ; 0.0007), and 0.001 epidemic per year to Réunion (95% CI: 4 × 10 -6 ; 0.16). For the latter pathway, mosquitoes dispersing on the wind from Mayotte between January and April 2019 could have reached the Comoros Islands, Madagascar, Mozambique and, possibly, Tanzania. However, these countries are already endemic for RVF, and an incursion of RVFV-infected mosquitoes would have negligible impact., (© 2020 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Rift Valley fever (RVF) is a vector-borne disease transmitted by a broad spectrum of mosquito species, especially Aedes and Culex genus, to animals (domestic and wild ruminants and camels) and humans. Rift Valley fever is endemic in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Arabian Peninsula, with periodic epidemics characterised by 5-15 years of inter-epizootic periods. In the last two decades, RVF was notified in new African regions (e.g. Sahel), RVF epidemics occurred more frequently and low-level enzootic virus circulation has been demonstrated in livestock in various areas. Recent outbreaks in a French overseas department and some seropositive cases detected in Turkey, Tunisia and Libya raised the attention of the EU for a possible incursion into neighbouring countries. The movement of live animals is the most important pathway for RVF spread from the African endemic areas to North Africa and the Middle East. The movement of infected animals and infected vectors when shipped by flights, containers or road transport is considered as other plausible pathways of introduction into Europe. The overall risk of introduction of RVF into EU through the movement of infected animals is very low in all the EU regions and in all MSs (less than one epidemic every 500 years), given the strict EU animal import policy. The same level of risk of introduction in all the EU regions was estimated also considering the movement of infected vectors, with the highest level for Belgium, Greece, Malta, the Netherlands (one epidemic every 228-700 years), mainly linked to the number of connections by air and sea transports with African RVF infected countries. Although the EU territory does not seem to be directly exposed to an imminent risk of RVFV introduction, the risk of further spread into countries neighbouring the EU and the risks of possible introduction of infected vectors, suggest that EU authorities need to strengthen their surveillance and response capacities, as well as the collaboration with North African and Middle Eastern countries., (© 2020 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

The European Commission requested EFSA to estimate the risk of spread of African swine fever (ASF) and to identify potential risk factors (indicators) for the spread of ASF, given introduction in the south-eastern countries of Europe (region of concern, ROC), namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia. Three EU Member States (MS) - Croatia, Greece and Slovenia - were included in the ROC due to their geographical location and ASF-free status. Based on collected information on potential risk factors (indicators) for each country and the relevant EU regulations in force, the estimated probability of spread of ASF within the ROC within one year after introduction into the ROC was assessed to be very high (from 66% to 100%). This estimate was determined after considering the high number of indicators present in most of the countries in the ROC and the known effect that these indicators can have on ASF spread, especially those related to the structure of the domestic pig sector, the presence of wild boar and social factors. The presence of indicators varies between countries in the ROC. Each country is at risk of ASF spread following introduction; however, some countries may have a higher probability of ASF spread following introduction. In addition, the probability of ASF spread from the ROC to EU MSs outside the ROC within one year after introduction of ASF in the ROC was estimated to be very low to low (from 0% to 15%). This estimate was based on the comparison of the indicators present in the ROC and the already affected countries in south-eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria and Romania, where there was no evidence of ASF spread to other EU MS within one year., (© 2019 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

The European Commission requested EFSA to compare the reliability of wild boar density estimates across the EU and to provide guidance to improve data collection methods. Currently, the only EU-wide available data are hunting data. Their collection methods should be harmonised to be comparable and to improve predictive models for wild boar density. These models could be validated by more precise density data, collected at local level e.g. by camera trapping. Based on practical and theoretical considerations, it is currently not possible to establish wild boar density thresholds that do not allow sustaining African swine fever (ASF). There are many drivers determining if ASF can be sustained or not, including heterogeneous population structures and human-mediated spread and there are still unknowns on the importance of different transmission modes in the epidemiology. Based on extensive literature reviews and observations from affected Member States, the efficacy of different wild boar population reduction and separation methods is evaluated. Different wild boar management strategies at different stages of the epidemic are suggested. Preventive measures to reduce and stabilise wild boar density, before ASF introduction, will be beneficial both in reducing the probability of exposure of the population to ASF and the efforts needed for potential emergency actions (i.e. less carcass removal) if an ASF incursion were to occur. Passive surveillance is the most effective and efficient method of surveillance for early detection of ASF in free areas. Following focal ASF introduction, the wild boar populations should be kept undisturbed for a short period (e.g. hunting ban on all species, leave crops unharvested to provide food and shelter within the affected area) and drastic reduction of the wild boar population may be performed only ahead of the ASF advance front, in the free populations. Following the decline in the epidemic, as demonstrated through passive surveillance, active population management should be reconsidered., (© 2018 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

