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In a reference letter for Feyerabend's application to UC Berkeley, Carl Hempel writes that 'Mr. Feyerabend combines a forceful and penetrating analytic mind with a remarkably thorough training and high competence in theoretical physics and mathematics' (Collodel and Oberheim, [2], 80). The hope is to better understand Feyerabend's philosophy of physics, its historical impact and reception, and discern what fruits Feyerabend's philosophy of physics may still bear. Del Santo shows how Feyerabend's growing "resentment" toward his authoritarian father-figure and Popper's growing frustration with Feyerabend centred on disagreements concerning quantum mechanics: how to interpret it, how to criticize it, and how to teach it. [Extracted from the article]

Karl Popper and Paul Feyerabend were among the most influential philosophers of science of the twentieth century. Extensive studies have been dedicated to the development of their controversial relationship, which saw Feyerabend turning from a student and supporter of Popper to one of his harshest critics. Yet, it is not as well known that the rift between Popper and Feyerabend arose mainly in the context of their studies on the foundations of quantum mechanics, which has been the main subject of their discussions for about two decades. This paper reconstructs in detail their diatribe over the foundations of quantum mechanics, emphasising also the major role that their personal relationship played in their distancing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent philosophical literature has turned its attention towards assessments of how to judge scientific proposals as worthy of further inquiry. Previous work, as well as papers contained within this special issue, propose criteria for pursuitworthiness (Achinstein, 1993; Whitt, 1992; DiMarco & Khalifa, 2019; Laudan, 1977; Shan, 2020; Šešelja et al., 2012). The purpose of this paper is to assess the grounds on which pursuitworthiness demands can be legitimately made. To do this, I propose a challenge to the possibility of even minimal criteria of pursuitworthiness, inspired by Paul Feyerabend. I go on to provide a framework for identifying the contexts in which pursuitworthiness criteria may promote the efficiency of scientific inquiry. I then spell out some implications this framework has for values and pursuit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I defend the claim that Paul Feyerabend held a robust metaphilosophical position for most of his philosophical career. This position I call Decision-Based Epistemology and reconstruct it in terms of three key components: (1) a form of epistemic voluntarism concerning the justification of philosophical positions and (2) a behaviorist account of philosophical beliefs, which allows him (3) to cast normative arguments concerning philosophical beliefs in scientific methodology, such as realism, in terms of means-ends relations. I then introduce non-naturalist and naturalist variants of his conception of normativity, which I trace back to his mentors Viktor Kraft and Karl Popper, respectively. This distinction, introduced on the metaphilosophical level, can can be put to use to explain key changes in Feyerabend's philosophical proposals, such as the viability of his methodological argument for realism. I conclude that this Decision-Based Epistemology should be further explored by historically embedding Feyerabend's metaphilosophy in a voluntarist tradition of scientific philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the years, science both as a discipline and as a method enjoys a primal place in society as a paradigm of rationality, as a model of truth, and as one of the standards of authentic knowledge. However, with the advent of Paul Feyerabend, a postmodernist, the story changed. Paul Feyerabend moved against this privileged position that science has enjoyed over the years. He argued that science could only give comfort to the narrowminded. That science was becoming over bearing and stretching its schemes beyond boundaries and stated that science cannot be the model or the ideal method for every mode of enquiry because its methodologies have their limitations and this inhibits the advancement of the frontier of knowledge. With this he propounded the theory of epistemological dadaism stating that anything goes, upholding non-methodism as the ideal model and mode against the sole reliance on science. However, employing the critical analytic model of interrogation this paper was able to point out that Paul Feyerabend was proposing his theory oblivious of the fact that his theory invariably enthroned the existential anarchic scenario that also throws up and off his submission as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a discussion of the renewed interest in developing a unified theoretical umbrella under which the various sociological theories can be ordered and contained. It suggests that a "unified or 'unifying" theory will do more harm than good toward advancing sociological knowledge. Using Paul K. Feyerabend's (1968) notions of (1) the relative autonomy of facts, (2) the consistency condition, and (3) the principle, of meaning invariance, the paper illustrates how a movement toward a dominant paradigm will have deleterious effects on sociological knowledge. A plea is made for maintaining theoretical diversity as an acceptable, means for advancing sociological knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Postmodernism is like a spectre hunting the intellectual world, and there is a sense in which the attitude is, first and foremost, against modern science. This essay is, therefore, an expository analysis of the thoughts of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, as classical representations of the postmodern reaction against modern science. The paper argues