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The article focuses on the attitudes of French government leaders during the reign of Louis XIII, King of France, toward a potential extension of the Twelve Years' Truce. The diplomatic correspondence of Jean de Péricard, Ambassador of France to Brussels (Belgium), is examined. Topics include France-Brussels relations from 1690 to 1619, relations between the French government and Huguenots, and archdukes Albert d'Autriche's and Isabelle Claire Eugénie's interpretation of the French king's diplomatic efforts.

This paper explores the conceptualization and interpretation of ‘European solidarity’ by the French President François Mitterrand. It discusses the relevance of former concepts of foreign and European policy. It differentiates between a European idea and European institutions, also taking into account personal experiences. Finally, it analyses the correlation between different concepts such as ‘European solidarity’, ‘transatlantic solidarity’, ‘West European solidarity’ and ‘pan-European solidarity’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At 10:30 in the morning on 28 June 1992, a Dauphin helicopter landed at Sarajevo airport carrying a precious cargo: the French president, François Mitterrand. Since the beginning of the Bosnian War, Bosnian Serb forces had controlled the airport and restricted the delivery of humanitarian aid to the city’s destitute population, which formed an important cornerstone of their siege strategy. In reaching the airport, the president secured its re-opening and, with it, the commencement of one of the longest humanitarian airlifts in history. However, Mitterrand’s visit also had implications and significance beyond the Bosnian capital. The visit secured humanitarian intervention through the United Nations as the international community’s modus operandi for conflict resolution in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Through its permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council and enthusiastic engagement with humanitarian intervention, France would shape the intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina and thus continue to justify its position amongst the world’s Great Powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces the key tenets of French foreign and security policy during the Cold War, and illustrates the deep challenges to the French consensus raised by the emergence of a unipolar system. There is a growing gap between the rhetoric of French security policy, emphasizing ‘autonomy’ and ‘sovereignty’ out of habit from the Cold War, and the actual security practices showing a gradual embedding within the transatlantic security structures. In the absence of a new transpartisan grand narrative relevant for the contemporary international system, such embedding is easily portrayed in France as a ‘treason’ from a romanticized Gaullist foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In France and Europe today, claims arise defining so-called Muslim and European ‘worlds’ and labelling them irreconcilable. These claims ignore the intertwined history of France and North Africa. When the six founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC) signed the Treaty of Rome, French administrators still considered Algeria to be a constituent part of France, despite the ongoing war. The Algerian question was central to negotiations for the Treaty of Rome and during them, French officials attempted to inscribe Algeria within the founding documents of the European project through a policy of ‘Eurafrique’. Their partners, eager for France’s signature on the Treaty, accepted a vision of integrated Europe with borders crossing the Mediterranean. This decision raised thorny issues in the months and years to come, first in debates of how or even if the Treaty could be implemented overseas, then when independent Algeria attempted to define its relationship with the EEC. These episodes of negotiation and interaction reveal the centrality of the question of empire to the foundations of integrated Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the creation of the European Community, the Gaullist movement has never been united over the question of European integration. De Gaulle’s intergovernmental vision of the European project has largely been the dominant discourse. At times however, this narrative has been questioned—on the one hand by more supranational notions of European integration; and on the other by a more pro-sovereignty Eurosceptic discourse. Subsequently, in its various modern-day guises the Gaullist movement has faced a series of major internal divisions with regard to its position on ‘Europe’. This uncertainty has also manifested itself at the highest level as demonstrated by the changing discourse advocated by former French presidents Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy. This paper analyses the internal tensions over the European issue within the Gaullist movement at elite level. It determines that despite Chirac’s and Sarkozy’s attempts to unite the party throughout their presidencies the Gaullist movement is far from having moved towards a united European stance. Accordingly, the authors identify that over the past three decades, it is possible