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Author(s): Jeremy Waldron [sup.1] [sup.2] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.137628.9, 0000 0004 1936 8753, New York University, , New York, NY, USA (2) grid.4991.5, 0000 0004 1936 8948, University of Oxford, [...]

Revelations of ill-treatment of prisoners by American forces at Abu Ghraib and the publication of memoranda showing that Bush administration lawyers have been seeking to narrow the application of the Convention against Torture and other similar provisions – these developments make it necessary for us to think afresh about the character and significance of the various legal prohibitions on torture. This paper argues that the prohibition on torture is not just one rule among others, but a legal archetype – a rule which is emblematic of our larger commitment to break the link between law and brutality. Characterizing the prohibition as a legal archetype affects how we think about the implications of authorizing torture (or interrogation methods that come close to torture); it affects how we think about issues of definition in regard to torture; and it affects how we think about the fragility and contingency of the provisions of positive law that stand between us and barbarism.

This paper considers the philosophical foundations of the law relating to migration. It examines the kinds of reasons that might justify the restriction of liberty as people move about on the face of the earth—something humans have done since time immemorial. The paper also examines the various interests that might be at stake in moral calculations regarding migration: economic interests, cultural interests, religious interests, or just sheer preferences. Drawing on the work of Locke, Kant, and Sidgwick, it considers conceptions like common ownership of the earth, the right of hospitality, and the difference between defending property and restricting access to economic interaction. The paper also considers the ambiguity of the commonly heard slogan that states by definition have a right to control their borders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Michael Mukasey's review of Paul Lauritzen's The Ethics of Interrogation ('Torture and Terror,' August/September) is actively misleading in at least one respect. In the course of correcting what he calls [...]