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This text provides an introduction to the topic of rational decision making as well as a brief overview of the most common biases in judgment and decision making. "Decision Making" is relatively short (300 pages) and richly illustrated with approximately 100 figures. It is suitable for both self-study and as the basis for an upper-division undergraduate course in judgment and decision making. The book is written to be accessible to anybody with minimum knowledge of mathematics (high-school level algebra and some elementary notions of set theory and probability, which are reviewed in the book). At the end of each chapter there is a collection of exercises that are grouped according to that chapter’s sections. Complete and detailed answers for each exercise are given in the last section of each chapter. The book contains a total of 121 fully solved exercises.

Collective decision making involves on the one hand individual mental states such as beliefs, emotions and intentions, and on the other hand interaction with others with possibly different mental states. Achieving a satisfactory common group decision on which all agree requires that such mental states are adapted to each other by social interaction. Recent developments in Social Neuroscience have revealed neural mechanisms by which such mutual adaptation can be realised. These mechanisms not only enable intentions to converge to an emerging common decision, but at the same time enable to achieve shared underlying individual beliefs and emotions. This paper presents a computational model for such processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chapter 7 of the book "Psychiatric Mental Health Nursing: Concepts of Care in Evidence-Based Practice" is presented. It explains several subroles within the psychiatric nurse's role. It identifies several characteristics that are necessary in the development of therapeutic relationship between nurses and their clients. It cites various reasons for the termination of such relationship.

In this chapter I argue for the importance of a specific kind of abstract analytical theorizing that differs from many other types of sociological theorizing in its focus on social mechanisms. A social mechanism, as defined here, is a constellation of entities and activities that are linked to one another in such a way that they regularly bring about a particular type of outcome. We explain an observed phenomenon by referring to the social mechanism by which such a phenomenon is regularly brought about. The purpose of the chapter is threefold. First, I very briefly discuss different notions of theorizing within contemporary sociology. Sociology is a fragmented discipline and theorizing means different things to different sociologists. Second, I consider at some length what ‘explanation’ entails. Sociologists differ not only on what they consider to be the objective of theorizing, but also on the meanings they attach to the concept of ‘explanation.’ Third, I discuss in some detail the main thrust of the mechanism-based approach developed here. As this brief synopsis indicates, in this chapter I touch upon a range of difficult problems related to causation and explanation. It goes without saying that a discussion of such vast and difficult problems runs the risk of being perceived as shallow. But the purpose of the chapter must be kept in mind. My intention is not to contribute to the theory of explanations or to the philosophy of the social sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When discussing the relationship between sociological theory and empirical research, Merton always emphasized how each draws strength from the other (e.g., Merton 1968c). Without theory, empirical research often lacks wider significance, and without empirical research, sociological theory easily turns into fictitious storytelling. Although most of us recognize the importance of a symbiotic relationship between theory and research, the current division of labour within the discipline would suggest otherwise. Most theorists specialize in theory and have little or no contact with empirical research, while empirical researchers are rarely seriously interested in theory. In an influential article, Goldthorpe (1996) discussed how one can bridge this gap between theory and empirical research by establishing a closer link between action-based theories and quantitative research. He argued that the contribution of quantitative research to sociology ‘will be seriously limited unless it is allied in some way or other to accounts of social action’ (1996: 111). For a variety of reasons Goldthorpe meant that rational-choice theory was particularly well suited to this purpose. Like Edling (2000), we have a somewhat mixed attitude towards some of the details in Goldthorpe's proposal. On the one hand his arguments for establishing close links between action-based theories and quantitative research are important and to the point. On the other hand his reasons for believing that rational-choice theory is uniquely suited to integrating quantitative research and sociological theory are not as persuasive. What sociology seems to need is not to bind itself to one specific substantive theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

