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The article analyzes the Amherst papers in relation to development of Parsons' theory. A careful analysis of the Amherst papers reveals that the basic ideas and philosophical principles that Parsons followed throughout his life were already in place, some more fully developed than others, yet forming an integrally coherent pattern to a surprising degree. The clear existence in Parsons's Amherst papers of a metatheoretical framework predating his later professional writing calls into question some still existing myths about radical breaks in the development of Parsons's theory. In one version of this mythology, Parsons began his theory as a voluntarist, then became a structural-functionalist, later moved on to become a systems-theorist and ended up as a social evolutionist. Despite such claims, Parsons always was a voluntarist, even during his so-called structural-functionalist middle period. The Amherst papers reveal an amazingly complex and logically coherent theoretical system-in the mind of a twenty-year-young man-and testify to an extraordinary scope of philosophical depth, and intellectual maturity.

The article discusses economic and social theory of Talcott Parsons. Parsons's persistent attention to economic theory has been relatively neglected by critics of Parsons who, in attacking the alleged functionalism of Parsonian sociology, concentrated on the issues of value consensus and normative integration, believing that Parsons had relatively little interest in the economic base of society. This neglect of Parsons's economic sociology was probably intensified by the Marxist undercurrent of much so-called conflict theory. In recent years there has fortunately been considerable interest shown in Parsons's analysis of economic theory and more specifically in his economic sociology. At Amherst, Parsons came under the influence of the philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn, who prompted his students to consider broad questions relating to alternatives to industrial capitalist society and who created an educational environment within which students were involved in a general analysis of the social sciences. It was this engagement with institutional economics that marked Parsons's departure from biology into the social sciences as an academic career. Parsons was introduced to a broad spectrum of social theory relating to cultural and biological dimensions of human existence as explanations of social differentiation.

Quantum mechanics supersedes classical mechanics, and social science, some argue, should be responsive to this change. This paper finds that two rather different arguments are currently being used to argue that quantum mechanics is epistemically relevant in social science. One, attributed to Alexander Wendt, appeals to the presence of quantum physical effects in the social world. The other, attributed to Karen Barad, insists on the importance of quantum metaphysics even when quantum effects are negligible. Neither argument, however, is sound. Consequently, the paper concludes that neither of them offers compelling arguments for the view that quantum mechanics has epistemic relevance for social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: This paper engages with the question of how one can arrive at more coherent explanations of social behavior in coupled socio-ecological systems. Objectives: The paper aims to give a counterargument to the assumption that social theory in coupled socio-ecological systems can only be developed in one way, as such showing that the premise of the special issue deserves further scrutiny. Methods: Current issues are identified and categorized based on a literature survey; likewise, the solutions derive from methodological literature, in particular from the realm of critical realism. Results: The paper shows how a set of assumptions about the nature of socio-ecological systems and about the nature of theory derived from observations prohibit a deeper understanding of how social theory may be developed at the nexus of coupled socio-ecological systems. Researchers should engage more clearly with movements between theories, models and data, and movements between ontology, epistemology and data. Conclusions: Landscape ecology can—and should—accommodate social theory in its analysis but from a different premise than is currently often the case. The proposed operations will contribute to a complexity-informed understanding of human behavior in coupled socio-ecological systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to show that Curry's recent defence of the interpretivist approach to beliefs is unsuccessful. Curry tries to argue that his version of interpretivism, which is based on the model-theoretic approach to folk-psychological attributions, is well-suited to resisting the epistemological argument that is directed at interpretivism. In this paper, I argue that even if Curry's defence is successful in this case, his theory does not have enough resources to solve the metaphysical problems of interpretivism. In particular, I argue that the model-theoretic version of interpretivism that Curry espouses does not explain the claim that beliefs are constituted by the process of attribution, which is central to the interpretivist project. In the final parts of the paper, I discuss the issue of the relation between interpretivism and other forms of the broadly superficial/deflationary approach to beliefs, especially dispositionalism. I contend that if one wants to adopt a superficial/deflationary approach, it is best not to adopt interpretivism as it is an unnecessarily complex and problematic version of this broad view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Finally, Price returns to the theme of Big Science and notes some of the changes in science and scientific practice in the age of Big Science. Price found that, for every 100 scientists who publish only one article during their career, there are 25 scientists who publish two articles, about 11 who publish three articles, about six scientists who publish four articles, and so on. A second, enlarged edition of the book was published in 1986, shortly after Price died, with the title I Little Science, Big Science ... and Beyond i . Let us briefly consider the impact of I Little Science, Big Science i , which was deemed a "Citation Classic" in 1983 (see Price [11], 18). [Extracted from the article]