that the colossal image of science, as well as the idea of a "unity of sciences" had to be jettisoned by postmodernism in order to make way for the relativism and multiplicity of points of view that are symptomatic of postmodern thinking. The paper concludes with some critical reflections of the thoughts of the two scholars, and notes that postmodernism opened the door for the recognition of African ideas and ideals. The implication is that postmodernism not only vitiates the hold exercised by Western European models of reality but equally gives fresh cultural confidence to other modes of cognition, especially in Africa, that have long been pushed to the periphery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend, an outcome of the Plato-led victory of philosophers over poets is the 'conquest of abundance' where abstraction replaces the 'richness of being'. This poignant motif is visible in the project of the social sciences, where theory describes classificatory schemas that can be imposed upon the social world to categorise and, subsequently, explain it. However, Homer's writings (which pre-date Plato) provide a completely different frame of reference. By reimagining ourselves within this work we may be able to rethink and reconfigure our understanding of science, and perhaps even the practice of science. This paper reports on a Feyerabendian 'experiment' in sociology of science which attempts to write contemporary scientific production from the frame of reference of Homer. This new methodology leads to fragments of epic poetry which act as a provocation to, and a disruption of, sociology of science and STS and their ways of making sense of science in society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophy of the Art of Science. Historical Remarks on the Significance of Rules in Scientific Language. This paper undertakes first steps toward a 'Philosophy of the Art of Science' from a History of Science and Philosophy of Language perspective. Traditionally it is understood that Philosophy of Science assesses science as to the validity of its methods and to the question of how it is that we hold its claims to be true. However, the range of presuppositions here is considerable: Roughly, it spans from Gottlob Frege's 'The True' (das Wahre) as the aim of scientific inquiry on the one end, to Paul Feyerabend's pluralistic understanding of science in a democratic society on the other. Despite this profound difference, however, we can nonetheless detect some similarity between them. Both hold science to be a normative endeavor: Frege thinks we ought to strive for true thoughts as somewhat independent ontological entities; Feyerabend thinks we ought to strive for a pragmatic humanism that takes the historicity of our knowledge into account. But while Frege ventured to show that natural language can benefit from insights drawn from the normative logic of formalized languages, Feyerabend discounted the idea of formalized language altogether, but with no less normative verve in regard to our scientific concept formation. Hence the combining question is whether scientific concept formation is indeed a rule-governed behavior, or, put more generally, whether semantic content as such is normative. Guided by this question, the present paper draws a line from Frege through Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Quine, to those authors who follow or refute Saul Kripke's Wittgensteinian notion of semantic normativity in the most recent discussion of today. However, the paper does not proceed chronologically, but rather thematically along the major lines of argument. Hence after a brief survey of Feyerabend's philosophy of scientific concept formation (I), we explore Frege and his legacy on semantic normativity (II), and investigate the route that eventually led to present day semantic rule-skepticism (III). We conclude with Carnap's 'Principle of Tolerance' combined with Feyerabend's notion of Science as an Art, parallels of which we can even find in Kant's third Critique (IV). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the influence of the fifth-century Christian Neoplatonist Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (Denys) on the twentieth-century philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend. I argue that the later Feyerabend took from Denys a metaphysical claim-the 'doctrine of ineffability'-intended to support epistemic pluralism. The paper has five parts. Part one introduces Denys and Feyerabend's common epistemological concern to deny the possibility of human knowledge of ultimate reality. Part two examines Denys' arguments for the 'ineffability' of God as presented in On the Divine Names. Part three then explores how Feyerabend imported Denys' account of divine ineffability into his own metaphysics to provide a novel argument for epistemic pluralism. Part four explains the significance of an appreciation of Dionyius' influence for our understanding of Feyerabend. I conclude that Denys was a significant and neglected influence upon the later Feyerabend. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay raises the question of material hermeneutics in Heelan's philosophy of techno-science. For Heelan, a continental philosophy of technoscience, referring to Husserl and Heidegger and especially to Merleau-Ponty, features hermeneutic contexts of mathematics and measurement as well as laboratory observation, including what the later Heelan spoke of as "portable laboratories," for the sake of objectivity and "meaning making." For Paul Feyerabend, this material practice corresponded to the use of both techniques of observation and instrumentation, and not less "propaganda" in the case of Galileo which practice for Heelan included the ontological status of measures and numbers as well as apprenticeship in what Heelan called "contingent local practical cultural milieus." The essay includes a discussion of Heidegger on mathematics and Bruno Latour on pasteurization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the relationship between epistemic integrity, virtue, and authority by offering a virtue epistemological reading of the defences of non-scientific beliefs, practices, and traditions in the writings of Paul Feyerabend. I argue that there was a robust epistemic rationale for those defences and that it can inform contemporary reflection on the epistemic authority of the sciences. Two common explanations of the purpose of those defences are rejected as lacking textual support. A third “pluralist” reading is judged more persuasive, but found to be incomplete, owing to a failure to accommodate Feyerabend’s focus upon the integrity of scientists and the authority of science. I therefore suggest that the defences are more fully understood as defences of the epistemic integrity of scientists that take the form of critical exposures of failures by scientists to act with integrity. An appeal is made to contemporary virtue epistemology that clarifies Feyerabend’s implicit association of epistemic integrity and epistemic virtue. If so, what critics have taken to be radically “anarchistic” defences of pseudoscience are, in fact, principled defences of the epistemic integrity—and hence authority—of science [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

For more than three decades, there has been significant debate about the relation between Feyerabend and Popper. The discussion has been nurtured and complicated by the rift that opened up between the two and by the later Feyerabend's controversial portrayal of his earlier self. The first part of the paper provides an overview of the accounts of the relation that have been proposed over the years, disentangles the problems they deal with, and analyses the evidence supporting their conclusions as well as the methodological approaches used to process that evidence. Rather than advancing a further speculative account of the relation based on Feyerabend's philosophical work or autobiographical recollections, the second part of the paper strives to clarify the problems at issue by making use of a wider range of evidence. It outlines a historical reconstruction of the social context within which Feyerabend's intellectual trajectory developed, putting a special emphasis on the interplay between the perceived intellectual identity of Feyerabend, Feyerabend's own intellectual self-concept, and the peculiar features of the evolving Popperian research group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a substantial literature on Feyerabend's relativism—including a few papers in this collection—but fewer specific studies of the ways that his writings and ideas have been taken up among the non-academic public. This is odd, given his obvious interest in the lives and concerns of persons who were not ‘intellectuals’—a term that, for him, had a pejorative ring to it. It is also odd, given the abundance of evidence of how Feyerabend's relativism played a role in a specific national and cultural context—namely, contemporary Italian debates about relativism. This paper offers a study of how Feyerabend's ideas have been deployed by Italian intellectuals and cultural commentators—including the current Pope—and critically assesses them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relativism is one of the most problematic terms associated with philosophical discourse, with Feyerabend considered among the most important twentieth century theorists subscribing to it. This paper provides a detailed overview of relativist positions advanced in Feyerabend's mid-to-late work and investigates the associated epistemic and political applications. Emphasis is placed on how Feyerabend supported certain aspects of relativism, and at what stage he rejected others. It is noted that Feyerabend had already imposed limitations on relativism in Farewell to Reason , in which he entertained the possibility of epistemic definition within stable contexts, and advanced the notion that opportunities and equality associated with political and cultural units could only be valid within a democratic system. In Conquest of Abundance , political relativism is largely discarded, while epistemological relativism is increasingly treated as an appeal for diversity in all areas. In this re-reading of his work, it becomes clear that Feyerabend was already advocating a moderate form of epistemic and political relativism in the middle of his career, which he subsequently developed in the direction of “ontological pluralism” in his later work. This paper thus shows that Feyerabend's relativism should not be completely rejected, but rather that it continues to offer interesting food for thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses the example of the COVID-19 pandemic to analyse the danger associated with insufficient epistemic pluralism in evidence-based public health policy. Drawing on certain elements in Paul Feyerabend's political philosophy of science, it discusses reasons for implementing more pluralism as well as challenges to be tackled on the way forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to show that the development of Feyerabend's philosophical ideas in the 1950s and 1960s largely took place in the context of debates on quantum mechanics. In particular, he developed his influential arguments for pluralism in science in discussions with the quantum physicist David Bohm, who had developed an alternative approach to quantum physics which (in Feyerabend's perception) was met with a dogmatic dismissal by some of the leading quantum physicists. I argue that Feyerabend's arguments for theoretical pluralism and for challenging established theories were connected to his objections to the dogmatism and conservatism he observed in quantum physics. However, as