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Water management is, by definition, conflict management. It is a resource on which we all depend, it fluctuates in time and space and its management is usually fragmented. That said, there is no such thing as managing water for a single purpose – all water management is multi-objective and based on navigating competing interests. Nevertheless, conflict is not a given. While it may be the focus of press reports of international waters, there is clear evidence from around the world that water issues also induce cooperation. This is even the case in ˵hostile″ basins where disputes rage over other issues, such as the Jordan River basin. There is certainly a long history of tensions over, or related to, shared freshwater resources, but there is also a lengthy, and in many ways deeper, history of water-related cooperation. Despite empirical research that finds that water-related cooperation overwhelms conflict over the last 50 years (see, most recently, Wolf et al., 2003), prevailing theories fail to explain this phenomenon. Why do countries that share a basin cooperate on water, even when they will not cooperate over other issues? By any quantitative measure, water should be the most conflictive of resources, not an elixir that drives enemies to craft functioning and resilient institutional arrangements. We examine these questions historically, yet, recognizing that history-based indicators may lose validity over time in a rapidly changing world, we focus on future issues that may look nothing like the past. Five critical areas related to water resources will change dramatically in coming years: 1. New technologies for negotiation and management are being implemented, changing the face of both. 2. Globalization, privatization and the WTO are impacting our valuation of water, and its place in relation to rights and responsibilities. 3. Global climate change may shift precipitation patterns, dramatically impacting water resources management. 4. The geopolitics of desalination is shifting, as cost becomes viable at a larger scale. 5. The nature of conflict and cooperation are changing in both scope and scale. Keywords: Shared waters; transboundary waters; hydropolitics; desalination; WTO [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1991 opened a new frontier in globalization: the economic integration of the Eurasian “super-continent.” This chapter explores the process and prospects of integration on the huge land mass that stretches from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the Arctic Sea to the Indian Ocean, principally focusing on the economic dimensions of the integration process in Eurasia. It compiles evidence on integration in the areas of energy and non-energy trade and transport, illicit drug trade, investment and capital flows, migration, and communication and knowledge. It concludes with a consideration of the institutional and political dimensions that affect regional cooperation in Eurasia and offers some broad policy recommendations. The Eurasian continental space was integrated for centuries, if not millennia, of pre-modern history. Anthropologists speculate that much of modern humanity originated in and spread from the Mongolian steppes millions of years ago. Waves of conquerors, among them Attila the Hun and Genghis Khan, followed these early migrations. The Great Silk Road (represented in a stylized manner in Chart 10.1) serves as the epitome of Eurasian economic and cultural connectedness. It ran east to west from the Yellow Sea through Central Asia, the Mediterranean, and on to Western Europe. The route also connected the Indian subcontinent and what are now the northern reaches of Russia (Hopkirk, 1980). Commerce, culture, and religion spread along this route, as did conflict and disease, including the Black Death of the mid-fourteenth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction The accession of ten new member states to the European Union on May 1, 2004, brought deep changes to Europe's political economy, both toward the new member states and the EU's “new neighbors” to the east and south. To formulate a policy toward these “new neighbors,” the European Commission (EC) presented the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) strategy paper, setting out a new framework for relations and financial support for the neighborhood countries in May 2004 (EC, 2004a). The neighbors in question were Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and the Palestinian Authority, with the recommendation to also include Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Russia was included as a privileged partner. Then European Commission President Romano Prodi described the goal of the ENP as seeking to create a “ring of friends” around the EU, by offering close cooperation on issues ranging from political dialogue to economic integration. This initiative was supposed to allow these neighbors to participate in major EU policies and programs, and ultimately in the EU's single market. ENP participants were expected to form a relationship with the EU similar to that of the European Economic Area (EEA) members, such as Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. This chapter describes the general framework of the EU's emerging relationship with its new neighbors and explores the potential economic impact of the ENP, both for the EU itself and for its neighbors in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cultural allegiances whether inherited, imposed or chosen, affect economic activity. Many of these cultural layers - ethnic background, religion, language, ideological orientation, and artistic interests - spill over national boundaries. Cultural ideas travel the world along many routes from the Silk Road to modern electronic networks. Historically, peripatetic artists, composers and writers have responded to shifting patronage and market opportunities. More recently, firms in the cultural industries develop and produce content and distribute it as widely as the