In contemporary social ontology, normative attitudes are often regarded as the essential element to account for the existence of the social/normative realm. However, by emphasizing their foundational explanatory role, philosophers have been led to overlook or misrepresent some aspects of their structure. The first part of this paper attempts to offer a more proportioned analysis of the structure of normative attitudes; according to it, normative attitudes are essentially sanctions that have a projective or generalizing aim, that is, sanctions that manage to point beyond the acts they directly target. The second part of the paper engages in a polemic with two prominent authors in the social-ontology/normativity debate, Brandom and Searle, and shows that, by building their views on normative attitudes with the almost exclusive purpose of meeting foundational explanatory constraints, they fail to adequately conceptualize crucial aspects that make normative attitudes normative at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the founders of sociology, it was Georg Simmel who provided the most thorough analysis and theory of space. This paper aims to reconstruct Simmel's spatial theory and his observations of spatial relations. The German sociologist engaged with spatiality in a threefold way. First, he tried to provide a systematic social theory of space; second, analyzing spatial relations was important for his diagnosis of modernity; third, he dealt with the subjective constitutions of space in his shorter, essayistic writings. This paper argues that the importance of the third strand for a sociological understanding of space has seldom been recognized in sociology. In addition, it also shows that despite the diversity in perspectives, there is an underlying coherence to Simmel's theory of space. As a result, it becomes evident that Simmel was not only ground-breaking in conceptualizing space from a sociological point of view, but that his theory of space continues to be inspirational and relevant to this day for interpreting the entanglement of social and spatial relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special issue comprises seven studies and a commentary piece, which relate to various aspects of rituals and the "ritual-exploration" dyad in learning, teaching and learning-to-teach mathematics. The theme of the special issue arose from Sfard and Lavie's (Cognition and Instruction, 23(2), 237–309, 2005) "ritual" vs. "explorative" dyad, on which a Working Session was held during the PME conference in 2016. Three central themes are addressed in the papers of this special issue: (1) the logic of ritual, and why rituals are so persistent in mathematics classrooms; (2) the co-existence of rituals and explorations, including the question of whether rituals and explorations are a binary or a continuum; and (3) alternative theoretical conceptualisations of the ritual-exploration dyad, focusing in particular on what can be learned about rituals from social and critical theory, as well as socio-linguistics. In this introduction, we first give an overview of each of the papers and its unique contribution. We then synthesise the answers given by the papers to the three themes described above. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This short introduction briefly recalls how sociological theories and formal methods for social networks can help to interpret diffusion processes of ancient cultural traits. It also provides a presentation of the selected papers. These papers focus not on the ways archaeological data can be represented in a relational format, but on the potential of specific sociological network-related models to gain insights into the underlying mechanisms of diffusion processes. The necessity to develop more fine-grained information to reconstruct ancient local social networks is underlined while three aspects of the diffusion process are explored: (a) situations in which cultural practices are not borrowed in spite of contact between groups; (b) situations in which cultural practices are adopted; and (c) situations in which cultural practices in one group are copied by people from another group. All of them take inspiration from sociological studies of diffusion processes through networks, although to different extents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mathematics as an Intersubjective Practice The philosophy of mathematical practice today is a diverse set of research unified by the common goal of investigating mathematics as a scientific practice, focusing attention on its history, specific case studies, and non-elementary theories. In this introductory essay we compare different strategies to study the possibility of applying philosophical theories of social ontology to mathematical practice and vice versa. Mathemata and Social Objects" José Ferreirós analyzes mathematical practice as an intersubjective semiotic practice, based on language and logical symbolism, and more precisely as a practice having strong cognitive roots and linked to the analysis of relational patterns in the world of our experience and action. A semiotic approach is also found in the paper "Mathematical Practice, Fictionalism and Social Ontology" by Jessica Carter, who combines an agent-based approach to mathematics as an intersubjective activity of human agents engaged in different mathematical tasks with an approach to mathematics as a practice consisting in a body of mathematical theories and in the historical and social process of their development. [Extracted from the article]