West Nile fever (WNF) has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on the eligibility of WNF to be listed, Article 9 for the categorisation of WNF according to disease prevention and control rules as in Annex IV and Article 8 on the list of animal species related to WNF. The assessment has been performed following a methodology composed of information collection and compilation, expert judgement on each criterion at individual and, if no consensus was reached before, also at collective level. The output is composed of the categorical answer, and for the questions where no consensus was reached, the different supporting views are reported. Details on the methodology used for this assessment are explained in a separate opinion. According to the assessment performed, WNF can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL. The disease would comply with the criteria as in Sections 2 and 5 of Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in points (b) and (e) of Article 9(1). The animal species to be listed for WNF according to Article 8(3) criteria are several orders of birds and mammals as susceptible species and several families of birds as reservoir. Different mosquito species can serve as vectors., (© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Bovine viral diarrhoea (BVD) has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on the eligibility of BVD to be listed, Article 9 for the categorisation of BVD according to disease prevention and control rules as in Annex IV and Article 8 on the list of animal species related to BVD. The assessment has been performed following a methodology composed of information collection and compilation, expert judgement on each criterion at individual and, if no consensus was reached before, also at collective level. The output is composed of the categorical answer, and for the questions where no consensus was reached, the different supporting views are reported. Details on the methodology used for this assessment are explained in a separate opinion. According to the assessment performed, BVD can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL. The disease would comply with the criteria as in Sections 4 and 5 of Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in points (d) and (e) of Article 9(1). The assessment here performed on compliance with the criteria as in Section 3 of Annex IV referred to in point (c) of Article 9(1) is inconclusive. The animal species to be listed for BVD according to Article 8(3) criteria are mainly species of the families Bovidae, Cervidae and Camelidae as susceptible species and several mammalian species as reservoirs., (© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Avian mycoplasmosis ( Mycoplasma gallisepticum , Mycoplasma meleagridis ) has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on the eligibility of avian mycoplasmosis to be listed, Article 9 for the categorisation of avian mycoplasmosis according to disease prevention and control rules as in Annex IV and Article 8 on the list of animal species related to avian mycoplasmosis. The assessment has been performed following a methodology composed of information collection and compilation, expert judgement on each criterion at individual and, if no consensus was reached before, also at collective level. The output is composed of the categorical answer, and for the questions where no consensus was reached, the different supporting views are reported. Details on the methodology used for this assessment are explained in a separate opinion. According to the assessment performed, avian mycoplasmosis can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL. The disease would comply with the criteria as in Sections 4 and 5 of Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in points (d) and (e) of Article 9(1). The assessment here performed on compliance with the criteria as in Section 3 of Annex IV referred to in point (c) of Article 9(1) is inconclusive. The animal species to be listed for avian mycoplasmosis according to Article 8(3) criteria are mainly domestic and wild birds of the order Galliformes, and also Passeriformes for M. gallisepticum ., (© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on the eligibility of VEE to be listed, Article 9 for the categorisation of VEE according to disease prevention and control rules as in Annex IV and Article 8 on the list of animal species related to VEE. The assessment has been performed following a methodology composed of information collection and compilation, expert judgement on each criterion at individual and, if no consensus was reached before, also at collective level. The output is composed of the categorical answer, and for the questions where no consensus was reached, the different supporting views are reported. Details on the methodology used for this assessment are explained in a separate opinion. According to the assessment performed, it is inconclusive whether VEE is eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL because there was no full consensus on the criterion 5 A(v). Consequently, since it is inconclusive whether VEE can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL, the assessment on compliance of VEE with the criteria as in Sections 4 and 5 of Annex IV to the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in points (d) and (e) of Article 9(1), and which animal species can be considered to be listed for VEE according to Article 8(3) of the AHL is also inconclusive., (© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Borna disease has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on the eligibility of Borna disease to be listed, Article 9 for the categorisation of Borna disease according to disease prevention and control rules as in Annex IV and Article 8 on the list of animal species related to Borna disease. The assessment has been performed following a methodology composed of information collection and compilation, expert judgement on each criterion at individual and, if no consensus was reached before, also at collective level. The output is composed of the categorical answer, and for the questions where no consensus was reached, the different supporting views are reported. Details on the methodology used for this assessment are explained in a separate opinion. According to the assessment performed, Borna disease cannot be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL because there was no compliance on criterion 5 A(v). Consequently, the assessment on compliance of Borna disease with the criteria as in Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in Article 9(1) is not applicable, as well as which animal species can be considered to be listed for Borna disease according to Article 8(3) of the AHL., (© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Japanese encephalitis (JE) has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on the eligibility of Japanese encephalitis to be listed, Article 9 for the categorisation of Japanese encephalitis according to disease prevention and control rules as in Annex IV and Article 8 on the list of animal species related to Japanese encephalitis. The assessment has been performed following a methodology composed of information collection and compilation, expert judgement on each criterion at individual and, if no consensus was reached before, also at collective level. The output is composed of the categorical answer, and for the questions where no consensus was reached, the different supporting views are reported. Details on the methodology used for this assessment are explained in a separate opinion. According to the assessment performed, JE can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL. The disease would comply with the criteria as in Section 5 of Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in point (e) of Article 9(1). The main animal species to be listed for JE according to Article 8(3) criteria are waterfowl, pigs and equines as susceptible species and waterfowl as reservoir, as reported in the present document., (© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern and Western) has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on the eligibility of equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern and Western) to be listed, Article 9 for the categorisation of equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern and Western) according to disease prevention and control rules as in Annex IV, and Article 8 on the list of animal species related to equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern and Western). The assessment has been performed following a methodology composed of information collection and compilation, expert judgement on each criterion at individual and, if no consensus was reached before, also at collective level. The output is composed of the categorical answer, and for the questions where no consensus was reached, the different supporting views are reported. Details on the methodology used for this assessment are explained in a separate opinion. According to the assessment performed, equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern and Western) can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL. The disease would comply with the criteria as in Section 5 of Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in point (e) of Article 9(1). The assessment here performed on compliance with the criteria as in Section 4 of Annex IV referred to in point (d) of Article 9(1) is inconclusive. The animal species to be listed for equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern and Western) according to Article 8(3) criteria are several species of mammals, birds, reptiles and amphibians as susceptible species; rodents, lagomorphs and several bird species as reservoirs and at least four mosquito species (family Culicidae) as vectors., (© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

Infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBR) has been assessed according to the criteria of the Animal Health Law (AHL), in particular criteria of Article 7 on disease profile and impacts, Article 5 on the eligibility of IBR to be listed, Article 9 for the categorisation of IBR according to disease prevention and control rules as in Annex IV and Article 8 on the list of animal species related to IBR. The assessment has been performed following a methodology composed of information collection and compilation, expert judgement on each criterion at individual and, if no consensus was reached before, also at collective level. The output is composed of the categorical answer, and for the questions where no consensus was reached, the different supporting views are reported. Details on the methodology used for this assessment are explained in a separate opinion. According to the assessment performed, IBR can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL. The disease would comply with the criteria in Sections 4 and 5 of Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in points (d) and (e) of Article 9(1). The assessment here performed on compliance with the criteria as in Section 3 of Annex IV referred to in point (c) of Article 9(1) is inconclusive. The animal species to be listed for IBR according to Article 8(3) criteria belong to the order Artiodactyla., (© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)

After a request from the European Commission, EFSA's Panel on Animal Health and Welfare summarised the main characteristics of 36 vector-borne diseases (VBDs) in https://efsa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/PublicGallery/index.html?appid=dfbeac92aea944599ed1eb754aa5e6d1. The risk of introduction in the EU through movement of livestock or pets was assessed for each of the 36 VBDs individually, using a semiquantitative Method to INTegrate all relevant RISK aspects (MINTRISK model), which was further modified to a European scale into the http://www3.lei.wur.nl/mintrisk/ModelMgt.aspx. Only eight of the 36 VBD-agents had an overall rate of introduction in the EU (being the combination of the rate of entry, vector transmission and establishment) which was estimated to be above 0.001 introductions per year. These were Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus, bluetongue virus, West Nile virus, Schmallenberg virus, Hepatozoon canis , Leishmania infantum , Bunyamwera virus and Highlands J. virus. For these eight diseases, the annual extent of spread was assessed, assuming the implementation of available, authorised prevention and control measures in the EU. Further, the probability of overwintering was assessed, as well as the possible impact of the VBDs on public health, animal health and farm production. For the other 28 VBD-agents for which the rate of introduction was estimated to be very low, no further assessments were made. Due to the uncertainty related to some parameters used for the risk assessment or the instable or unpredictability disease situation in some of the source regions, it is recommended to update the assessment when new information becomes available. Since this risk assessment was carried out for large regions in the EU for many VBD-agents, it should be considered as a first screening. If a more detailed risk assessment for a specific VBD is wished for on a national or subnational level, the EFSA-VBD-RISK-model is freely available for this purpose., (© 2017 European Food Safety Authority. EFSA Journal published by John Wiley and Sons Ltd on behalf of European Food Safety Authority.)