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This paper considers an e‐commerce supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an online platform and investigates the manufacturer's pricing decisions without and with platform coupons and the online platform's coupon decision under different power structures. In the manufacturer (platform) Stackelberg power structure, issuing platform coupons cannot (can) always stimulate the demand and benefit the manufacturer, the online platform, and the entire system. In the vertical Nash power structure, issuing platform coupons can always stimulate demand and benefit the manufacturer and the entire system but cannot always benefit the online platform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the rising price and the shrinking demand caused by the inflation. To manage these above risks, the firm has a chance to place two types of orders in each period, viz., the firm order and the put options order. This paper formulates a multiperiod ordering model, either without or with put option contracts. Based on stochastic dynamic programming, this paper studies the optimal ordering policy structure in each period and provides an approximation to evaluate the corresponding policy parameters. By taking the case without put option contracts as a benchmark, put option contracts are demonstrated to prompt the firm to enhance the service level and improve the performance.

This study aims to explore how traceability affects quality and price competition in a duopoly. A theoretical model is developed in which both enterprises are liable to recall low-quality (defective) products identified by traceability and compensate consumers for the disutility caused by unidentified low-quality products. The equilibrium results are derived by determining the optimal product quality and sales price decisions. The key findings are highlighted below. (1) Traceability affects product quality primarily through the expected social cost (the sum of expected recall cost and expected consumer disutility), i.e., higher (lower) expected social cost induced by increased traceability of each enterprise leads to higher (lower) product quality for both enterprises, enhancing (reducing) quality competition. (2) If an enterprise's improved (decreased) product quality is driven by its own increased traceability, it will result in lower (higher) consumer demand and profit, while it will result in higher (lower) consumer demand and profit if caused by its competitor's increased traceability. (3) If an enterprise's increased traceability results in higher expected social cost, the enterprise's sales price falls while the competitor's sales price rises; otherwise, both enterprises' sales prices fall, leading to greater price competition. (4) Quality competition is unaffected by product liability but is improved by increased recall cost and consumer disutility, whereas price competition is intensified by increased consumer disutility but is reduced by increased product liability and recall cost. Managerial insights are also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The introduction of tradable electricity platforms in China has enriched the channels for consumers to purchase electricity and intensified the competition among channels. The quality of electricity is an essential factor affecting consumer purchasing behavior. This paper mainly focuses on the influence of the competition among channels on electricity quality.We construct a dual-channel electricity supply chain, in which electricity generators sell electricity directly to consumers or resell it through electricity retailers. We use the backward induction method of game theory to solve the equilibrium solutions in centralized, decentralized, and coordinated decisions. By analyzing and comparing the equilibrium solutions, we draw the following conclusions; (1) Electricity quality, electricity price, electricity demand, and profits increase with the sensitivity coefficient of electricity quality and price competition coefficient. (2) Electricity quality, electricity price, electricity demand, and profits decrease with the investment cost coefficient of quality improvement. (3) The increase in transmission and distribution costs reduces the electricity quality while increasing the electricity price through both channels. Furthermore, the increase leads to an increase in electricity demand and the profit of the electricity retailer through the resale channel. However, it reduces the electricity demand and the profit of the electricity generator through the direct sales channel. (4) A combined contract consisting of revenue sharing and quality improvement investment cost-sharing can lead to coordination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to analyze the inventory purchasing model for a manufacturer with an objective of minimizing risk and a constraint on profit target, where the manufacturer buys the components from the supplier or in the spot market and tailors them into the final products to meet a deterministic demand. This paper develops the mean-variance optimization models without and with option contracts, and conducts numerical examples to explore how the target profit level, the spot price uncertainty and option contracts affect the manufacturer's optimal solutions and the level of risk. It is shown that without and with option contracts the manufacturer's level of risk is non-decreasing in the target profit level. With (without) option contracts, the manufacturer suffers a zero risk from a higher spot price uncertainty if the profit target is low, whereas suffers a lower (higher) risk from a higher spot price uncertainty if the profit target is high. Finally, the level of risk faced by the manufacturer is not higher with option contracts than without them. This paper facilitates the application of option contracts in inventory purchasing management with a spot market for the risk minimization manufacturer with a profit target consideration. New insights are also provided for the manufacturer to set an appropriate profit target for an affordable level of risk, and establish the risk observation mechanism for hedging against the spot price volatility effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A multiperiodic structure always underlies the procurement problem in practice. Option contracts are widely used to make a firm capable of responding flexibly to high demand uncertainty. However, so far, the impact of different option contracts on the multiperiod decisions and performance of a firm has been not discussed. Motivated by this problem, in this paper we analyze the multiperiod procurement problem within the framework of wholesale price, call, put, and bidirectional option contracts. Based on the dynamic programming theory, we characterize the structure of the firm's optimal replenishment policy for each period