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The recognition of human rights has had a revolutionary influence on the international and national legal fields that is outlined in this chapter. Revolution is a term frequent in human rights literature. The Human Rights Revolution was a triple one: The human being has been recognized as the ethical-legal supreme universal value and gained international personality. Human rights have been internationally proclaimed, and mechanisms, including Courts, have been established for their protection. International Human Rights Law principles became the Law of Law, prompting ongoing changes of the international and national legal landscapes. There has been a Copernican revolution in classic International Law. A New Constitutionalism has arisen too. The new International and Constitutional Law led to a refounding of the concept of Rule of Law, implying the rethinking of democracy. Humanity is a notion polarizing core principles of morality. The notion of `crimes against humanity' consecrates Humanity as rights-holder, embracing both the dignity of the whole human species and the uniqueness of each human being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on several defective products which brought changes in the legal rules to protect the consumers. It informs that the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 was passed by Congress in effect of a public outcry due to consumption of an antibiotic called Elixir Sulfanilamide. It further informs the establishment of strict liability rule for defective products by Roger Traynor, Supreme Court Justice, California in response to the case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products.

Chapter 13 of the book "Withdrawal From Iraq: Assessing the Readiness of Iraqi Security Forces" is presented. It summarizes the challenges and problems that come with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and the creation of effective Iraqi security forces (ISF). Among the important factors affecting the development of ISF are political divisions, ethnic and sectarian tensions, lack of procurement plans, lack of governance, rule of law, government services and spending, and budget shortfall.

Chapter 11 of the book "Withdrawal From Iraq: Assessing the Readiness of Iraqi Security Forces" is presented. It discusses the challenges that come with the further development of Iraqi paramilitary and security forces as well as the reforms of Iraq's criminal justice system and the establishment of the rule of law. These forces are the Counter-Terrorism Bureau and Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Force, Iraqi Special Operations Forces, Directorate of Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry Directorate, Oil Police, and the Facilities Protection Services.

Chapter 9 of the book "Withdrawal From Iraq: Assessing the Readiness of Iraqi Security Forces" is presented. It discusses the challenges in the development of Iraqi security forces particularly in the expansion of the Iraqi Police. Among the important issues affecting the development of the Iraqi Police are the quality and quantity of police manpower, training, leadership, the shift from paramilitary and security missions to conventional policing and the establishment of the rule of law.

The pace of change is accelerating in international politics, yet social science remains a notoriously poor guide to understanding and shaping it. The waning of sharp military rivalries among the great powers, America's unprecedented position of material dominance, its struggle against hydra-headed terrorist networks, and the rise of global advocacy politics suggest that the basic shape of the international order is changing. Old conceptions of international order and the role of violence in it have been overtaken by events. However, new visions of international order that are prominent in the academy and in the world of affairs often misunderstand the relationship between material and normative change. People who act on these mistaken assumptions may unintentionally hinder the achievement of their goals of peace and democracy. According to the realist school of international relations, which dominated American academic thought for half a century, politics among states is ordered only in the thin sense that their struggle for security in international anarchy recurrently produces balance-of-power behaviors, such as the formation of military alliances against strong, threatening states. Realists portray this order as timeless, changing only in its details since Thucydides, depending on the number of great powers and the ebb and flow of their relative strength (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). In today's unipolar circumstances, where American power cannot be balanced in the traditional sense, many prominent international relations scholars still adopt a state-centered power-politics framework as a starting point, though not necessarily the end point, of their analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conclusion to the book "The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State," by Noah Feldman is presented. It highlights the question on the capability of Islamism to promulgate a rule of law which is not corrupt. Furthermore, it explains how Islamism in a Islamic state can promote justice to its constituents.