market will bear. Visual and performing arts and the cultural industries have both common and distinct international economic dimensions. In trade agreements, countries voluntarily limit their policy options in return for restrictions on the choices of the other member countries. Arguments for protection versus openness for cultural activities are more complex and nuanced than for other economic sectors because of a wide range of views on how international cultural policy affects individuals and the national culture. The inclusion of GATS and TRIPS in the WTO made theWTO a more important influence on international cultural policy than its GATT predecessor. UNESCO continues to play a complementary role. The Florence agreement (1950) encourages the free flow of cultural products and a convention addresses illicit trade in cultural property, a heritage issue. Currently, UNESCO is the focus of efforts to create a rules-based convention to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions, which is designed to either separate international cultural policy governance from the WTO or strengthen the bargaining position of cultural industry interests in WTO negotiations. These discussions take place in circumstances where there are serious shortcomings in the measurement of trade in cultural goods and services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The normalization that China and Vietnam announced in November 1991 was profoundly important. It was a decisive move beyond hostile stalemate. The climate of the official relationships between states and between communist parties changed from a zero-sum confrontation to one emphasizing common ground and cooperation. Practically speaking, however, normalization is a process rather than an event. Gradually the heat of hostility cools down and permits a readjustment of relations, and thus normalization starts from a cold and distant situation in which recent resentments and tensions are pushed out of official view but are not forgotten. The relationship is stable because the alternative of hostility is all too familiar. But it is a new relationship, and each side will be suspicious of the other and will hedge against the other. Bullying and paranoia continue, but under a general flag of truce. Eventually, however, memories of hostility fade and new challenges are faced together. The economic relationship begins to grow and to displace security concerns in the calculations of both sides. The new bilateral relationship affects the structure of regional relations. The new context of normalization is accepted as a continuing reality, and pursuit of opportunities displaces hedging. Normalization evolves into normalcy. Normalcy might be called “mature asymmetry” because it is grounded in a learning experience and it has the capacity to be long term and stable. In mature asymmetry, the deference of b to A and A's acknowledgment of b's autonomy become embedded in mutual expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In November 1991 the General Secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party Do Muoi and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Vietnam Vo Van Kiet visited Beijing at the invitation of Chinese Communist Party Secretary Jiang Zemin and Chinese Premier Li Peng, and a Joint Communiqué was signed on November 10 establishing normal relations between China and Vietnam, ending twelve years of hostility. In one sense this marked the re-establishment of relations, since China had been the first country to extend diplomatic recognition to Ho Chi Minh's government and had been its major supporter during its struggles against the French, the Saigon government, and the Americans. But neither China nor Vietnam viewed the normalization of 1991 as a return to the alliance of 1950–1975. Despite the fact that normalization concluded a decade of bitter hostility in which neither side had triumphed, admitted defeat, or apologized, the era of normalization was immediately accepted by the participants and by external observers as a robust and long-term relationship. Normalization was expected to be a new era of peaceful but not close relations, and from 1999 it has exceeded those expectations by moving from cautious normalization to more integrated normalcy. Why? The shorter the question, the longer the answer. This book attempts to present a holistic view of China and Vietnam in their relationship, and this chapter is in part an introduction to the subject and in part a microcosm of the book. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Domestic Trade Network Post-Soviet Russia has provided the population with consumer goods and services through an expanding network of retail stores, public catering establishments, wholesale trading organizations, and a number of household service institutions involved in information, health, dwellings, culture and science, credit and finance, and so on. What is the pattern of ownership in this sector? How many trading enterprises and workers are engaged in this field? What exactly is the commodity composition of this trade? What is the structure of the households' and of the companies' expenditures in domestic trade? These are the main questions that I consider in this chapter. As I pointed out previously (in Chapter 21), the privatization drive affected between 1992 and 1998 a total of 43,166 retail stores, 9,922 public catering enterprises, and, from 1993 to 1998, 1,517 wholesale trade establishments. During this period, the ownership shares in retail trade turnover changed as indicated in Table 24-1. The share of the state fell from 41 to 7 percent while that of the private sector increased from 52 to 80 percent and that of mixed enterprises from 7 to 13 percent. However, the state still holds blocks of stocks in the large private companies as well as in the mixed ones. Over the period 1993 to 1998, the number of retail and public catering stores increased appreciably, but the number of their workers decreased sharply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]