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Parliamentary oversight is one of the most important consequences of separation of power system which has a great role in regulating power and protecting the rights of citizens. However, several factors and tools saffect this supervision. Considering the important role of political parties in the democratic life of the society and the organization of power, the role of the parties in realizing the desired parliamentary supervision cannot be ignored. Therefore, this article used a descriptive method and analyzed the reliable library sources to answer the question regarding the role of political parties in the application of political tools of parliamentary oversight. In this regard, it was found that coherent organization within the party is very important to fully exploit and direct the monitoring tools. Subjects that have been regulated in many parliaments, regardless of the type of political system and the difference in the degree of success, were able to organize the parliamentary groups, determine the direction of the flow of tools such as questions, notes, impeachment, etc. (whatever issues are raised in the spotlight for everyone), gain public support for the application of those tools, obtain the power to organize and form the composition of special commissions, moderate the dominance of the majority party, and prevent unilateralism.

It can be challenging for a democratic government to effectively make policies that address crucial national problems. While a bulk of literature reports that many democracies have overcome this challenge through centralization of legislative organization, few studies have explained why legislative decentralization that allegedly impairs policymaking performance would take place. Drawing on Taiwan's experience and over 13,000 legislative bills proposed in Taiwan's parliament between 1993 and 2012, this article demonstrates that the legislative decentralization during the onset of Taiwan's democratization slightly revived the policymaking performance of a near-paralysed parliament. Like drinking poison to quench the thirst, myopic politicians may opt for legislative decentralization as an instant remedy to ease severe legislative obstruction, despite the unfavourable consequences that the resulting decentralized legislative organization may eventually bring about. These findings shed new light on the evolution of legislative organization and account for the difficulties in policymaking facing developing democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Why would a generic parliament have committees with minority party members? If the majority party considers minority party committee members a burden, then it could choose to exclude minority party members entirely from the committee system. This, however, has rarely happened in history. In this paper, I provide an informational rationale for the bipartisan committee system through a simple signaling model. I show that, in equilibrium, the majority party on the floor can extract better information and, therefore, enact more preferred policy outcomes by forming committees with members of both parties. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Is sponsorship and co-sponsorship behavior by U.S. House members responsive to which party controls the chamber? The Republican takeover of the U.S. House in 1995 provides an ideal natural experiment to test whether House members am more or less likely to sponsor and cosponsor legislation as a function of their majority or minority party status. We suggest that changes in control of the House created a set of institutional incentives that shifted sponsorship and co-sponsorship behavior by House members. Using data on House members serving from the 102nd Congress to the 105th Congress, we consider whether Democrats and Republicans reconfigured their sponsorship and co-sponsorship behavior after the shift in partisan control, controlling for the effects of other variables. We find that majority party status matters, with members of the majority party consistently exhibiting higher levels of sponsorship activity, though our findings on co-sponsorship activity are less definitive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]