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Abstract Plasma cell disorders (PCDs) are identified in the clinical lab by detecting the monoclonal immunoglobulin (M-protein) which they produce. Traditionally, serum protein electrophoresis methods have been utilized to detect and isotype M-proteins. Increasing demands to detect low-level disease and new therapeutic monoclonal immunoglobulin treatments have stretched the electrophoretic methods to their analytical limits. Newer techniques based on mass spectrometry (MS) are emerging which have improved clinical and analytical performance. MS is gaining traction into clinical laboratories, and has replaced immunofixation electrophoresis (IFE) in routine practice at one institution. The International Myeloma Working Group (IMWG) Mass Spectrometry Committee reviewed the literature in order to summarize current data and to make recommendations regarding the role of mass spectrometric methods in diagnosing and monitoring patients with myeloma and related disorders. Current literature demonstrates that immune-enrichment of immunoglobulins coupled to intact light chain MALDI-TOF MS has clinical characteristics equivalent in performance to IFE with added benefits of detecting additional risk factors for PCDs, differentiating M-protein from therapeutic antibodies, and is a suitable replacement for IFE for diagnosing and monitoring multiple myeloma and related PCDs. In this paper we discuss the IMWG recommendations for the use of MS in PCDs.

Aquinas's theory of human action seems to reduce the will to the status of an obedient servant, who can only choose actions that intellect has judged approvingly. So how can Aquinas claim that the will is free? And can his theory account for our apparent ability to make choices that defy the dictates of our own practical rationality? The keys to answering these questions lie in (1) Aquinas' attribution of freedom to reason as a whole, and (2) the role of intention in Aquinas' account.

Abstract  For decades, the greater part of efforts to improve regulatory frameworks for research ethics has focused on informed consent procedures; their design, codification and regulation. Why is informed consent thought to be so important? Since the publication of the Belmont Report in 1979, the standard response has been that obtaining informed consent is a way of treating individuals as autonomous agents. Despite its political success, the philosophical validity of this Belmont view cannot be taken for granted. If the Belmont view is to be based on a conception of autonomy that generates moral justification, it will either have to be reinterpreted along Kantian lines or coupled with a something like Mill’s conception of individuality. The Kantian interpretation would be a radical reinterpretation of the Belmont view, while the Millian justification is incompatible with the liberal requirement that justification for public policy should be neutral between controversial conceptions of the good. This consequence might be avoided by replacing Mill’s conception of individuality with a procedural conception of autonomy, but I argue that the resulting view would in fact fail to support a non-Kantian, autonomy-based justification of informed consent. These difficulties suggest that insofar as informed consent is justified by respect for persons and considerations of autonomy, as the Belmont report maintained, the justification should be along the lines of Kantian autonomy and not individual autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]