Feyerabend gained insight into the physical details and historical complexities which led to the development of quantum mechanics, he gradually became more modest in his criticisms. His writings on quantum mechanics especially engaged with Niels Bohr; initially, he was critical of Bohr's work in quantum mechanics, but in the late 1960s, he completely withdrew his criticism and even praised Bohr as a model scientist. He became convinced that however puzzling quantum mechanics seemed, it was methodologically unobjectionable – and this was crucial for his move towards 'anarchism' in philosophy of science. • Paul Feyerabend has worked intensely on the foundations of quantum mechanics. • This forms an essential context in which his philosophy of science developed. • He was influenced by Bohm, who developed an alternative account of quantum mechanics. • He developed his arguments for pluralism in the context of debates surrounding Bohm. • His move towards anarchism went together with a reappreciation of Niels Bohr. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This retitled excerpt from Frank Kermode's introduction to the symposium "Beyond Post-: A Revaluation of the Revaluation of All Values" (Common Knowledge 1:3 [Winter 1992]: 10–12) is republished here in a special issue of representative pieces from the journal's first twenty-five years. Kermode had called for papers in the journal's inaugural issue (1:1 [Spring 1992]: 5–6) on "the question of value" and was to a degree disappointed with the results. He had wanted the ensuing symposium to treat and even focus on axiology in the arts, but the papers answering his call mainly dealt with political and ethical matters. In this introduction he replies chiefly to pieces by the philosophers Richard Rorty and Paul Feyerabend dealing with poverty, famine, sickness, and environmental concerns, but Kermode also addresses and mostly agrees with arguments made in Common Knowledge 1:1 by the philosopher Bernard Williams. (Williams's article, "Left-Wing Wittgenstein," is likewise reprinted in the 2019 anniversary issue.) Kermode's piece concludes by restating the hope of his call for papers that "the matter of literary value" will be treated "in the broad context" that Common Knowledge provides "for discussion of the philosophy of value. Precedence must obviously be given to a planet at risk, but to lose what has been valued in literature is a sure way of increasing the unpleasantness of the future." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The near consensus in the secondary literature on Feyerabend is that his epistemological anarchism, characterized by the slogan ‘anything goes’, was not a positive proposal but the conclusion of a reductio argument against his opponents (Lloyd 1997; Staley 1999; Munévar 2000; Farrell 2003; Tsou 2003; Oberheim 2006; Roe 2009). This makes anarchism a mere criticism rather than a substantive position in its own right. In this paper, I argue that Feyerabend held anarchism as a positive thesis. Specifically, I present two possible interpretations of anarchism: one where anarchism is entailed by Feyerabend's radical view of pluralism and another where scientists must be ‘methodological opportunists’, which Feyerabend held simultaneously from at least 1970. I then consider how these positions fare against the more influential criticisms of anarchism (Nagel 1977; Worrall 1978; Godfrey-Smith 2003). I conclude by suggesting two avenues to constraining a literal interpretation of ‘anything goes’ on Feyerabendian grounds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that essential features of Feyerabend's philosophy, namely his radicalization of critical rationalism and his turn to relativism, could be understood better in the light of his engagement with early Greek thought. In contrast to his earlier, Popperian views he came to see the Homeric worldview as a genuine alternative, which was not falsified by the Presocratics. Unlike socio–psychological and externalist accounts my reading of his published and unpublished material suggests that his alternative reconstruction of the ancient beginnings of the Western scientific tradition motivate and justify his moderate Protagorean relativism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend promote incommensurability as a central component of their conflicting accounts of the nature of science. This paper argues that in so doing, they both develop Albert Einstein's views, albeit in different directions. Einstein describes scientific revolutions as conceptual replacements, not mere revisions, endorsing ‘Kant-on-wheels’ metaphysics in light of ‘world change’. Einstein emphasizes underdetermination of theory by evidence, rational disagreement in theory choice, and the non-neutrality of empirical evidence. Einstein even uses the term ‘incommensurable’ specifically to apply to challenges posed to comparatively evaluating scientific theories in 1949, more than a decade before Kuhn and Feyerabend. This analysis shows how Einstein anticipates substantial components of Kuhn and Feyerabend's views, and suggests that there are strong reasons to suspect that Kuhn and Feyerabend were directly inspired by Einstein's use of the term ‘incommensurable’, as well as his more general methodological and philosophical reflections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reconstructs, and distinguishes between, Feyerabend's different forms of relativism in his later writings. Science in a Free Society remains close to familiar forms of relativism, while, at the same time, developing an original but under-argued form of political relativism, and rejecting “conversion” models of cultural exchange. Farewell to Reason moves away from common renderings of relativism, and develops a range of different new forms. Central here are links between relativism, skepticism and infallibilism. In the