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In 2018, the US Congress enacted a policy permitting Medicare Advantage (MA) plans to cover telehealth services in a beneficiary’s home and through audio-only means as part of the basic benefit package of services, where prior to the policy change such benefits were only allowed to be covered as a supplemental benefit. MA plans were afforded 2 years of lead time for strategizing, negotiating, and capital investment prior to the start date (January 1, 2020) of the new coverage option. Our data analysis found basic benefit telehealth was offered by plans comprising 71% of enrollment in 2020 and increased to 95% in 2021. At the same time, remote access telehealth was offered as a supplemental benefit for 69% of enrollees in 2020, a decrease of 23% compared to 2019. These efforts by MA plans may have enabled traditional Medicare (TM) to leverage an existing telehealth infrastructure as a solution to the access issues created by public health policies requiring sheltering in place and social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic. The success of this MA policy prompts consideration of additional flexibility beyond the standard basic benefit package, and whether such benefits reduce costs while improving access and/or outcomes in the context of a managed care environment like MA. Subject to oversight, such flexibility could potentially improve value in MA, and facilitate future changes in TM, as appropriate.

The exclusion of employment-based health insurance from income and payroll taxes is thought to increase the generosity of insurance coverage and, in turn, increase the overutilization of low-value health care services. We examine this inefficiency of overinsurance by quantifying the change in expected utility across 4 benchmark plans varying in actuarial value (AV) and focus on the distribution of each of these estimates across different groups of people varying in health status. Specifically, we quantify the changes in health care spending due to moral hazard and the changes in uncertainty tied to risk aversion using data from the nationally representative sample of adults with employment-based coverage from the 2007-2016 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, and produce estimates of expected utility for 24 groups of people based on their age, gender, and preexisting conditions. Our model suggests an average preferred AV of 78% without the tax exclusion, with 29.0% of the population preferring a 60% AV, 6.5% preferring a 70% AV, 18.1% preferring an 80% AV, and 46.4% preferring a 90% AV. When incorporating the distortionary effect of the employment-based tax exclusion, the preferred plan increases to an 83% AV for low-income people (with 71.0% of the population preferring a 90% AV) and an 84% AV for high-income people (with 76.0% of the population preferring a 90% AV). We estimate that policy changes to make subsidies independent of a plan’s AV could result in increases in utility equal to about 2.7% of total health care spending, but with those net gains concentrated among the healthy.

OBJECTIVES:To measure value in the delivery of inpatient care and to quantify its variation across U.S. regions. DATA SOURCES / STUDY SETTING:A random (20%) sample of 33,713 elderly fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries treated in 2,232 hospitals for a heart attack in 2013. STUDY DESIGN:We estimate a production function for inpatient care, defining output as stays with favorable patient outcomes in terms of survival and readmission. The regression model includes hospital inputs measured by treatment costs, as well as patient characteristics. Region-level effects in the production function are used to estimate the productivity and value of the care delivered by hospitals within regions. DATA COLLECTION / EXTRACTION METHODS:Medicare claims and enrollment files, linked to the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care and Inpatient Prospective Payment System Impact Files. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS:Hospitals in the hospital referral region at the 90th percentile of the value distribution delivered 54% more high-quality stays than hospitals at the 10th percentile could have delivered, after adjusting for treatment costs and patient severity. CONCLUSIONS:Variation in the delivery of high-value inpatient care points to opportunities for better quality and lower costs.

The slowed growth in national health care spending over the past decade has led analysts to question the extent to which this recent slowdown can be explained by predictable factors such as the Great Recession or must be driven by some unpredictable structural change in the health care sector. To help address this question, we first estimate a regression model for state personal health care spending for 1991-2009, with an emphasis on the explanatory power of income, insurance, and provider market characteristics. We then use the results from this simple predictive model to produce state-level projections of health care spending for 2010-2013 to subsequently compare those average projected state values with actual national spending for 2010-2013, finding that at least 70% of the recent slowdown in health care spending can likely be explained by long-standing patterns. We also use the results from this predictive model to both examine the Great Recession’s likely reduction in health care spending and project the Affordable Care Act’s insurance expansion’s likely increase in health care spending.

