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Copyright of FiFo Berichte is the property of University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Current plans to permanently fix the level of benefits provided by the German Statutory Pension Scheme are at odds with the reality of demographic ageing and the requirements for sustainable pension policies. Instead, the causes of the ageing process ought to be addressed through poten-tially unpopular reforms. Linking the statutory retirement age to further life expectancy and building up supplementary funded pensions are core elements of a far-sighted reform that could stabilise the German system of old-age provision in the long run. In the short run, increasing con-tribution rates and reducing the benefit level are inevitable. This should be communicated very clearly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of FiFo Berichte is the property of University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Germany is being hit relatively hard by demographic aging. The latest round of major pension reforms dates back to the period from 2001 to 2007. The last government tried to prepare a new reform, but failed to reach a consensus. The new coalition government is not pursuing these plans any further. This article describes the changes in existing rules that the coalition is nevertheless considering and discusses actual reform needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present experimental design and results of the 'Passauer Wahlborse' (PWB), a field experiment encompassing the first political call markets, which was successful in predicting the outcome of the 1994 German Bundestag election. Building on both theoretical and experimental literature, we discuss the determinants of individual trading behaviour in a complex field environment and point at difficulties in analysing the data generated by political market experiments. While previous explanations for the predictive success of political markets - i.e., the 'marginal trader hypothesis' - do not appear wholly convincing, we proffer an alternative that focusses on the role of information costs and show that our findings are consistent with basic tenets from received information economics.

Most equivalence scales that are applied in research on inequality do not depend on income, even though there is strong empirical evidence that equivalence scales are actually income-dependent. This paper explores the consistency of results derived from income-independent and income-dependent scales. We show that applying income-independent scales when income-dependent scales would be appropriate leads to violations of the transfer principle. Surprisingly, there are some exceptions, but these require unrealistic and strong assumptions. Thus, the use of income-dependent equivalence scales almost always leads to different assessments of inequality than the use of income-independent equivalence scales. Two examples illustrate our findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ein strukturbildendes Merkmal der Gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung (GRV) ist die Teilhabeäquivalenz, der zufolge Rentenleistungen proportional mit den Beitragszahlungen steigen. Die konkrete Art der Rentenberechnung geht allerdings zu Lasten von Versicherten, die viele Jahre in die GRV eingezahlt haben und eine unterdurchschnittliche Lebenserwartung aufweisen. Soweit solche Personen als wirtschaftlich leistungsschwach anzusehen sind, wirkt die Rentenberechnung damit regressiv. Die Ursache liegt zum einen im Verzicht auf eine Aufzinsung von Beitragszahlungen und zum anderen in der risikounabhängigen Form der Versicherung. Die „Rente ab 63" und die „Grundrente" lassen sich als wenig treffsichere Versuche der Politik deuten, die regressive Verteilungswirkung zu mildern. In diesem Beitrag verfolgen die Autoren einen anderen Lösungsansatz. Sie plädieren dafür, einkommensschwachen Versicherten bei ihrer Verrentung das Recht zu gewähren, zwischen zwei Formen von Rentenanpassung zu wählen. Statt einer Rente mit lohnorientierter Anpassung nach geltendem Recht sollen die Begünstigten eine barwertgleiche Rente mit reinem Inflationsausgleich wählen können. Eine solche Rente nach österreichischem Vorbild startet höher, wächst im Regelfall aber schwächer als die deutsche Rente. Wenn die regressiv wirkende Umverteilung in der GRV auf diese Weise reduziert wird, lassen sich – so die Erwartung – weitere Anhebungen der Regelaltersgrenze, die zur Bewältigung des demografischen Wandels erforderlich sind, politisch leichter durchsetzen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of ifo Schnelldienst is the property of ifo Institute for Economic Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Many countries followed the German example in increasing the legal retirement age, reaching the German standard envisaged for 2030 (of 67 years of age) at an earlier stage (in Ireland: 2021; the Netherlands: 2021; and Denmark: 2022) or even exceeding it (in Ireland: with 68 years, starting in 2028). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of ifo Schnelldienst is the property of ifo Institute for Economic Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of ifo Schnelldienst is the property of ifo Institute for Economic Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of ifo Schnelldienst is the property of ifo Institute for Economic Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Like in a number of other transition countries, the Croatian pension system comprises a traditional public pay-as-you-go scheme and a mandatory funded scheme (second pillar) that will provide increasing amounts of supplementary pensions to those entering retirement in the future. Due to the continuing economic crisis, the public scheme is currently under enormous financial strain, with a sizeable impact on central government finances. At the same time, the level of benefits deriving from the overall system is likely to become inadequately low in the long run. In this paper, we describe the existing system and project its future development under current rules. We also discuss options for further reforming the system and highlight their potential impact on pension finances, public budgets and retirement incomes, as this may provide lessons, which are of interest elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of ifo Schnelldienst is the property of ifo Institute for Economic Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article focuses on the lessons learned on unemployment in Croatia. It states that the country's labour-market performance is extremely sluggish today, not only because of the Great Recession, but also for reasons which appear to be fundamental, or structural, in their nature. It mentions that activating those who are in long-term unemployment or outside the official labour force is a major sub-task within an overall agenda for increasing employment and stimulating growth in the country.

The article focuses on the old-age policy in Croatia. It mentions that the country's system of old-age provision comprises a traditional public pay-as-you-go scheme and a mandatory funded scheme which will provide increasing amounts of supplementary pensions to those entering retirement in the future. Topics including policy proposals, options for reforms and assumptions for the long-term projections are discussed.

Public health insurance and other arrangements covering health costs effectively provide insurance against changes in health status. These arrangements engage in burdensmoothing over the life cycle and entail various elements of redistribution. Lack of portability regarding this type of cover may impede international mobility and create financial losses or windfall gains on various sides, which can lead to risk segmentation across national health systems. Existing portability rules do not fully address these problems. In this article, we try to clarify the implications of mobility for typical systems covering health costs and the requirements which have to be met to ensure full portability. When individuals are internationally mobile, compensating payments are needed based on changes in expected net costs in both of the health funds involved. Illustrative simulations show that this approach may be operative under real-world conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]