in four cases. We then develop a heuristic to approximate the corresponding policy parameters. Through system comparisons of four cases, we examine the value of option contracts for the firm and discuss the best option contract type for the firm. The results show that the firm will gain higher profits after the option contracts are introduced. Moreover, if the unit purchase and exercise costs of the bidirectional option are equal to those of the unilateral option, then bidirectional option contracts are preferred over unilateral option contracts. If the unit purchase cost of the bidirectional option is higher than that of the unilateral option, unilateral option contracts may be more profitable than bidirectional option contracts. Furthermore, if the unit backlogging cost is high and the unit inventory holding cost is low, call option contracts are better than put option contracts; if the unit backlogging cost is low and the unit inventory holding cost is high, then put option contracts work better than call option contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the option coordination problem of a fresh agricultural product supply chain under two supply chain structures, when the production cost and the loss rate are disrupted simultaneously. This paper provides the explicit option coordination conditions for the disrupted supply chain under two supply chain structures, and then explores the effects of the disruptions and supply chain structure on the option coordination conditions. The results suggest that it is unfavorable to apply the original coordinating contracts without disruptions to coordinate the disrupted supply chain. The coordination of the disrupted supply chain can be achieved with knowledge of the distribution of demand. In two coordinating contracts for the disrupted supply chain, the exercise price is still at the original level without disruptions while the option price deviates from the original level without disruptions. Moreover, the relationships of the coordination conditions in two supply chain structures depend on the value of the profit allocation coefficient. When the profit allocation coefficient exceeds (falls behind) a certain threshold, the option price is set at a higher (lower) value in the supplier-led supply chain structure than in the distributor-led supply chain structure, while the exercise price is set at a lower (higher) value in the supplier-led supply chain structure than in the distributor-led supply chain structure. Finally, the disrupted supply chain with any supply chain structure will perform better in the modified coordinating contracts than in the original coordinating contracts without disruptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a supply chain consisting of a supplier who manufactures one type of perishable products characterized by a long lead time and a retailer who purchases the products from the supplier and sells them to end consumers. In order to hedge against the risks of price and demand caused by inflation, portfolio contracts with put options, namely, a combination of wholesale price contracts and put option contracts, are adopted by the retailer to obtain the products from the supplier. We characterize the optimal ordering and production policies for the retailer and the supplier in the presence of put option contracts under inflation. By comparing with the case without put option contracts, we discuss the effect of put option contracts on the supply chain and prove that the usage of put option contracts benefits these two members under inflation. Through several numerical examples, we illustrate the effect of inflation on the supply chain with and without put option contracts. On this basis, we design a feasible supply chain coordination strategy based on put option contracts under inflation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The government subsidy, collection mode, and power structure not only bring about a big challenge for the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) management but also affect both the customer and the environment. This paper considers a CLSC consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the manufacturer sells the new and remanufactured products through the retailer to the customer and he obtains a low carbon subsidy allocated by the government for each unit remanufactured product. Three different collection modes, viz., manufacturer collection, retailer collection, and dual collection, can be chosen from collecting the used products. In addition, three different power structures, i.e., Manufacturer Stackelberg, Vertical Nash, and Retailer Stackelberg, are considered in this paper. Based on the game theory approach, the optimal pricing and recycling policies of the CLSC members are derived under nine different scenarios. Then, we compare the derived results to explore the impacts of the low carbon subsidy, collection mode, and power structure on the CLSC from the perspectives of the customer, the environment, the manufacturer, and the retailer. It is shown that a high low carbon subsidy will lead to heightened market demand, improved environment performance, and increased members' profits. A balanced supply chain power relationship will benefit the customer and the environment, and in contrast, an imbalanced supply chain power relationship will benefit the manufacturer and the retailer. We derive the value range of the competing intensity for which it is beneficial to build dual collection channels based on these above perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Inflation causes an increase in the retail price and a decrease in the market demand, both arise from the problem of seasonal product management and occur during the long production lead time. As an effective tool for hedging against the risks, option contracts, including call, put, and bidirectional option contracts, have been proved to benefit two members in a one‐supplier and one‐retailer supply chain under inflation. The aim of this paper is to examine the effect of different option contacts on the decisions and performances for both the supplier and the retailer under inflation. Our results suggest that the retailer prefers adopting portfolio contracts with bidirectional options under inflation, whereas the supplier is inclined to provide call option contracts under inflation. Our study also reveals that call option contracts are implemented ultimately by the supply chain under inflation because of the supplier's market dominant position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper formulates two groups of multiperiod production and ordering models with call and bidirectional option contracts for a two-party supply chain consisting of one followed supplier and one dominant retailer, respectively. Based on dynamic programming theory, we characterize the optimal policy structures for two partners