last six years of his life, Feyerabend often criticizes a peculiar radical form of relativism that arguably no-one has ever proposed or defended. In the same context, Feyerabend sketches an “ontological” form of relativism. It combines “Kantian humility”, metaphysical pluralism and constructivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this paper is to provide an interpretation of Feyerabend's metaphysics of science as found in late works like Conquest of Abundance and Tyranny of Science . Feyerabend's late metaphysics consists of an attempt to criticize and provide a systematic alternative to traditional scientific realism, a package of views he sometimes referred to as “scientific materialism.” Scientific materialism is objectionable not only on metaphysical grounds, nor because it provides a poor ground for understanding science, but because it implies problematic claims about the epistemic and cultural authority of science, claims incompatible with situating science properly in democratic societies. I show how Feyerabend's metaphysical view, which I call “the abundant world” or “abundant realism,” constitute a sophisticated and challenging form of ontological pluralism that makes interesting connections with contemporary philosophy of science and issues of the political and policy role of science in a democratic society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares Feyerabend's arguments in Science in a Free Society to the controversial theory of expertise proposed by Harry Collins and Robert Evans as a Third Wave of Science Studies . Is the legitimacy of democratic decisions threatened by the unquestioned authority of scientific advice? Or does, on the contrary, science need protection from too much democratic participation in technical decisions? Where Feyerabend's political relativism envisions democratic society as inherently pluralist and demands equal contribution of all traditions and worldviews to public decision-making, Collins and Evans hold a conception of elective modernism , defending the reality and value of technical expertise and arguing that science deserves a privileged status in modern democracies, because scientific values are also democratic values. I will argue that Feyerabend's political relativism provides a valuable framework for the evaluation of Collins' and Evans' theory of expertise. By constructing a dialog between Feyerabend and this more recent approach in Science and Technology Studies, the aim of this article is not only to show where the two positions differ and in what way they might be reconciled, but also how Feyerabend's philosophy provides substantial input to contemporary debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to offer a sympathetic reconstruction of the political thought of Paul Feyerabend. Using a critical discussion of the idea of the ‘free society’ it is suggested that his political thought is best understood in terms of three thematic concerns— liberation , hegemony , and the authority of science—and that the political significance of those claims become clear when they are considered in the context of his educational views. It emerges that Feyerabend is best understood as calling for the grounding of cognitive and cultural authorities—like the sciences—in informed deliberation, rather than the uncritical embrace of prevailing convictions. It therefore emerges that a free society is best understood as one of epistemically responsible citizenship rather than epistemically anarchistic relativism of the ‘anything goes’ sort—a striking anticipation of current debates about philosophy of science in society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, three theories of progress and the aim of science are discussed: ( i ) the theory of progress as increasing explanatory power, advocated by Popper in The logic of scientific discovery (1935/1959); ( ii ) the theory of progress as approximation to the truth, introduced by Popper in Conjectures and refutations (1963); ( iii ) the theory of progress as a steady increase of competing alternatives, which Feyerabend put forward in the essay “Reply to criticism. Comments on Smart, Sellars and Putnam” (1965) and defended as late as the last edition of Against method (1993). It is argued that, contrary to what Feyerabend scholars have predominantly assumed, Feyerabend's changing attitude towards falsificationism—which he often advocated at the beginning of his career, and vociferously attacked in the 1970s and 1980s—must be explained by taking into account not only Feyerabend's very peculiar view of the aim of science, but also Popper's changing account of progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1966, Paul Feyerabend published a short essay on the relation between dialectical materialist philosophy and Niels Bohr's quantum theory, in which he develops several provocative ideas about the relations between science, ideology and society. I use Feyerabend's essay to construct an account of his 'Dadaist' philosophical methodology. I argue that Dadaism is an ironic form of intellectual seriousness, such that the Dadaist is prepared to take any idea or practice seriously as a potentially valuable contribution to collective human thought and action (despite any diverging personal convictions), especially if they find such engagement to be lacking in their local culture. I identify a weakness in Feyerabend's formulation of Dadaism, so far as it is conceived as a matter of individual epistemic character and thus fails to account for the role of the social structure of intellectual activity. This weakness can be remedied by supplementing philosophical Dadaism with descriptions of the kinds of institutions and incentive structures that might cultivate its constitutive epistemic dispositions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Cottingham and Holland make a persuasive case