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This paper seeks to uncover the modes of justification by which sociological theorists legitimize the "canon" of sociological theory in practice, through the stories they tell to students in sociological theory textbooks. Specifically, we ask: how do textbook authors rationalize their decisions to include and exclude some theorists? Further, what are the modes or "rules of the conceptual game" underlying these justifications? To address these questions, we undertake a rhetorical examination of a corpus of 250 English-language editions of sociological theory textbooks. Focusing on their Introductions and Conclusions, we highlight texts that presume the canon is a social fact and investigate the justifications they provide for assenting to this fact. We articulate and illustrate three forms of legitimation: functionalist, historicist, and humanist. Functionalist justifications legitimate the canon by appealing to its capacity to generate disciplinary unity and integrity. Historicist justifications legitimate the canon by appealing to its members' foundational and influential role in defining the direction of the field. Humanist justifications legitimate the canon through appealing to the intrinsic qualities of its texts and authors. Identifying these pathways is the primary empirical contribution of this paper, which in turn contributes to the collective project of disciplinary self-reflection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intersectionality is the notion that concerns the complexity of the experiences of individuals in virtue of their belonging to multiple socially significant categories. One of its main insights is that the way society is structured around categories such as gender, race, sexuality, class, etc., produces distinctive and specific forms of discrimination and privilege for groups in the intersections. In this paper, we suggest conceiving intersectionality as a general metaphysical framework wherein specific claims to the effect that the experiences of discrimination of Black women, among others, can be fruitfully formulated and examined. The main claim is that intersectional experiences emerge from the conjunction of social categories when social structures make them relevant vis-à-vis discrimination and privilege. We then argue that our view has three main virtues: metaphysical neutrality, explanatory flexibility and methodological openness. Explaining these virtues will allow us to contrast our proposal with alternatives from the recent literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that social theory can cast light on some of the main themes in current debates about trans issues. It considers four such themes: social classification and social control; tensions between individual and group rights; access to public spaces; and the relationship between personal pronouns and social identity. In so doing, it seeks to reframe local disagreement and polemic through more general questions about our modes of living together, and concludes that these debates are at bottom about the future of civility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following reflections by Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann, this paper is concerned with the changing meaning of the profession as a sociological category for analyzing modern society. Professions are practical academic occupational groups oriented to certain social values, to which a special significance for society was attributed in the social sciences for a long time, thus marking a connection between professions' research and theory of society. This paper now describes that the causal relationship between profession and society is limited to a historically relatively early period. In the transition to modern society, this close network of relationships begins to dissolve, and now professions operate in the context of some function systems of society whose task is the professional assistance of single clients, such as in the fields of health, law, and pastoral care. However, the professions' highlighted position in the knowledge and action structure of single function systems seems to dissolve more and more today so that one can ask whether we can speak here already of an end of the social form profession. This would correspond with the observation that actually the professions no longer appear at all in the newer theories of society and therefore their function as an important mechanism of social structure formation is no longer attributed to them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper elaborates an aspirations–capabilities framework to advance our understanding of human mobility as an intrinsic part of broader processes of social change. In order to achieve a more meaningful understanding of agency and structure in migration processes, this framework conceptualises migration as a function of aspirations and capabilities to migrate within given sets of perceived geographical opportunity structures. It distinguishes between the instrumental (means-to-an-end) and intrinsic (directly wellbeing-affecting) dimensions of human mobility. This yields a vision in which moving and staying are seen as complementary manifestations of migratory agency and in which human mobility is defined as people's capability to choose where to live, including the option to stay, rather than as the act of moving or migrating itself. Drawing on Berlin's concepts of positive and negative liberty (as manifestations of the widely varying structural conditions under which migration occurs) this paper conceptualises how macro-structural change shapes people's migratory aspirations and capabilities. The resulting framework helps to understand the complex and often counter-intuitive ways in which processes of social transformation and 'development' shape patterns of migration and enable us to integrate the analysis of almost all forms of migratory mobility within one meta-conceptual framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Network embedding has facilitated lots of network analytical tasks by representing nodes as low-dimensional vectors. As an extension of convolutional neural networks from Euclidean data to irregular data, Graph Convolutional Networks (GCNs) provide a novel way to learn network representations and have attracted widespread attention currently. Most of the existing GCNs are only applied to unsigned networks. However, networks could have both positive and negative links in the real world, to which the unsigned algorithms are no longer applicable. In this paper, we