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A growing literature shows that music increases prosocial behavior. Why does this occur? We propose a novel hypothesis, informed by moral psychology: evidence of others’ musicality may promote prosociality by leading us to judge musical individuals as having enhanced moral standing. This effect may be largely indirect, by increasing perceptions of how intelligent and emotionally sensitive musical individuals are. If so, simply knowing about others’ musicality should affect moral evaluations, such as wrongness to harm. Across four experiments (total N = 550), we found supportive evidence. Information that an animal or person had the capacity and motivation to engage with music led participants to judge these entities as more wrong to harm than matched neutral or non-musical counterparts. Similarly, knowing that a person was not musical made people judge them as less wrong to harm than neutral or musical counterparts. As predicted, musicality was positively associated with perceptions of capacities for emotionality and intelligence, and these broader factors partially mediated the relationship between musicality and wrongness to harm. These effects were not influenced by participants’ own musicality. Thus, non-moral attributes like musicality can impact moral consideration, carrying implications for social behavior and for interventions to promote prosociality.

When people who are generally loyal or fair have a momentary lapse in their moral behavior, how does that impact whether we continue to perceive them as loyal or fair people––and how is this shaped by our relative valuation of loyalty and fairness? Reasoning from an error-management perspective suggests the Moral Stringency Hypothesis: Upon witnessing a moral lapse, we should be especially prone to discount category membership for our most deeply valued moral categories, given the potential costs of affiliating with people who do not reliably adhere to our core moral values. However, another line of research on conceptions of the "true self" suggests the opposite. Specifically, the True Self Hypothesis predicts that we should reliably project our most strongly held moral values onto others, even after a lapse. Across two studies (N = 720), we found consistent evidence favoring the Moral Stringency Hypothesis over the True Self Hypothesis.

Investigating folk conceptions of choice and constraints havebeen problematic given that human actions are rarelyconsidered constrained. In this paper, we utilize humanoidrobots (more clearly influenced by determined programming)to empirically test children’s developing concepts of choiceand action. Using a series of agency attribution and choiceprediction tasks, we examined whether children differentiatefree will abilities between robots and humans. Resultsindicated that 5–7-year-old children similarly attributed theability to choose to both a robot and human child. However,for moral scenarios, participants considered the robot’s actionsto be more constrained than the human. These findingsdemonstrate that children appear to hold a nuancedunderstanding of choice across agents and across context.

How can social learning influence children’s inclinationstoward equality-based or merit-based fairness? To investigatethis question, six- and seven-year-olds were first presentedwith a pre-test distribution task in which they divided eightstickers between two hypothetical children, one of whom wasa more productive worker. Participants were then given brief,direct testimony that advocated either equality- or merit-basedfairness (whichever was not preferred at pre-test), and thatappealed either to emotions or reason. A novel experimenterthen presented participants with a post-test distribution task.The results indicated that a majority of children changed theirdistribution patterns from pre-test to post-test after beingprovided with direct testimony. These changes in resourcedistribution were accompanied by marked changes in thekinds of explanations that children provided. This researchindicates that children’s preferences for different forms of justresource distribution can be heavily influenced by socialcommunication.

Descriptively, Dahl's definition encompasses the typical focus amongst developmental psychologists studying morality, who have largely relied on similar definitions for the past half-century. Research articles in moral psychology seldom offer a definition of the scope of the word "moral" - that is, a rationale for claiming that the phenomenon under consideration falls into the moral domain. Greater clarity in the definition of individual moral phenomena should not necessarily lead to a single definition of morality across phenomena. [Extracted from the article]

The traditional cognitive developmental perspective on moral acquisition posits that children actively construct moral beliefs by assessing the negative impacts of antisocial behaviors. This account is not easily applied to actions that are considered immoral despite lacking consequences for others' welfare. We studied the moralization of behaviors without tangible impacts, specifically examining the independent and joint roles of feelings and norms in children's acquisition of purity-based morals. Seven-year-olds were shown pictures of anthropomorphic aliens engaged in unfamiliar activities and were asked to judge whether these actions were wrong or OK. Relative to a control condition matched for valence and informational complexity, children made elevated wrongness judgments when they were either disgusted or led to believe that the behaviors were unnatural. However, it was only in a condition that included both disgust induction and information about unnaturalness that children exhibited robust tendencies to judge the actions as wrong. This research therefore demonstrates that feelings and norms work in concert such that purity morals are most readily acquired when both factors are involved. The implications for accounts of moral development are discussed. (Contains 1 figure and 1 table.)