for the claim that it is difficult to situate a meaningful life within a Darwinian naturalistic cosmology, this paper argues that their case should be modified in response to the apparent fact that certain persons seem genuinely not to experience the 'bleakness' that they describe. Although certain of these cases will reflect an incomplete appreciation of the existential implications of Darwinian naturalism, at least some of those cases may be genuine. The resulting possibility that certain persons can embrace Darwinian naturalism and live meaningful lives in apparent immunity to the 'bleakness charge' therefore poses new puzzles for Cottingham and Holland, and for wider questions about the meaningfulness of human life. I consider that possibility in light of the work of David E. Cooper and Paul Feyerabend and offer a set of three suggestions for further developing these debates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paul Feyerabend argued that theories can be faced with experimental anomalies whose refuting character can only be recognized by developing alternatives to the theory. The alternate theory must explain the experimental results without contrivance and it must also be supported by independent evidence. I show that the situation described by Feyerabend arises again and again in experiments or observations that test the postulates in the standard cosmological model relating to dark matter. The alternate theory is Milgrom's modified dynamics (MOND). I discuss three examples: the failure to detect dark-matter particles in laboratory experiments; the lack of evidence for dark-matter sub-haloes and the dwarf galaxies that are postulated to inhabit them; and the failure to confirm the predicted orbital decay of Milky Way satellite galaxies and other systems due to dynamical friction against the dark matter. In each case, Feyerabend's criterion directs us to interpret the experimental or observational results as an indirect refutation of the standard cosmological model in favor of Milgrom's theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thomas Kuhn claims that all scientific discoveries share the same characteristics: namely, an awareness of anomaly and an emergence of observational and conceptual recognition leading to a change of paradigm categories and procedures. He does not, however, discuss how new hypotheses or explanations are formed or invented. Paul Feyerabend claims that scientific progress results from a range of sociological factors which work to promote politically convenient notions of how nature operates. In this paper, I argue that science can benefit from revolutionary social circumstances; that the social circumstances in force at the time that, for instance, Johannes Kepler developed his theories of planetary motion, created an environment which encouraged, albeit indirectly, revolutionary scientific thinking; that there is no Kuhnian scientific revolution without revolutionary hypotheses; and that the formation or invention of these revolutionary hypotheses is a creative act that requires an environment that encourages creativity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In the following pages, a hermeneutical exploration is conducted: Richard Dawkins' work The Selfish Gene will be analyzed according to the anarchistic way of understanding science that philosopher Paul K. Feyerabend posits in his work Against Method. No specific attitude towards these authors is intended here; the aim of the paper is instead a complementary approach to both theories, an exercise that will hopefully prove useful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his shattering criticism, Paul Feyerabend charges against the scientific method, rationalism, theory creations and their uses, research and knowledge generation. He labeled this (philosophical) pounding as epistemological anarchism. It is frequently taken for granted that the conjunction between anarchism and epistemology is 'well' applied (or conceived). And it seems to be that nobody asks. In this paper, the aforementioned application of anarchism to epistemology is disputed. Moreover, within the context of Feyerabend's opus, the common epithet that both masks and veils is elucidated. At a tangent, this work confronts Kroppotkin's anarchism along with its contribution to the philosophy of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The history of the philosophy of thought experiments (TEs) has touched on the work of Kuhn, Popper, Duhem, Mach, Lakatos, and other big names of the twentieth-century. But so far, almost nothing has been written about Paul Feyerabend. His most influential work was Against Method , eight chapters of which concern Galileo, with a significant focus on Galileo's TEs. The later Feyerabend was interested in what might be called the epistemology of drama, including stories and myths. This article brings these aspects of Feyerabend's work together in an attempt to present what might have been his considered views on scientific TEs. According to Feyerabend, TEs are a special kind of story that can help to demolish a dominant myth and instigate a new one through the use of propaganda to change our habits, by appealing to our sense of what is interesting, appealing, revealing, comprehensible, coherent, and surprising. I conclude by contrasting Feyerabend's ideas with two currents in the modern debate on TEs: (1) the claim that the epistemology of TEs is just the epistemology of deductive or inductive arguments and (2) the claim that a complete epistemology of TEs must take into account the fact that TEs are a kind of narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a paper which indicates one of Paul Feyerabend's divided legacy, which pertains the Feyerabend's retreat from realism. Indepth look at Feyerabend's early scientific realism; Conclusions reached on Feyerabend's voluntarism.