propose a novel Signed Directed Attention Network model to capture the structural and social theoretical information of signed directed networks comprehensively through an auto-encoder framework. In the encoding block, the information of sign, direction, social theory, and "bridge" edges are encoded into node embeddings by a node fine-grained classification aggregation layer. Besides, a direction parameterization layer is also introduced to convert directions into direction-specific convolutional filters to enhance the node embeddings. In the decoding block, loss functions are designed to model sign, direction, "bridge" edge, and social theory information accordingly and make them complementary to each other to capture the network information fully. Experimental results for the signed link prediction task on several real-world signed directed graphs show that the proposed framework can achieve state-of-the-art performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main purpose of this article is to provide some guidance and inspiration for the teaching of the classics in sociology by taking a close look at the way in which Robert K. Merton taught this topic at Columbia University. The course was entitled "History of Sociological Theory (Sociology 150)" and was given between 1958 and 1968. With the help of archival material, the article reconstructs what Merton said during his lectures, which texts he assigned, what kind of tests he gave, and what type of paper the students should write. Merton did not want the students to only study the texts of the classics but also try to figure out how these went about their research and were able to formulate their theories. This meant that he emphasized how the classics approached such activities as problem-finding, problem-solving and looking for strategic research sites. In the concluding section, the broad approach to theory in Merton's teaching is contrasted to the more narrow one he presented in Social Theory and Social Structure. Positive and negative aspects of Merton's approach to the classics are also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I explore a fundamental but under-appreciated distinction between two ways of understanding the desire-satisfaction theory of well-being. According to proactive desire satisfactionism, a person is benefited by the acquisition of new satisfied desires. According to reactive desire satisfactionism, a person can be benefited only by the satisfaction of their existing desires. I first offer an overview of this distinction. I then canvass several ways of developing a general formulation of desire satisfactionism that would capture the reactive view, and argue that all come with significant costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intentional action is, in some sense, non-accidental, and one common way action theorists have attempted to explain this is with reference to control. The idea, in short, is that intentional action implicates control, and control precludes accidentality. But in virtue of what, exactly, would exercising control over an action suffice to make it non-accidental in whatever sense is required for the action to be intentional? One interesting and prima facie plausible idea that we wish to explore in this paper is that control is non-accidental in virtue of requiring knowledge—either knowledge-that or knowledge-how (e.g., Beddor and Pavese 2021; cf., Setiya 2008; 2012 and Habgood-Coote 2018). We review in detail some key recent work defending such knowledge-centric theories of control, and we show that none of these accounts holds water. We conclude with some discussion about how control opposes the sort of luck intentional action excludes without doing so by requiring knowledge (that- or how). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to a familiar modern view, color and other so-called secondary qualities reside only in consciousness, not in the external physical world. Many have argued that this "Galilean" view is the source of the mind-body problem in its current form. This paper critically examines a radical alternative to the Galilean view, which has recently been defended or sympathetically discussed by several philosophers, a view I call "anti-modernism." Anti-modernism holds, roughly, that the modern Galilean scientific image is incomplete – in particular, it leaves out certain irreducible qualitative properties, such as colors – and that we can solve (or dissolve) the hard problem of consciousness by accepting these properties as objective features of the external physical world. I argue, first, that anti-modernism cannot fulfill its promise. Even if the outer world is resplendent with primitive colors, color experience remains a mystery. Second, I argue that the theoretical costs of accepting irreducible colors in the world are enormous. Even if irreducible colors in the world could dispel the mysteries surrounding consciousness, the theoretical benefit would not be worth the cost. If the problems of consciousness and color require that we posit irreducible properties somewhere, it would be far more plausible to accept irreducible phenomenal properties on the side of the subject, and to reject irreducible colors on the side of the object. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1979 the author spent the summer at a National Endowment for the Humanities summer seminar at Princeton with Richard Rorty, an experience which had numerous consequences, including a very Rortyan paper subsequently published in Human Studies called "Social theory," without wholes. Over this summer he has also worked on a manuscript that grew out a long article published in Human Studies on Max Weber and the fact-value distinction entitled "The limits of reason and some limitations of Weber's morality." The research that he was doing in the Princeton library was primarily concerned with filling in the context in which Weber had made his famous statements about fact and value, and also with examining the sequel of those writings in subsequent philosophy. This topic represents an important and distinctive strand in the tradition of continental philosophy, something that has now increasingly come to be recognized.

