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This article aims at challenging certain conceptions related to the activities of non-State armed groups (NSAGs) in armed conflict. Contrary to the conventional thinking that all NSAGs are violent and disrespectful of international law, not only are some of them are aware of the applicable rules, they have even adopted measures to respect, implement and enforce the obligations contained therein, thus willingly restricting their own behaviours and prerogatives. In the context of these practices—and despite the lack of a clear legal framework addressing their international responsibility as collective entities, NSAGs have also dealt with violations of international law by their own members in various ways: some groups have publicly committed to provide compensation, while others have issued public apologies and modified their internal codes of conduct to prohibit the commission of certain acts by their members. NSAGs have also signed Geneva Call's Deeds of Commitment , through which they pledge to prevent the violation of specific norms. Based on these responses, this article's goal is to explore certain correlations that may exist between NSAGs' degree of compliance with international humanitarian law and the manner in which they have reacted to possible breaches of this normative framework. In doing so, it examines the reasons why NSAGs may have a different attitude when responding to international law violations and concludes by proposing some causal factors that may serve to explain the adoption of restorative measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the existence of a comprehensive international legal framework protecting children in armed conflict, ensuring its respect by armed non-State actors (ANSAs) still remains an important challenge. This can be linked to several circumstances, such as their lack of knowledge of the law, the absence of an incentive to abide by the applicable rules, their fragmented structure and their lack of capacity to implement the applicable framework. Certain practical cases, however, show that ANSAs' behaviours may vary throughout armed conflicts. While certain groups have, at a given moment, breached some of their international obligations, others have shown some degree of commitment to respecting children's safeguards. When addressing the prohibition of recruiting and using children in hostilities, the reasons behind these variations have remained insufficiently explored. This article reviews some of the lessons learned from Geneva Call's experience when engaging ANSAs towards their compliance with child protection norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This review explores certain challenges related to the notion of customary international law. It seems that it was a long time ago when international law academics and practitioners ever thought that the nature of this source was a well-settled topic. Nowadays international lawmaking processes involve an extraordinary number of interactions, taking place both formally and informally. Such complex features are reflected by an exponential increase in the scholarly study of international legal sources. The legal nature, its applicability and principles regulating customary international law are addressed in the book under review (Brian D Lepard (ed), Reexamining Customary International Law (Cambridge University Press 2017)) through several topical essays. The chapters offer a comprehensive analysis of these lawmaking processes and the challenges they portray from various perspectives and in various fields, such as: What is customary international law and why is it law? Is it law because it reflects a 'global legislative' model? What is the current value of the persistent objector theory? Is the two-element definition of customary international law still applicable? By meticulously addressing these and other inquiries, the book presents novel arguments and represents a stimulating addition to the literature on sources of international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last few decades, the role of non-state armed groups has become an essential topic of analysis and discussion to better understand international humanitarian law dynamics. While their increasing importance is uncontroversial, their place and regulation in specific areas of international law still remains unclear or insufficiently explored. Chief among these is the possible non-state armed groups' international responsibility. Although it is undisputed that some of these entities breach their international law obligations, others seemingly engage with certain rules on the topic. This article addresses some legal consequences of such scenarios. Taking into account the principle of equality of belligerents in noninternational armed conflicts, two issues are dealt with: i) the existence of "nonstate" organs that could trigger the attribution of violations of international rules to non-state armed groups; ii) possible reparations owed by these non-state entities for their breaches during armed conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions encourages the parties to a non-international armed conflict to bring into force international humanitarian law provisions through the conclusion of special agreements. Since armed groups are ever more frequent participants in contemporary armed conflicts, the relevance of those agreements as means to enhance compliance with IHL has grown as well. The decision-making process of special agreements recognizes that all the parties to the conflict participate in the clarification and expansion of the applicable rights and obligations in a way that is consistent with the principle of equality of belligerents. This provides incentives for armed groups to respect the IHL rules they have themselves negotiated. However, even upon the conclusion of such agreements, it remains unclear which legal regime governs them. This paper will argue that special agreements are governed by international law instead of domestic law or a sui generis legal regime. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the last few decades, the UN Security Council has increasingly implemented enforcement measures in the context of many non-international armed conflicts. Both in those cases and in international conflicts, certain resolutions explicitly impose rights and obligations upon all the parties, without making a legal distinction between States and non-State actors, including armed opposition groups. This paper aims to explain some consequences of the approach adopted by the Security Council. Mainly, two issues are dealt with: (a) how does the Security Council address armed opposition groups and to what extent its resolutions impose rights and obligations upon them; (b) if these non-State actors are in fact bound by those resolutions and why. In order to achieve an explanation that grasps the complexity of these issues, the article adopts a systemic approach, which includes the application of the principle of equality of belligerents to Security Council resolutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most of the present rules of international law regulate the behavior of States. Within States, however, there are other entities such as corporations, non-governmental organizations, individuals, international governmental organizations and armed opposition groups that are regulated by different national and international regimes. In this regard, non-State armed opposition groups present particular challenges to international law due to their dominant presence and participation in armed conflicts. Armed opposition groups are one of the most important actors in international humanitarian law today. Yet, taking into consideration that they a priori have certain international humanitarian obligations to fulfill, it remains unclear what the implications are when they, as a group, commit violations. Among these uncertainties, is that there is no formally recognized mechanism to attribute such breaches to the relevant non - state armed opposition group as such. In fact, unlike States, they have no organs. Similarly, there is also no consensus on circumstance that could preclude the wrongfulness of these breaches for armed opposition groups. By challenging the State-centric system of public international law, this article analyses the possible application of certain rules contained in the International Law Commission's Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) to violations of international humanitarian law by armed opposition groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The right to truth, as a legal concept, has emerged in different national, regional and international settings of human rights protection. It refers to the state's obligation to provide information to the victims, their families, and the society as a whole, about the circumstances in which gross human rights violations were committed. The truth is analyzed, therefore, as the consequence of a process involving the search of justice and the issue of rulings that have a merely reparational goal. However, for the safeguard international systems, this right has not been clearly recognized, at least in a conventional manner. Its mention in these systems is limited and ambiguous. Therefore, this paper aims to study how the Human Rights Inter-American System has defined the right to truth, taking as study case the El Mozote Massacre, which took place in El Salvador in 1981. This event still today remains unpunished, leaving the Salvadorian society without justice or reparation, but fundamentally without memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]