The problem of the empirical basis is one of the most prominent difficulties within the Popperian tradition. Some claim that Popper's anti-inductivism and antipsychologism lead to the concession that science has no empirical basis. Recent commentators have focused on this problem in Popper's methodology. However, the problem also arises in a peculiar way in the thought of two underdiscussed members of the Popperian tradition: William Bartley and Paul Feyerabend. In this article, I aim to accomplish three primary goals. First, I argue that defenses of Popper's solution to the problem of the empirical basis fail to address the deeper issues that have been pointed out by Popper's critics. Second, I show how, despite Bartley's efforts, he also succumbs to a modified version of the problem of the empirical basis. However, Bartley's later work in evolutionary epistemology provides a more sensible response to the problem. Finally, I show how the problem arises in two distinct senses within Feyerabend's methodology. I show how Feyerabend accidentally dissolves one sense of the problem and then provide a proposal for remedying the second version of the problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though tourism research has become more value-laden in its scholarship and pedagogy, there is still a risk that tourism higher education curricula (re)produce uncritical views of society and sustainability. I argue that research methodology courses and assignments based on data collection can legitimize the use of sustainable tourism solutions based in generalizations and abstractions, rather than encourage the dialogue and reflectivity needed for major change in times of crisis. They also risk promoting a self-serving agenda where researchers (re)produce their success in the knowledge economy. In light of the limitations of the sustainability concept in time of planetary crisis, I look into the possibilities of a tourism research pedagogy in the Anthropocene by uncovering arguments for plurality and deliberation in knowledge production. Social scientists need to address questions of ethics in times of crisis. Conjointly, the Anthropocene highlights our planetary attachment, where human responsibility and social action are imminent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After his death, Paul Feyerabend, the philosopher of science, was labeled, not altogether seriously, as "the worst enemy of science." He often favorably compared theologians to scientists, and yet there is little real comfort for theology in his writings. His anarchic epistemology is destructive for any philosophical system which wishes to retain the claim that it is scientific, truth-telling, rational, and methodical. Can theology therefore withstand this anarchic challenge? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Groundwork Kant refers to the analogy between the moral law and the law of nature when clarifying the concept of the categorical imperative. However, in the Groundwork itself, he does not give any further explanation as to why he introduces the analogy. Therefore, I take the Groundwork as a starting point of my article, but then I explicate on the analogy from a broader perspective, focusing especially on his lecture courses Moral Mrongovius II and Naturrecht Feyerabend as well as on his Typic chapter of the second Critique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paul Feyerabend once suggested that his pragmatic theory of observation can be traced back to proposals put forward by leading Logical Empiricists during the height of the protocol sentence debate. In this article, I want to vindicate the systematic side of Feyerabend’s remark and show that a pragmatic theory of observation can in fact be found in Rudolf Carnap’s writings of 1932. I first proceed to dispel a misunderstanding concerning the term “pragmatic” raised by Thomas Oberdan. Following Charles William Morris’s and Carnap’s documented usage, I show that the intended meaning of “pragmatic” refers to a specific semiotic relation between users of a language and their environment describable by empirical means (specifically, the causal relation between the verbal behavior of language users and their environment). I reconstruct such a pragmatic theory in terms of a detector model that interprets observation sentences as bodily dispositions indicating physical events in the surroundings of the detector. I then proceed to show how Feyerabend’s later theory of observation picks up central features of Carnap’s account and also shares some of the motivations. I conclude by noting how an empirical theory of observation sentences offers a bootstrapping solution to the “basis problem.