The status of disgust as a sociomoral emotion is debated. We conducted a stringent test of whether social stimuli (specifically, political outgroup members) can elicit physical disgust, as distinct from moral or metaphorical disgust. We employed stimuli (male faces) matched on baseline disgustingness, provided other ways for participants to express negativity toward outgroup members, and used concrete self-report measures of disgust, as well as a nonverbal measure (participants' facial expressions). Across three preregistered studies (total N = 915), we found that political outgroup members are judged to be "disgusting," although this effect is generally weaker for concrete self-report measures and absent for the nonverbal measure. This suggests that social stimuli are capable of eliciting genuine physical disgust, although it is not always outwardly expressed, and the strength of this result depends on the measures employed. We discuss implications of these results for research on sociomoral emotions and American politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Morally convicted attitudes—attitudes grounded in core beliefs about fundamental right and wrong—play an important role in political psychology, public opinion, and political behavior. Extant research suggests that these attitudes are intensely held, likely to evoke strong emotional responses, more stable and less amenable to compromise, and perceived to be universally true. Despite a large body of research on how morally convicted attitudes affect behavior and choice, several open questions remain about their antecedents. There are two questions central to this article: First, can the news media effectively communicate a sense of moral conviction to the mass public? Second, if so, what are the factors that cause these attitudes to become morally convicted? Drawing on framing theory, appraisal theory, and research in political communication, we hypothesize that moral conviction can be effectively communicated using episodic (as opposed to thematic) frames, and also, that emotional reactions to such frames contribute to the development of moral conviction. Using four survey experiments and two replications, we find some support for our hypotheses, but we also find that treatment effects are likely context dependent. We close with a discussion about avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Young children, like adults, understand that human agents can flexibly choose different actions in different contexts, and they evaluate these agents based on such choices. However, little is known about children's tendencies to attribute the capacity to choose to robots, despite increased contact with robotic agents. In this paper, we compare 5‐ to 7‐year‐old children's and adults' attributions of free choice to a robot and to a human child by using a series of tasks measuring agency attribution, action prediction, and choice attribution. In morally neutral scenarios, children ascribed similar levels of free choice to the robot and the human, while adults were more likely to ascribe free choice to the human. For morally relevant scenarios, however, both age groups considered the robot's actions to be more constrained than the human's actions. These findings demonstrate that children and adults hold a nuanced understanding of free choice that is sensitive to both the agent type and constraints within a given scenario. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous examinations of the scope of moral concern have focused on aggregate attributions of moral worth. However, because trade‐offs exist in valuing different kinds of entities, tabulating total amounts of moral expansiveness may conceal significant individual differences in the relative proportions of moral valuation ascribed to various entities. We hypothesized that some individuals ("tree‐huggers") would ascribe greater moral worth to animals and ecosystems than to humans from marginalized or stigmatized groups, while others ("human‐lovers") would ascribe greater moral worth to outgroup members than to the natural world. Additionally, because moral valuation is often treated as being zero‐sum, we hypothesized that there would be no difference in aggregate levels of moral concern between tree‐huggers and human‐lovers. Finally, because attributions of mental capacities substantially contribute to moral valuation, we predicted that tree‐huggers and human‐lovers would show different patterns of mind attribution for animals versus humans. Three studies (N = 985) yielded evidence in support of our hypotheses. First, over one‐third of participants valued nature over outgroups. Second, extending moral value to animals and nature was not indicative of more expansive moral concern overall; instead, tree‐huggers and human‐lovers were identical in their aggregate ascriptions of moral worth. Third, tree‐huggers had relatively amplified tendencies to attribute mental capacities to animals and relatively reduced tendencies to attribute mental capacities to outgroup members—thus having elevated rates of both anthropomorphism and dehumanization. These findings necessitate a reconceptualization of both the extension of moral worth and the attribution of minds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the relationship between religious affiliation and conceptions of the moral domain? Putting aside the question of whether people from different religions agree about how to answer moral questions, here we investigate a more fundamental question: How much disagreement is there across religions about which issues count as moral in the first place? That is, do people from different religions conceptualize the scope of morality differently? Using a new methodology to map out how individuals conceive of the moral domain, we find dramatic differences among adherents of different religions. Mormon and Muslim participants moralized their religious norms, while Jewish participants did not. Hindu participants in our sample did not seem to make a moral/non-moral distinction of the same kind. These results suggest a profound relationship between religious affiliation and conceptions of the scope of the moral domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals often develop negative biases toward unfamiliar or denigrated groups. Two experimental studies were conducted to investigate the extent to which brief negative messages about novel social groups influence children's (4- to 9-year-olds'; N = 153) intergroup attitudes. The studies examined the relative influence of messages that are provided directly to children versus messages that are overheard and examined whether the force of these messages varies with children's age. According to implicit and explicit measures of children's intergroup attitudes, children rapidly internalized messages demeaning novel groups, thus forming negative attitudes toward outgroups merely on the basis of hearsay. These effects were generally stronger among older children, and were particularly pronounced when the message was provided directly to children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evidence of perpetrators' biological or situational circumstances has been increasingly brought to bear in courtrooms. Yet, research findings are mixed as to whether this information influences folk evaluations of perpetrators' dispositions, and subsequently, evaluations of their deserved punishments. Previous research has not clearly dissociated the effects of information about perpetrators' genetic endowment versus their environmental circumstances. Additionally, most research has focused exclusively on violations involving extreme physical harm, often using mock capital sentences cases as examples. To address these gaps in the literature, we employed a "switched-at-birth" paradigm to investigate whether positive or negative information about perpetrators' genetic or environmental backgrounds influence evaluations of a perpetrator's mental states, character, and deserved punishment. Across three studies, we varied whether the transgression involved direct harm, an impure act that caused no harm, or a case of moral luck. The results indicate that negative genetic and environmental backgrounds influenced participants' evaluations of perpetrators' intentions, free will, and character, but did not influence participants' punishment decisions. Overall, these results replicate and extend existing findings suggesting that perpetrators' supposed extenuating circumstances may not mitigate the punishment that others assign to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Levels of moral condemnation often vary with outcome severity (e.g., extreme destruction is morally worse than moderate damage), but this is not always true. We investigated whether judgments of purity transgressions are more or less sensitive to variation in dosage than judgments of harm transgressions. In three studies, adults (N = 426) made moral evaluations of harm and purity transgressions that systematically varied in dosage (frequency or magnitude). Pairs of low-dosage and high-dosage transgressions were presented such that the same sets of modifiers (e.g., "occasionally" vs. "regularly," "small" vs. "large") or amounts (e.g., "millimeter" vs. "centimeter") were reused across moral domains. Statistical interactions between domain and dosage indicated robust distinctions between the perceived wrongness of high-dosage and low-dosage harms, whereas moral evaluations of impure acts were considerably less influenced by dosage. Our findings support the existence of a cognitive distinction between purity-based and harm-based morals and challenge current wisdom regarding relationships between intentions and outcomes in moral judgment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lee and Schwarz propose grounded procedures of separation as a domain-general mechanism underlying cleansing effects. One strong test of domain generality is to investigate the ontogenetic origins of a process. Here, we argue that the developmental evidence provides weak support for a domain-general grounded procedures account. Instead, it is likely that distinct separation procedures develop uniquely for different content domains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issues of climate change and environmental degradation elicit diverse responses. This paper explores how an understanding of human moral psychology might be used to motivate conservation efforts. Moral concerns for the environment can relate to issues of harm (i.e., causing pain or impinging on another's welfare) or impurity (i.e., engaging in sacrilegious, polluting, or disgusting actions). Aversions to harm are linked to concern for current or future generations, non-human animals, and anthropomorphized aspects of the environment. Concerns for purity are linked to viewing the environment as imbued with sacred value and therefore worthy of being protected at all costs. While both harm-based and purity-based framings of environmental issues can sometimes backfire, we argue that making these moral concerns salient can nevertheless bring about moral responses to environmental issues. In sum, scientists' emerging knowledge about the moral mind can be used to facilitate the sustainable conservation of the planet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the psychological foundations of biocentrism. It discusses the distinct forms of biocentrism, one of which stems from a desire to avoid hurting sentient beings and the other stems from a desire to uphold purity. Also discussed are the moral concerns about purity or sanctity where biocentrism can be based.

