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This paper critically contrasts Laudan's normative naturalism with Friedman's arguments about the importance of a priori concepts in scientific methodology. I do not take issue with Laudan's claim that taking philosophy and science to be continuous does not preclude a normative role for the philosophy of science. The main focus of criticism instead is Laudan's assertion that if normative philosophy employs the methods found in the sciences themselves, then this precludes any a priori or philosophical justification of methodological rules. I make the case that not only are such justifications possible, they are central to any proper philosophical understanding of scientific methodology, and must figure prominently in any plausible version of normative naturalism. To make this case I sketch Laudan's position and his reasons for the ban on a priori justification. I then contrast Laudan's position with Friedman's recent studies on the prominence of relativised constitutive a priori principles within science and show that this view can serve as the basis of a contrasting variation of naturalised philosophy of science. I elucidate Friedman's position in order to identity some prima facie difficulties with Laudan's ban on the a priori in our understanding of science but also to provide an example of a competing variation of philosophical naturalism. Finally, I further highlight the difficulties that attend Laudan's position through a case study, the central methodological role of renormalisation in quantum field theory.

Debate in the philosophy of science has recently been much concerned with the controversy over the body of doctrines that goes by the name 'social constructivism.' While the school has generated little enthusiasm among philosophers of science, in one form or another it dominates the broader field of science-studies. In spite of its unpopularity among philosophers of science Arthur Fine has argued that an attenuated form of constructivism can be useful within the context of a deflationary approach to science. Fine maintains that the deflationary doctrine, the view that global positions on the realism question ought to be eschewed, can accommodate some constructivist interpretations. In this paper I show that, in most cases, social constructivist interpretations of scientific practice cannot be reconciled with the goals of deflationary philosophy of science. I also demonstrate that to the extent constructivism can be made consistent with deflationary goals it will not resemble Fine's and that it will be far more limited in its applicability than philosophers sympathetic with Fine might think.

Assemblage Theory proposed by DeLanda (2006) argues that an assemblage is made up of the specific interaction of components and the combination of these components is how agency is expressed. Agency is determined by capacity; the potential a component has. Assemblages should be viewed as multiscaled. Recent calls by Normak (2010) argues that Assemblage Theory needs to be operationalised into a robust method that archaeologists can use. This paper outlines an experimental method that focuses around a capacity analysis while proposing a Multi Scale Capacity Analysis Model. To test this model a case study of carrizo cane used by the Chumash of Southern California is examined. Recent discoveries from a Californian cave system called Cache Cave has found an abundance of this material. Combined with other carrizo Chumash artefacts, the aim of the study is to establish if Assemblage Theory can be used to understand the carrizo in Cache Cave. The study found that by using the model it was shown that carrizo was being stored and processed in Cache Cave in part as a response to technical attributes of the carrizo itself which offers a wide range of possible uses, but also due to complex environmental effects. This indicates a certain level of social organisation, understanding of the landscape, and possibly the means to have social standing through the control of raw and semiprocessed resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the role of precautionary principle in social philosophy. It states that precautionary principle is fundamentally a principle born in the context of public policy and includes in a framework that provide a policy which permits action that raises the prospect of a threat of harm to others. It also discusses on principles as an interface rule and moral rule and provide justification for precautionary principle.

In this paper I claim that Quinean naturalist accounts of science, that deny that there are any a priori statements in scientific frameworks, cannot account for the foundational role of certain classes of statements in scientific practice. In this I follow Michael Friedman who claims that certain a priori statements must be presupposed in order to formulate empirical hypotheses. I also show that Friedman's account, in spite of his claims to the contrary, is compatible with a type of non-Quinean naturalism that I sketch. Finally I also show that Friedman's account needs amending because it cannot provide a rational account of theory change. I accomplish this by arguing for a structural realist view of theory change. I show how this view fits well with an account like Friedman's and helps it deal with the problem of theory change and in retaining its superiority over Quinean naturalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the ethical questions that potentially arise from any interactions with extra-planetary life that outer space explorations might bring about. Recent discoveries of planets in orbit around other stars and publicity surrounding the activities of the international space agencies have revived enthusiasm for planetary exploration. The idea of life on other planets has traditionally been associated with Christian teleology. To the question regarding the basis of an ethic of space exploration, it is possible to respond with skepticism and reject as illusory the ability of humans to develop a code of ethics for interplanetary exploration. One can adopt a skeptical approach to the very idea of an ethic of the space program by invoking the moral-identification thesis. This skeptical approach would be compelling if the moral-identification thesis were cogent. But it suffers from some fundamental problems. This view of morality is as unsatisfactory when applied to the inhabitants of other worlds as it is when applied on Earth. Once established, the moral theory can guide the conduct with non-humans. Moreover, the plausible approach to an ethics of space exploration discussed proceeds by extending conceptions of environmental ethics into the new environments.

Explores the question of whether or not the resolution of the realism question has any implications for scientific methodology. Discussion on Arthur Fine's attempt to sketch a compromise position between realism and anti-realism; Impact of realism on quantum mechanics.

Reports that the United States' push for quality remained stagnant after pioneering and proving it. Techniques employed at AT&T Corp.'s Shreveport, Louisiana plant to overhaul its operations; Results of quality efforts at a plastics maker; Importance of perception of quality in achieving success in business.