We compared the generosity of Medicare plans in terms of out-of-pocket costs attributable to cost sharing and premiums, including both basic and supplemental services. From 2014 through 2019, projected out-of-pocket costs for a typical enrollee were 18-24 percent lower in Medicare Advantage than traditional fee-for-service Medicare.

Medicare Advantage (MA) enrollment increased by 22.2 million beneficiaries (337.0 percent) from 2006 through 2022, whereas traditional Medicare enrollment declined by 1.0 million (-2.9 percent) over that period. In 2022, adjusted MA penetration was 49.9 percent nationally, and 24.0 percent of Medicare beneficiaries with Parts A and B lived in a county with adjusted MA penetration equal to or exceeding 60 percent.

The No Surprises Act prohibits most surprise billing but notably does not apply to ground ambulance services. In this study we created a novel data set that identifies the ownership structure of ground ambulance organizations to compare pricing and billing between private- and public-sector ambulances, with a specific focus on organizations owned by private equity or publicly traded companies. Overall, we found that 28 percent of commercially insured emergency ground ambulance transports during the period 2014-17 resulted in a potential surprise bill. Our analysis illustrates that being transported by a private-sector ambulance in an emergency comes with substantially higher allowed amounts, patient cost sharing, and potential surprise bills compared with being transported by a public-sector ambulance. Further, allowed amounts and cost sharing tended to be higher for private equity- or publicly traded company-owned ambulances than other private-sector ambulances. These findings highlight substantial patient liability and important differences in pricing and billing patterns between public- and private-sector ground ambulance organizations.

The 21st Century Cures Act of 2016 lifted regulations prohibiting Medicare Advantage (MA) enrollment after patients initiate dialysis, starting in 2021, and early reports indicate increased MA enrollment among such patients. Large shifts into Medicare Advantage could disrupt the market because the consolidated dialysis industry can negotiate payment from MA plans that is higher than that for fee-for-service Medicare. For three large insurers representing 48 percent of the 2016-17 MA market, we found that MA plans paid 27 percent more than fee-for-service Medicare. Larger dialysis center chains commanded higher markups. Virtually all facilities of the two largest chains were in network, suggesting that they leverage their market power into all-or-nothing negotiations with plans. Policy makers should consider regulations that limit market consolidation among dialysis providers, as well as their ability to exercise that power in the MA market.

Surprise medical bills occur when a patient unexpectedly or involuntarily receives care from an out-of-network provider and is billed for the amount not covered by insurance. Past studies were unable to observe whether bills for such care were sent to patients and, if so, how much patients paid directly to out-of-network providers. We used data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to measure how much privately insured emergency patients paid when they likely received a surprise bill and how much physicians received in these situations. Physicians collected 65 percent of the charged amount for likely surprise bills compared with 52 percent for other cases. Patients who likely received a surprise out-of-network bill for emergency care paid physicians more than ten times as much as other emergency patients paid, on average.

In 2018 New Jersey implemented a final-offer arbitration system to resolve payment disputes between insurers and out-of-network providers over surprise medical bills. Similar proposals are being considered by Congress and other states. In this article we examine how arbitration decisions compare with other relevant provider payment amounts by linking administrative data from New Jersey arbitration cases to Medicare and commercial insurance claims data. We find that decisions track closely with one of the metrics that arbitrators are shown-the eightieth percentile of provider charges-with the median decision being 5.7 times prevailing in-network rates for the same services. It is not a foregone conclusion that arbitrators will select winning offers based on proximity to this target, although our findings suggest that it is a strong anchor. The amount that providers can expect to receive through the arbitration process also affects their bargaining leverage with insurers, which could affect in-network negotiated rates more broadly. Therefore, basing arbitration decisions or a payment standard on unilaterally set provider-billed charges appears likely to increase health care costs relative to other surprise billing solutions and perversely incentivizes providers to inflate their charges over time.