Evolutionary developmental psychology typically utilizes an evolutionary lens to explain various phenomena that occur throughout development. In this paper, I argue that the converse is also important: Developmental evidence can inform evolutionary theory. In particular, knowledge about the developmental origins of a psychological trait can be used to evaluate theoretical claims about its evolved function. I use the emotion of disgust as a case study to illustrate this approach. Disgust is commonly thought to be a behavioral adaptation for avoiding the ingestion of pathogens. Given this claim, disgust should be expected to develop at a time when humans are especially vulnerable to the dangers of ingesting pathogens, during the immediate post-weaning period from about 3 to 5 years of age. Despite a strong selective pressure at this point in development, research has suggested that the emotion of disgust and the recognition of the "disgust face" do not reliably emerge until later in ontogeny, at 5 years of age or after. Given the late developmental appearance of disgust, I re-evaluate claims about its adaptive role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Distinguishing intentional behavior from accidental behavior is a crucial component of social cognition and a major developmental achievement. It has often been assumed that developmental changes in intentional reasoning result from a gradual sophistication in the ability to discern intentions in action. We take issue with this notion, demonstrating that data from cognitive, developmental, and social psychology are more consistent with the hypothesis that it is instead a gradual sophistication in the ability to understand accidents that drives developmental change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While primarily identifying similarities between suicide terrorists and other suicidal individuals, Lankford also notes differences in how their actions are morally evaluated. Specifically, “conventional” suicide is stigmatized in a way that suicide terrorism is not. We identify the root of this condemnation, showing that suicide is intuitively considered impure and disgusting, and discuss implications of this purity-based stigma. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Strohminger (2014) is revolted by McGinn’s (2011) book, The Meaning of Disgust. We argue that her reaction of repugnance highlights one of the greatest mysteries in the psychology of disgust: this emotion is at times elicited by abstract ideological concerns rather than physical threats of infection or contamination. Here we describe the theoretical challenge of accounting for nonpathogenic disgust elicitors, which include spiritual defilement, violations of the “natural order,” and, apparently, McGinn’s latest publication. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Global levels of violence are declining, yet gun violence and other instances of instrumental violence still occur. While previous research has examined motivations for owning firearms, cognition about firearms—and in particular, perceptions of weapons as affording safety or as affording danger—has remained largely unexplored. We conducted a cross-national mixed-methods investigation involving the United States and three European countries (France, Spain, and Greece). Our findings indicated that Americans perceived weapons (assault rifle, handgun, hunting rifle, combat knife) as more protective and less dangerous than their European counterparts. These differential perceptions have implications for understanding variations in worldwide rates of violence. Public Significance Statement: Americans perceive firearms and weapons as less dangerous than their European counterparts, despite being at a greater risk of gun violence. Elucidating the psychological processes behind firearm perception can inform our understanding of firearm ownership, as well as future research and policy on the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes the data reported in the paper "Being in the know: Social network analysis of gossip and friendship on college campuses" (Yucel et al. 2021). Data were collected from a Men's and Women's collegiate crew team members from a small liberal arts college. Participants ( N  = 44) reported information about how often they gossip about members of the team (positively, negatively), who they have had hooked-up with on the team, who they consider to be friends with on the team, whether they have to sabotaged or been sabotaged by any teammates, their well-being and feelings of loneliness. This data brief provides detailed information about data preparation and participants responses to all survey items., Competing Interests: This work was supported by Psi Chi, The International Honor Society in Psychology and the Franklin & Marshall College Committee on Grants. The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships which have, or could be perceived to have, influenced the work reported in this article., (© 2021 Published by Elsevier Inc.)