What is the place of social theory in mathematics education research, and what is it for? This special issue of Educational Studies in Mathematics offers insights on what could be the role of some sociological theories in a field that has historically privileged learning theories coming from psychology and mathematics as the main theoretical frames informing research. Although during the last 10 years the term 'socio-cultural' has become part of the accepted and widespread trends of mathematics education research when addressing learning, this issue gathers a collection of papers that depart from a 'socio-cultural' approach to learning and rather deploy sociological theories in the analysis of mathematics education practices. In this commentary paper, we will point to what we see to be the contributions of these papers to the field. We will do so by highlighting issues that run through the six papers. We will try to synthetize what we think are the benchmarks of the social approach to mathematics education that they propose. We will also take a critical stance and indicate some possible extensions of the use of social theory that are not addressed in this special issue but nonetheless are worth being explored for a fuller understanding of the 'social' in mathematics education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we sketch a programme for AI-driven social theory. We begin by defining what we mean by artificial intelligence (AI) in this context. We then lay out our specification for how AI-based models can draw on the growing availability of digital data to help test the validity of different social theories based on their predictive power. In doing so, we use the work of Randall Collins and his state breakdown model to exemplify that, already today, AI-based models can help synthesise knowledge from a variety of sources, reason about the world, and apply what is known across a wide range of problems in a systematic way. However, we also find that AI-driven social theory remains subject to a range of practical, technical, and epistemological limitations. Most critically, existing AI-systems lack three essential capabilities needed to advance social theory in ways that are cumulative, holistic, open-ended, and purposeful. These are (1) semanticisation, i.e., the ability to develop and operationalize verbal concepts to represent machine-manipulable knowledge; (2) transferability, i.e., the ability to transfer what has been learned in one context to another; and (3) generativity, i.e., the ability to independently create and improve on concepts and models. We argue that if the gaps identified here are addressed by further research, there is no reason why, in the future, the most advanced programme in social theory should not be led by AI-driven cumulative advances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a soil layer identification method using probabilistic collaborative representation–based classification (ProCRC). The representative parameters (cone tip resistance qt, pore pressure u2, and pore pressure ratio Bq) are selected from the CPTu data acquired through numerous engineering sites for normalization. Then, the salient features of the data are extracted based on a sparse automatic encoder, and the optimal solution of the test data was obtained. At that point, the soil layer identification and classification can be carried out by combining the ProCRC algorithm. The proposed method was adopted to identify the soil layers in four different kinds of sites and compared with other existing methods. The classification results were analyzed by regression analysis, and it was observed that the proposed method exhibits higher precision and validity than other methods. The underlying soil stratigraphy including interbeds and mixed layers can be well determined via the ProCRC method with CPTu data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In several papers (2013, 2014, 2015) Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic responsibility, viz. our responsibility for our beliefs, is grounded in a specific form of reasons-responsiveness. The main purpose of this paper is to show that a subject's belief can be responsive to reasons in this specific way without the subject being responsible for her belief. While this specific form of reasons-responsiveness might be necessary, it is not sufficient for doxastic responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In some views in the history, philosophy and social studies of chemistry, Joseph Priestley is at least as well-known and cited for his objections to the new chemistry and his promotion of his own late version of the theory of phlogiston, as for his early series of discoveries about types of air for which he had become famous. These citations are generally not associated with any detailed indications about his late work from 1788 onwards and his late phlogistic theory, of which there has not been a detailed study. This paper undertakes a detailed study of Priestley's late work on water and related airs. He put forward a theory to support which his apparatus and initial substances would have needed to exclude impurities altogether. His theory did not take into account the solutions to the difficulties with the experiment which had been comprehensively understood and published by the phlogistian Cavendish several years previously, and with which the Lavoisians were in agreement. Priestley readily and fundamentally changed his interpretations of experiments in order to support the theory he currently favoured, and he was highly selective about replying about the criticisms of any opponent. This detailed analysis shows many divergences between his own practices and aspects of his objections to the new chemistry, which have implications for those stances in the secondary literature which do not question his objections. Accordingly, this study has implications concerning the nature of chemistry and other sciences, how they do progress and how they should progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the outline of an ontology of the social realm that aims to provide a new perspective to the study of social phenomena. It will be argued that in order to raise the impact of the social sciences, research should start from a new ontological discursive perspective. This implies that rather than dividing the social