to identify three distinct, and at times conflicting, Gaullist stances on European integration with which the party’s elites have vacillated, namely Euro-Federalism, Euro-Pragmatism and Euro-Populism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Studies of the relationship of political parties to the European Community/Union (EC/EU) increasingly use the perspective of ‘Europeanisation’ to measure such relationships. There is also a case, however, for looking at Europe from the perhaps narrower but no less necessary point of view of intra-party dynamics: in particular, what kinds of challenge does ‘Europe’ represent to party managers and how do they deal with it? By analysing the relationship of the Socialist Party to the EC/EU at three key moments in the history of European integration, the author identifies some common tropisms which continue to operate even as the effects of ‘Europeanisation’ increase. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

By integrating French archives and untapped US intelligence records, this article uncovers a debate within US government circles about the accuracy of the entrenched image of France at the onset of the Cold War as decadent and teetering toward revolution. In exchanges with the White House, State Department and military, right-leaning French sources bolstered this view. French contacts in the Resistance meanwhile shaped Office of Strategic Services analysis that France was a strong, worthy ally. France became a contested idea with warring factions in both capitals seeking to influence US policy - with repercussions for Franco-American relations for decades to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article talks about the Egypt Plan formulated by philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, which aimed to convince King Louis XIV of France to invade Egypt. Topics discussed include scholars' contention that the plan was formulated to divert the King from invading Holland and German territories, the diversion hypothesis, and the authors opinion that the diversion account offers an incomplete reasoning for Leibniz's motives.

French policy towards UN peacekeeping reflects the ambivalence of what France wants to achieve in the field of conflict management and through which institutional frameworks it prefers to work. On the one hand, France is greatly involved in the design and decision-making process of contemporary UN-led peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, after having been present in the field during the early 1990s, France underwent a major policy shift that led it to distance itself from UN operations. This chapter offers a narrative of French policy and perceptionsvis-à-visthe virtues and limits of UN peacekeeping operations in the twenty-first century. It examines the French level of contributions, decision-making process, motivations and lessons learnt from past and current operations. It also analyses the dichotomy between the political role that France plays at the Security Council and its absence from UN-led operations. It seeks to determine how coherent this dichotomy is, its rationale, and how likely – and under what conditions – it will change in the near future, in particular through a hypothetical French return to UN-led peacekeeping operations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Two decades later, the Rwandan genocide has been broadly analysed and, to a certain extent, so has the French response to the genocide. Nevertheless, even though the literature covers extensivelyhowthe French executive responded to the genocide, it remains confusing when it comes to explainingwhyit responded in such a controversial way, since two—somewhat contradictory—accounts have been put forward. In order to address this lack of clarity, the article analyses these main accounts and concludes that they both present key weaknesses that prevent us from fully understanding France’s controversial response. Building on Prunier’s testimony, this article suggests a third explanation by arguing that the ‘Fashoda syndrome’ had a strong influence on President Mitterrand and should be taken into account more consistently, not only when studying the French response in Rwanda, but also Mitterrand’s foreign policy in Africa more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The paper addresses the impact of the Rhine Crisis of 1840 on Italian countries and explains the role they played in the European State System when the Continent seemed to be on the eve of a general war. As the paper attempts to prove, the crisis seriously alarmed the ruling classes as well as the general public and revealed the internal problems of the Italian countries as well as their deep distrust towards the egotistic and self-serving policies of the Great Powers. The paper therefore introduces the history of Italy during late 1840 within the wider context of European diplomatic history and serves as a probe into the history of the European State System during the Pre-March period in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historians have speculated over the existence of an 1841 plan by the French foreign minister François Guizot to internationalize Jerusalem as a Christian city, a plan holding major implications for the eventual