Patients treated at in-network facilities can involuntarily receive services from out-of-network providers, which may result in "surprise bills." While several studies report the surprise billing prevalence in emergency department and inpatient settings, none document the prevalence in ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs). The extent to which health plans pay a portion or all of out-of-network providers' bills in these situations is also unexplored. We analyzed 4.2 million ASC-based episodes of care in 2014-17, involving 3.3 million patients enrolled in UnitedHealth Group, Humana, and Aetna commercial plans. One in ten ASC episodes involved out-of-network ancillary providers at in-network ASC facilities. Insurers paid providers' full billed charges in 24 percent of the cases, leaving no balance to bill patients. After we accounted for insurer payment, we found that there were potential surprise bills in 8 percent of the episodes at in-network ASCs. The average balance per episode increased by 81 percent, from $819 in 2014 to $1,483 in 2017. Anesthesiologists (44 percent), certified registered nurse anesthetists (25 percent), and independent laboratories (10 percent) generated most potential surprise bills. There is a need for federal policy to expand protection from surprise bills to patients enrolled in all commercial insurance plans.

Medicare Part D has no cap on beneficiaries' out-of-pocket spending for outpatient prescription drugs, and, unlike Medicare Parts A and B, beneficiaries are prohibited from purchasing supplemental insurance that could provide such a cap. Historically, most beneficiaries whose annual Part D spending reached the catastrophic level were protected from unlimited personal liability by the Low-Income Subsidy (LIS). However, we found that the proportion of beneficiaries whose spending reached that level but did not qualify for the subsidy-and therefore remained liable for coinsurance-increased rapidly, from 18 percent in 2007 to 28 percent in 2015. Moreover, average total per person per year spending grew much more rapidly for those who did not qualify for the LIS than for those who did, primarily because of differences in price and utilization trends for the drugs that represented disproportionately large shares of their spending. We estimated that a cap for all Part D enrollees in 2015 would have raised monthly premiums by only $0.40-$1.31 per member.

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) includes provisions to reduce Medicare beneficiaries' out-of-pocket spending for prescription drugs by gradually closing the coverage gap between the initial coverage limit and the catastrophic coverage threshold (known as the doughnut hole) beginning in 2011. However, Medicare beneficiaries who take specialty pharmaceuticals could still face a large out-of-pocket burden because of uncapped cost sharing in the catastrophic coverage phase. Using 2008-12 pharmacy claims data from a 20 percent sample of Medicare beneficiaries, we analyzed trends in total and out-of-pocket spending among Medicare beneficiaries who take at least one high-cost specialty drug from the top eight specialty drug classes in terms of spending. Annual total drug spending per specialty drug user studied increased considerably during the study period, from $18,335 to $33,301, and the proportion of expenditures incurred while in the catastrophic coverage phase increased from 70 percent to 80 percent. We observed a 26 percent decrease in mean annual out-of-pocket expenditures incurred below the catastrophic coverage threshold, likely attributable to the ACA's doughnut hole cost-sharing reductions, but increases in mean annual out-of-pocket expenditures incurred while in the catastrophic coverage phase offset these reductions almost entirely. Policy makers should consider implementing limits on patients' out-of-pocket burden., (Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.)

Specialty pharmaceuticals include most injectable and biologic agents used to treat complex conditions such as rheumatoid arthritis, multiple sclerosis, and cancer. We analyzed trends in specialty drug spending among Medicare beneficiaries ages sixty-five and older using 2007-11 pharmacy claims data from a 20 percent sample of Medicare beneficiaries. Annual specialty drug spending per beneficiary who used specialty drugs increased considerably during the study period, from $2,641 to $8,976. However, specialty drugs accounted for only 6.7 percent of total drug spending per beneficiary in 2007 and 9.1 percent in 2011. Moreover, in 2011 cost-sharing reductions under the Affordable Care Act significantly reduced specialty drug users' out-of-pocket burden, which decreased 26 percent from 2010. Oral cancer agents accounted for a significant proportion of the increase in specialty drug spending among the study population. This suggests that the migration of specialty drug coverage from Medicare's Part B medical benefit to the Part D pharmacy benefit because of new treatment options may play an important role in specialty pharmacy trends. This shift is likely to continue as pharmaceutical innovations enable more specialty therapeutics to be self-administered and to be covered under the pharmacy instead of the medical benefit., (Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.)