and psychological realm into different "disciplines", the social and the psychological realm need to be imagined as two sides of the same coin. And also, that space and time should not be regarded as the primary referential grid for the social sciences but conversations and people. Within this perspective the "substance" of the social realm can be imagined as a species-wide and history-long web of conversations between people (and other actors with personhood properties) in which speech-acts are the basic forces that create agents and structures. The power of speech-acts is in essence non-local: it does not matter much where and when they occur, but rather by whom and in which conversational contexts they are uttered. This can be captured by the metaphor of social entanglement where social events have particular bonds that transcend space and time. All of this resonates more with the probabilistic realm of quantum physics than with the Newtonian world were causality reigns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The multiple problems that the planet is currently experiencing—climate crisis, conventional and unconventional wars, planetary disenchantment with political systems, growth of inequality, increase in all kinds of intersectional violence, destructuring of the political economy of morality, etc.—are not a favorable scenario for thinking about hope. This paper nevertheless offers a summary presentation of the sociology of hope, presenting some of its central sources and components as well as a proposed study agenda for the future. This article seeks to foster discussion of what could be the central axes of a sociology of hope. To achieve this purpose, the following argumentative strategy was chosen: (a) the "place" of hope is explored in some classics of sociology, (b) the central components of a sociological investigation of hope are synthesized, and (c) an agenda is presented as a summary for a future development of a sociology of hope. The article seeks to draw attention to the urgency of hope as an important element for the future of sociology and social sciences in the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of "environment" is ambiguous in social theory. Sometimes it is wielded like a "tyrant" which moulds subjects as if they were a simple reflection of its environment; other times it is treated as if the environment is a "slave" of subjects whose agency can transform it. This paper reflects on the complex interaction between people and their environments. Social theory cannot establish a univocal, abstract, final explanation of the influence of the environment on people's behaviour and identity. Each environment will have a situational configuration that will have different consequences depending on other biological and cultural traits of the subject. Each specific situation must be analysed empirically to understand this complex interaction. The subject-environment mismatch creates "social folds" — that is wrinkles which open new social spaces and enable freedom. The modulation between environment and subject creates risks to freedom, but also liberating opportunities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops an internal critique of Graham Oppy's metaphilosophy of religion – his theories of argumentation, worldview comparison, and epistemic justification. First, it presents Oppy's views and his main reasons in their favor. Second, it argues that Oppy is committed to two claims – that only truth-conducive reasons can justify philosophical belief and that such justification depends entirely on one's judgments about the theoretical virtues of comprehensive worldviews – that jointly entail the unacceptable conclusion that philosophical beliefs cannot be justified. Third, it briefly argues that of his two claims, it is his thoroughgoing coherentism that should be rejected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses limitarianism in light of three popular objections to the redistribution of extreme wealth: (i) that such redistribution legitimizes envy, which is a morally objectionable attitude; (ii) that it disincentivizes the wealthy to invest and work, leading to a diminished social product, and, thereby, making everyone worse-off; and (iii) that it undercuts the pursuit and achievement of human excellence by depriving successful people of resources through which they may otherwise excel. We argue that these objections fail to undermine limitarianism. An elaborated defence against them, rather, reveals how the Standard Defence of limitarianism may be expanded and strengthened by relying explicitly on the importance of preventing a society of envy, avoiding harm to non-rich citizens, and ensuring that humans are given the opportunities to excel in ways that go beyond those that allow for the amassment of wealth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are social objects and what makes them different from other realms of scientifically studied reality? How can sociology theoretically account for the relationship between objects of social reality such as norms and social structures, and their existence as objects of experience for living human actors? Contemporary sociology is characterized by a fundamental dissensus with regard to this question. Ironically, this is the very problem Alfred Schutz tackled in his phenomenological critique of Max Weber's sociological theory. As Schutz demonstrated nearly a century ago, phenomenology's egological method is indispensable to a non-reductionist theory of intersubjectivity, namely, one that does full justice to embodied conscious life while demonstrating the relative independence of the intersubjective (social) sphere. In the process, Schutz's mundane phenomenology results not only in a thorough rejection of all kinds of philosophical solipsism but also warns of the dangers, one that Husserl himself succumbed to, of granting collective structures transcendental status. Through a critical reading of Schutz's early theory in the Phenomenology of the Social World, alongside key texts by Husserl, this paper shows the continued relevance of Schutz's phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity to serve both as ontological grounding of "the social" and a method for investigating and describing concrete social objects in their transformation into theoretico-analytical objects amenable