So far this book has been exclusively concerned with theory. Chapter 2 focused on theories of explanation, chapter 4 on theories of action and chapter 3 on theories linking individual action to social outcomes. This chapter and the next are concerned with the relationship between theory and empirical research. In this chapter I continue the discussion started in chapter 2 about statistical explanations; chapter 6 illustrates how one can establish a close link between the type of theory discussed in previous chapters and quantitative empirical analyses. As will be seen below, I have many objections to the way quantitative research is conducted today, but I nevertheless believe that quantitative research is essential for sociology. Although qualitative research can be important for the development of explanatory theory, it lacks the reliability and generalizability of quantitative research, and this is critical if sociology is to be a rigorous science of the social. The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section I describe the main currents of causal modelling. I then spell out in some detail why I find these traditions wanting. The discussion centres on four topics, (1) the weak theoretical foundation of many causal models, (2) the excessive importance given to predictive accuracy, (3) the lack of attention given to the role of social interactions, and (4) the focus on individual rather than social outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the previous chapter I focused on the characteristics of explanatory theories. I made a distinction between covering-law explanations, statistical explanations and mechanism-based explanations, and I suggested that the advancement of sociological theory largely hinges on our ability to develop precise mechanism-based theories. The main reason for this is that we arrive at more intellectually satisfying answers to the question of why we observe the social phenomena we observe if we specify the individual-level mechanisms likely to have brought them about. Furthermore, and as a side effect, this is likely to lead to more useful theories in that detailed knowledge of how things are brought about is useful if one wants to alter a process in a more desirable direction. The most viable alternative to the mechanism-based approach is a statistical approach that directly examines the relationship between variables describing different entities. As the discussion in the previous chapter suggests, such an approach to theory building is prone to difficulties, and a ‘deeper’ causal account can be obtained by explicating mechanisms through which social patterns are likely to have been brought about. The types of mechanisms we are looking for are those concerned with the causes and consequences of individual actions, because, as Popper (1994) expressed it, actions are the ‘animating principles’ of the social. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In chapter 3 I focused on how the actions of individuals can be explained by reference to their beliefs, desires and opportunities, and how these mental states and action opportunities are, in turn, influenced by the actions and behaviours of others. This chapter builds upon and extends this foundation. The explanatory focus is no longer on individual actions, however, but on the macro-level or social phenomena that these actions bring about. As mentioned in chapter 1, the types of social phenomena I focus on are collective properties that are not definable for a single member of the collectivity. Examples of different types of social phenomena and some associated why-questions include: Typical actions, beliefs or desires Why have some racial prejudices changed over time? Why are some communities more conformist than others? Distributions and aggregate patterns Why are some cities more ethnically segregated than others? Why are some societies more unequal than others? Topologies of networks Why are social networks more tightly knit in some communities than in others? Why are some networks highly clustered while others are not? Informal rules or social norms Why are norms of reciprocity common in some groups but not in others? Why are work norms stronger in some societies than in others? In all of these cases, the entity to be explained concerns a social phenomenon that characterizes a collectivity of actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Popular religion – the religion of the generality of people, especially those of the lower orders – is a large subject. It ranges from belief, worship, private prayer, and reading to morality, charity, and the payment of church dues. These elements may vary according to people's gender, age, status, and context, presenting the historian with many aspects to study and evaluate. This chapter is concerned with three of them: worship in church, the economic support of churches, and ceremonies outside church. It begins by reviewing the systems in force in early Tudor England, continues by studying the impact of “state religion” during the Reformation of the mid-sixteenth century, and concludes by tracing the survival of some pre-Reformation beliefs and practices between about 1600 and 1750. To achieve focus, the survey centers on one English county, Cornwall, an appropriate area for this purpose because it is rich both in pre-Reformation records of popular religion and in literary descriptions of its society and customs after the Reformation. Some features of Cornish popular religion were characteristic of other parts of England and illustrate general conditions. Equally, Cornwall had attributes distinct to itself, like all English counties, and some of these were untypical of England elsewhere. Its study reveals both national verities and regional variations. Cornwall is England's most maritime county: a long peninsula attached to the mainland by a short land border with Devon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our theme is religion and the early modern state, with all the polarities such a title implies. In this chapter, I want to consider the impact of the Reformation in a community in which “folk belief” and the state religion – or at any rate the religion of the local clerical and social elites – were intimately bound together, and in which the social, economic, and religious dynamics and interests of the community were represented and inscribed in a great building, one of the most harmonious perpendicular churches of fifteenth-century England. I want to explore the way in which that building even now encodes the interplay of social realities and relations within a gentry-dominated community on the eve of the Reformation. I also want to raise some questions about the extent to which the Reformation should be considered not an act of state so much as an assertion of social hegemony, a radical simplification of social as well as religious space, the elimination or overwhelming of some of the key constituent elements in the balance of a late medieval community. THE PARISH OF SALLE The great church of Salle stands isolated in the north Norfolk fields near Aylsham: There is no longer anything that could be called a village. The parish was once a rich and important place, weaving linen and Hessian for the region as well as wool, but there were never enough people in Salle to fill the church. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Counter-Reformation was for Spain, as it was for other European countries, a great watershed, a time when longstanding beliefs and behaviors usually characterized as traditional or medieval were discarded in favor of new ones. Official changes in religious ideas were made carefully, for early modern theologians and rulers fully understood both religion's integrative and disintegrative power. They saw the intimate connection between formal theology and social dealings, and if they embarked on the perilous course of changing religious law, they also expected concomitant change in society. Early modern people intuitively understood Clifford Geertz's conclusion that culture does not consist of a catalog of gestures per se but of the meanings that give gestures their significance, hence their willingness to fight (endlessly, it seems to us) over the religious laws and symbols, both humble and exalted, that gave meaning to their lives. Both Reformations are distinguished by their self-conscious efforts to direct the beliefs and actions of entire populations or, to put it another way, their attempt to ensure cultural conformity through the shared understanding of symbols of faith. No transformation of cultural attitudes had been attempted on this scale in Europe since the original conversion of the Germanic tribes in the early Middle Ages, which took place under vastly different circumstances. This early modern battle for symbols and souls was waged on several fronts, through religious education, propaganda, and social discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]