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Managers in decentralized firms often face a fundamental information asymmetry condition which allows for budget gaming by unit managers. Unit managers (agents) often possess private information important to broader firm planning and budgeting; however, these same managers benefit through easier performance targets by keeping the information private. Firm-level managers involve lower-level managers in the budgeting process to induce the sharing of this information. The extent to which such control structures are successful may depend on the personality of the individual manager. The authors predict and find the personality aspect enthusiasm, part of the broader personality dimension extraversion, correlates with a significantly lower likelihood to share information in budget negotiation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a world characterized by increasing pressure from financial and product markets, the question of how exogenous constraints affect internal coordination and control processes has become increasingly important. This experiment investigates how two exogenous constraints that superiors can face in budget negotiation settings, increased opportunity costs and financial pressure to meet unit targets, affect budget negotiations and subordinate effort. The results show that both constraints induce more cooperation, but in different ways. Financial pressure on the superior leads to more cooperative negotiation behavior by superiors and subordinates than increased opportunity costs. Specifically, subordinates do not take advantage of the superior's increased financial pressure to enforce lower budgets. After negotiation, both constraints strongly mitigate the negative effects of superior budget imposition on subordinate effort because exogenous constraints eliminate the effect of procedural fairness considerations on subordinate effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper offers a reflection on the negotiations at European level for the multi- annual budget of the European Union for 2014-2020 from two perspectives, the state centric and the multi-level governance one. It concludes that the Council -- made up by representatives of the member-states -- is no longer the sole decisive actor in negotiations at European level. The collective control over European decision- making processes spreads within the European Parliament as well. Therefore, the arena of bargaining processes on which the European Union is build spans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even in foreign services that, like Germany's Auswärtiges Amt, follow a generalist principle in their human resources' management, individual careers are shaped by specific experiences. The author uses his own curriculum vitae as a case in point: he served many years in Press and Public Affairs at the German Embassy in Washington DC and as Foreign Office Spokesman in Bonn; he also acquired solid expertise in Personnel and Administration and headed the German Foreign Ministry's Central Department. He was later selected for an assignment as the United Nations' Inspector-General. Paschke feels that interaction with the media, administrative matters and oversight in international organizations are as challenging and attractive as any other diplomatic activity. His professional expertise continues to be in demand even after his retirement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]