to empirical observation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main purpose of this paper is to provide a biographical sketch of the late Hans L. Zetterberg and a historical background to a translation of an essay based on a lecture given by Zetterberg in Stockholm in 1995. In it, he recounts his time at the Department of Sociology at Columbia University in the years 1953–1964. This essay is full of insights into an inspiring and formative period for Zetterberg in the United States, particularly in the stimulating milieu that was Columbia, at this time the center of American sociology led by Robert K. Merton and Paul Lazarsfeld. In the introduction to this translated essay, I give a brief overview of the establishment of sociology as a discipline in Sweden, and the transfer of knowledge between the United States and Sweden (and Europe, more broadly), embodied in Hans Zetterberg. In the post-WWII years, American sociology, which had a strong positivistic imprint, played an important role in shaping the beginnings of Swedish sociology. However, the transfer of knowledge went both ways, with Zetterberg, a semi-central and often neglected figure, being both a significant contributor to sociology at Columbia in its period of greatest prominence, and in his native Sweden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I focus on some of Peter McHugh's most recent papers. This is work that is not yet widely known, some of which has not even been published as yet. I try to show that while the work does not in any way contradict his life-long commitments, it still has the capacity to be not at all predictable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents elements for an operational approach to the formal modeling of the macro functional aspects of agent societies. The concept of agent society used in the paper is summarized. The exchange process-based concept of elementary social function is reviewed and a corresponding concept of elementary social mechanism is introduced. Together, these concepts allow for the recursive definition of the concept of functional system, with which one can account for the general functions performed by the core organizational structure of agent societies. Two case studies are developed to illustrate the type of functional modeling of agent societies that is enabled by the concepts introduced in the paper. The first case study concerns the functional analysis of a simple motivating thought experiment. The second concerns the use of agent societies as formal models for natural societies: it sketches the formalization of Pierre Bourdieu’s functional analysis of the reproduction process of contemporary human societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few readers notice that in a celebrated essay, Goffman, in a footnote, acknowledges the Chinese source of his concept of face. Around the time that Goffman published 'On Face-work,' Merton urged that theory development requires, among other things, clarification or refinement of concepts. If culture is taken to be effectively related to action and meaning, it is necessary to go beyond the approach in which theories, concepts, and methods developed in one socio-cultural context are simply applied to data generated in another. The present paper shows that concepts from other cultures may challenge taken-for-granted assumptions, received wisdoms, and established conventions. The paper draws on semi-structured interviews with respondents in a number of sites in mainland China. Examination of the various notions of face articulated by respondents suggests possible developments in sociological conceptualizations of face neglected in previous discussion. It is shown that an individual's face generation and outcome may arise out of another individual's status or behavior. An individual's action may give rise to a collective face outcome and a collective's circumstances may have impact on an individual's face state. Additionally, it is shown that face itself may become an object of self-conscious deliberation and construction. The paper demonstrates that conceptualizations employed by Chinese subjects can lead to the identification or illumination of properties and relations neglected in mainstream cultural sociology. New directions of research and theorization are thus encouraged by incorporation of culturally extraneous experiences and categories into mainstream sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper critically interrogates the usefulness of the concept of violence regimes for social politics, social analysis, and social theory. In the first case, violence regimes address and inform politics and policy, that is, social politics, both around various forms of violence, such as gender-based violence, violence against women, anti-lesbian, gay and transgender violence, intimate partner violence, and more widely in terms of social and related policies and practices on violence and anti-violence. In the second case, violence regimes assist social analysis of the interconnections of different forms and aspects of violence, and relative autonomy from welfare regimes and gender regimes. Third, the violence regime concept engages a wider range of issues in social theory, including the exclusion of the knowledges of the violated, most obviously, but not only, when the voices and experiences of those killed are unheard. The concept directs attention to assumptions made in social theory as incorporating or neglecting violence. More specifically, it highlights the significance of: social effects beyond agency; autotelic ontology, that is, violence as a means and end in itself, and an inequality in itself; the relations of violence, sociality and social relations; violence and power, and the contested boundary between them; and materiality-discursivity in violence and what is to count as violence. These are key issues for both violence studies and social theory more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In this paper, we propose a novel account of desire reports, i.e. sentences of the form ⌜ S wants p ⌝ . Our theory is partly motivated by Phillips-Brown's (Mind 130(518):413–437, 2021) observation that subjects can desire things even if those things aren't best by the subject's lights. That is, being best isn't necessary for being desired. We compare our proposal to existing theories, and