emergence of a Jewish state and for European–Ottoman relations. This article aims, based on fresh archival and other sources, to provide a definitive evaluation of Guizot's plan, its scope, and its motivations. It broadens the field to encompass other great power plans mooted in 1841, including plans of a Protestant yet Zionist flavour, and it reassesses the political weight of early nineteenth-century European religious impulses with regard to Palestine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The French doctrine towards peace operations has, over the last two decades, reflected the ambivalence of France’s position, stretched between on the one hand a military culture that places the use of force at the centre of strategy and on the other hand multidimensional operations that by their nature integrate a large range of activities. As a consequence France has evolved as a ‘reluctant peacekeeper’: while it has been significantly involved in peace operations since the end of the Cold War, the military has never felt comfortable with the peacekeeping concept, seen as a dilution of their primary function of fighting wars. This tension has shaped both doctrinal development and operations. Twenty years after the French engagement in former Yugoslavia, lessons have been learnt, and policy-makers have become aware of the evolution of conflict management and the subsequent necessity to integrate the military dimension into a broader framework. Yet France’s policy is still shaped by a certain aversion towards the concept of long-term multinational peace operations, and a parallel preference for more focused and reactive operations. The merits of the use of force are central to these debates. While these policy preferences are responses to legitimate concerns about both the efficiency of foreign interventions and the soldier’s identity, they also raise questions as to their compatibility with the long term and multidimensional requirements of bringing sustainable peace in fragile states. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the 1960s, French president de Gaulle's ambition to create a ‘European Europe’ depended heavily on German support. This article illustrates and reinterprets the crucial attitude of Ludwig Erhard by focusing on his role after the signing of the Elysée treaty in January 1963, and his reaction to a secret (and since forgotten) French proposal for monetary union in March 1964. The evidence shows that Erhard, fundamentally a moderate Atlanticist, was profoundly affected by the pressure of the Kennedy administration not to harbour Gaullist ideas. Indeed, as German chancellor Erhard feared that America might cease to defend Europe if de Gaulle's idea of a more independent Europe were to gain ground in Germany. Hence Erhard simply ignored any French move perceived to be contradictory to US policy. The article adds an element to the complexity of Franco-German relations in the 1960s while providing an example of how American power was exercised during the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Selim III ruled the Ottoman Empire in the Age of Revolutions, but his rule did not reflect the vigorous, expansionist and aggressive spirit of this age. He more resembled a ruler forced to defend his empire from the turbulence of the age, an effort which also shaped his character and perception of rulership. During his years in royal confinement, he clung passionately to the revival of the warrior-sultan through charismatic leadership. While on the throne, there was a gradual transformation of his perception of rulership and he became satisfied with being the bureaucratic ruler of the empire. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The purpose of this article is to problematize how a specific set of films is constructed, promoted and valorized as 'cinemas of the Maghreb', via a consideration of the people, the institutions and the interactions that are involved in different geographical and institutional contexts. The analysis contrasts three different geographical, cultural and institutional contexts in which 'cinemas of the Maghreb' become meaningful, as well as the set of common features that underlie the category. Focusing on international co-productions, the circulation of films through commercial exhibition, box-office receipts, film events organized and film scholarship, the article explores the extent to which such a denomination is deeply enmeshed with France, but also how it raises very different issues, involves different agents, and refers to different objects and temporalities in France, Anglo-American academia and the Maghreb itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the history the Crimean War with a particular focus on the allegiance of the Crimean Tartar khans, or rulers, to the Allied Powers of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain and France against Russia during the war. The article also discusses the issue of independence for Crimea debated by the Allied Powers during the war, including their fear that if Crimea gained autonomy, Russia would regain it. An overview of the British home secretary Lord Henry John Temple Palmerston, including his hope that the Crimean War would weaken Russia's power in its frontier regions, is provided.