Due to the new wave of danger of trans-national crime in a time of globalization and considering that organized crime and terrorism are becoming more prevalent and global, the European states are prepared to leave behind a part of their national sovereignty to establish closer cooperation to address these problems. Otherwise, the states are left out and can not prevent and fight these problems as isolated national governments. Even though open borders and advanced technology enabled fast development of international trade and global commerce, they have also led to a dramatic increase in the number of criminal groups engaged in activities throughout nations, regions, and continents. These trans-national criminal organizations have acquired huge assets that are further used for other illegal activities. Establishing joint international cooperation for law enforcement institutions based on a powerful legal foundation is the only response to these emerging criminal threats. The international documents and projects relating to the development of regional cooperation in South-East Europe represent an excellent opportunity for efficient cooperation toward the end of organized crime prevention and suppression. Having received country-candiate status for European Union (EU) membership in 2005, the Republic of Macedonia actively contributes to strengthening confidence between the foreign services partners in the fight against crime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whose democracy is it anyway? Introduction Although the populist radical right is not antidemocratic in a procedural sense, as argued in chapter 1, core tenets of its ideology stand in fundamental tension with liberal democracy. Various authors have discussed this tension, although mostly at an abstract level without much reference to concrete positions of the parties in question (e.g. Betz 2004; Decker 2004; see also Lipset 1955). To understand the nature and scope of this tension, we must examine the societal and systemic consequences of the three key features of the populist radical right: nativism, authoritarianism and populism. The following sections will discuss the populist radical right parties' views on nativist democracy, authoritarian democracy, and populist democracy, respectively. In the conclusion the populist radical right view of democracy will be constructed and compared to the key features of liberal democracy in general, and the way they are implemented in contemporary European countries in particular. This exercise should also help provide a clearer insight into the key question on the mind of many authors and, indeed, readers: how dangerous are populist radical right parties for liberal democracy? Nativist democracy: it's our country! The key concept of the populist radical right is nativism, the ideology that a state should comprise “natives” and that “nonnatives” are to be treated with hostility. Like all ideologues, nativists are torn between the ideal and the practice, the dream and the reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction The relationship between the common law and statute law is a subject of debate. The controversy goes deeper than questions of interpretation, such as – given the doctrine of legislative supremacy over the common law – why, how, and to what extent the meaning of a statute can legitimately be governed by common law principles. The answers to those questions depend partly on more basic issues concerning the legal foundations of the two bodies of law, and their respective status. The orthodox view is that because Parliament can enact statutes that override any part of the common law, statute law is superior to common law. But according to an increasingly popular theory, Britain's “unwritten” constitution consists of common law principles, and therefore Parliament's authority to enact statutes derives from the common law. As Trevor Allan puts it, “the common law is prior to legislative supremacy, which it defines and regulates.” This theory has become so popular that even the British government has endorsed it. When the Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith was asked in Parliament what was the government's understanding of “the legal sources from which the legislative powers of Parliament are derived,” he replied, “The source of the legislative powers is the common law.” This theory threatens to invert the relationship between statute law and common law as traditionally understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction In anglophone legal systems, the common law provides a constitutional foundation for legitimate government. It embodies a tradition of governmental compliance with the rule of law, subjecting official decisions and actions to independent judicial scrutiny. The evolution of common law principle, prompted by changing moral attitudes within society at large, provides for the adaptation of traditional values to present conditions. It enables the abstract clauses of a “written” constitution to acquire new meaning and gives an “unwritten” constitution its principal legal content. In performing such important tasks, moreover, the common law presupposes a distinctive vision of liberal democracy: It aspires to nurture and sustain a coherent constitutional morality, reflecting widely shared commitments to a fundamental ideal of equal justice. In a common law legal order, authoritative texts – whatever their formal status – are interpreted as elements of that larger constitutional design. Their true meaning and legal consequences are always matters of conscientious moral judgment, undertaken within the context of a strong legal tradition: The exercise of power is everywhere subject to moral scrutiny and the standing requirement of reasoned justification. In the context of a common law rule, the notion of legal “validity” is largely redundant. The rule announced by the court in an earlier case may be relevant to the current inquiry, yet have little or no force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In dealing with the antinomy of reason and fiat, the main effort of the various schools of legal philosophy has been to obliterate one of its branches. [T]he historical study of legal institutions may have more to offer to … [the] … solution [of the problems of legal theory] than has yet been appreciated. The common law tradition claims not only that the law is reason but also that the reason of the law is morally good. Judges' reasons for decision, their judgments, are considered within this tradition to be evidence for this claim, for the way in which the common law “works itself pure.” Philosophers of law who work in common law jurisdictions have taken one of three approaches to this claim. First, there are philosophers who have tried to make sense of the common law through an argument that in attending to the way that judges interpret the law, we will not only best understand law but also discern the connection between law and morality. We will call such philosophers, without any pejorative intent, common law romantics. Most notable among them is Ronald Dworkin. Second, philosophers have argued that the common law is a mess – in Jeremy Bentham's words, a “shapeless heap of odds and ends.” Such a mess, Bentham argued, leads to uncertainty about the law that not only is contrary to the demands of utility but permits “Judge & Co.” to arrogate power that properly belongs to the legislature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]