show that it provides a neat account of the central phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that moral distress is a distinctive category of reactive attitudes that are taken to be part and parcel of the social dynamics for recognition. While moral distress does not demonstrate evidence of wrongdoing, it does emotionally articulate a demand for normative attention that is addressed to others as moral providers. The argument for this characterization of the deontic power of moral distress builds upon two examples in which the cognitive value of the victim's emotional experience is controversial: the case of micro-aggression, and the case of misplaced distress. In contrast to appraisal and perceptual models of distress, it is argued that its epistemic and normative value is dialogical rather than evidential, in that it presses claims that engage the audience in a normative discussion about the normative standing of the claimant, the proper grounds of the attitude, and the normative standards used to assess them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article presents abstracts of two articles published in the September 1, 1974, issue of the periodical "Quality and Quantity." One article focuses on structural models of voluntaristics social action. Using a broad characterization of recent liberal, pluralistic, social science research interests defined in terms of Parsonian social theory, this article reviews recent developments in social science statistical practices. These developments are seen as converging toward a cross-disciplinary synthesis of rigorous "structural" or "causal" modeling approaches. The major negative thesis of the paper is the frequent inadequacy in empirical practice of simply specified, statistically manipulable structural models. The other article focuses on change and unreliability. The analysis is concentrated on the dichotomous case, two observations, and two response classes. Using a latent structural approach, two true latent classes are analytically separated from two manifest response categories.

This article is a comment on papers being published in this special issue concerned with interactional semantics. As these papers are concerned with abstractions, formulations, generalizations, and other uses of categorizations whereby participants' everyday understandings and interpretations come to the foreground of analysis, I explore the wider issue with which the papers wrestle. That issue is whether problems of meaning-related to subjectivity, intersubjectivity, mutual comprehension, and the like-are pervasive in interaction, or are limited and situational. I examine problems of meaning through the lenses of social theory and ethnomethodology, and take the position that analytic preoccupation with interpretation should be one that follows participants' own orientations to problems of meaning. This is different from but related to what each author argues in his own paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Announces the 31st Annual International Conference on Social Theory, Politics and the Arts. Description of the conference; Main theme of the 2005 conference; Deadline for the submission of papers to be presented during the conference; Contact information.

This paper is an exploration of the relevance of Habermas's social theory for understanding meaning making in the context of shared online interaction. It describes some of the key ideas within Habermas's work, noting the central importance it gives to the idea of communicative action - a special kind of discourse in which there is 'no other force than that of the better argument' and no other motive other than 'the cooperative search for truth'. The paper then turns to the referencing of Habermas by educationalists in general and by supporters of online discussion in particular. It argues that a Habermasian perspective on meaning making is one in which participants strive for 'genuine consensus' by interrogating their own beliefs while actively engaging with opposing points of view. The value of this approach is that it introduces a concern for validity or truth into discussion of knowledge building and discriminates between emancipatory and strategic goals. While critics would argue that genuine consensus is not achievable, from Habermas we can better understand the importance of striving for such consensus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tracks Mead's induction into the sociological canon, focusing in particular on American sociologists who made a concerted effort to reconstruct Mead as a systematic social theorist and apply his ideas to empirical research. It distinguishes two interpretive strategies of framing the classic and constructing the canon -- the politics of orthodoxy and politics of the open canon. The politics of orthodoxy aims to ascertain the original meaning and close the textual canon, creating a template relative to which alternative interpretations are judged incomplete, unorthodox, or wrongheaded. The politics of the open canon proceeds on the assumption that the classic text lends itself to conflicting interpretations, that room for the honest difference of opinion must be safeguarded, and that the capacity to further productive inquiry rather than the adherence to an orthodox view recommends a particular construal as viable and canon-worhty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pragmatism, especially the works of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead, is in the midst of a revival in American sociology. American sociologists have drawn on these authors in their addressment of contemporary debates in the wider disciplinary field. Placing these contemporary applications of pragmatist thought alongside the broader intellectual tradition of pragmatic philosophy, however, demonstrates tensions associated with this revival. This paper draws on the work of John Dewey as a particularly stark case of the conflict between the philosophy of social science espoused by the original pragmatist philosophers and the use of their ideas in American sociology today. This treatment affords the opportunity to recover a vision for social science which has been overlooked in the contemporary pragmatist revival with deep implications for the practice of social science today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]