Turkish foreign policy toward the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62) was construed as persistent Turkish endorsement of official French positions generating abiding resentment among the states of the Third World, especially Arab states, and understandably in Algeria, which was to elicit backlashes from the Third World states thereafter consequently causing substantial complications in Turkish foreign policy. Stressing the importance of incorporating nonmaterial and ideational factors in analyses of foreign policy, two arguments are put forward in this article for an accurate explanation of Turkish foreign policy toward Algerian War of Independence. First, it was the conception of the West, defined not only in strategic or military terms, but also in ideational and civilizational terms that induced Turkish policy-makers to adopt insular policies regarding Algeria. Second, a “temporal contextualization” of Turkish foreign policy during the Algerian War of Independence is required for a proper understanding of Turkish foreign policy toward the Algerian War of Independence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This introductory article presents the history of francophone spaces to critically assess their specificity, and to situate them in academic debates on peace operations. It argues that the specificity is the inescapable a priori context of peace missions, even if this context is rapidly evolving and in interaction with non-francophone spaces. The specificity is nevertheless increasingly difficult to identify, as new practices and conditions emerge and as the lines between different francophone spaces and between francophone and non-francophone spaces are increasingly fluid. The article explores the range of possibilities that emerge from such interrogations, and emphasizes that to add the experiences of ‘francophone spaces’ to analyses of peace operations is to confront the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion already expressed by the terms ‘francophone’ and francophonie. This approach points to where and how hegemonic practices move and change between locations and different contexts, and where and how the organization or reorganization of power is negotiated, imposed and/or resisted across ‘francophone’ and ‘non-francophone’ spaces. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In early 1971, two Canadian unionists travelled to New Caledonia on a technical mission of assistance to the territory's unions. At the airport in Nouméa, however, the territorial authorities refused the unionists entry. For the French government, the interest of the United Steelworkers of America in New Caledonia represented a threat to the stability and competitiveness of the territory's nickel industry. The visit was also seen as a manifestation of growing American influence on New Caledonia's economic and political development at a time when the French were increasingly concerned about the territory's attachment to France. Yet efforts by the territorial authorities in Nouméa to prevent the visit were complicated by other French and Canadian concerns. Neither Canada nor the metropolitan government of France wanted an international incident that might jeopardise France–Canada relations, which were improving slowly after several years of acrimony. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An essay is presented on how France retained possession of Morocco during World War I. It discusses the ways in which France was able to fight foreign wars in the Middle East, North Africa, and Italy in addition to engaging in military operations on the Western Front of World War I. The article argues that France had developed a conventional army and two colonial armies, the Armée d’Afrique and the Chasseurs d'Afrique.

As many unused sources in the Service Historique de la Defense in Vincennes and the Quai d'Orsay in Paris reveal the French Deuxieme Bureau, and also naval intelligence, monitored events during the home rule crisis, the Easter Rising, the First World War, the Peace Conference in Paris and the Civil War. Also worthy of note are the elaboration of Franco-Irish invasion plans during the Boer War and the secret mission of an Irish general in Paris shortly after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty on 6 December 1921. The aims of this article will be to give an overview of French military intelligence activities regarding Ireland and to give an assessment of its interest in the country during the period under consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using previously unpublished material to further socio-historic research into the migration of top footballers, this contribution studies changing national contexts in France and Algeria resulting in the dramatic fall in migration by Algerian footballers - the third largest 'foreign' population (since 1962) to play in the French Championship after professionalization. It also questions whether acculturation persisted in Algeria after independence. A quantitative analysis of 25 interviews carried out mainly in Algeria with ex-champions who had played for French clubs (colonial and postcolonial), shows that between 1956 and 1982 there did exist a 'desire for France'. Despite changes to the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) sports policies nationalizing Algerian football, this desire for France remained founded on socio-economic advancement and a fascination for life in the ex-homeland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Monumental history seems to be fading in the films on contemporary Algeria. The unrest of the last decades has fractured false certainties and new images have since emerged. Although present, the relationship to France, as a colonial power, is secondary; this