The present studies examine developmental changes in the elicitors of disgust by examining adults' and children's ideas of what is disgusting. In three experiments, we asked adults and children between the ages of 3 and 12 to report what is "disgusting," what is "gross," or what might have caused someone to make a disgust face. In Study 1, parents of 3- to 12-year-old children ( n = 120) were asked what they thought was disgusting and what they thought their children would find disgusting and completed a picky eating questionnaire to examine the extent to which children's eating habits may be related to disgust. In Studies 2 and 3 ( n = 98 per study), children were asked what they thought was disgusting. In Study 3, children's parents also completed a questionnaire about their child's food pickiness. Typically eaten foods that were not contaminated or spoiled were frequently mentioned in all studies, both by children and their parents. There was considerable diversity in the disgust elicitors that were mentioned across participants, highlighting the importance of examining individual differences in the development of disgust. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

May interprets the prevalence of non-emotional moral intuitions as indicating support for rationalism. However, research in developmental psychology indicates that the mechanisms underlying these intuitions are not always rational in nature. Specifically, automatic intuitions can emerge passively, through processes such as evolutionary preparedness and enculturation. Although these intuitions are not always emotional, they are not clearly indicative of reason.

What leads children to moralize actions that cause no apparent harm? We hypothesized that adults' verbal instruction ("testimony"), as well as emotions such as disgust, would influence children's moralization of apparently harmless actions. To test this hypothesis, 7-year-old children were asked to render moral judgments of novel, seemingly victimless, body-directed or nature-directed actions after being exposed to adults' testimony or to an emotional induction. Study 1 demonstrated that children became more likely to judge actions as "wrong" upon being verbally presented with testimony about disgust or anger-but not upon being directly induced to feel disgusted. Study 2 established that principle-based testimony is an even more powerful source of moralization, and additionally found long-term retention of newly formed moral beliefs. These studies also indicated that children frequently lack introspective insight into the sources of their newly acquired moral reactions; they often invoked welfare-based concerns in their explanations regardless of experimental condition. In sum, this research demonstrates that children rapidly and enduringly moralize entirely unfamiliar, apparently innocuous actions upon exposure to a diverse array of morally relevant testimony. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).)