in each period. We also provide an approximation for the corresponding policy parameters evaluation in two cases. Then, we investigate the impacts of different option contracts and the demand risk on the decisions and performances of two members. Our results suggest that, whether concerning call or bidirectional option contracts, the optimal policies for two members always follow a base stock type. When the price parameters are the same for different option contracts, the service levels of both the system and the retailer are higher with call option contracts than with bidirectional ones, whereas the retailer’s inventory risk is lower with bidirectional option contracts than with call ones. Under the same conditions stated above, call option contracts can always benefit the supplier, but not the retailer. Owing to the retailer’s dominant position, call option contracts are better choice for the supply chain if the option (exercise) price is low (high), while bidirectional option contracts are more suitable choice for the supply chain if the option (exercise) price is high (low). In addition, an increase in the demand risk would prompt the supplier to increase his production quantity and the retailer to reduce the initial firm order quantity, either with call or bidirectional option contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the problem of the multiperiod replenishment decisions for the retailer under inflation. In order to manage the risks of price and demand caused by inflation, the retailer has an opportunity to order products and purchase options from the supplier in each period. We formulate the multiperiod inventory model for the retailer with option contracts and then derive his myopic ordering policy in each period and his myopic expected total discounted profit over the entire time horizon. By taking the case without option contracts as a benchmark, we explore the effect of option contracts on the retailer’s decisions and performance under inflation. We find that the application of option contracts might induce the retailer to reduce the firm order and increase the total order in each period under inflation. We also find that the application of option contracts might benefit the retailer under inflation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There exist obvious changes in price and demand during the inflationary period, both of which are regarded as the key factors leading to supply chain uncertainty. In this paper, we focus our discussion on price increase and demand contraction caused by inflation, integrate the effect of inflation and option contracts within the model framework, and analyze how to use option contracts to achieve supply chain coordination under inflation scenarios. We consider a one-period two-stage supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer and explore the effect of inflation on the optimal ordering and production decisions under three different types of contracts: wholesale price contracts, option contracts, and portfolio contracts. Moreover, we explore the impact of option contracts on the supply chain through using wholesale price contracts model as the benchmark. We find that the retailer prefers adopting portfolio contracts, but the supplier prefers providing option contracts under inflation scenarios. Ultimately, option contracts will be implemented owing to the supplier’s market dominant position. In addition, we discuss the supply chain bilateral coordination mechanism with option contracts from the perspectives of two members and derive that option contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto improvement under inflation scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As far as the price increase and the demand contraction caused by inflation are concerned, we establish a Stackelberg game model that incorporates bidirectional option contracts and the effect of inflation and derive the optimal ordering and production policies on a one-period two-stage supply chain composed of one supplier and one retailer. Through using the model of wholesale price contracts as the benchmark, we find that the introduction of bidirectional option contracts can benefit both the supplier and the retailer under inflation scenarios. Based on the conclusions drawn above, we design the bilateral coordination mechanism from the different perspective of two members involved and discuss how bidirectional option contracts should be set to achieve channel coordination under inflation scenarios. Through the sensitivity analysis, we illustrate the effect of inflation on the optimal decision variables and the optimal expected profits of the two parties with bidirectional option contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A triazine-based conjugated microporous polymer (TCMP) was generated by introduced 1, 3, 5-triazine into conjugated microporous polymer network via Friedel-Crafts reaction. Under the optimum synthesis conditions, the obtained TCMP has a loose and porous structure. It was then used as a fiber coating material for solid-phase microextraction (SPME) of halogens-containing environmental hormones. It showed a strong adsorption capability due to the halogen bond, electrostatic, π-π stacking and hydrophobicity interactions. An analytical method combining the TCMP coated fiber-based SPME with gas chromatography-electron capture detection was developed to determine twelve halogens-containing environmental hormones in vegetable and fruit samples. A wide linear range (0.07–100.0 ng g−1) with the determination coefficients in the range of 0.9907–0.9996 and low limits of detection (0.02–0.04 ng g−1, S/N = 3) were achieved under optimized experimental conditions. The applicability of the established method was evaluated by the determination of the environmental hormones from three different fruit samples (apple, nectarine and pear) and five vegetable samples (Chinese cabbage, pakchoi, baby cabbage, rape and round lettuce). The resulting relative recoveries ranged from 76.6% to 123% with the relative standard deviations less than 10%. This research demonstrates the application potential of the TCMP coated fiber in the analysis of the halogens-containing environmental hormones in real vegetable and fruit samples. A novel triazine-based conjugated microporous polymer (TCMP) was synthesized and used as solid phase microextraction fiber coating to extract twelve halogens-containing environmental hormones from eight fruits and vegetables. [Display omitted] • A novel triazine-based conjugated microporous polymer (TCMP) was synthesized by Friedel-Crafts reaction for the first time. • The effect of monomer length on adsorption of halogen environmental hormones by TCMPs was investigated. • The TBPT-TCMP coated fiber was applied for the SPME of the twelve environmental hormones from fruits and vegetables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]