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Extant research on independent director careers argues that CEOs favor independent directors with social ties. This study departs from the corporate elite view of board studies, which asserts that all social relationships between the CEO and director will be mutually beneficial. This study addresses a critical construct coined as "norm preservation," which suggests that the norm of social experiences between individuals preserve over time. In a norm preservation view, the critical question is, "what is the consequence of the former conforming or conflicting functional norms between the CEO and director to the director's tenure?" To test this idea, we collect a sample of 431 S&P 1000 firms with an independent director-firm-year of 37,056 observations between 2003 and 2012. Using conditional fixed-effects logistic estimation and Cox survival model, we find that the former team-based professional norm between the independent director and CEO is critical in the independent director's tenure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How CEOs influence board vigilance has been studied by constructing that former CEO-director social connections are embedded with trust, therefore mutually beneficial. This study departs from the social network perspectives and find boundary conditions where CEO-director social connections have positive and negative consequences. We use social exchange theory to examines ¡°Which type of social exchange between CEO and the independent director extend independent directorship?¡± We argue that the independent director who have positive social exchange with the CEO have greater chance for extending independent director service, while negative social exchange with the CEO reduces the probability of survival. To test our ideas, we construct a sample of 431 S&P 1500 firms with independent director-firm-year of 28,365 observations over the time series of 2001 to 2013. Using random effects logistic estimation, we find that independent director¡¯s shared directorship experience with the CEO increases their chances to remain, while the shared C-suite experience reduces this chance. Our results indicate that social ties have two faces, thus emphasize that corporate governance studies should put emphasis in the positive and negative social exchange consequences between the CEO and directors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]