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Following the end of the coronavirus pandemic, the European Central Bank (ECB) was confronted with an unprecedented increase in energy prices. This led to consumer price inflation in the euro area far beyond the ECB's inflation target of two percent, at times up to 10 percent. At the same time, the euro area economy was threatened by a recession, which resulted in the ECB facing conflicting objectives of stabilizing the economy and combating inflation. Estimates show that while the ECB's policy strategy of maintaining a low level of interest rates did improve the economy, it also exacerbated the rise in energy prices. The empirical analysis demonstrates that an interest rate hike at the beginning of the energy crisis would have stabilized inflation more effectively. Tightening monetary policy would have curbed energy demand and caused the euro to appreciate, which would have led to a more rapid decline in energy prices. In this counterfactual scenario, the euro area would have had to endure a brief recession, but the overall economic situation would have stabilized by the fourth quarter of 2023. The ECB would likely have been better able to follow its price stability mandate if a capital markets and fiscal union existed in the euro area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the 24 years since its introduction, the euro has experienced a financial crisis, a government debt crisis, a global pandemic, and an energy crisis--and survived. Using a model focusing on households, this Weekly Report shows that the monetary union's stability is rooted in the fact that the middle class neither gains nor loses significantly relative to an independent currency following business cycle impulses. The shifting of the costs due to a crisis as a result of membership in a monetary union occurs at the tails of the wealth distribution, namely between groups of equal wealth in different countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Energy prices have risen sharply as a result of the coronavirus pandemic as well as the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022. The resulting consumer price inflation is forcing the European Central Bank (ECB) to act in accordance with its mandate. However, the ECB expresses doubts that it will be able to have an impact on the price increases. As this Weekly Report based on an analysis of structural relationships in the euro area emphasizes, the ECB is anything but powerless in regard to energy price developments: Following a 2022 Weekly Report that showed that fuel and heating costs generally fall in the wake of an interest rate hike, this Weekly Report identifies three channels of monetary policy through energy prices. In some cases, they have countervailing effects. However, the conclusion is clear: The ECB can actually dampen energy prices by raising the key interest rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

May 2022 marked the 90th anniversary of the end of Heinrich Brüning's term as Reich Chancellor. To this day, the economic effects of Brüning's extreme austerity measures remain unclear. However, new data and calculations have made an initial quantification of the economic consequences of Brüning's policies possible. An analysis based on a time series model illustrates how the Weimar Republic's economy could have developed without Brüning's austerity measures. According to this model, real GDP fell by around 4.5 percent overall in the reference year 1932 and unemployment rose sharply as a result of Brüning's emergency decrees. Considering this analysis, current calls for fiscal austerity to reduce debt should be questioned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Inflation has been growing considerably since the middle of 2021, with rising energy prices driving the increase in particular. Since the end of February 2022, the trend has also been exacerbated by the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. To keep prices stable, the European Central Bank must rein in its accomodative monetary policy. However, would doing so--by enacting an interest rate increase, for example--even decrease the prices of energy traded on the world market? In this Weekly Report, a time series model shows energy prices in Germany would sink by around four percent--even more strongly than the overall consumer price index at 0.2 percent--were the ECB to increase the interest rate. This is primarily due to the fact that such an increase would appreciate the euro, which would make dollar-traded oil imports cheaper. However, at the same time, an interest rate increase would derail industrial production and increase unemployment during an already slow economic recovery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This study is the first to investigate the interdependence of income inequality and business cycles in Germany over the past 40 years. These fluctuations in income inequality are important because they are decisive for designing effective and targeted structural redistributive and stabilization measures. The results of this study show that income inequality in Germany fluctuates with the business cycle procyclically. Thus, gross and net income inequality decrease during economic crises and increase during recovery periods. This is mainly due to the fact that the percentage loss or gain of income of the ten percent with the highest incomes is higher than those of individuals with lower incomes. Stabilization policies that cushion income losses during crises, such as the short-time work allowance, reinforce the procyclicality slightly and counteract inequality, especially in crises. This procyclicality is desirable from a political perspective and has a welfare-enhancing effect by, for example, providing social security for low-income earners against negative shocks. However, to what extent the corresponding increase in income inequality during booms must be tolerated remains unclear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Since decades, only one fourth of German households invest in shares. One exception was during the three IPOs from 1996 to 2000 of the Deutsche Telekom, which gave Germans a taste to enter the stock market. However, the fall in the share price shortly after the second IPO, followed by corruption scandals of the company, put an end to their enthusiasm. The present study based on SOEP data shows that the events surrounding the Deutsche Telekom IPOs led to persistently lower stock market participation--by around 60 percent, even 20 years on. This effect is greater for households that invested directly in T-shares. As a result, confidence in stock investment was permanently destroyed, which can have significantly negative impact on their long-term asset accumulation. In order to counter this loss of confidence, supervisory authorities should examine companies that issue shares to retail investors more closely, in order that cases like Deutsche Telekom and, more recently, Wirecard, do not continue to undermine confidence in the stock exchange. It is also important to provide retail investors with better access to financial education so they can evaluate stock market investments more rationally, thus safeguarding their portfolios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The presently tenuous situation in Turkey will worsen if the government does not take appropriate policy action. In view of foreign investors' loss of confidence, the cost of external financing is likely to rise while consumption and investment will fall, and the Turkish lira would depreciate further. The influx of foreign capital would dry up as well. Conservative estimates show that the country's growth would decline by five percent in the first year. These are the results of simulations with an equilibrium model developed by the German Institute for Economic Research. However, adopting measures such as budget consolidation, interest rate hikes, or lowering the target inflation rate could prevent a crisis. The most effective and efficient measure is lowering the perceived inflation target by restoring central bank's independence, thereby regaining investor confidence. Loans from international partners would also stabilize Turkey's currency, inflation, and economy – and support the country's reform process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: DIW-Wochenbericht is the property of DIW Berlin and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)