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Up to the introduction of the term and concept of incommensurability by T. S. Kuhn and P. K. Feyerabend in the early 1960s, scientific texts were supposed to pose no problem as regards their translation, unlike literature, which was thought very difficult to translate. After the introduction of the term, translation of scientific language became equally problematic because, due to conceptual and perceptual incommensurability, there was no common observation basis to ground linguistic equivalences between languages of incommensurable paradigms. This article highlights the presuppositions that link incommensurability to dramatic consequences (impossibility of communication, translation, and comparative evaluation of paradigms) and tries to sketch an alternative way of understanding incommensurability and translation drawing on Kuhn's work. From this perspective, translation is not an all-or-nothing affair for either science or literature and becomes a problem to be solved for each particular set of circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article synthesizes Paul Feyerabend's controversial contributions to 20th-century philosophy of science through the synthesis of his works and the secondary literature, with specific foci on current trends in educational foundations and the potentials and pitfalls for applying Feyerabendian logics to our work. First, I situate his strains of thought within 20th-century philosophy of science contributions from Popper, Lakatos, and Kuhn. Drawing on this explication, the second section pushes against the primary misconception/controversy regarding Feyerabend as ascience-hater. In reality, his contributions promote a pluralistic methodology, termed by Feyerabend (1975) as “anarchist epistemologies,” whereby (a) knowledge seekers draw from scientific methodologies and other traditions to develop competing theories and (b) they adjudicate the best methods to move forward as they seek knowledge and/or solve problems. In the third section, I tease out Feyerabend's complicated relationship to anarchism, where, on the one hand, he himself denounced political anarchism and, on the other, Feyerabend committed to anarchism by using its theory to discuss knowledge production and the role of science in society. Finally, a concluding discussion makes more explicit the specific relevance of these arguments to trends in educational foundations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary scholars seeking to advance the study of political phenomena identify their inquiry as a ‘science' that attains success through rigorous method. Thus the ‘methodological anarchism' of Paul Feyerabend's philosophy of science might seem an inauspicious place to find a fruitful disciplinary vision. Nonetheless, it echoes a longstanding conception of the ‘science' of politics articulated by Niccolò Machiavelli. Looking to Feyerabend, we propose to surmount the impasse between Machiavelli's account of politics and the demands of modern science and recover his contribution to the scientific study of politics. In doing so, Machiavelli illustrates the potential of a Feyerabendian political science. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article asks whether the philosophy of Paul K. Feyerabend can be reasonably classified as postmodernist, a label applied to him by friends and foes alike. After describing some superficial similarities between the style and content of both Feyerabend’s and postmodernist writings, I offer three more robust characterisations of postmodernism in terms of relativism, ‘incredulity to metanarratives’, and ‘depthlessness’. It emerges that none of these characterisations offers a strong justification for classifying Feyerabend as ‘postmodern’ in any significant sense. Indeed, what does emerge is that Feyerabend’s work was fundamentally informed by a humanitarian vision of the value of science that is, in fact, strikinglymodern. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

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Theory-ladenness is the view that observation cannot function in an unbiased way in the testing of theories because observational judgments are affected by the theoretical beliefs of the observer. Its more radical cousin, incommensurability, argues that because there is no theory-neutral language, paradigms, or worldviews, cannot be compared because in different paradigms the meaning of observational terms is different, even when the word used is the same. There are both philosophical and practical components to these problems. I argue, using a procedurally-defined, theory-neutral experiment that paradigms are indeed commensurable. The practical problems of theory ladenness include experimental design, failure to interpret observations correctly, possible experimenter bias, and difficulties in data acquisition. I suggest that there are methods to deal with these problems, although sometimes they cannot be dealt with completely. I believe that the philosophical problems of theory-ladenness have been solved, although the practical problems remain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]