positioning allows a tangential critique of the Algerian political regime, while daily experiences are explored and given more exposure. In continuity with the films of the 1970s and 1980s, this exploration is mainly performed by female characters, with the particularity that they are left alone in their search for a better life and/or recognition. This paper aims to examine the aforementioned search in light of two major lines: first, the absence of strong male characters and the political and social marginality of female characters, and second, the contemporary expression of the logic of honour. Spatiality is central to the examination of the function of France as a constitutive part in the formation of Algerian (urban?) identities, be they problematic and highly conflictual. It allows shedding some light on the difficulty to foresee a possible change in the social structure and in the defining identities. In these contexts, social reality is raw and exposed, and life is so tenuous that the body becomes the prime target and the only shield to the violence. How then is speech rendered and how could it be transformative? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The French experience of the First World War has aroused significant interest within and outside academic circles since the 1990s. A heated controversy over the role and significance of the 1914-1918 'war culture' has, in the last ten years, pitted two schools of interpretation, emphasizing 'consent' on the one hand and 'coercion' on the other. This paper first presents the main lines of the argument between two groups of historians anxious to contribute to a European history of the First World War. It then suggests avenues of further investigation that urgently require an international and collaborative effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The British and French held divergent views from the late 1940s on relations with the United States and on the development of European integration. Differences between the two countries caused particular strain once General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. The clash that ensued between British and French policies towards the Atlantic Alliance and Europe during his presidency is the subject of this article. It suggests that while the British were unable to overcome de Gaulle's resistance to their membership of the EEC, Britain's fortunes in Europe were nevertheless improved by the Wilson government's response to de Gaulle's actions in the Atlantic Alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sir Ronald H. Campbell was the first British ambassador during the Second World War to manage a key bilateral relationship with a wartime ally. When the Germans invaded France in May 1940, Campbell's Embassy was transformed from a diplomatic reporting post into a frontline base that had to brief London not only on the political situation in France but also on strategic military matters. However, the British ambassador would constantly struggle to register his authority in the overall management of the Franco-British relationship, and more often than not, was bypassed by Whitehall departments, special advisors and senior ministers. Campbell only found himself in a more pivotal role as communications between the British and French Governments disintegrated and the latter moved to Bordeaux. It then fell upon Campbell to make some of the most dramatic decisions in twentieth century Franco-British history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventionally, it was Palmerston's political nemesis, Lord Aberdeen (foreign secretary 1841–46), who brokered an entente cordiale with François Guizot and France in the early 1840s, which the belligerent and unequivocally “English” Palmerston then systematically destroyed when he returned to office in 1846. However, not only is this a distortion of the relationship between Britain and France prior to 1846, it also fails to appreciate the nuances of Palmerston's approach to Anglo–French politics. Naval scares and rhetorical constructions of English and British identities certainly drew Palmerston to adopt aggressive positions towards France on occasion, but against this must be set his close personal ties with leading French statesmen, not least Napoleon III himself, and his desire to maintain peaceful harmonious relations with France in order to free Britain's diplomatic hand elsewhere in the world. Although superficially swinging between extremes of amity and enmity, therefore, Anglo–French relations under Palmerston's guidance were in fact far more cordial and close than has sometimes been allowed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the inscription of Angkor on the World Heritage List in December 1992. Description of the site and its temples; Historic value of the site; Role of the French government in developing the site and in the site's universal recognition; Display of major documents on Khmer art at the Universal Exhibition in Paris, France in 1878; Establishment of an Indochine Museum at the Tracadero; Success of the efforts of the French government to return Angkor to the Kingdom of Cambodian in 1907.

Examines how the dynamics of the relationship between France and the Armenians in Syria during the French Mandate led to its failure. Partnership between French and Armenians following the First World War; Persecution and mass deportation of Armenians from Turkey; Emigration of Armenians into Syria; Displacement of Syrian laborers by Armenians; Decline of French support for Armenians.

Examines the development of enemy concepts in France and Germany between 1871 and 1914. Aggression and decline; Factors that contributed to the development of an enemy concept in France; Revenge and the enemy concept; Cultural exponents of revenge.